Category Archives: Full Disclosure

Minor Traffic Issue Allegedly Ends With Cop Pointing Gun At Head

Well, Fairview Heights Police have again illustrated their propensity for aggressiona and violence when they chase down a family in their vehicle before dragging them out and putting guns to their heads. This is not so far removed from what happened to me on Feb. 17th, 2009 when I too was pulled over and had a gun drawn on me. The difference is, I was beaten‚ and Tasered as well. That story can be found here.

Here is the story as reported by Fox2Now.com in St. Louis, Mo. Visit their site to also see a video of their interview with the Sims’.

http://fox2now.com/2012/03/12/minor-traffic-issue-allegedly-ends-with-cop-pointing-gun-at-head/

BELLEVILLE, IL (KTVI)- A Belleville family wants answers‚  after they say an undercover police officer crossed the line during a traffic stop.

The family says undercover officer pointed a gun at their heads while a four year old watched in the back seat.

The Sims family says they were headed from Fairview Heights to Belleville last Wednesday evening when their four year old accidentally tossed an ash tray out of the window.

Moments later, they say a man in a Cadillac Escalade tried to run them off the road.
They thought it was road rage, but it was an undercover officer who they say was out of control.

Adriana Sims, 18, said, ‚“When he was chasing us I was thinking it`s road rage and I tried to get somewhere in the light where there are people.‚

Adriana Sims was behind the wheel driving her parents GMC Envoy.
Her sister, older brother and his four year‚ old daughter are in the car. They are scared.

Arthur Sims Jr. said, ‚“Being the older brother I said it`s road rage don`t stop until we get to a lighted area.. We rode for while and finally when we saw some other cars he turned on the lights.‚

But even then. they say they had no idea the man behind the wheel was an undercover officer.

‚“My main concern is my baby was sitting right next to me he would get behind us and rev the engine,‚ said Arthur.

The intersection at Lebonnon Ave in Belleville is where the situation allegedly escalated.
The Sims say the officer jumped out of his car, put a gun to their heads and slammed them on the ground while the four year old watched.

‚“First the gun was to my head and then to my back as we were walking. All I‚  could think about was if he would slip that bullet was going through me,‚ said Arthur.

As other Fairview Heights police officers started to show up the Sims thought the situation would improve.

‚“When I saw them I was thinking maybe they are going to help but they helped him and everything he was doing,‚ said Adriana.

Fairview Heights police say the undercover officer is assigned to the narcotics task force.
In a written statement, they say the officer pursued the Sims after they yelled curse words and threw something out the window that hit his unmarked car.

‚“I felt helpless it was all because an ash tray fell out if anything give me a littering ticket,‚ said Arthur.

Arthur says his four year old now has nightmares. He says the officer could have handled the situation differently.

‚“It was embarrassing. My daughter was right there,‚ said Arthur.

‚“He didn`t jump out with a badge. He just jumped out with a gun,‚ said Adriana.

Adriana Sims was ticketed for not having her insurance card and drivers license and failing to stop for an emergency vehicle.

Arthur Sims was taken‚ to Fairview Heights jail for disorderly conduct and was released when his parents arrived.

The Sims say the are filing a complaint.

Fairview Heights police say they have initiated an internal review.

Below is the statement from police:

Fairview Press Release on Sims Incident

I will quote from the Press Release, and address disparities between what Fairview Heights Police say should be done in trying to bring criminal charges against police, and driving to a well-lit area if pulled over by an unmarked vehicle.

“On Thursday, March 8, 2012, Arthur Sims Jr., and Adriana Sims came to the Fairview Heights Police Department to file a complaint against the Fairview Heights Police officer. After briefly explaining their version of the events, theey‚ were informed that state law requires they provide a sworn affidavit as to their complaint. They were provided the necessary paperwork, but they refused to provide a sworn affidavit. As of Monday, March 12, 2012, they have not returned and no formal complaint has been filed.

The Fairview Heights Police Department holds all its officers to high ethical and professional standards. Although the formal investigation process legally requires the signed affidavit, we recognoze and are aware of the incident and complaint. We have initiated our internal review process and await further information and a sworn affidavit from the Sims.

We recognize the presence of emergency lights in an unmarked vehicle does not provide complete assurance the vehicle is actually an authorized police vehicle. Drivers are reminded when they have doubt, they should continue driving to a well-lit populated location before stopping. In addition, they should call 911 whenever possible while driving to determine the validity of the stop.”

‚ Now, as for the first paragraph regarding sworn affidavits; I have provided the same to officials in St. Clair County, only to have them mis-handled and filed as a civil complaint by the then Circuit Clerk, Brendan Kelly.

http://marcmkkoy.com/2010/08/20/corruption-in-st-clair-county-illinois-officials-refuse-to-prosecute-police-for-misconduct/

Mr. Kelly had the case assigned to his judicial lackey, Brian Babka, who very adroitly disposed of the case upon being met with my motion proving that associate judges had a duty under the Illinois Constitution to hear criminal complaints.

http://marcmkkoy.com/mark/FHPD/Criminal%20Complaints%20against%20Alemond%20and%20Nyman.pdf

http://marcmkkoy.com/2011/06/26/judge-brian-babka-dodges-the-issue-of-issuing-arrest-warrants-against-police-case-10-mr-212-is-dismissed/

With regard to the last paragraph regarding driving when you can’t identify the vehicle as being an official police vehicle, I did the same thing when pulled over at 2am and could not tell if the car was marked or the driver in uniform. I proceeded to drive to a lit area and was beaten, as well as charged with fleeing and eluding. Even though I could not identify the vehicle with lights on as a police vehicle due to it being dark and lights shining in my eyes, I drove to a lighted street, was ordered from my vehicle at gunpoint, beaten and Tasered.

I hope to speak with the Sims’ soon and get more information on their case.

Judge Brian Babka Dodges the Issue of Issuing Arrest Warrants Against Police. Case 10-MR-212 is Dismissed…..for now….

I must admit that I may have been Pollyanna in assuming a judicial officer in St. Clair County, Illinois would faithfully execute the duties of his office. I received word, through a judicial order, on 6/25/11, that a case I was hoping would afford an unbiased and fair examination of the facts was officially dismissed.

BACKGROUND

Upon my persistence in bringing sworn criminal complaints before a court, where the State’s Attorney and police agencies had refused to act due to the charges involving crimes by police officers, I was met at the Circuit Clerk’s Office in St. Clair County, Illinois by Brendan Kelly, the then Clerk of the Circuit Court. On June 17, 2010, I was at the Circuit Clerk’s office making another attempt at filing criminal complaints against Fairview Heights, Illinois police officers Joshua Alemond and Aaron Nyman. I was acting under the direction of Judge Randall Kelly, who imparted to me that a private individual can bring a complaint for a violation of law. Footnote 1 The clerks refused to file my complaints, stating they were unfamiliar with any filing that would address criminal complaints. Upon my insistence, they directed the matter to Brendan Kelly, the Clerk of the Circuit Court, who personally came into the hallway in front of the clerk’s office to meet with me. I explained the situation to him and he then offered to personally take the complaints and determine the best way to address them and to file them, if such action was within his power to do so.  Footnote 2

Mr. Kelly and I communicated over email and voice mail over a week or so. In Mr. Kelly’s email, he make reference to “package of information which you describe as felonies was also similarly file stamped- on August 16, 2010”. What is curious is how this information made it into the file, since I did not deliver to the Clerk any pleadings or documents which needed to be filed. The “package of information” to which Mr. Kelly refers relates to a letter which I sent to Robert Haida, State’s Attorney, John Baricevic, Chief Judge, and Mr. Kelly, Clerk of the Circuit Court. Footnote 3 As a result, Case 10-MR-212, was born. Within that case, are sworn criminal complaints which were delivered to Brendan Kelly on June 17, 2010 and “information” received by him by way of a letter on August 16, 2010. There has been no communication from either the State’s Attorney or Chief Judge in the matter. Something else to consider, as there are fees for every filing with the Circuit Clerk, in this case, a Miscellaneous Remedy, the fee is $246. There was no filing fee tendered by me, or anyone else to my knowledge, and how this case came into existence without a fee being remitted is a question for Mr. Brendan Kelly. Was this an abuse of his discretion and violation of law for allowing a case to be filed without the proper fee and secondly, filing a case of his own volition in another party’s name? Footnote 4

Subsequent to Case 10-MR-212 being created on June 17, 2010, it took until December 7, 2010 for a judge to be assigned by Chief Judge John Baricevic. The assignment fell on Judge Brian Babka of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit. I appeared on February 24, 2011 before Judge Brian Babka. At that initial hearing,  Judge Brian Babka expressed his bemusement about the file contents, which were the criminal complaints filed by Brendan Kelly, being before him in a miscellaneous remedy court. I likewise expressed confusion and explained to Judge Babka that it was not I who filed the case, nor remitted a filing fee. I explained it was Mr. Kelly who acted on my behalf. Judge Babka proceeded to engage me as to what I hoped to achieve and I explained that I believed it was possible to bring charges to a court without the aid of police of the State’s Attorney. When asked by what authority I came to hold such belief I provided the citation for Lindquist v. Friedmans, Inc. Footnote 5 Babka said he would take the case under advisement and review the cited case, following up with a subsequent hearing.

I appeared again before Judge Babka on May 12, 2011. He was cordial and friendly. He told me that the Lidquist case was still good law, but dwelled on the courts use of the word “magistrate” since that case was from 1937. He said that he did not believe there were any “magistrates” to present complaints to and therefore the law, albeit still good, had been rendered moot by the elimination of magistrates. Footnote 5 He said that I may want to channel my energies in other directions rather than going down “blind alleys” in pursuing criminal complaints. He recommended, instead, pursuing civil remedies. He said that the law has become too “automated”, and the process for bringing charges now rests with the State’s Attorney or police. I respectfully disagreed and said that I do  not believe the clear language of the statute would allude to the remedy I sought to only be neutered by the removal of a judicial officer required for carrying it into effect. He said he would keep the case open and set it for another status in a year, but if I found anything to further support my claim or otherwise clarify the “magistrate” issue, I could present it to the court for his review.

DISCUSSION

On June 13, 2011, I filed a Memorandum of Law for Case 10-MR-212, in response to Judge Babka’s interpretation of Lindquist and his acknowledgement of that case not having been overturned by any subsequent Illinois Appellate decision; and in that Memorandum I requested a hearing on the issues therein raised.  Footnote 6 Not only did I further clarify the issue raised by Lindquist regarding the fate of former magistrates, who merely were renamed to “associate judges” under the Illinois Constitution of 1970 and who still retain the power to issue warrants of arrest, I elaborated on the right of an individual to bring charges without the aid of police or State’s Attorney, not resting the entire argument upon Lindquist, but citing other authorities as well. Footnote 6

On June 25, 2011, I received an Order from Judge Babka which was entered on June 20, 2011, in response to my Memorandum and essentially dismissing the case. Footnote 7 In his Order, Babka does not address any of the issues presented, aside from the holding in Lindquist as being a case from 1937, which he said was still good law, and attempting to distinguish that holding with one from People Ex Rel. Daley v. Moran, 94Ill. 2d 41, 445N.E. 2d, 67, Ill. Dec 790. Footnote 8 I contend that the Daley case is not on point for purposes of my argument. I do aver, in my Memorandum, that the State’s Attorney has sole discretion in whether to prosecute, but prosecution and arrest are two different matters. Footnote 9 Within the separation of powers doctrine, only the judiciary has the power to issue warrants of arrest, and the State’s Attorney has the power to pursue prosecution. Footnote 10

Reviewing the Daley case, it seems a judge attempted to direct a State’s Attorney to file an information relating to an offense, to which the State’s Attorney refused and the court pursued the filing of an information itself, and the State’s Attorney responded with a writ of mandamus expunging the court’s order of the information. What distinguishes Daley from Lindquist is that in Daley the issue of arrest is not in controversy. The defendants in Daley were involved in possible plea negotiations over a charge of aggravated battery, and had already been arrested through a complaint brought by the complainant, a police officer. Footnote 11 What has happened in that case is upon arrest, defendants are entitled to a preliminary examination for determining if probable cause exists, and if so, to be held to answer and post bail. Footnote 12 Of course, for this to take place, the defendant must first be arrested, and whether or not a prosecutor proceeds with or declines prosecution, there must first be a warrant issued for the court to ever acquire jurisdiction, which requires a complaint, information, or indictment. Footnote 13 In Daley, the defendants had been charged by complaint and then engaged in plea negotiations. At that point, the State’s Attorney has discretion in how to proceed with prosecution. In Daley, the court attempted to intervene in that discretion, which prompted the writ of mandamus. In my case, I am attempting to have the officers arrested in order to answer the charge. At that point, the parallel between my case and Daley may be drawn since there would then be an arrest initiated by a judicial officer who then hands the prosecution of the offense to the State’s Attorney. With that in mind, the Order entered by Babka, by his reliance upon Daley, is without merit and off-point for the purposes of having warrants of arrest issued as opposed to prosecutorial discretion.

CONCLUSION

What I have now to consider is, which method do I employ to press this issue? I am considering a motion to reconsider Babka’s Order based on the foregoing, as well as a preemptive letter to the Attorney General. Given the inarticulate and imprecise response from St. Clair County judges to-date, I must also consider a Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the Illinois Supreme Court. Honestly, I question whatever satisfaction this endeavor may afford, even if the officers are arrested and held to answer the charges, reasonably presuming Brendan Kelly will exercise his “prosecutorial discretion” and dismiss the charges. Then again, this is not about prevailing in any prosecution, but rather addressing the fundamental question, viz., are individuals bound exclusively to the whim and whimsy of police and prosecutors when seeking justice, or has the avenue to the judiciary for such matters been completely delegated to the administrative branch? If the State’s Attorney has sole discretion in the bringing of charges, then he holds the power of guilt or no guilt as well for there can be no finding of guilt without prosecution; and without the ability to have the accused answer the charges, we are bound to suffer assault by those with impunity and no fear of retaliation under law should they carry favor with those who wield that power, or refuse to wield it, capriciously.

UPDATE 7/7/11

I will be filing my Motion to Reconsider and Motion for Mandatory Judicial Notice today.

http://markmccoy.com/wp/2011/07/07/motion-to-reconsider-courts-dismissal-of-case-10-mr-212-absent-a-review-of-all-authorities-cited-in-plaintiff%E2%80%99s-memorandum-of-law/

http://markmccoy.com/wp/2011/07/07/motion-for-mandatory-judicial-notice-in-support-of-petitioner%E2%80%99s-motion-to-reconsider/

 

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Footnote 1. Report of Proceedings, Sept. 20, 2009 in the case of People v. Mark McCoy, Randall Kelly presiding, discussion on pages 5 – 6. http://markmccoy.com/Record%20of%20Proceedings%209-30-09%20Second%20Appearance.pdf

 

Footnote 2. Excerpt from email on Thu, 26 Aug 2010 10:39:07 from Brendan Kelly. http://markmccoy.com/wp/2010/09/20/email-tete-a-tete-between-myself-and-brendan-kelly-circuit-clerk-of-st-clair-county/

Mr. McCoy:

The original complaints which you describe as misdemeanors were filed with this office and received a “file stamp” on the date which you filed them- June 17, 2010.  When these documents received a case type assignment and placed into an actual file folder is not relevant to the issue of statute of limitations and does not deprive you of any relief at least in that regard.  Again, the “file stamp” date of June 17, 2010 is the relevant date for those documents- the very day you filed them here.

Since those documents were received and file stamped by a deputized clerk of the court, and since the more recent package of information which you describe as felonies was also similarly file stamped- on August 16, 2010- a record of some type had to be created. That is legal obligation as the Clerk of the Court.  As a matter of course, criminal charges of any type either felony or misdemeanor are initiated by the State’s Attorney or grand jury in our case management system.  Since the documents you filed with my office were not filed by either entity, and because some record was required, those filings were assigned case number 10-MR-212.  MR stands for “miscellaneous remedy.”  A wide variety of legal issues fall into that category and is often the case type used when it may not be clear where a party’s pleadings need to go.  In some circumstances, legal issues in an MR case are later assigned a different case type once the court has made a determination where they belong.

 

Footnote 3. This “package of information” was sent via US Mail, Return Receipt Requested, to Mr. Kelly, Mr. Baricevic, and Mr. Haida. I do not see anywhere in that letter where I express any intent for Mr. Kelly to take the contents and add them to an existing case file that likewise was never filed or authorized by me. http://markmccoy.com/wp/2010/08/20/corruption-in-st-clair-county-illinois-officials-refuse-to-prosecute-police-for-misconduct/

Copy of letter regarding Official Misconduct to Officials

Return receipts for letter of official misconduct

 

Footnote 4. The required fee for a Miscellaneous Remedy case, as specified in the Circuit Clerk’s website http://www.circuitclerk.co.st-clair.il.us/NR/rdonlyres/22141ED7-BD4F-4312-BA2A-A34A0584FDFA/0/FeeBook10122010.pdf

This schedule of fees is designed primarily to give you an outline of the fees that are required in civil and criminal cases.  The fees are established by the Illinois General Assembly and the Circuit Court Clerk is mandated to collect them.  The fees of the St. Clair County Circuit Court Clerk are set forth in the 705 ILCS 105/27.1a and set by resolution of the County Board of St. Clair County in order to continue in effect.
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW    MR      FILING FEE   $246.00 ANSWER FEE   $146.00

 

Footnote 5. Discussion on the matter found at http://markmccoy.com/wp/2011/06/06/memorandum-of-law-regarding-private-individual-making-criminal-complaint-and-the-former-office-of-magistrate-in-illinois/

Petitioner has appeared twice before the Honorable Brian Babka in response to this case. In the first appearance, Petitioner made his case for bringing criminal complaints against officers Alemond and Nyman. He presented Judge Babka with a the case of Lindquist v. Friedman’s, Inc. 366 Ill. 232, 8 N.E.2d 625 upon which he relied for bringing charges without the assistance or intervention of a police agency or state’s attorney. Judge Babka reviewed the provided case and met again with the Petitioner in a subsequent status hearing. During that hearing, Judge Babka confirmed the holding in Lindquist as having not been overturned in any subsequent Illinois Appellate Opinions. That case did provide for a private individual bringing a criminal complaint before a “magistrate”.  Judge Babka was unclear on the applicability of the word “magistrate” regarding any judicial officers presently serving, stating that the word appears to apply only to cases of antiquity where such officers were hearing complaints brought before them for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest. Although the law is still “good law”, it appears the avenue for presentment has changed over time with the elimination of the position of magistrates, therefore rendering this procedure ineffective. The State, appeared to, for some reason, have done away with the position of magistrate and instead instituted procedures for individuals wrestling with such issues to bring their complaints before police agencies or State’s Attorneys.

 

Footnote 6.      Statutory authority: 725 ILCS 5/111‑3725 ILCS 5/107‑9725 ILCS 5/102 8725 ILCS 5/107-7725 ILCS 5/102‑10725 ILCS 5/102‑13 Appellate Opinions: Lindquist v. Friedman’s, Inc. 366 Ill. 232, 8 N.E.2d 625 – Village of Willowbrook v. Miller, App.1966, 72 Ill.App.2d 30, 217 N.E.2d 809, People v. Siex, App.1942, 39 N.E.2d 84, 312 Ill.App. 657 – People v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,1925, 238 Ill.App. 112 – Kindred v. Stitt 51 Ill. 401, 1869 WL 5352 (Ill.) – Enright v. Gibson 219 Ill. 550, 76 N.E. 689 – People v. Parker, 374 Ill. 524, N.E.2d 11 – People v. Hooper, 1989, 142 Ill.Dec. 93, 133 Ill.2d 469, 552 N.E.2d 684, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 284, 498 U.S. 911, 112 L.Ed.2d 239 – People v. Krumery, App.1966, 74 Ill.App.2d 298, 220 N.E.2d 241 – 280 Ill. at 166, 117 N.E. at 434 – People ex rel. v. Leinecke, 290 Ill. 560, 125 N.E. 513; People v. Clark, 280 Ill. 160, 117 N.E. 432; Housh v. People, 75 Ill. 487  Secondary Authority: “Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, Daily Journals – December 8, 1969 – September 3, 1970.”


Footnote 7. Case 10-MR-75 case dismissal by Babka

 

Footnote 8. People Ex Rel. Daley v. Moran, 94Ill. 2d 41, 445N.E. 2d, 67, Ill. Dec 790

http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?xmldoc=198313594Ill2d41_1132.xml&docbase=CSLWAR1-1950-1985

http://il.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.%5CSAC%5CIL%5C1983%5C19830104_0000003.IL.htm/qx

 

Footnote 9. http://markmccoy.com/wp/2011/06/06/memorandum-of-law-regarding-private-individual-making-criminal-complaint-and-the-former-office-of-magistrate-in-illinois/

Judge Babka did make clear that the State’s Attorney has ultimate discretion to proceed with the prosecution of criminal offenses, yet the Petitioner maintained that before that discretion may be exercised he still has a right to have charges presented before the State’s Attorney can decline any prosecution. The Petitioner merely wishes to present his complaints before a person authorized by law to hear said complaints and act upon such information, upon a finding of probable cause, and issue warrants for the arrest of said persons so accused. At that point, the ministerial duty of the judicial official is satisfied and the procedural duties thereby shift to the State’s Attorney.

 

Footnote 10. http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?xmldoc=198313594Ill2d41_1132.xml&docbase=CSLWAR1-1950-1985

people-ex-rel-daley-v-moran2372

It is a familiar and firmly established principle that the State’s Attorney, as a member of the executive branch of government, is vested with exclusive discretion in the initiation and management of a criminal prosecution. (People ex rel. Davis v. Vazquez (1982), 92 Ill.2d 132, 150; People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins (1979), 77 Ill.2d 531, 539; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 14, par. 5.) That discretion includes the decision whether to prosecute at all, as well as to choose which of several charges shall be brought. (People v. Pankey (1983), 94 Ill.2d 12, 16; People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins (1979), 77 Ill.2d 531, 539.) The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 111-2(a)) provides that “[a]ll prosecutions of felonies shall be by information or by indictment,” and that “[n]o prosecution may be pursued by information unless a preliminary hearing has been held or waived in accordance with Section 109-3 and at that hearing probable cause to believe the defendant committed an offense was found.” An information, of course, is a formal presentation of a criminal charge against a defendant by the People’s representative: the State’s Attorney. (People v. Gahagan (1938), 368 Ill. 475, 478; Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 111-1, Committee Comments, at 321 (Smith-Hurd 1980).) It “shall be signed by the State’s Attorney and sworn to by him or another.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 111-3(b).) No authority is cited and we have found none authorizing a trial judge to order the State to file an information, or to file that charge on the court’s own motion upon the State’s Attorney’s refusal to do so.We consider such action by a trial judge to be an impermissible exercise by the judicial branch of powers belonging exclusively to the executive and in direct contravention of the applicable statutory mandates. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, sec. 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 14, par. 5; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 111.) A trial judge cannot, consistent with the constitutional principle of separation of powers, assume the role of prosecutor and determine which criminal offense shall be charged and thereafter proceed with disposition of that offense over the State’s objection, and the court had no authority to direct that the information be filed and then accept the guilty pleas thereto. (People ex rel. Elliott v. Covelli)

 

Footnote 11. THE PEOPLE EX REL. RICHARD M. DALEY 94 Ill.2d 41, 445 N.E.2d 270, 1983.IL.

On June 27, 1982, Johnnie and Charles Wilson were charged in a complaint for preliminary examination with aggravated battery. They allegedly struck a police officer in the head and upper body with a car jack. On July 9, the Wilsons appeared before respondent with their attorney. The complaining witness, Officer Willie Cochran, and an assistant State’s Attorney were also present.

 

Footnote 12. 725 ILCS 5/109‑3Sec. 109‑3.  http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs4.asp?DocName=072500050HArt%2E+109&ActID=1966&ChapterID=54&SeqStart=15000000&SeqEnd=15600000

Preliminary examination.) (a) The judge shall hold the defendant to answer to the court having jurisdiction of the offense if from the evidence it appears there is probable cause to believe an offense has been committed by the defendant, as provided in Section 109‑3.1 of this Code, if the offense is a felony.

 

Footnote 13. http://markmccoy.com/wp/2011/04/30/how-the-state-of-illinois-commits-fraud-when-charging-an-offense/

This section of the Constitution has been many times construed by this court, and it has been uniformly held that no person may be arrested and held to answer a charge of crime other than on asworn complaint before a judge or justice of the peace, or an indictment returned by a grand jury duly sworn and impaneled, or by presentment of not less than two members of such grand jury, or by verified information of the state’s attorney or Attorney General in certain cases.People ex rel. v. Leinecke, 290 Ill. 560, 125 N.E. 513;People v. Clark, 280 Ill. 160, 117 N.E. 432;Housh v. People, 75 Ill. 487; also, Smith-Hurd Rev.St.1931, c. 38, ss 662, 664, 711, 721. The only exceptions to these requirements arise in cases where the arrest or seizure is made by an officer in whose presence the crime is committed or who has reasonable ground for believing that the person arrested was implicated in the commission of a crime.People v. Caruso, 339 Ill. 258, 171 N.E. 128;People v. Swift, 319 Ill. 359, 150 N.E. 263;Lynn v. People, 170 Ill. 527, 48 N.E. 964;North v. People, 139 Ill. 81, 28 N.E. 966),

The only other instance where an arrest or seizure is at all justifiable is where an offense is committed in the presence of the officer or person making the arrest, And in such case there must be a sworn complaint or indictment before trial to set the machinery of the law in motion.’ (Emphasis supplied.) 280 Ill. at 166, 117 N.E. at 434.

The only exceptions to these requirements arise in cases where the arrest or seizure is made by an officer in whose presence the crime is committed or who has reasonable ground for believing that the person arrested was implicated in the commission of a crime. ( People v. Caruso, 339 Ill. 258, 171 N.E. 128;People v. Swift, 319 Ill. 359, 150 N.E. 263;Lynn v. People, 170 Ill. 527, 48 N.E. 964;North v. People, 139 Ill. 81, 28 N.E. 966), And even then a sworn complaint or indictment must follow before the court can take jurisdiction.’

Arrest by warrant is unlawful until complaint charging crime has been filedHoush v. People, 1874, 75 Ill. 487.

 

Other Articles germane to this article:

http://markmccoy.com/wp/2011/01/07/in-the-beginning-a-preface-to-this-subject/
http://markmccoy.com/wp/2010/08/20/corruption-in-st-clair-county-illinois-officials-refuse-to-prosecute-police-for-misconduct/
http://markmccoy.com/wp/2011/03/28/my-pursuit-of-criminal-charges-against-fairview-heights-police-for-beating-me/
http://markmccoy.com/wp/2010/09/20/email-tete-a-tete-between-myself-and-brendan-kelly-circuit-clerk-of-st-clair-county/
http://markmccoy.com/wp/2011/04/13/an-open-letter-to-brendan-kelly-state%E2%80%99s-attorney/
http://markmccoy.com/wp/2011/06/06/memorandum-of-law-regarding-private-individual-making-criminal-complaint-and-the-former-office-of-magistrate-in-illinois/

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An open letter to Brendan Kelly, State's Attorney

An open letter to Brendan Kelly, State’s Attorney

Mr. Kelly, you know of me. We have met face-to-face and communicated over phone calls and email. I have published our dealings on my website, www.marcmkkoy.com. You likewise know that I have been making claims of criminal acts committed by Fairview Heights Policemen, Joshua Alemond and Aaron Nyman. We met when you were acting as Circuit Clerk, and at that time you became aware of my allegations of criminal acts committed by these officers.

Mr. Kelly, I also know that your office is in possession of video evidence of the alleged criminal acts. You possess falsified and perjured reports from these officers, as well as video from the dashboard cameras from their patrol cars. The video shows one of the officers approaching me while on my knees at gunpoint, fully compliant and passive, and then being laid on the ground then beaten and Tasered, unprovoked. The ensuing reports which fabricated charges contradict the video evidence and give rise to perjury and falsifying charges.

Yet, Mr. Kelly, men such as you and these officers invoke what you call, ‚“the law‚, and selectively assail and prosecute what is convenient. The State was determined in pursuing charges against me, all of which were dismissed. Where is the same level of commitment in prosecuting police who break the law?

Tell me, Mr. Kelly, why do you not review the evidence? Why do you not accept my complaints? Where is so-called justice? I think we both know.

Mr. Kelly, let me introduce ‚ you to some Appellate Court opinions that you may be familiar with, and if not, should acquaint yourself with.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

The People, ex rel. James M. Mahoney, State’s Attorney,

v.

Decatur, Springfield & St. Louis Railway Company, et al.

1905.

120 Ill.App. 229, 1905 WL 1987 (Ill.App. 3 Dist.)

This is an information or bill in chancery, in the name of the People of the State of Illinois, filed by James M. Mahoney, state’s attorney of Macoupin county, praying that appellees may be perpetually enjoined from entering upon any portion of West street in Carlinville, a city incorporated under the general incorporation law of Illinois, for the purpose of constructing a railroad, and from constructing such railroad in or upon said street. Upon a hearing upon the merits, the Circuit Court entered a decree dismissing the bill for want of equity, from which the complainant appeals.

Appellees were engaged in building an electric railroad from the city of Springfield to and through the city of Carlinville, and desired to obtain the right to lay down railroad tracks in and upon West street, in said city of Carlinville.

Pursuant to the statute enumerating the powers of city councils, which provides that a city council shall have no power to grant the use of, or the right to, lay down any railroad tracks, in any street of the city, to any railroad company, except upon the petition of the owners of the land representing more than one-half of the frontage of the street, or so much thereof as is sought to be used for railroad purposes (Rev. Stat. 1903), certain persons professing to own property having a frontage of 8,200.5 feet upon said West street (the total frontage upon said street being 13,364.84 feet) on July 30, 1903, filed with the city clerk of said city a petition asking the city council to adopt an ordinance granting such right to appellees. On August 17, 1903, a number of those who had signed such original petition, and who represented 1,716 feet of frontage, filed with the city clerk an instrument in writing, which was on the same day presented and read to a meeting of the city council, by which they sought to withdraw their signatures from the original petition, and protesting that by reason of such withdrawal there remained no petition signed by more than one-half of the frontage of said street as required by law and therefore the council had no legal power to pass an ordinance granting such privilege. On August 21, 1903, an ordinance was duly passed by the city council authorizing appellees to construct, maintain and operate an electric railway on said West street.

It is first contended by appellees that the bill was properly dismissed for the reason that it appears that the proceeding is not bona fide for the purpose of protecting a public right shown to be threatened, but was in fact instituted to protect private owners of abutting property from a threatened injury to their property for which there is a complete remedy at law.

*2 In support of such contention affidavits were presented and filed upon the hearing, to the effect that the bill of information is contained in a wrapper indorsed with the names of the attorneys who are assisting the state’s attorney in the case; that the interlineations therein and indorsements thereon are in the handwriting of one of such attorneys, and further that the state’s attorney had theretofore stated that the bill was filed in his name because the property owners had been advised by their attorneys that they could not obtain an injunction in any way and that they had for that reason gotten him to file the bill in his own name.

Affidavits filed by appellant show that the information was prepared and filed conjointly by the state’s attorney and counsel for certain property owners who were, at the request of the state’s attorney, assisting him in the suit, and that the state’s attorney was impelled to act in the matter through the solicitation and importunity of different property holders upon West street and elsewhere in the city. We are unable to perceive how the actions of the state’s attorney can be impugned because he was thus moved to act, or that there was any impropriety in his accepting the assistance of private counsel, who were acting also for certain property owners. Any citizen has a right to call upon the state’s attorney to redress a public wrong. The fact that private rights may also be involved and that through the acts of the state’s attorney in the interests of the public, private wrongs, as well, may directly or indirectly be redressed, is immaterial. There was no impropriety in the action of the state’s attorney in requesting and accepting the assistance of such other counsel. Moreover it appears from the affidavit of the assistant state’s attorney, made in the absence of his chief from the State, that the information was filed by the state’s attorney of his own motion as the representative of the public; that he has not received and does not expect to receive any compensation whatever for his acts or services in the matter. In the case of People v. G. E. Ry. Co., 172 Ill. 129, cited by counsel for appellees, the court dismissed a similar proceeding to this for the reason that it clearly appeared from the evidence that the people were not in fact parties, that, on the contrary, the suit was instituted and prosecuted by the attorney-general at the sole instigation of a rival corporation by which he was employed and paid for his services. Nothing of the kind appears in the case at bar, and we, therefore, hold the contention in question to be unfounded and without merit.

It is further contended by appellees in support of the decree that the parties who signed the original petition asking the city council to grant the privileges sought by appellees could not afterward, and before the adoption of an ordinance, withdraw their signatures from such petition, and revoke such authority as said signatures thereto had given the council.

*3 In the case of Theurer v. The People, 211 Ill. 296, the sufficiency of an application for a license to keep a dramshop was involved. By an ordinance of the village of Hyde Park, it was necessary that a majority of the property owners within a certain prescribed territory should sign the application for such a license before the same could be granted by the mayor of the city of Chicago, to which the village had been annexed. The application there under consideration was, among others, signed by one Alister, who represented a certain number of feet frontage. It was presented to the mayor on May 29th. On June 22nd, and while the matter was under consideration and the signatures to the application were being verified, the mayor consented that the dram-shop might be opened, subject however, to the revocation of such provisional consent, if evidence should meanwhile be produced, sufficient under the law, in the judgment of the mayor, to invalidate the application. On July 22nd, following, Alister withdrew his name from the application, the effect of which was to leave the application unsupported by the requisite amount of frontage. Whereupon the mayor refused to grant the license. It was insisted by counsel for the applicant seeking the license, that the act of signing the application was an irrevocable act. The court held that Alister had a right to withdraw his consent at any time before the mayor had finally acted. See also, Kinsloe v. Pogue, 213 Ill. 302.

We are of opinion that the reasoning adopted and the conclusions reached by the court in the Theurer case and the cases there cited, and the rule thereby established, are applicable to the case at bar and are decisive of the question under consideration. That upon the withdrawal by property owners representing 1,716 feet of frontage, of their signatures to the application, there remained no such petition as is required by statute. Consequently the city council were without legal power or authority thereafter to adopt the ordinance in question and such ordinance was void and without legal force or effect.

Appellees further contend that inasmuch as the legislature has committed to the city of Carlinville, and other like municipalities, its sovereignty in respect to streets, highways and public grounds within its limits, the city of Carlinville is invested with the authority of the State in this respect and is the proper, if not the only party to maintain a bill in equity to restrain obstructions of streets within its limits; that it may, or may not, in its discretion, question appellees’ right of occupancy of West street; and further that the city having decided not to act, abutting owners can recover at law and have no other remedy.

In answer to this contention it is sufficient to reiterate that this proceeding is not by abutting property owners, but is, brought by the representative of the public, in their interest and behalf. In Doane v. Lake St. El. R. Co., 165 Ill. 510, it is said where the use of a street has not been legally authorized, an information in chancery by the attorney-general or state’s attorney on behalf of the People or a bill for injunction by the city, affords a proper and complete remedy. There is nothing in the authorities cited by counsel inconsistent with the view that a bill may be filed by either the city, the attorney-general or the state’s attorney, or that the state’s attorney may act regardless of whether the city may or may not think proper to do so. In the case under consideration, the city council has acted without legal authority or power. The theory that unless such city council chooses to stultify itself by authorizing proceedings to attach and defeat the result of such illegal action on its part the public is without remedy in the premises, is without support of reason or authority and clearly untenable.

*4 It is finally insisted that the abutting and other property owners upon whose motion the state’s attorney acted, have been guilty of such laches in denying the filing of the bill for five months, while the railroad company was acquiring and grading its right of way, and in failing to urge the application for an injunction for six months further while the company was completing its tracks up West street; that no such drastic relief as asked should be now allowed, but that they should be remitted to their action at law. The proceeding being in behalf of, and in the interests of the People, the doctrine of laches is not applicable.

‚“The attorney-general and the state’s attorney may file an information on behalf of the People where the interests of the public are involved and lapse of time constitutes no bar to such proceeding. The doctrine of estoppel does not apply to a matter in the nature of a public right, and the State is not embraced within the Statute of Limitations unless specially named, and, by analogy, does not fall within the doctrine of estoppel.‚ The People v. Burns, 212 Ill. 227.

The decree of the Circuit Court will be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to proceed in conformity with the views herein expressed.

Reversed and remanded.

 

Mitchell WARE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

C. Bernard CAREY, Ralph Berkowitz, Kenneth Gillis and Nicholas Iavarone, Defendants-Appellees.

75 Ill.App.3d 906, 394 N.E.2d 690, 31 Ill.Dec. 488

In 1973 plaintiff, Mitchell Ware, filed a complaint against C. Bernard Carey, Ralph Berkowitz, Kenneth Gillis and Nicholas Iavarone, charging defamation. After several amendments and the dismissal of various counts, plaintiff’s third amended complaint was reduced to three counts‚ (Counts I, III and X). Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on all three counts and subsequently amended that motion. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment as to Counts I and III. On January 19, 1978, the circuit court of Cook County granted summary judgment for defendants on all counts. Plaintiff appeals that order. Because of the death of defendant Berkowitz, the action has abated as to him.

At the time of the alleged defamatory publications, plaintiff was the Deputy Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department. His responsibilities included supervision of the Intelligence Division, Internal Affairs Division, Inspections Division and Vice Control Division. Defendant, C. Bernard Carey, was the Cook County State’s Attorney. The remaining defendants were assistant State’s attorneys.

Count I alleges that Carey defamed plaintiff by virtue of a press release and public statement issued on September 11, 1973. It was further alleged that Carey knowingly made these false, defamatory statements. Count III alleges that Carey defamed Ware when he knowingly made false defamatory statements on a television interview show. Count X alleges that Carey and the other defendants caused the Cook County Grand Jury to issue a letter to Chicago Police Superintendent James Rochford that defamed plaintiff. Ware also alleged that defendants acted with knowledge of the falsity of the letter’s contents. The circuit court entered summary judgment for defendants on Counts I and III, finding as a matter of law that actual malice did not exist. Summary judgment for defendants on Count X was also granted because there was no genuine issue of material fact that defendants caused the drafting or publication of the letter.

Ware appeals on all counts, contending that factual issues remain necessitating remandment for trial on the merits. We affirm on all counts. Further development of the facts pertaining to each count follows in connection with the contentions of the parties.

Count I concerns Carey’s September 11, 1973, press release, which follows in its entirety:

‚“I have called this press conference to call public attention to what appears to me a deliberate attempt by Mayor Daley and his Police Superintendent Conlisk and Mitchell Ware to cover up police corruption and downgrade the efforts being made by this Office and U.S. Attorney James Thompson to expose and prosecute the many instances of extortion, shakedown, and corruption in the Police Department.

‚“Yesterday, a story appeared in one of the Chicago newspapers in which Mitchell Ware, Deputy Superintendent of Police in charge of inspectional services stated that now the cleanup of the Police Department in Chicago has been completed. According to Ware there can be no more corruption in the Police Department because if there was he would be aware of it.

‚“This follows the recent statement by Ware’s mentor, Mayor Daley, that there is no corruption in the Police Department. The public is corrupt, not the police.

‚“Shortly before the Mayor’s astounding pronouncement his Police Superintendent James Conlisk exploded to the press his confidence in the Police Department and in fact characterized prosecution of police extortionists as a smear on the top command of his Department. These public statements seem to me to be a deliberate signal to the police that official Chicago will continue to wink at corruption.

‚“I want to go on record that nothing is further from the truth. The era of police shakedown and extortion is ending. Such practices will no longer be tolerated.

‚“My office and the U.S. Attorney’s office will continue to investigate and prosecute any illegal acts to the limit of the law. It is the height of irony that the C-5 unit which Ware credits with the miracle of completing the cleanup of police corruption in Chicago should be headed by Mayor Daley’s protege, John J. Clarke, the man who is himself under indictment in the Federal Court on 8 counts of obstruction of justice and perjury. This is one more glaring example of Mayor Daley’s contempt for the intelligence of the people of Chicago and their concern for a Police Department worthy to meet the challenge of crime.

‚“Conlisk has publicly declared his confidence in Clarke despite the federal indictment. He can see nothing wrong in keeping a man in charge of this sensitive C-5 unit whose integrity has been challenged by the Federal Grand Jury. On the other hand, he cannot contain his indignation that at long last corruption within the Department is being brought to account before the courts.

‚“This City’s Police Department faces a crisis of confidence with the public. This is not a time for officials to show weakness or avert their eyes. I call upon these officials to retract these obnoxious statements and join with me to root out police corruption.

‚“Our office has charged or convicted 19 police officers this year, while the U.S. Attorney’s Office has 61 indictments or convictions of police officers.

‚“The vast majority of police are honest. They strive to be allowed to carry out their duty to protect the safety of the community. Without public respect and cooperation, their job can become ‚ difficult and bitter. To ignore and even condone police corruption puts an extra burden on the honest cop.

‚“Mitchell Ware was appointed to clean up the Police Department when the public was crying out against obvious dishonesty, but now that the heat has cooled down, Daley, Conlisk and Ware think they can go back to the old routine of automatic whitewash.

‚“U.S. Attorney Thompson and I are determined to rid the Police Department of the extortionists and shakedown artists of whatever rank. Chicago needs and is entitled to an honest Police Department.‚

Ware alleged that these statements were reported extensively by various Chicago newspapers, wire services and local radio and television stations. He contends that according to the plain meaning of the statement, Carey accused him of protecting and covering up police corruption.

After learning about this press release, Ware made a phone call to Carey. Ware alleged in his complaint that during this phone conversation ‚“(t)he defendant Carey acknowledged and admitted the falsity of the statements complained of .‚

Ware asserts that summary judgment on Count I was improper because the depositions on file established a material issue of fact as to whether Carey published his statements with actual malice (I. e., with knowledge of the falsity of his remarks or reckless disregard of whether they were false or not).‚ ‚  Troman v. Wood (1975), 62 Ill.2d 184, 189-190, 340 N.E.2d 292.

Carey offers four responses. First, by filing a cross-motion for summary judgment on Count I, Ware conceded that no triable fact issues remained and waiver or estoppel prohibits his arguing this issue on appeal. Second, his press release is capable of an innocent construction. Third, no triable issue as to actual malice exists. Fourth, as Cook County State’s Attorney, Carey is protected by an absolute privilege from defamation actions.

We find that Carey was protected by an absolute privilege from civil defamation and need not address the remaining issues.

II.

Carey maintains that the public statement which forms the basis for Count I is protected by the absolute executive privilege recognized in Blair v. Walker (1976), 64 Ill.2d 1, 349 N.E.2d 385. Alternatively, he claims the statement is non-actionable because of the doctrine of prosecutorial (quasi-judicial) immunity as defined in Imbler v. Pachtman (1976), 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128. We agree that Blair is controlling and need not discuss quasi-judicial immunity.

In Blair, plaintiffs were allegedly libeled by press releases made by Governor Walker. The Governor stated that plaintiffs used a corporate front and legal technicalities to obtain the home of a ‚“helpless woman‚ through a foreclosure sale. He accused plaintiffs of violating real estate broker licensing laws and characterized them as ‚“unscrupulous.‚ The Governor further stated that he had instructed the Department of Registration and Education to revoke plaintiffs’ real estate licenses.

The Supreme Court held that the Governor is protected from defamation actions by an absolute privilege when issuing statements legitimately related to matters committed to his responsibility. Plaintiffs contended that since the Governor had no express authority to license real estate brokers, he had acted beyond the scope of his duty. The court reasoned that the Governor did not violate the inherent, discretionary authority of his office by informing the public of actions he had directed be instituted against plaintiffs. The Governor’s duties include supervision of the Department of Registration and Education. Department officers are his subordinates. If the Governor’s statements had been communicated to Department officials, they clearly would have been absolutely privileged. The court also believed that the Governor did not exceed the bounds of his duty in communicating this message to his constituency.

Carey asks us to extend the Blair holding to afford him an absolute privilege in this case. Two issues concern us: (1) whether absolute executive immunity granted the Governor in Blair should be applied to the State’s Attorney, and (2) if so, whether Carey acted within the scope of that immunity.

We note initially that the State’s Attorney is an executive official as his office is part of the executive branch of government. ( People v. Vaughn (1977), 49 Ill.App.3d 37, 6 Ill.Dec. 932, 363 N.E.2d 879.) Blair’s grant of absolute executive immunity was held applicable to the chief executive officer of a municipality in Loniello v.‚ ‚  Fitzgerald (1976), 42 Ill.App.3d 900, 1 Ill.Dec. 560, 356 N.E.2d 842. Statements made by a mayor during a city council meeting were within the ambit of this privilege. The Loniello court deemed it logical that a mayor, like the Governor ‚“should be able to carry out his daily responsibilities free from concern that his actions will result in civil damage suits.‚ Blair, 64 Ill.2d 1, 7, 349 N.E.2d 385, 387; see, also, Larson v. Doner (1961), 32 Ill.App.2d 471, 178 N.E.2d 399 (absolute privilege afforded mayor and city commissioners).

We are of the opinion that the policy underlying the grant of absolute immunity in Blair, Loniello and Larson is equally applicable to the instant case. Judge Learned Hand summarized the policy considerations favoring absolute immunity for government officials in Gregoire v. Biddle (2d Cir. 1939), 177 F.2d 579, 581 (Cert. denied (1950), 339 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 803, 94 L.Ed. 1363):

‚“It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and again the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later find himself hard put to satisfy a jury of his good faith.‚

[1][2] Carey is the chief law enforcement official for Cook County, Illinois. The State’s Attorney is a high ranking executive officer and an officer of the court charged with the administration of the law. ( People v. Dean (1923), 308 Ill. 74, 139 N.E. 37.) He has also been described as a ‚“ quasi-judicial‚ officer. ( People ex rel. Schreiner v. Courtney (1942), 380 Ill. 171, 43 N.E.2d 982.) We believe that his office and the social and public interests it furthers are comparable to the chief executive officials of municipalities. Accordingly, we hold that the State’s Attorney has an absolute executive privilege from liability for defamation arising from the performance of his duties.

[3][4] It remains to be considered whether Carey’s press release under the circumstances of this case concerns matters legitimately related to matters committed to his responsibility. (Blair.) Duties of the State’s Attorney are codified in Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 14, par. 5. Among others, they include the duties:

‚“(1) To commence and prosecute all actions, suits, indictments and prosecutions, civil and criminal, in the circuit court for his county, in which the people of the State or county may be concerned.

‚“(6) To attend before judges and prosecute charges of felony or misdemeanor, for which the offender is required to be recognized to appear before the circuit court, when in his power so to do.

‚“(10) To perform such other and further duties as may, from time to time, be enjoined on him by law.‚

The Illinois judiciary has added the duty to keep informed as to violations of the criminal laws ( O’Hair v. People (1889), 32 Ill.App. 277) and to investigate facts and determine whether an offense has been committed ( People v. Pohl (1964), 47 Ill.App.2d 232, 197 N.E.2d 759). The State’s Attorney has the responsibility of evaluating evidence and other pertinent factors and determining what, if any, offense may be charged. ( People v. Rhodes (1967), 38 Ill.2d 389, 231 N.E.2d 400.) In short, he has wide discretion in enforcing the criminal laws. ( Marcisz v. Marcisz (1976), 65 Ill.2d 206, 2 Ill.Dec. 310, 357 N.E.2d 477.) We interpret these Particularly principles as charging the State’s Attorney with responsibilities in criminal matters prior to any formal charging that may take place.

Standards of the American Bar Association regarding prosecution are also helpful in delineating the scope of the State’s Attorney’s responsibilities.‚ ‚  (ABA Standards, The Prosecution Function (1971).) Sections 1.1(a), (b), and 2.7 provide:

‚“1.1 The function of the prosecutor.

(a) The office of prosecutor, as the chief law enforcement official of his jurisdiction, is an agency of the executive branch of government which is charged with the duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed and enforced in order to maintain the rule of law.

(b) The prosecutor is both an administrator of justice and an advocate; he must exercise sound discretion in the performance of his functions.

‚“2.7 Relations with the police.

(a) The prosecutor should provide legal advice to the police concerning police functions and duties in criminal matters.

(b) The prosecutor should cooperate with police in providing the services of his staff to aid in training police in the performance of their function in accordance with law.‚“ (Emphasis added.)

Particularly pertinent is section 3.1(a):

‚“A prosecutor, as the chief law enforcement official of his jurisdiction, ordinarily relies on police and other investigative agencies for investigation of alleged criminal acts, but he has an affirmative responsibility to investigate suspected illegal activity when it is not adequately dealt with by other agencies.‚

Of particular interest to this case are remarks in the Introduction to these ABA standards:

‚“(T)he prosecutor is the leader of law enforcement in the community. He is expected to participate actively in marshaling society’s resources against the threat of crime. When a crisis in the enforcement of criminal law arises in the community, * * * he may be drawn into the maelstrom of political controversy by the demand that he ‚stamp out the criminals.’ He is called upon to make public statements, to propose legislative reforms, or to direct the energies of the law enforcement machinery of the community.‚ ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Compilation, p. 77 (1974). (Emphasis added.)

ABA Standards regarding police functions also are instructive (ABA Standards, The Urban Police Function, ss 1.1, 5.1, 9.3 (1973):

‚“1.1 Complexity of police task.

(a) Since police, as an agency of the criminal justice system, have a major responsibility for dealing with serious crime, efforts should continually be made to improve the capacity of police to discharge this responsibility effectively. It should also be recognized, however, that police effectiveness in dealing with crime is often largely dependent upon the effectiveness of other agencies both within and outside the criminal justice system. Those in the system must work together through liaison, cooperation, and constructive joint effort. This effort is vital to the effective operation of the police and the entire criminal justice system.

‚“5.1 Need for accountability.

Since a principal function of police is the safeguarding of democratic processes, if police fail to conform their conduct to the requirements of law, they subvert the democratic process and frustrate the achievement of a principal police function. It is for this reason that high priority must be given for ensuring that the police are made fully accountable to their police administrator and to the public for their actions.

‚“9.3 The news media.

Public understanding of the police function is heavily dependent upon the coverage given by mass media to the newsworthy events in which the police are involved. Newspaper, radio, and television**696 ***494 reporters assigned to reporting on police activities should have a sufficiently thorough understanding of the complexities of the police function to enable them to cover such events (as well as other matters that now go unreported) in a manner that promotes the public’s understanding of the police role.‚“

[5] With these principles in mind, we turn to the circumstances of the instant case.‚ ‚ Carey submitted an affidavit in support of his motion for summary judgment on Counts I and III.‚ ‚ This affidavit was not contested by motion or counter-affidavit, so its substance must be taken as true.‚ ‚  ( Heidelberger v. Jewel Companies, Inc. (1974), 57 Ill.2d 87, 92-93, 312 N.E.2d 601; Watson v. Southwest Messenger Press, Inc. (1973),12 Ill.App.3d 968, 299 N.E.2d 409.) Carey contends that his affidavit establishes an innocent construction for his press release. We do not reach this issue, but consider the affidavit solely to determine the scope of Carey’s responsibilities as Cook County State’s Attorney. In pertinent part, the affidavit reads:

‚“5. That statements which are the subject matter of Counts I and II of the Substitute Third Amended Complaint were made by me as State’s Attorney of Cook County in response to statements by the late Mayor of Chicago, Richard J. Daley, that the person that pays off a police official is responsible for police corruption and not the policeman that takes the money, and that tavern owners may lose their liquor licenses after they testify against the police officers charged with extorting the payoff; a statement by former Chicago Superintendent of Police James Conlisk publicly attacking the credibility of a police officer who testified in a police extortion trial that other police officers extorted or received payoffs from tavern owners; and the statement of plaintiff Mitchell Ware that all pockets of corruption have been removed from the Chicago Police Department.

‚“6. The aforementioned statements were made during the pendency of an extortion trial of a Chicago Police Commander and other Chicago policemen before an unsequestered jury.

‚“7. That my many years of experience as a law enforcement official and my reading of studies of official corruption led me to believe that corruption cannot be eradicated until there is an admission that it exists and that the aforementioned statements of Mayor Daley, Superintendent Conlisk and Deputy Superintendent Ware, taken together, implied that individuals who came forward to testify about police extortion and payoffs could be punished and that police officers could infer that other law enforcement officials would not be vigilant in attempting to eradicate corruption.

‚“8. That by my statements I intended to call a halt to the type of statements being made by Mayor Daley, Superintendent Conlisk and Deputy Superintendent Ware and request that we work together to eradicate corruption.

‚“9. That I believed that my statements, taken as a whole, were true and in the best public interest.‚

[6] We believe that Carey’s issuance of the press release remarks were legitimately related to his responsibilities as leader of community law enforcement and his concomitant duty to investigate police corruption. The ABA Standards charge the prosecutor with (1) the duty to insure faithful execution of the laws (s 1.1(a)); (2) providing legal advice and training concerning police functions (s 2.7); (3) an affirmative *917 responsibility to investigate suspected illegal activity when this is not adequately dealt with by the police (s 3.1(a)); and (4) maintaining liaison, cooperation and constructive joint effort with the police department to assure police effectiveness in dealing with the crime (s 1.1 of The Urban Police Function).

If that portion of the press release pertaining to Ware was communicated directly to him, rather than to the public, it undoubtedly would be absolutely privileged. Carey’s affidavit demonstrates his twofold concern over (1) the effect Ware’s statement may have had on a pending police extortion trial and Carey’s ability to prosecute future episodes of police misconduct, and (2) the need to recognize corruption exists as a prerequisite to its eradication. The communication of these concerns to Deputy Superintendent Ware was certainly consistent with the principles set forth by the ABA. It was also a proper exercise of Carey’s discretion as to the pretrial administration of criminal justice.

Following the Blair analysis, we must next decide whether Carey’s decision to inform the general public should be afforded absolute privilege. We are of the opinion that, like the Governor in Blair, Carey could, in the exercise of his discretion, communicate these remarks to the public. The ABA Standards portray the importance of public disclosure concerning the police function (ABA Standards, The Urban Police Function, s 9.3 (1973)) and the need for police accountability to the public (s 5.1). The State’s Attorney has the inherent power as the chief legal official in the county to maintain this accountability. As the Introduction to the Standards indicates ‚“(h)e is called upon to make public statements‚ and ‚“the prosecutor’s activity is in large part open to the public gaze and spotlighted by the press.‚ We cannot say Carey’s call for public accountability by Ware was outside the perimeters of the State’s Attorney’s discretion.

In Blair, the court noted that the Governor did not exceed the scope of his discretionary powers by informing the public about disciplinary actions he had directed be taken. Indeed, the effective functioning of our system of government is dependent largely upon the force of an informed public opinion as to the quality of service rendered by public officials, and free and unfettered action by the public’s representatives. ( Howlett v. Scott (1977), 69 Ill.2d 135, 144, 13 Ill.Dec. 9, 370 N.E.2d 1036.) Carey’s press release appeared to be an effort to harness the dual effectiveness of his office and public opinion to curb what he believed was an improper use of police powers by Ware. Carey’s remarks may be taken, therefore, as an official reprimand to Ware for actions that Carey believed were not in the best interest of criminal justice administration.

Ware argues, however, that the State’s Attorney’s office admitted that no prosecution or investigation of Ware was under process or even contemplated. Therefore, Carey exceeded his traditional responsibilities by accusing Ware of protecting corruption. This argument misses the point. Ware had made public statements that all pockets of corruption had been eradicated from the Chicago Police Department. Carey feared this sort of statement might have influenced an unsequestered jury in a pending federal trial. Investigation of whether Ware had made his statements with the intent of protecting corruption was not necessary since the effect of his statements might have influenced that jury. According to his affidavit, Carey acted based upon his experience in law enforcement, his studies of official corruption, and his belief that police corruption continued to exist in Chicago. At the point in time of Carey’s remarks to the press, Carey was only concerned with the veracity and effect of Ware’s statement and the appearance of impropriety by Ware. The fact that no formal investigation or charging of Ware based upon an intent to protect corruption took place does not militate against Carey’s responsibility to mitigate what he believed were damaging remarks by Ware. Accordingly, under the circumstances described above, Carey’s September 11, 1973, press release was absolutely privileged.

We need not decide if executive absolute immunity is applicable to Counts III and X, as they are affirmed for other reasons explained below.

III.

Count III of plaintiff’s complaint alleges that on September 23, 1973, Carey made the following defamatory statement during a public television appearance:

Question from Mary Jane O’Dell: ‚“Mr. Carey, I don’t understand why are you miffed with Mitchell Ware because he seems to have done something before you‚ did it . . . you say you are going to do this . . . you are planning to do this . . . but you haven’t actually done it yet. What has he done thats wrong?‚

Carey: ‚“No not at all. And if you will look back at what I have said regardless of how they have changed the tones of all this and all the silly counter charges that they have made . . . is that my only disagreement with Mitchell Ware is that I disagreed with two statements that he made. The first one indicating that all the police corruption had now been cleaned up and that he was aware of all the pockets of corruption . . . now this couldn’t be so because he hasn’t brought us all of these things that we know are still going on. Now we have worked on a cooperative basis with the C-5 Unit and they have done an excellent job in many areas . . . and I never questioned the job that they are doing. What I question are these types of public statements that are intended to delude the public into thinking that this is all over now or utilizes a signal to everyone that now you don’t have to cooperate anymore because the corruption is ended and we’re going to go back to good old times in Chicago. Those were my quarrels with Mitchell Ware . . . I also quarreled with his statement the other day that this gambling operation erradicated a three million industry when in fact the next day the operation is back in business.‚

Question from Mary Jane O’Dell: ‚“But isn’t it a fact your quarrel with him goes a little deeper than that, doesn’t it Mr. Carey, because you say that the statements he makes are not really true. Well granted that it hasn’t all been eradicated, but basically what you’re saying is that the Mayor and Superintendent Conlisk and Mr. Ware are all responsible are all responsible for protecting the syndicate. Thats what you’re really saying.‚

Carey: ‚“Oh yes, lets put that back in the proper perspective. Its a historical fact that the syndicate has operated for years in the city of Chicago and I dare anyone to try and dispute that fact and its also historical fact and its not only historical fact but its a matter of testimony in pending federal trials excluding the one thats going on now which we can’t discuss . . . but the federal trials that have gone on heretofore which indicated much corruption in high public officials including an ex-governor, including the present, at that time the present county clerk, and corruption within the police department, convictions have been had.‚

Specifically, Ware contends that Carey’s response to the second question is an allegation that Ware was responsible for protecting the syndicate. Carey asserts that summary judgment in his favor on Count III was proper based on three grounds. First, the complaint alleges only conclusions with regard to the alleged defamatory statement and does not allege actual malice. Second, the specific statement alleged was never pleaded until after the statute of limitations had expired. Third, the specific statement complained of is capable of an innocent construction which does not defame Ware.

[7] We agree with Carey’s third contention and need not address his other arguments.‚ ‚ The innocent construction rule requires that an article, passage or statement be read and construed as a whole and the words given their natural and obvious meaning.‚ ‚ Words that are allegedly libelous capable of being read innocently must be so read and declared nonactionable as a matter of law.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. (1968), 41 Ill.2d 345, 347, 243 N.E.2d 217; John v. Tribune Co. (1962), 24 Ill.2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105, Cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877, 83 S.Ct. 148, 9 L.Ed.2d 114.

[8] We are of the opinion that placed in the full context of the conversation Carey’s response is capable of an innocent construction. Mary Jane O’Dell offered two questions for Carey’s consideration. First, he was asked: ‚“But isn’t it a fact your quarrel with him goes a little deeper than that, doesn’t it Mr. Carey, because you say that‚ the statements he makes are not really true.‚ Immediately following was the query: ‚“Well granted that it hasn’t all been eradicated, but basically what you’re saying is that the Mayor and Superintendent Conlisk and Mr. Ware are all responsible are all responsible for protecting the syndicate. Thats what you’re really saying.‚ Carey’s response, ‚“Oh yes, let’s put that back in the proper perspective‚ might refer to either question. It is possible that Carey was merely quarreling with Ware’s claim that police corruption did not exist, rather than accusing Ware of protecting corruption and the syndicate. Accordingly, we are required to hold Carey’s statement is nonactionable.

The plausibility of this innocent construction is evidenced by Carey’s response to O’Dell’s previous question which is quoted above. There, she also presented Carey with a twofold question: ‚“I don’t understand why are you miffed with Mitchell Ware‚ and ‚“What has he done thats wrong?‚ Carey’s answer, ‚“No not at all‚ more probably relates to the first question and indicates he was not ‚“miffed‚ at Ware. Consistency would require his answer to O’Dell’s next question also be interpreted as sequential.

IV.

Count X of plaintiff’s complaint deals with the publication of a letter, signed by the foreman of the extended May 1975 Grand Jury, to the Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, James M. Rochford. The substance of the letter was that evidence presented during the grand jury investigation indicated that Deputy Superintendent Ware completely ignored his responsibility to supervise the activities of the Security Section of the Chicago Police Department. Ware was accused of gross neglect of his official duties which attributed to the excesses engaged in by members of the Security System. Ware alleged that the letter was written at the direction of the defendants Carey, Berkowitz, Iavarone and Gillis, and published in the news media by or with their approval.

The complaint further alleges that the scope of the investigation by the extended May 1975 Grand Jury concerned criminal acts committed by police officers from 1967 to 1970. Defendants were aware that Ware did not join the Chicago Police Department until 1972. Thus, each defendant was allegedly aware of the falsity of the letter’s contents.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was supported by the affidavits of Carey, Berkowitz, Gillis and Iavarone. Each affiant asserted that he did not cause or direct the grand jury foreman to write, sign or issue the controverted letter. Nor did affiants cause or direct their agents *921 or employees to take such action. Attached also to the motion for summary judgment were excerpts from the deposition of the grand jury foreman, Sylvester Maida. Pertinent portions of Maida’s deposition testimony explaining the composition and publication of the letter follow:

‚“Q (by Mr. Ware): Had you ever met with any of the Defendants and that would include Bernard Carey, Ralph Berkowitz, Kenneth Gillis, Nicholas Iavarone, or any of their employees before the convening of the Cook County Grand Jury?

‚“A: No.

‚“Q: Have you ever met and conversed with either of the Defendants in this cause outside the Grand Jury room?

‚“A: No.

‚“Q: When did you initially decide to write the letter?

‚“A: I guess I did write the letter but the jury did discuss some kind of letter to Rochford, and this is what they discussed and what they wanted to send.

‚“Q: Did you discuss the idea of writing the letter, the contents of this letter with anyone other than a Grand Juror outside the Grand Jury room before it was written?

‚“A: No.

‚“Q: Were you given any directions or suggestions or assistance in the composition of this letter by anyone in the State’s Attorney’s office outside the Grand Jury room?

‚“A: No, not that I can recall, no.

‚“Q: Did anyone in the State’s Attorney’s office suggest to you the writing of the 44 page report or the letter in this case outside the Grand Jury room?

‚“A: No.

‚“The Witness: I didn’t write the letter. There was some college people there that were a little in fact, towards the end of the last couple of weeks of this here, when they wrote up this recommendation, there were a couple of well, I presume they had college educations because they were rather smart, as far as I was concerned, and they kind of took over the recommendations. And there was one or two others that were kind of a little sharp on this and I kind of just sat in the background and just listened to what they were doing and went along and read it and agreed with them on what they had said and on what they decided, the recommendation of it.

‚“That’s why I said I never wrote any letters, or I don’t think I ever made my own recommendation in that 44 page report. That was all agreed by the jurors, so this is the truth and nothing but the truth.‚

During their depositions, defendants were questioned as to whether they wrote the letter to Rochford or assisted the foreman in its drafting. Defendants refused to answer on the grounds of grand jury secrecy. Therefore, defendants’ depositions are not inconsistent with their affidavits.

Plaintiff filed a response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Count X. He contended that an issue of fact remained; that defendants’ affidavits were self-serving and failed to resolve the issue of responsibility for the letter; and that defendants failed to answer pertinent questions on discovery under the guise of grand jury secrecy. In support of his response, Ware attached excerpts from the deposition of Maida, excerpts from the depositions of defendants Iavarone and Gillis and his own affidavit.

Ware’s affidavit states that defendants were aware of when he began his services as a Chicago Police Department Superintendent. Affiant further stated that each defendant knew of the existence of a gag order issued by the circuit court of Cook County pertaining to the extended May 1975 Grand Jury. Iavarone and Gillis were working under the direction of Carey and Berkowitz and reported to them on grand jury activities.

Ware also stated that the letter ‚“was delivered at the direction of the defendant Iavarone, and with knowledge and complicity on the parts of both Iavarone and Gillis (with knowledge) that it contained * * * defamatory allegations concerning (Ware).‚ Affiant attempted to identify the individuals specifically responsible for the letter but defendants chose not to answer during discovery, alleging grand jury secrecy.

Excerpts from Maida’s deposition testimony selected by Ware establish that Maida did not personally write the letter to Superintendent Rochford. In fact, Maida had little or no recollection as to the drafting, editing, typing or mailing of the letter. However, Maida did admit the possibility that the grand jury was responsible for the letter. He maintained that his involvement, if any, consisted of reading the proposed letter and signing it.

Gillis’ deposition revealed that he was familiar with the grand jury letter and report. However, Gillis was instructed by counsel not to answer questions pertaining to the grand jury letter. Gillis, therefore, offered no information as to the preparation of the letter and report.

The deposition testimony of Iavarone established that he was familiar with the letter sent to Rochford, that he knew its contents and that he had it physically delivered. The witness professed to know who wrote the letter but was instructed by counsel not to answer the question: ‚“Did you‚ write the letter?‚ Iavarone stated that Carey knew about the letter but did not know its contents until this suit was filed. He did not personally show the letter to Carey or Berkowitz. Iavarone did show the letter to Gillis, but did not know if Gillis discussed it with Carey or Berkowitz. Iavarone also testified that his secretary had typed the letter.

We find that, based on the above-mentioned affidavits and deposition excerpts, no triable issue of fact existed as to whether defendants were responsible for the publication of the grand jury letter.

[9][10] Defendants’ affidavits are neither controverted by Ware’s affidavit nor by deposition testimony. An affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment is actually a substitute for in-court testimony and should contain as much information as the affiant could competently testify to if he were sworn as a witness. ( Fooden v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities (1971), 48 Ill.2d 580, 587, 272 N.E.2d 497, Cert. denied (1972), 408 U.S. 943, 92 S.Ct. 2847, 33 L.Ed.2d 766.) Here, defendants directly contradicted the allegations of Count X in their affidavits by denying any responsibility for the drafting or publication of the grand jury letter. Where such averments of fact are not contradicted by counteraffidavit, they must be taken as true, notwithstanding the existence of contrary averments in the adverse party’s pleadings which merely purport to establish issues of fact. (Fooden.) Ware’s counteraffidavit is wholly conclusory, speculative and merely serves to restate the allegations of his complaint with reference to defendants’ responsibility for the letter. Ware states no facts indicating his personal knowledge concerning these allegations. Moreover, Ware admitted in his deposition that he had no personal knowledge regarding what transpired before the grand jury. Only defendants and Maida would have personal knowledge as to responsibility for the letter. Defendants’ affidavits denying responsibility remain uncontroverted by Ware. Maida’s explanation that other jurors may have been responsible for the letter is consistent with defendants’ affidavits. Accordingly, summary judgment for defendants as to Count X was proper.

Ware also complains that defendants’ failure to discuss the letter during deposition testimony under the guise of grand jury secrecy creates an issue of fact. Ware asserts the fact of nondisclosure in his counteraffidavit and defendants’ depositions bear this out. During deposition questioning, on advice from counsel, defendants refused to answer certain questions pertaining to the authorship, composition and delivery of the grand jury letter. Defendants’ counsel made timely objections to these questions and Ware ‚“certified‚ these questions.

We are of the opinion that this issue should have been raised in the trial court. (See Hill v. Thomas B. Jeffery Co. (1920), 292 Ill. 490, 127 N.E. 124.) Supreme Court Rule 211 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 110A, par. 211(c)(4) ) provides:

‚“Any party may, but need not, on notice and motion obtain a ruling by the court on the objections In advance of the trial.‚ (Emphasis added.)

Moreover, Rule 219, concerning refusal to answer by a deponent, provides that the proponent of the question may move for an order compelling an answer. Additional discovery options available to Ware were the possibilities of a protective order regulating discovery to prevent an unreasonable disadvantage, or oppression by defendants (Rule 201(c)(1) ); court supervision of discovery (Rule 201(c)(2) ); or discovery sanctions where appropriate (Rule 219(c), (d) ).

If Ware had attempted to implement these discovery safeguards, the issue of grand jury secrecy as a purported ground for refusal to answer deposition questions could have been litigated below. Our record, however, is silent on this issue. Since defendants have denied involvement with the grand jury letter via affidavits, we will not construe their deposition silence as inconsistent with these denials.

Construing all of the materials before the trial court in the light most favorable to the non-moving party Century Display Manufacturing‚ ‚  Corp. v. D. R. Wager Construction Co., Inc.‚ ‚ (1977), 46 Ill.App.3d 643, 4 Ill.Dec. 913, 360 N.E.2d 1346), we find no triable issue of fact as to Count X.

For all of the aforementioned reasons, the order of the circuit court of Cook County granting defendants summary judgment on Counts I, III and X is affirmed.

Affirmed.

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Terrence J. BARON, Defendant-Appellant.

130 Ill.App.2d 588, 264 N.E.2d 423

The defendant, Terrence J. Baron, was indicted for the illegal sale of hallucinogenic drugs, in violation of section 802(b) of Chapter 111 1/2 of Illinois Revised Statutes of 1969. The indictment charged that the defendant sold 220 LSD tablets on May 27, 1969, and the indictment bore number F69-41. This was a second offense and was therefore classified as a felony. The first offense against the defendant was charged in a complaint which was then pending before the same court. It bore case number M69-590, and was classified as a misdemeanor. See: Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 111 1/2, par. 804. A further and unrelated misdemeanor charge was pending against the defendant which bore number M69-591.

The defendant pled guilty to charges M69-590 and F69-41, and the State then filed a nolle prosequi to case number M69-591. The case numbered F69-41 was then set for hearing on an application for probation and for hearing in aggravation and mitigation. The court ordered the probation officer to make an investigation and report back within two weeks.

At this point in the proceeding, it was made known to the court that the guilty pleas in cases F69-41 and M69-590 had both been obtained upon a promise of probation. When it became apparent that the court was not going to be governed by the negotiated plea agreement, the defendant’s counsel immediately asked that the pleas of guilty be withdrawn in cases F69-41 and M69-590, and that the nolle prosequi, which had been entered in case M69-591, be withdrawn and the case reinstated, thus placing everything in the proceedings back at its initial status. The court denied the motion and granted probation for a period of three years, conditioned upon the first nine months thereof being served in the Illinois State Prison Farm at Vandalia.

[1] The defendant filed an extensive motion for new trial, which was denied, and he has appealed. He contends, among things, that the trial court erred in refusing‚ to permit him to withdraw his pleas of guilty. We believe that the defendant is correct in this contention.

The defendant obviously agreed to plead guilty upon the misapprehension that he would receive an unconditional probation on the felony charge of selling hallucinogenic drugs. The record permits no other conclusion. The court would not accede to such agreement, and conditioned the defendant’s probation upon the first nine months thereof being served in the Illinois State Prison Farm at Vandalia.

In The People v. Riebe, 40 Ill.2d 565 at page 568, 241 N.E.2d 313 at page 314 (1969), the court summarized the oft-repeated principles applicable to permitting the withdrawal of a plea of guilty, in these words:

‚The discretion of the trial court to permit the withdrawal of the plea of guilty is a judicial discretion which should always be exercised in favor of innocence and liberty. The law favors a trial upon the merits by jury, and all courts should so administer the law and construe the rules of practice as to secure a hearing upon the merits, if possible. The least surprise or influence causing a defendant to plead guilty when he has any defense at all should be sufficient cause to permit a change of the plea from guilty to not guilty. The withdrawal of the plea of guilty should not be denied in any case where it is evident that the ends of justice will be served by permitting the plea of not guilty in its stead.’

The Advisory Committee on the Criminal Trial of the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice with reference to Pleas of Guilty, recommends in Part II, Section 2.1, (a)(ii)(4), relating to the withdrawal of a guilty plea, that the court should allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if the defendant proves that ‚he did not receive the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by the plea agreement and the prosecuting attorney failed to seek or not to oppose these concessions as promised in the plea agreement.’ See: The People v. Walston, 38 Ill.2d 39, 43, 44, 230 N.E.2d 233 (1967).

[2] We are compelled to the conclusion that the trial judge knew of the negotiations that preceded the plea of guilty in cases numbered F69-41 and M69-590. While that judge was not the judge who entered the subsequent orders, this circumstance does not alter our view that the ends of justice require that the defendant be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty in cases numbered M69-590 and F69-41, and to substitute in lieu thereof, pleas of not guilty. We note that as to the other misdemeanor case numbered M69-591, a nolle prosequi was entered at the time the guilty pleas were entered. The record and appellant’s brief indicate*591 that this nolle prosequi was a part of the same plea agreement. Consequently, the defendant must agree to the reinstatement of that case, subject to his right to change his pleas, if he is to be permitted to alter his pleas in cases F69-41 and M69-590.

If such concession is not forthcoming, the judgment herein is to be affirmed; if such concession is made, then the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

[3][4][5] The trial judge who entered the judgment appealed from herein evidently became confused with reference to the number, charge, plea, and status of each of the three cases which were pending against the defendant. Under such circumstances, he entered an order that the felony case against the defendant, numbered F69-41 be designated a misdemeanor. Such order was beyond his power. It is the duty of the State’s Attorney in misdemeanor cases, and the State’s Attorney or Grand Jury in felony cases, to determine the charge which will be placed against a person.

Section 5 of Chapter 14 of Illinois Revised Statutes of 1969 provides that it is the duty of the State’s Attorney to commence and prosecute all criminal actions, suits and indictments. Article III of the Illinois Constitution divides the powers of the government among the legislative, executive and judicial departments, and provides that neither of these departments shall exercise powers belonging to either of the other departments.

The State’s Attorney’s office is a part of the executive branch of the government, and the powers exercised by that office are executive powers.‚ ‚ A judge or court cannot exercise the powers of the executive branch of our government.‚ ‚  People ex rel. Elliott v. Covelli, 415 Ill. 79, 88, 89, 112 N.E.2d 156 (1953). Thus, the court erred in designating the felony charge as a misdemeanor and in treating it as such. This order was void as a judicial encroachment upon the executive power of the State’s Attorney.

The other matters raised by the defendant need not be discussed in view of the position we have taken herein. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and remanded, subject to the conditions enumerated in the opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Supreme Court of the United States.

 

VOGEL, Ex’r, etc.,

v.

GRUAZ.

110 U.S. 311, 4 S.Ct. 12, 28 L.Ed. 158

This is an action on the case, brought by Timothy Gruaz, against Rudolph Bircher, to recover damages for the speaking and publishing of false, malicious, scandalous, and defamatory words, charging the plaintiff with being a thief, and with having stolen the money of the defendant, meaning the crime of larceny. The suit was commenced in a state court of Illinois, and was removed by the defendant into the circuit court of the United States for the Southern district of Illinois. At the trial before a jury a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff, June 6, 1879, for $6,000 damages. On the next day the defendant filed a motion for a new trial. On the fourteenth of June the defendant died, on the twelfth of July an order abating the case was moved for, on behalf of the defendant, and on the sixteenth of August the court overruled the motion for a new trial and the motion for an order of abatement, and entered a judgment for the plaintiff, against Bircher, for $6,000 and costs, as of June 7, 1879. The order for judgment recited that the hearing by the court of the motion for a new trial was, when it was filed, postponed to a then future and convenient day of the same term, and that the defendant died pending the hearing of the motion. Leave was given to the executor of the defendant to prepare a bill of exceptions and to take a writ of error. The bill of exceptions being signed, it was filed by the executor, and the writ of error was issued. Various errors are assigned, and among them that the circuit court did not grant the motion to abate the suit, and that it rendered a judgment against Bircher after his death. But it is unnecessary to pass on those questions, because we are of opinion that the judgment must be reversed for another error committed at the trial.

Three witnesses for the plaintiff gave evidence tending to prove the speaking to them by the defendant of more or less of the words set forth in the declaration; and afterwards C. L. Cook was sworn as a witness for the plaintiff, and testified that he was state’s attorney for Madison county, Illinois; he had a slight acquaintance with Bircher; and that he knew Gruaz. The following proceedings then occurred: ‚Question. I will ask you if you had any conversation with Dr. Bircher with regard to Gruaz, and, if so, when was it? Counsel for defense asked witness if at that time he was occupying the same position he now holds. Answer. Yes, sir. Q. It was communicated to you while you held that position and were acting in that capacity, whatever was communicated to you by Bircher? A. Yes, sir. (Defendant’s counsel object to witness testifying to matters disclosed to him by the defendant under the circumstances stated, on the ground that such communications are to be treated as privileged.) The Court. I will ask the witness if he regarded it professionally as a privileged communication? A. I had never met defendant before; he was introduced to me by a citizen of our place, and he informed me that he wanted to talk with me with regard to a matter he wanted to bring before the grand jury. (Objected to.) The Court. I will allow the witness to state what the doctor said on that occasion. Of course, if he made the communication to the witness in good faith, there would be no malice about it, and I shall instruct the jury to* disregard it. The objection is overruled. To which ruling of the court the defendant at the time excepted. A. As I stated, I had at that time no acquaintance with defendant whatever. He inquired for the state’s attorney, and was introduced to me, and he spoke of his affairs. He said he wanted to bring a matter before the grand jury in regard to Mr. Gruaz. I talked with him in regard to the nature of the matter, and he talked pretty freely in regard to it, and I directed him to the grand jury room. He said a good many things. He was evidently in earnest at the time, expressed himself very freely in regard to him. I would not like to swear to the exact words used, or that anybody used at the time. I can give the substance of what he said, I suppose. He wanted to prosecute Gruaz for stealing, was the amount of it. I recollect this: he charged him with having stolen his money, and I asked him how, and he told me how it had been done. Gruaz was his agent and handled his funds, rented his farms, and had failed to account for a large amount of money, he told me, and he charged him in this conversation with having stolen his money, and he said he wanted to know if there was any law in this state to prosecute a man for that. I have no objection to state any words. I remember his making the charge that he had stolen his money, but I can’t swear that the word ‚thief’ was used at that time; that it was in substance, undoubtedly. My impression is that this was the March term, 1878, of the circuit court of Madison county, either that or October term, 1877; my recollection and decided impression is that it was the spring term, 1878. Dr. Bircher went into the grand jury room and gave his statement to the grand jury. He was anxious, of course, to have the indictment found, and he evidently believed or so expressed himself. (Counsel for defendant objected to witness stating his opinion about what defendant evidently believed.) The Court. He said he went before the grand jury, and said he seemed to be in earnest in his movements, but he didn’t say what took place before the grand jury. Don’t know, I suppose. Witness. No, I don’t know. Cross-examination. Maj. Prickett introduced Bircher to me; never saw him before in my life. I was certain he came to see me as prosecuting attorney, in good faith. That was his business, as he stated it to me. After he made his statement to me I advised him to go before the grand jury; directed him to their room. He went there by my advice. Hold on-I don’t say that; I advised him that he had a good case. He came to me and I showed him where the grand jury room was. He stated his case to me as state’s attorney. I then directed him where to go, and said I should prosecute it as vigorously as possible, if the indictment was found. In regard to the advice I gave him, I rather encouraged him to drop the thing; I told him he better sue Mr. Gruaz first, and see if he couldn’t get judgment against him, and so put it in a better shape to prosecute him. He stated his case, and I thought from his statement that he would have few, if any, witnesses besides himself, and that it would be doubtful, however honestly he might believe, that he had cause; it would be doubtful whether the jury would bring a bill; so I advised him to bring a civil suit; but, said I, you are here, and you mustn’t think hardly of me if the grand jury don’t find a bill; and I directed him to the grand jury room.’

The bill of exceptions also contains the following: ‚In reference to the testimony of state’s attorney C. L. Cook, the court instructed the jury as folfows: ‚I admitted that evidence with an explanation, and with the explanation made in the admission of it I think I am content, and I think the jury may take it into consideration; but if they think the defendant was actuated by honest motives in making the declaration he did, they will disregard it.’ To the giving of which last instruction the defendant excepted, for the reason that the instruction ignores the element of want of probable cause, and for the reason also that the jury should have been instructed to disregard Cook’s testimony entirely.’

We are of opinion that what was said by Bircher to Mr. Cook was an absolutely privileged communication. It was said to Mr. Cook while he was state’s attorney or prosecutor of crimes for the county, and while he was acting in that capacity. Bircher inquired for the state’s attorney and was introduced to him, and stated to him that he wanted to talk with him about a matter he wanted to bring before the grand jury in regard to Gruaz. He laid the matter before Mr. Cook, and charged Gruaz with having stolen his money, and was asked how, and stated how and inquired of Mr. Cook if there was any law in Illinois by which a man could be prosecuted for that.‚  The grand jury was then in session, and Mr. Cook advised Bircher that he had a good case and directed him to the grand jury-room, and Bircher went before the grand jury. If all this had taken place between Bircher and an attorney consulted by him who did not hold the public position which Mr. Cook did, clearly, the communication would have been privileged and not to be disclosed against the objection of Bircher.‚ ‚ Under the circumstances shown, Mr. Cook was the professional adviser of Bircher, consulted by him on a statement of his case, to learn his opinion as to whether there was ground in fact and in law for making an attempt to procure an indictment against Gruaz.‚ ‚ The fact that Mr. Cook held the position of public prosecutor, and was not to be paid by Bircher for information or advice, did not destroy the relation which the law established between them.‚ ‚ It made that relation more sacred on the ground of public policy.‚  The avenue to the grand jury should always be free and unobstructed.‚ ‚ Bircher might have gone directly before it without consulting with Mr. Cook, but if he chose to consult him instead of a private counsel, there was great propriety in his doing so.‚ ‚ Any person who desires to pursue the same course should not be deterred by the fear of having what he may say in the confidence of a consultation with a professional adviser, supposed to be the best qualified for the purpose, disclosed afterwards in a civil suit against his objection.‚ ‚  Oliver v. Pate, 43 Ind. 132. By the statute of Illinois in force at the time of this occurrence, it was made the duty of each state’s attorney to ‚commence and prosecute’ all criminal actions, suits, indictments, and prosecutions in any court of record in his county, in which the people of the state or county might be concerned. (Rev. St. 1874, c. 14, ‚§ 5, subd. 1.) Under this provision it was the province and the privilege of any person who knew of facts tending to show the commission of a crime, to lay those facts before the public officer whose duty it was to commence a prosecution for the crime. Public policy will protect all such communications absolutely, and without reference to the motive or intent of the informer or the question of probable cause; the ground being that greater mischief will probably result from requiring or permitting them to be disclosed than from wholly rejecting them. Mr. Cook learned from Bircher the things to which he testified, because he occupied the position of public prosecuting officer, and because he was acting at the time as the legal adviser of Bircher in respect to the matter and question which Bircher was laying before him. The free and unembarrassed administration of justice in respect to the criminal law in which the public is concerned, is involved in a case like the present, in addition to the considerations which ordinarily apply in communications from client to counsel in matters of purely private concern. Bircher made his communication to Mr. Cook for the purpose of obtaining professional advice as to his right, and that of the public through him, to have a criminal prosecution commenced by Mr. Cook by the intervention of the grand jury against Gruaz.

But there is another view of the subject. The matter concerned the administration of penal justice, and the principle of public safety justifies and demands the rule of exclusion. In Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487, an action for maliciously and falsely representing to the treasury department of the United States that the plaintiff was intending to defraud the revenue, it was held that the defendant could not be compelled to answer whether he did not give to the department information of supposed or alleged frauds on the revenue contemplated by the plaintiff. The principle laid down in that case was, that it is the duty of every citizen to communicate to his government any information which he has of the commission of an offense against its laws; and that a court of justice will not compel or allow such information to be disclosed, either by the subordinate officer to whom it is given, by the informer himself, or by any other person, without the permission of the government, the evidence being excluded not for the protection of the witness or of the party in the particular case, but upon general grounds of public policy, because of the confidential nature of such communications. The authorities are collected and reviewed in that case. The case of Dawkins v. Rokeby, L. R. 8 Q. B. 255, there cited, was affirmed by the house of lords, L. R. 7 H. L. 744. See, also, 1 Greenl. Ev. ⤠250; Black v. Holmes, 1 Fox & Sm. 28.

It makes no difference that there was evidence of the speaking of the same words to persons other than Mr. Cook, and that the speaking of them to Mr. Cook was not the sole ground of action or of recovery. The evidence was incompetent, and it must be inferred that it affected the minds of the jury both on the main issue and on the question of damages.

It results from these views that the judgment below cannot be upheld, and that it must be reversed, and the case be remanded to the circuit court, with direction to set aside the verdict and vacate the judgment and take such further proceedings as may be according to law and not inconsistent with this opinion.

An open letter to Brendan Kelly, State’s Attorney

An open letter to Brendan Kelly, State’s Attorney

Mr. Kelly, you know of me. We have met face-to-face and communicated over phone calls and email. I have published our dealings on my website, www.markmccoy.com. You likewise know that I have been making claims of criminal acts committed by Fairview Heights Policemen, Joshua Alemond and Aaron Nyman. We met when you were acting as Circuit Clerk, and at that time you became aware of my allegations of criminal acts committed by these officers.

Mr. Kelly, I also know that your office is in possession of video evidence of the alleged criminal acts. You possess falsified and perjured reports from these officers, as well as video from the dashboard cameras from their patrol cars. The video shows one of the officers approaching me while on my knees at gunpoint, fully compliant and passive, and then being laid on the ground then beaten and Tasered, unprovoked. The ensuing reports which fabricated charges contradict the video evidence and give rise to perjury and falsifying charges.

Yet, Mr. Kelly, men such as you and these officers invoke what you call, “the law”, and selectively assail and prosecute what is convenient. The State was determined in pursuing charges against me, all of which were dismissed. Where is the same level of commitment in prosecuting police who break the law?

Tell me, Mr. Kelly, why do you not review the evidence? Why do you not accept my complaints? Where is so-called justice? I think we both know.

Mr. Kelly, let me introduce  you to some Appellate Court opinions that you may be familiar with, and if not, should acquaint yourself with.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

The People, ex rel. James M. Mahoney, State’s Attorney,

v.

Decatur, Springfield & St. Louis Railway Company, et al.

1905.

120 Ill.App. 229, 1905 WL 1987 (Ill.App. 3 Dist.)

This is an information or bill in chancery, in the name of the People of the State of Illinois, filed by James M. Mahoney, state’s attorney of Macoupin county, praying that appellees may be perpetually enjoined from entering upon any portion of West street in Carlinville, a city incorporated under the general incorporation law of Illinois, for the purpose of constructing a railroad, and from constructing such railroad in or upon said street. Upon a hearing upon the merits, the Circuit Court entered a decree dismissing the bill for want of equity, from which the complainant appeals.

Appellees were engaged in building an electric railroad from the city of Springfield to and through the city of Carlinville, and desired to obtain the right to lay down railroad tracks in and upon West street, in said city of Carlinville.

Pursuant to the statute enumerating the powers of city councils, which provides that a city council shall have no power to grant the use of, or the right to, lay down any railroad tracks, in any street of the city, to any railroad company, except upon the petition of the owners of the land representing more than one-half of the frontage of the street, or so much thereof as is sought to be used for railroad purposes (Rev. Stat. 1903), certain persons professing to own property having a frontage of 8,200.5 feet upon said West street (the total frontage upon said street being 13,364.84 feet) on July 30, 1903, filed with the city clerk of said city a petition asking the city council to adopt an ordinance granting such right to appellees. On August 17, 1903, a number of those who had signed such original petition, and who represented 1,716 feet of frontage, filed with the city clerk an instrument in writing, which was on the same day presented and read to a meeting of the city council, by which they sought to withdraw their signatures from the original petition, and protesting that by reason of such withdrawal there remained no petition signed by more than one-half of the frontage of said street as required by law and therefore the council had no legal power to pass an ordinance granting such privilege. On August 21, 1903, an ordinance was duly passed by the city council authorizing appellees to construct, maintain and operate an electric railway on said West street.

It is first contended by appellees that the bill was properly dismissed for the reason that it appears that the proceeding is not bona fide for the purpose of protecting a public right shown to be threatened, but was in fact instituted to protect private owners of abutting property from a threatened injury to their property for which there is a complete remedy at law.

*2 In support of such contention affidavits were presented and filed upon the hearing, to the effect that the bill of information is contained in a wrapper indorsed with the names of the attorneys who are assisting the state’s attorney in the case; that the interlineations therein and indorsements thereon are in the handwriting of one of such attorneys, and further that the state’s attorney had theretofore stated that the bill was filed in his name because the property owners had been advised by their attorneys that they could not obtain an injunction in any way and that they had for that reason gotten him to file the bill in his own name.

Affidavits filed by appellant show that the information was prepared and filed conjointly by the state’s attorney and counsel for certain property owners who were, at the request of the state’s attorney, assisting him in the suit, and that the state’s attorney was impelled to act in the matter through the solicitation and importunity of different property holders upon West street and elsewhere in the city. We are unable to perceive how the actions of the state’s attorney can be impugned because he was thus moved to act, or that there was any impropriety in his accepting the assistance of private counsel, who were acting also for certain property owners. Any citizen has a right to call upon the state’s attorney to redress a public wrong. The fact that private rights may also be involved and that through the acts of the state’s attorney in the interests of the public, private wrongs, as well, may directly or indirectly be redressed, is immaterial. There was no impropriety in the action of the state’s attorney in requesting and accepting the assistance of such other counsel. Moreover it appears from the affidavit of the assistant state’s attorney, made in the absence of his chief from the State, that the information was filed by the state’s attorney of his own motion as the representative of the public; that he has not received and does not expect to receive any compensation whatever for his acts or services in the matter. In the case of People v. G. E. Ry. Co., 172 Ill. 129, cited by counsel for appellees, the court dismissed a similar proceeding to this for the reason that it clearly appeared from the evidence that the people were not in fact parties, that, on the contrary, the suit was instituted and prosecuted by the attorney-general at the sole instigation of a rival corporation by which he was employed and paid for his services. Nothing of the kind appears in the case at bar, and we, therefore, hold the contention in question to be unfounded and without merit.

It is further contended by appellees in support of the decree that the parties who signed the original petition asking the city council to grant the privileges sought by appellees could not afterward, and before the adoption of an ordinance, withdraw their signatures from such petition, and revoke such authority as said signatures thereto had given the council.

*3 In the case of Theurer v. The People, 211 Ill. 296, the sufficiency of an application for a license to keep a dramshop was involved. By an ordinance of the village of Hyde Park, it was necessary that a majority of the property owners within a certain prescribed territory should sign the application for such a license before the same could be granted by the mayor of the city of Chicago, to which the village had been annexed. The application there under consideration was, among others, signed by one Alister, who represented a certain number of feet frontage. It was presented to the mayor on May 29th. On June 22nd, and while the matter was under consideration and the signatures to the application were being verified, the mayor consented that the dram-shop might be opened, subject however, to the revocation of such provisional consent, if evidence should meanwhile be produced, sufficient under the law, in the judgment of the mayor, to invalidate the application. On July 22nd, following, Alister withdrew his name from the application, the effect of which was to leave the application unsupported by the requisite amount of frontage. Whereupon the mayor refused to grant the license. It was insisted by counsel for the applicant seeking the license, that the act of signing the application was an irrevocable act. The court held that Alister had a right to withdraw his consent at any time before the mayor had finally acted. See also, Kinsloe v. Pogue, 213 Ill. 302.

We are of opinion that the reasoning adopted and the conclusions reached by the court in the Theurer case and the cases there cited, and the rule thereby established, are applicable to the case at bar and are decisive of the question under consideration. That upon the withdrawal by property owners representing 1,716 feet of frontage, of their signatures to the application, there remained no such petition as is required by statute. Consequently the city council were without legal power or authority thereafter to adopt the ordinance in question and such ordinance was void and without legal force or effect.

Appellees further contend that inasmuch as the legislature has committed to the city of Carlinville, and other like municipalities, its sovereignty in respect to streets, highways and public grounds within its limits, the city of Carlinville is invested with the authority of the State in this respect and is the proper, if not the only party to maintain a bill in equity to restrain obstructions of streets within its limits; that it may, or may not, in its discretion, question appellees’ right of occupancy of West street; and further that the city having decided not to act, abutting owners can recover at law and have no other remedy.

In answer to this contention it is sufficient to reiterate that this proceeding is not by abutting property owners, but is, brought by the representative of the public, in their interest and behalf. In Doane v. Lake St. El. R. Co., 165 Ill. 510, it is said where the use of a street has not been legally authorized, an information in chancery by the attorney-general or state’s attorney on behalf of the People or a bill for injunction by the city, affords a proper and complete remedy. There is nothing in the authorities cited by counsel inconsistent with the view that a bill may be filed by either the city, the attorney-general or the state’s attorney, or that the state’s attorney may act regardless of whether the city may or may not think proper to do so. In the case under consideration, the city council has acted without legal authority or power. The theory that unless such city council chooses to stultify itself by authorizing proceedings to attach and defeat the result of such illegal action on its part the public is without remedy in the premises, is without support of reason or authority and clearly untenable.

*4 It is finally insisted that the abutting and other property owners upon whose motion the state’s attorney acted, have been guilty of such laches in denying the filing of the bill for five months, while the railroad company was acquiring and grading its right of way, and in failing to urge the application for an injunction for six months further while the company was completing its tracks up West street; that no such drastic relief as asked should be now allowed, but that they should be remitted to their action at law. The proceeding being in behalf of, and in the interests of the People, the doctrine of laches is not applicable.

“The attorney-general and the state’s attorney may file an information on behalf of the People where the interests of the public are involved and lapse of time constitutes no bar to such proceeding. The doctrine of estoppel does not apply to a matter in the nature of a public right, and the State is not embraced within the Statute of Limitations unless specially named, and, by analogy, does not fall within the doctrine of estoppel.” The People v. Burns, 212 Ill. 227.

The decree of the Circuit Court will be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to proceed in conformity with the views herein expressed.

Reversed and remanded.

 

Mitchell WARE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

C. Bernard CAREY, Ralph Berkowitz, Kenneth Gillis and Nicholas Iavarone, Defendants-Appellees.

75 Ill.App.3d 906, 394 N.E.2d 690, 31 Ill.Dec. 488

In 1973 plaintiff, Mitchell Ware, filed a complaint against C. Bernard Carey, Ralph Berkowitz, Kenneth Gillis and Nicholas Iavarone, charging defamation. After several amendments and the dismissal of various counts, plaintiff’s third amended complaint was reduced to three counts (Counts I, III and X). Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on all three counts and subsequently amended that motion. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment as to Counts I and III. On January 19, 1978, the circuit court of Cook County granted summary judgment for defendants on all counts. Plaintiff appeals that order. Because of the death of defendant Berkowitz, the action has abated as to him.

At the time of the alleged defamatory publications, plaintiff was the Deputy Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department. His responsibilities included supervision of the Intelligence Division, Internal Affairs Division, Inspections Division and Vice Control Division. Defendant, C. Bernard Carey, was the Cook County State’s Attorney. The remaining defendants were assistant State’s attorneys.

Count I alleges that Carey defamed plaintiff by virtue of a press release and public statement issued on September 11, 1973. It was further alleged that Carey knowingly made these false, defamatory statements. Count III alleges that Carey defamed Ware when he knowingly made false defamatory statements on a television interview show. Count X alleges that Carey and the other defendants caused the Cook County Grand Jury to issue a letter to Chicago Police Superintendent James Rochford that defamed plaintiff. Ware also alleged that defendants acted with knowledge of the falsity of the letter’s contents. The circuit court entered summary judgment for defendants on Counts I and III, finding as a matter of law that actual malice did not exist. Summary judgment for defendants on Count X was also granted because there was no genuine issue of material fact that defendants caused the drafting or publication of the letter.

Ware appeals on all counts, contending that factual issues remain necessitating remandment for trial on the merits. We affirm on all counts. Further development of the facts pertaining to each count follows in connection with the contentions of the parties.

Count I concerns Carey’s September 11, 1973, press release, which follows in its entirety:

“I have called this press conference to call public attention to what appears to me a deliberate attempt by Mayor Daley and his Police Superintendent Conlisk and Mitchell Ware to cover up police corruption and downgrade the efforts being made by this Office and U.S. Attorney James Thompson to expose and prosecute the many instances of extortion, shakedown, and corruption in the Police Department.

“Yesterday, a story appeared in one of the Chicago newspapers in which Mitchell Ware, Deputy Superintendent of Police in charge of inspectional services stated that now the cleanup of the Police Department in Chicago has been completed. According to Ware there can be no more corruption in the Police Department because if there was he would be aware of it.

“This follows the recent statement by Ware’s mentor, Mayor Daley, that there is no corruption in the Police Department. The public is corrupt, not the police.

“Shortly before the Mayor’s astounding pronouncement his Police Superintendent James Conlisk exploded to the press his confidence in the Police Department and in fact characterized prosecution of police extortionists as a smear on the top command of his Department. These public statements seem to me to be a deliberate signal to the police that official Chicago will continue to wink at corruption.

“I want to go on record that nothing is further from the truth. The era of police shakedown and extortion is ending. Such practices will no longer be tolerated.

“My office and the U.S. Attorney’s office will continue to investigate and prosecute any illegal acts to the limit of the law. It is the height of irony that the C-5 unit which Ware credits with the miracle of completing the cleanup of police corruption in Chicago should be headed by Mayor Daley’s protege, John J. Clarke, the man who is himself under indictment in the Federal Court on 8 counts of obstruction of justice and perjury. This is one more glaring example of Mayor Daley’s contempt for the intelligence of the people of Chicago and their concern for a Police Department worthy to meet the challenge of crime.

“Conlisk has publicly declared his confidence in Clarke despite the federal indictment. He can see nothing wrong in keeping a man in charge of this sensitive C-5 unit whose integrity has been challenged by the Federal Grand Jury. On the other hand, he cannot contain his indignation that at long last corruption within the Department is being brought to account before the courts.

“This City’s Police Department faces a crisis of confidence with the public. This is not a time for officials to show weakness or avert their eyes. I call upon these officials to retract these obnoxious statements and join with me to root out police corruption.

“Our office has charged or convicted 19 police officers this year, while the U.S. Attorney’s Office has 61 indictments or convictions of police officers.

“The vast majority of police are honest. They strive to be allowed to carry out their duty to protect the safety of the community. Without public respect and cooperation, their job can become  difficult and bitter. To ignore and even condone police corruption puts an extra burden on the honest cop.

“Mitchell Ware was appointed to clean up the Police Department when the public was crying out against obvious dishonesty, but now that the heat has cooled down, Daley, Conlisk and Ware think they can go back to the old routine of automatic whitewash.

“U.S. Attorney Thompson and I are determined to rid the Police Department of the extortionists and shakedown artists of whatever rank. Chicago needs and is entitled to an honest Police Department.”

Ware alleged that these statements were reported extensively by various Chicago newspapers, wire services and local radio and television stations. He contends that according to the plain meaning of the statement, Carey accused him of protecting and covering up police corruption.

After learning about this press release, Ware made a phone call to Carey. Ware alleged in his complaint that during this phone conversation “(t)he defendant Carey acknowledged and admitted the falsity of the statements complained of .”

Ware asserts that summary judgment on Count I was improper because the depositions on file established a material issue of fact as to whether Carey published his statements with actual malice (I. e., with knowledge of the falsity of his remarks or reckless disregard of whether they were false or not).   Troman v. Wood (1975), 62 Ill.2d 184, 189-190, 340 N.E.2d 292.

Carey offers four responses. First, by filing a cross-motion for summary judgment on Count I, Ware conceded that no triable fact issues remained and waiver or estoppel prohibits his arguing this issue on appeal. Second, his press release is capable of an innocent construction. Third, no triable issue as to actual malice exists. Fourth, as Cook County State’s Attorney, Carey is protected by an absolute privilege from defamation actions.

We find that Carey was protected by an absolute privilege from civil defamation and need not address the remaining issues.

II.

Carey maintains that the public statement which forms the basis for Count I is protected by the absolute executive privilege recognized in Blair v. Walker (1976), 64 Ill.2d 1, 349 N.E.2d 385. Alternatively, he claims the statement is non-actionable because of the doctrine of prosecutorial (quasi-judicial) immunity as defined in Imbler v. Pachtman (1976), 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128. We agree that Blair is controlling and need not discuss quasi-judicial immunity.

In Blair, plaintiffs were allegedly libeled by press releases made by Governor Walker. The Governor stated that plaintiffs used a corporate front and legal technicalities to obtain the home of a “helpless woman” through a foreclosure sale. He accused plaintiffs of violating real estate broker licensing laws and characterized them as “unscrupulous.” The Governor further stated that he had instructed the Department of Registration and Education to revoke plaintiffs’ real estate licenses.

The Supreme Court held that the Governor is protected from defamation actions by an absolute privilege when issuing statements legitimately related to matters committed to his responsibility. Plaintiffs contended that since the Governor had no express authority to license real estate brokers, he had acted beyond the scope of his duty. The court reasoned that the Governor did not violate the inherent, discretionary authority of his office by informing the public of actions he had directed be instituted against plaintiffs. The Governor’s duties include supervision of the Department of Registration and Education. Department officers are his subordinates. If the Governor’s statements had been communicated to Department officials, they clearly would have been absolutely privileged. The court also believed that the Governor did not exceed the bounds of his duty in communicating this message to his constituency.

Carey asks us to extend the Blair holding to afford him an absolute privilege in this case. Two issues concern us: (1) whether absolute executive immunity granted the Governor in Blair should be applied to the State’s Attorney, and (2) if so, whether Carey acted within the scope of that immunity.

We note initially that the State’s Attorney is an executive official as his office is part of the executive branch of government. ( People v. Vaughn (1977), 49 Ill.App.3d 37, 6 Ill.Dec. 932, 363 N.E.2d 879.) Blair’s grant of absolute executive immunity was held applicable to the chief executive officer of a municipality in Loniello v.   Fitzgerald (1976), 42 Ill.App.3d 900, 1 Ill.Dec. 560, 356 N.E.2d 842. Statements made by a mayor during a city council meeting were within the ambit of this privilege. The Loniello court deemed it logical that a mayor, like the Governor “should be able to carry out his daily responsibilities free from concern that his actions will result in civil damage suits.” Blair, 64 Ill.2d 1, 7, 349 N.E.2d 385, 387; see, also, Larson v. Doner (1961), 32 Ill.App.2d 471, 178 N.E.2d 399 (absolute privilege afforded mayor and city commissioners).

We are of the opinion that the policy underlying the grant of absolute immunity in Blair, Loniello and Larson is equally applicable to the instant case. Judge Learned Hand summarized the policy considerations favoring absolute immunity for government officials in Gregoire v. Biddle (2d Cir. 1939), 177 F.2d 579, 581 (Cert. denied (1950), 339 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 803, 94 L.Ed. 1363):

“It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and again the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later find himself hard put to satisfy a jury of his good faith.”

[1][2] Carey is the chief law enforcement official for Cook County, Illinois. The State’s Attorney is a high ranking executive officer and an officer of the court charged with the administration of the law. ( People v. Dean (1923), 308 Ill. 74, 139 N.E. 37.) He has also been described as a “ quasi-judicial” officer. ( People ex rel. Schreiner v. Courtney (1942), 380 Ill. 171, 43 N.E.2d 982.) We believe that his office and the social and public interests it furthers are comparable to the chief executive officials of municipalities. Accordingly, we hold that the State’s Attorney has an absolute executive privilege from liability for defamation arising from the performance of his duties.

[3][4] It remains to be considered whether Carey’s press release under the circumstances of this case concerns matters legitimately related to matters committed to his responsibility. (Blair.) Duties of the State’s Attorney are codified in Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 14, par. 5. Among others, they include the duties:

“(1) To commence and prosecute all actions, suits, indictments and prosecutions, civil and criminal, in the circuit court for his county, in which the people of the State or county may be concerned.

“(6) To attend before judges and prosecute charges of felony or misdemeanor, for which the offender is required to be recognized to appear before the circuit court, when in his power so to do.

“(10) To perform such other and further duties as may, from time to time, be enjoined on him by law.”

The Illinois judiciary has added the duty to keep informed as to violations of the criminal laws ( O’Hair v. People (1889), 32 Ill.App. 277) and to investigate facts and determine whether an offense has been committed ( People v. Pohl (1964), 47 Ill.App.2d 232, 197 N.E.2d 759). The State’s Attorney has the responsibility of evaluating evidence and other pertinent factors and determining what, if any, offense may be charged. ( People v. Rhodes (1967), 38 Ill.2d 389, 231 N.E.2d 400.) In short, he has wide discretion in enforcing the criminal laws. ( Marcisz v. Marcisz (1976), 65 Ill.2d 206, 2 Ill.Dec. 310, 357 N.E.2d 477.) We interpret these Particularly principles as charging the State’s Attorney with responsibilities in criminal matters prior to any formal charging that may take place.

Standards of the American Bar Association regarding prosecution are also helpful in delineating the scope of the State’s Attorney’s responsibilities.   (ABA Standards, The Prosecution Function (1971).) Sections 1.1(a), (b), and 2.7 provide:

“1.1 The function of the prosecutor.

(a) The office of prosecutor, as the chief law enforcement official of his jurisdiction, is an agency of the executive branch of government which is charged with the duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed and enforced in order to maintain the rule of law.

(b) The prosecutor is both an administrator of justice and an advocate; he must exercise sound discretion in the performance of his functions.

“2.7 Relations with the police.

(a) The prosecutor should provide legal advice to the police concerning police functions and duties in criminal matters.

(b) The prosecutor should cooperate with police in providing the services of his staff to aid in training police in the performance of their function in accordance with law.“ (Emphasis added.)

Particularly pertinent is section 3.1(a):

“A prosecutor, as the chief law enforcement official of his jurisdiction, ordinarily relies on police and other investigative agencies for investigation of alleged criminal acts, but he has an affirmative responsibility to investigate suspected illegal activity when it is not adequately dealt with by other agencies.”

Of particular interest to this case are remarks in the Introduction to these ABA standards:

“(T)he prosecutor is the leader of law enforcement in the community. He is expected to participate actively in marshaling society’s resources against the threat of crime. When a crisis in the enforcement of criminal law arises in the community, * * * he may be drawn into the maelstrom of political controversy by the demand that he ‘stamp out the criminals.’ He is called upon to make public statements, to propose legislative reforms, or to direct the energies of the law enforcement machinery of the community.” ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Compilation, p. 77 (1974). (Emphasis added.)

ABA Standards regarding police functions also are instructive (ABA Standards, The Urban Police Function, ss 1.1, 5.1, 9.3 (1973):

“1.1 Complexity of police task.

(a) Since police, as an agency of the criminal justice system, have a major responsibility for dealing with serious crime, efforts should continually be made to improve the capacity of police to discharge this responsibility effectively. It should also be recognized, however, that police effectiveness in dealing with crime is often largely dependent upon the effectiveness of other agencies both within and outside the criminal justice system. Those in the system must work together through liaison, cooperation, and constructive joint effort. This effort is vital to the effective operation of the police and the entire criminal justice system.

“5.1 Need for accountability.

Since a principal function of police is the safeguarding of democratic processes, if police fail to conform their conduct to the requirements of law, they subvert the democratic process and frustrate the achievement of a principal police function. It is for this reason that high priority must be given for ensuring that the police are made fully accountable to their police administrator and to the public for their actions.

“9.3 The news media.

Public understanding of the police function is heavily dependent upon the coverage given by mass media to the newsworthy events in which the police are involved. Newspaper, radio, and television**696 ***494 reporters assigned to reporting on police activities should have a sufficiently thorough understanding of the complexities of the police function to enable them to cover such events (as well as other matters that now go unreported) in a manner that promotes the public’s understanding of the police role.“

[5] With these principles in mind, we turn to the circumstances of the instant case.  Carey submitted an affidavit in support of his motion for summary judgment on Counts I and III.  This affidavit was not contested by motion or counter-affidavit, so its substance must be taken as true.   ( Heidelberger v. Jewel Companies, Inc. (1974), 57 Ill.2d 87, 92-93, 312 N.E.2d 601; Watson v. Southwest Messenger Press, Inc. (1973),12 Ill.App.3d 968, 299 N.E.2d 409.) Carey contends that his affidavit establishes an innocent construction for his press release. We do not reach this issue, but consider the affidavit solely to determine the scope of Carey’s responsibilities as Cook County State’s Attorney. In pertinent part, the affidavit reads:

“5. That statements which are the subject matter of Counts I and II of the Substitute Third Amended Complaint were made by me as State’s Attorney of Cook County in response to statements by the late Mayor of Chicago, Richard J. Daley, that the person that pays off a police official is responsible for police corruption and not the policeman that takes the money, and that tavern owners may lose their liquor licenses after they testify against the police officers charged with extorting the payoff; a statement by former Chicago Superintendent of Police James Conlisk publicly attacking the credibility of a police officer who testified in a police extortion trial that other police officers extorted or received payoffs from tavern owners; and the statement of plaintiff Mitchell Ware that all pockets of corruption have been removed from the Chicago Police Department.

“6. The aforementioned statements were made during the pendency of an extortion trial of a Chicago Police Commander and other Chicago policemen before an unsequestered jury.

“7. That my many years of experience as a law enforcement official and my reading of studies of official corruption led me to believe that corruption cannot be eradicated until there is an admission that it exists and that the aforementioned statements of Mayor Daley, Superintendent Conlisk and Deputy Superintendent Ware, taken together, implied that individuals who came forward to testify about police extortion and payoffs could be punished and that police officers could infer that other law enforcement officials would not be vigilant in attempting to eradicate corruption.

“8. That by my statements I intended to call a halt to the type of statements being made by Mayor Daley, Superintendent Conlisk and Deputy Superintendent Ware and request that we work together to eradicate corruption.

“9. That I believed that my statements, taken as a whole, were true and in the best public interest.”

[6] We believe that Carey’s issuance of the press release remarks were legitimately related to his responsibilities as leader of community law enforcement and his concomitant duty to investigate police corruption. The ABA Standards charge the prosecutor with (1) the duty to insure faithful execution of the laws (s 1.1(a)); (2) providing legal advice and training concerning police functions (s 2.7); (3) an affirmative *917 responsibility to investigate suspected illegal activity when this is not adequately dealt with by the police (s 3.1(a)); and (4) maintaining liaison, cooperation and constructive joint effort with the police department to assure police effectiveness in dealing with the crime (s 1.1 of The Urban Police Function).

If that portion of the press release pertaining to Ware was communicated directly to him, rather than to the public, it undoubtedly would be absolutely privileged. Carey’s affidavit demonstrates his twofold concern over (1) the effect Ware’s statement may have had on a pending police extortion trial and Carey’s ability to prosecute future episodes of police misconduct, and (2) the need to recognize corruption exists as a prerequisite to its eradication. The communication of these concerns to Deputy Superintendent Ware was certainly consistent with the principles set forth by the ABA. It was also a proper exercise of Carey’s discretion as to the pretrial administration of criminal justice.

Following the Blair analysis, we must next decide whether Carey’s decision to inform the general public should be afforded absolute privilege. We are of the opinion that, like the Governor in Blair, Carey could, in the exercise of his discretion, communicate these remarks to the public. The ABA Standards portray the importance of public disclosure concerning the police function (ABA Standards, The Urban Police Function, s 9.3 (1973)) and the need for police accountability to the public (s 5.1). The State’s Attorney has the inherent power as the chief legal official in the county to maintain this accountability. As the Introduction to the Standards indicates “(h)e is called upon to make public statements” and “the prosecutor’s activity is in large part open to the public gaze and spotlighted by the press.” We cannot say Carey’s call for public accountability by Ware was outside the perimeters of the State’s Attorney’s discretion.

In Blair, the court noted that the Governor did not exceed the scope of his discretionary powers by informing the public about disciplinary actions he had directed be taken. Indeed, the effective functioning of our system of government is dependent largely upon the force of an informed public opinion as to the quality of service rendered by public officials, and free and unfettered action by the public’s representatives. ( Howlett v. Scott (1977), 69 Ill.2d 135, 144, 13 Ill.Dec. 9, 370 N.E.2d 1036.) Carey’s press release appeared to be an effort to harness the dual effectiveness of his office and public opinion to curb what he believed was an improper use of police powers by Ware. Carey’s remarks may be taken, therefore, as an official reprimand to Ware for actions that Carey believed were not in the best interest of criminal justice administration.

Ware argues, however, that the State’s Attorney’s office admitted that no prosecution or investigation of Ware was under process or even contemplated. Therefore, Carey exceeded his traditional responsibilities by accusing Ware of protecting corruption. This argument misses the point. Ware had made public statements that all pockets of corruption had been eradicated from the Chicago Police Department. Carey feared this sort of statement might have influenced an unsequestered jury in a pending federal trial. Investigation of whether Ware had made his statements with the intent of protecting corruption was not necessary since the effect of his statements might have influenced that jury. According to his affidavit, Carey acted based upon his experience in law enforcement, his studies of official corruption, and his belief that police corruption continued to exist in Chicago. At the point in time of Carey’s remarks to the press, Carey was only concerned with the veracity and effect of Ware’s statement and the appearance of impropriety by Ware. The fact that no formal investigation or charging of Ware based upon an intent to protect corruption took place does not militate against Carey’s responsibility to mitigate what he believed were damaging remarks by Ware. Accordingly, under the circumstances described above, Carey’s September 11, 1973, press release was absolutely privileged.

We need not decide if executive absolute immunity is applicable to Counts III and X, as they are affirmed for other reasons explained below.

III.

Count III of plaintiff’s complaint alleges that on September 23, 1973, Carey made the following defamatory statement during a public television appearance:

Question from Mary Jane O’Dell: “Mr. Carey, I don’t understand why are you miffed with Mitchell Ware because he seems to have done something before you did it . . . you say you are going to do this . . . you are planning to do this . . . but you haven’t actually done it yet. What has he done thats wrong?”

Carey: “No not at all. And if you will look back at what I have said regardless of how they have changed the tones of all this and all the silly counter charges that they have made . . . is that my only disagreement with Mitchell Ware is that I disagreed with two statements that he made. The first one indicating that all the police corruption had now been cleaned up and that he was aware of all the pockets of corruption . . . now this couldn’t be so because he hasn’t brought us all of these things that we know are still going on. Now we have worked on a cooperative basis with the C-5 Unit and they have done an excellent job in many areas . . . and I never questioned the job that they are doing. What I question are these types of public statements that are intended to delude the public into thinking that this is all over now or utilizes a signal to everyone that now you don’t have to cooperate anymore because the corruption is ended and we’re going to go back to good old times in Chicago. Those were my quarrels with Mitchell Ware . . . I also quarreled with his statement the other day that this gambling operation erradicated a three million industry when in fact the next day the operation is back in business.”

Question from Mary Jane O’Dell: “But isn’t it a fact your quarrel with him goes a little deeper than that, doesn’t it Mr. Carey, because you say that the statements he makes are not really true. Well granted that it hasn’t all been eradicated, but basically what you’re saying is that the Mayor and Superintendent Conlisk and Mr. Ware are all responsible are all responsible for protecting the syndicate. Thats what you’re really saying.”

Carey: “Oh yes, lets put that back in the proper perspective. Its a historical fact that the syndicate has operated for years in the city of Chicago and I dare anyone to try and dispute that fact and its also historical fact and its not only historical fact but its a matter of testimony in pending federal trials excluding the one thats going on now which we can’t discuss . . . but the federal trials that have gone on heretofore which indicated much corruption in high public officials including an ex-governor, including the present, at that time the present county clerk, and corruption within the police department, convictions have been had.”

Specifically, Ware contends that Carey’s response to the second question is an allegation that Ware was responsible for protecting the syndicate. Carey asserts that summary judgment in his favor on Count III was proper based on three grounds. First, the complaint alleges only conclusions with regard to the alleged defamatory statement and does not allege actual malice. Second, the specific statement alleged was never pleaded until after the statute of limitations had expired. Third, the specific statement complained of is capable of an innocent construction which does not defame Ware.

[7] We agree with Carey’s third contention and need not address his other arguments.  The innocent construction rule requires that an article, passage or statement be read and construed as a whole and the words given their natural and obvious meaning.  Words that are allegedly libelous capable of being read innocently must be so read and declared nonactionable as a matter of law.     Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. (1968), 41 Ill.2d 345, 347, 243 N.E.2d 217; John v. Tribune Co. (1962), 24 Ill.2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105, Cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877, 83 S.Ct. 148, 9 L.Ed.2d 114.

[8] We are of the opinion that placed in the full context of the conversation Carey’s response is capable of an innocent construction. Mary Jane O’Dell offered two questions for Carey’s consideration. First, he was asked: “But isn’t it a fact your quarrel with him goes a little deeper than that, doesn’t it Mr. Carey, because you say that the statements he makes are not really true.” Immediately following was the query: “Well granted that it hasn’t all been eradicated, but basically what you’re saying is that the Mayor and Superintendent Conlisk and Mr. Ware are all responsible are all responsible for protecting the syndicate. Thats what you’re really saying.” Carey’s response, “Oh yes, let’s put that back in the proper perspective” might refer to either question. It is possible that Carey was merely quarreling with Ware’s claim that police corruption did not exist, rather than accusing Ware of protecting corruption and the syndicate. Accordingly, we are required to hold Carey’s statement is nonactionable.

The plausibility of this innocent construction is evidenced by Carey’s response to O’Dell’s previous question which is quoted above. There, she also presented Carey with a twofold question: “I don’t understand why are you miffed with Mitchell Ware” and “What has he done thats wrong?” Carey’s answer, “No not at all” more probably relates to the first question and indicates he was not “miffed” at Ware. Consistency would require his answer to O’Dell’s next question also be interpreted as sequential.

IV.

Count X of plaintiff’s complaint deals with the publication of a letter, signed by the foreman of the extended May 1975 Grand Jury, to the Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, James M. Rochford. The substance of the letter was that evidence presented during the grand jury investigation indicated that Deputy Superintendent Ware completely ignored his responsibility to supervise the activities of the Security Section of the Chicago Police Department. Ware was accused of gross neglect of his official duties which attributed to the excesses engaged in by members of the Security System. Ware alleged that the letter was written at the direction of the defendants Carey, Berkowitz, Iavarone and Gillis, and published in the news media by or with their approval.

The complaint further alleges that the scope of the investigation by the extended May 1975 Grand Jury concerned criminal acts committed by police officers from 1967 to 1970. Defendants were aware that Ware did not join the Chicago Police Department until 1972. Thus, each defendant was allegedly aware of the falsity of the letter’s contents.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was supported by the affidavits of Carey, Berkowitz, Gillis and Iavarone. Each affiant asserted that he did not cause or direct the grand jury foreman to write, sign or issue the controverted letter. Nor did affiants cause or direct their agents *921 or employees to take such action. Attached also to the motion for summary judgment were excerpts from the deposition of the grand jury foreman, Sylvester Maida. Pertinent portions of Maida’s deposition testimony explaining the composition and publication of the letter follow:

“Q (by Mr. Ware): Had you ever met with any of the Defendants and that would include Bernard Carey, Ralph Berkowitz, Kenneth Gillis, Nicholas Iavarone, or any of their employees before the convening of the Cook County Grand Jury?

“A: No.

“Q: Have you ever met and conversed with either of the Defendants in this cause outside the Grand Jury room?

“A: No.

“Q: When did you initially decide to write the letter?

“A: I guess I did write the letter but the jury did discuss some kind of letter to Rochford, and this is what they discussed and what they wanted to send.

“Q: Did you discuss the idea of writing the letter, the contents of this letter with anyone other than a Grand Juror outside the Grand Jury room before it was written?

“A: No.

“Q: Were you given any directions or suggestions or assistance in the composition of this letter by anyone in the State’s Attorney’s office outside the Grand Jury room?

“A: No, not that I can recall, no.

“Q: Did anyone in the State’s Attorney’s office suggest to you the writing of the 44 page report or the letter in this case outside the Grand Jury room?

“A: No.

“The Witness: I didn’t write the letter. There was some college people there that were a little in fact, towards the end of the last couple of weeks of this here, when they wrote up this recommendation, there were a couple of well, I presume they had college educations because they were rather smart, as far as I was concerned, and they kind of took over the recommendations. And there was one or two others that were kind of a little sharp on this and I kind of just sat in the background and just listened to what they were doing and went along and read it and agreed with them on what they had said and on what they decided, the recommendation of it.

“That’s why I said I never wrote any letters, or I don’t think I ever made my own recommendation in that 44 page report. That was all agreed by the jurors, so this is the truth and nothing but the truth.”

During their depositions, defendants were questioned as to whether they wrote the letter to Rochford or assisted the foreman in its drafting. Defendants refused to answer on the grounds of grand jury secrecy. Therefore, defendants’ depositions are not inconsistent with their affidavits.

Plaintiff filed a response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Count X. He contended that an issue of fact remained; that defendants’ affidavits were self-serving and failed to resolve the issue of responsibility for the letter; and that defendants failed to answer pertinent questions on discovery under the guise of grand jury secrecy. In support of his response, Ware attached excerpts from the deposition of Maida, excerpts from the depositions of defendants Iavarone and Gillis and his own affidavit.

Ware’s affidavit states that defendants were aware of when he began his services as a Chicago Police Department Superintendent. Affiant further stated that each defendant knew of the existence of a gag order issued by the circuit court of Cook County pertaining to the extended May 1975 Grand Jury. Iavarone and Gillis were working under the direction of Carey and Berkowitz and reported to them on grand jury activities.

Ware also stated that the letter “was delivered at the direction of the defendant Iavarone, and with knowledge and complicity on the parts of both Iavarone and Gillis (with knowledge) that it contained * * * defamatory allegations concerning (Ware).” Affiant attempted to identify the individuals specifically responsible for the letter but defendants chose not to answer during discovery, alleging grand jury secrecy.

Excerpts from Maida’s deposition testimony selected by Ware establish that Maida did not personally write the letter to Superintendent Rochford. In fact, Maida had little or no recollection as to the drafting, editing, typing or mailing of the letter. However, Maida did admit the possibility that the grand jury was responsible for the letter. He maintained that his involvement, if any, consisted of reading the proposed letter and signing it.

Gillis’ deposition revealed that he was familiar with the grand jury letter and report. However, Gillis was instructed by counsel not to answer questions pertaining to the grand jury letter. Gillis, therefore, offered no information as to the preparation of the letter and report.

The deposition testimony of Iavarone established that he was familiar with the letter sent to Rochford, that he knew its contents and that he had it physically delivered. The witness professed to know who wrote the letter but was instructed by counsel not to answer the question: “Did you write the letter?” Iavarone stated that Carey knew about the letter but did not know its contents until this suit was filed. He did not personally show the letter to Carey or Berkowitz. Iavarone did show the letter to Gillis, but did not know if Gillis discussed it with Carey or Berkowitz. Iavarone also testified that his secretary had typed the letter.

We find that, based on the above-mentioned affidavits and deposition excerpts, no triable issue of fact existed as to whether defendants were responsible for the publication of the grand jury letter.

[9][10] Defendants’ affidavits are neither controverted by Ware’s affidavit nor by deposition testimony. An affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment is actually a substitute for in-court testimony and should contain as much information as the affiant could competently testify to if he were sworn as a witness. ( Fooden v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities (1971), 48 Ill.2d 580, 587, 272 N.E.2d 497, Cert. denied (1972), 408 U.S. 943, 92 S.Ct. 2847, 33 L.Ed.2d 766.) Here, defendants directly contradicted the allegations of Count X in their affidavits by denying any responsibility for the drafting or publication of the grand jury letter. Where such averments of fact are not contradicted by counteraffidavit, they must be taken as true, notwithstanding the existence of contrary averments in the adverse party’s pleadings which merely purport to establish issues of fact. (Fooden.) Ware’s counteraffidavit is wholly conclusory, speculative and merely serves to restate the allegations of his complaint with reference to defendants’ responsibility for the letter. Ware states no facts indicating his personal knowledge concerning these allegations. Moreover, Ware admitted in his deposition that he had no personal knowledge regarding what transpired before the grand jury. Only defendants and Maida would have personal knowledge as to responsibility for the letter. Defendants’ affidavits denying responsibility remain uncontroverted by Ware. Maida’s explanation that other jurors may have been responsible for the letter is consistent with defendants’ affidavits. Accordingly, summary judgment for defendants as to Count X was proper.

Ware also complains that defendants’ failure to discuss the letter during deposition testimony under the guise of grand jury secrecy creates an issue of fact. Ware asserts the fact of nondisclosure in his counteraffidavit and defendants’ depositions bear this out. During deposition questioning, on advice from counsel, defendants refused to answer certain questions pertaining to the authorship, composition and delivery of the grand jury letter. Defendants’ counsel made timely objections to these questions and Ware “certified” these questions.

We are of the opinion that this issue should have been raised in the trial court. (See Hill v. Thomas B. Jeffery Co. (1920), 292 Ill. 490, 127 N.E. 124.) Supreme Court Rule 211 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 110A, par. 211(c)(4) ) provides:

“Any party may, but need not, on notice and motion obtain a ruling by the court on the objections In advance of the trial.” (Emphasis added.)

Moreover, Rule 219, concerning refusal to answer by a deponent, provides that the proponent of the question may move for an order compelling an answer. Additional discovery options available to Ware were the possibilities of a protective order regulating discovery to prevent an unreasonable disadvantage, or oppression by defendants (Rule 201(c)(1) ); court supervision of discovery (Rule 201(c)(2) ); or discovery sanctions where appropriate (Rule 219(c), (d) ).

If Ware had attempted to implement these discovery safeguards, the issue of grand jury secrecy as a purported ground for refusal to answer deposition questions could have been litigated below. Our record, however, is silent on this issue. Since defendants have denied involvement with the grand jury letter via affidavits, we will not construe their deposition silence as inconsistent with these denials.

Construing all of the materials before the trial court in the light most favorable to the non-moving party Century Display Manufacturing   Corp. v. D. R. Wager Construction Co., Inc.  (1977), 46 Ill.App.3d 643, 4 Ill.Dec. 913, 360 N.E.2d 1346), we find no triable issue of fact as to Count X.

For all of the aforementioned reasons, the order of the circuit court of Cook County granting defendants summary judgment on Counts I, III and X is affirmed.

Affirmed.

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Terrence J. BARON, Defendant-Appellant.

130 Ill.App.2d 588, 264 N.E.2d 423

The defendant, Terrence J. Baron, was indicted for the illegal sale of hallucinogenic drugs, in violation of section 802(b) of Chapter 111 1/2 of Illinois Revised Statutes of 1969. The indictment charged that the defendant sold 220 LSD tablets on May 27, 1969, and the indictment bore number F69-41. This was a second offense and was therefore classified as a felony. The first offense against the defendant was charged in a complaint which was then pending before the same court. It bore case number M69-590, and was classified as a misdemeanor. See: Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 111 1/2, par. 804. A further and unrelated misdemeanor charge was pending against the defendant which bore number M69-591.

The defendant pled guilty to charges M69-590 and F69-41, and the State then filed a nolle prosequi to case number M69-591. The case numbered F69-41 was then set for hearing on an application for probation and for hearing in aggravation and mitigation. The court ordered the probation officer to make an investigation and report back within two weeks.

At this point in the proceeding, it was made known to the court that the guilty pleas in cases F69-41 and M69-590 had both been obtained upon a promise of probation. When it became apparent that the court was not going to be governed by the negotiated plea agreement, the defendant’s counsel immediately asked that the pleas of guilty be withdrawn in cases F69-41 and M69-590, and that the nolle prosequi, which had been entered in case M69-591, be withdrawn and the case reinstated, thus placing everything in the proceedings back at its initial status. The court denied the motion and granted probation for a period of three years, conditioned upon the first nine months thereof being served in the Illinois State Prison Farm at Vandalia.

[1] The defendant filed an extensive motion for new trial, which was denied, and he has appealed. He contends, among things, that the trial court erred in refusing to permit him to withdraw his pleas of guilty. We believe that the defendant is correct in this contention.

The defendant obviously agreed to plead guilty upon the misapprehension that he would receive an unconditional probation on the felony charge of selling hallucinogenic drugs. The record permits no other conclusion. The court would not accede to such agreement, and conditioned the defendant’s probation upon the first nine months thereof being served in the Illinois State Prison Farm at Vandalia.

In The People v. Riebe, 40 Ill.2d 565 at page 568, 241 N.E.2d 313 at page 314 (1969), the court summarized the oft-repeated principles applicable to permitting the withdrawal of a plea of guilty, in these words:

‘The discretion of the trial court to permit the withdrawal of the plea of guilty is a judicial discretion which should always be exercised in favor of innocence and liberty. The law favors a trial upon the merits by jury, and all courts should so administer the law and construe the rules of practice as to secure a hearing upon the merits, if possible. The least surprise or influence causing a defendant to plead guilty when he has any defense at all should be sufficient cause to permit a change of the plea from guilty to not guilty. The withdrawal of the plea of guilty should not be denied in any case where it is evident that the ends of justice will be served by permitting the plea of not guilty in its stead.’

The Advisory Committee on the Criminal Trial of the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice with reference to Pleas of Guilty, recommends in Part II, Section 2.1, (a)(ii)(4), relating to the withdrawal of a guilty plea, that the court should allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if the defendant proves that ‘he did not receive the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by the plea agreement and the prosecuting attorney failed to seek or not to oppose these concessions as promised in the plea agreement.’ See: The People v. Walston, 38 Ill.2d 39, 43, 44, 230 N.E.2d 233 (1967).

[2] We are compelled to the conclusion that the trial judge knew of the negotiations that preceded the plea of guilty in cases numbered F69-41 and M69-590. While that judge was not the judge who entered the subsequent orders, this circumstance does not alter our view that the ends of justice require that the defendant be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty in cases numbered M69-590 and F69-41, and to substitute in lieu thereof, pleas of not guilty. We note that as to the other misdemeanor case numbered M69-591, a nolle prosequi was entered at the time the guilty pleas were entered. The record and appellant’s brief indicate*591 that this nolle prosequi was a part of the same plea agreement. Consequently, the defendant must agree to the reinstatement of that case, subject to his right to change his pleas, if he is to be permitted to alter his pleas in cases F69-41 and M69-590.

If such concession is not forthcoming, the judgment herein is to be affirmed; if such concession is made, then the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

[3][4][5] The trial judge who entered the judgment appealed from herein evidently became confused with reference to the number, charge, plea, and status of each of the three cases which were pending against the defendant. Under such circumstances, he entered an order that the felony case against the defendant, numbered F69-41 be designated a misdemeanor. Such order was beyond his power. It is the duty of the State’s Attorney in misdemeanor cases, and the State’s Attorney or Grand Jury in felony cases, to determine the charge which will be placed against a person.

Section 5 of Chapter 14 of Illinois Revised Statutes of 1969 provides that it is the duty of the State’s Attorney to commence and prosecute all criminal actions, suits and indictments. Article III of the Illinois Constitution divides the powers of the government among the legislative, executive and judicial departments, and provides that neither of these departments shall exercise powers belonging to either of the other departments.

The State’s Attorney’s office is a part of the executive branch of the government, and the powers exercised by that office are executive powers.  A judge or court cannot exercise the powers of the executive branch of our government.   People ex rel. Elliott v. Covelli, 415 Ill. 79, 88, 89, 112 N.E.2d 156 (1953). Thus, the court erred in designating the felony charge as a misdemeanor and in treating it as such. This order was void as a judicial encroachment upon the executive power of the State’s Attorney.

The other matters raised by the defendant need not be discussed in view of the position we have taken herein. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and remanded, subject to the conditions enumerated in the opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Supreme Court of the United States.

 

VOGEL, Ex’r, etc.,

v.

GRUAZ.

110 U.S. 311, 4 S.Ct. 12, 28 L.Ed. 158

This is an action on the case, brought by Timothy Gruaz, against Rudolph Bircher, to recover damages for the speaking and publishing of false, malicious, scandalous, and defamatory words, charging the plaintiff with being a thief, and with having stolen the money of the defendant, meaning the crime of larceny. The suit was commenced in a state court of Illinois, and was removed by the defendant into the circuit court of the United States for the Southern district of Illinois. At the trial before a jury a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff, June 6, 1879, for $6,000 damages. On the next day the defendant filed a motion for a new trial. On the fourteenth of June the defendant died, on the twelfth of July an order abating the case was moved for, on behalf of the defendant, and on the sixteenth of August the court overruled the motion for a new trial and the motion for an order of abatement, and entered a judgment for the plaintiff, against Bircher, for $6,000 and costs, as of June 7, 1879. The order for judgment recited that the hearing by the court of the motion for a new trial was, when it was filed, postponed to a then future and convenient day of the same term, and that the defendant died pending the hearing of the motion. Leave was given to the executor of the defendant to prepare a bill of exceptions and to take a writ of error. The bill of exceptions being signed, it was filed by the executor, and the writ of error was issued. Various errors are assigned, and among them that the circuit court did not grant the motion to abate the suit, and that it rendered a judgment against Bircher after his death. But it is unnecessary to pass on those questions, because we are of opinion that the judgment must be reversed for another error committed at the trial.

Three witnesses for the plaintiff gave evidence tending to prove the speaking to them by the defendant of more or less of the words set forth in the declaration; and afterwards C. L. Cook was sworn as a witness for the plaintiff, and testified that he was state’s attorney for Madison county, Illinois; he had a slight acquaintance with Bircher; and that he knew Gruaz. The following proceedings then occurred: ‘Question. I will ask you if you had any conversation with Dr. Bircher with regard to Gruaz, and, if so, when was it? Counsel for defense asked witness if at that time he was occupying the same position he now holds. Answer. Yes, sir. Q. It was communicated to you while you held that position and were acting in that capacity, whatever was communicated to you by Bircher? A. Yes, sir. (Defendant’s counsel object to witness testifying to matters disclosed to him by the defendant under the circumstances stated, on the ground that such communications are to be treated as privileged.) The Court. I will ask the witness if he regarded it professionally as a privileged communication? A. I had never met defendant before; he was introduced to me by a citizen of our place, and he informed me that he wanted to talk with me with regard to a matter he wanted to bring before the grand jury. (Objected to.) The Court. I will allow the witness to state what the doctor said on that occasion. Of course, if he made the communication to the witness in good faith, there would be no malice about it, and I shall instruct the jury to* disregard it. The objection is overruled. To which ruling of the court the defendant at the time excepted. A. As I stated, I had at that time no acquaintance with defendant whatever. He inquired for the state’s attorney, and was introduced to me, and he spoke of his affairs. He said he wanted to bring a matter before the grand jury in regard to Mr. Gruaz. I talked with him in regard to the nature of the matter, and he talked pretty freely in regard to it, and I directed him to the grand jury room. He said a good many things. He was evidently in earnest at the time, expressed himself very freely in regard to him. I would not like to swear to the exact words used, or that anybody used at the time. I can give the substance of what he said, I suppose. He wanted to prosecute Gruaz for stealing, was the amount of it. I recollect this: he charged him with having stolen his money, and I asked him how, and he told me how it had been done. Gruaz was his agent and handled his funds, rented his farms, and had failed to account for a large amount of money, he told me, and he charged him in this conversation with having stolen his money, and he said he wanted to know if there was any law in this state to prosecute a man for that. I have no objection to state any words. I remember his making the charge that he had stolen his money, but I can’t swear that the word ‘thief’ was used at that time; that it was in substance, undoubtedly. My impression is that this was the March term, 1878, of the circuit court of Madison county, either that or October term, 1877; my recollection and decided impression is that it was the spring term, 1878. Dr. Bircher went into the grand jury room and gave his statement to the grand jury. He was anxious, of course, to have the indictment found, and he evidently believed or so expressed himself. (Counsel for defendant objected to witness stating his opinion about what defendant evidently believed.) The Court. He said he went before the grand jury, and said he seemed to be in earnest in his movements, but he didn’t say what took place before the grand jury. Don’t know, I suppose. Witness. No, I don’t know. Cross-examination. Maj. Prickett introduced Bircher to me; never saw him before in my life. I was certain he came to see me as prosecuting attorney, in good faith. That was his business, as he stated it to me. After he made his statement to me I advised him to go before the grand jury; directed him to their room. He went there by my advice. Hold on-I don’t say that; I advised him that he had a good case. He came to me and I showed him where the grand jury room was. He stated his case to me as state’s attorney. I then directed him where to go, and said I should prosecute it as vigorously as possible, if the indictment was found. In regard to the advice I gave him, I rather encouraged him to drop the thing; I told him he better sue Mr. Gruaz first, and see if he couldn’t get judgment against him, and so put it in a better shape to prosecute him. He stated his case, and I thought from his statement that he would have few, if any, witnesses besides himself, and that it would be doubtful, however honestly he might believe, that he had cause; it would be doubtful whether the jury would bring a bill; so I advised him to bring a civil suit; but, said I, you are here, and you mustn’t think hardly of me if the grand jury don’t find a bill; and I directed him to the grand jury room.’

The bill of exceptions also contains the following: ‘In reference to the testimony of state’s attorney C. L. Cook, the court instructed the jury as folfows: ‘I admitted that evidence with an explanation, and with the explanation made in the admission of it I think I am content, and I think the jury may take it into consideration; but if they think the defendant was actuated by honest motives in making the declaration he did, they will disregard it.’ To the giving of which last instruction the defendant excepted, for the reason that the instruction ignores the element of want of probable cause, and for the reason also that the jury should have been instructed to disregard Cook’s testimony entirely.’

We are of opinion that what was said by Bircher to Mr. Cook was an absolutely privileged communication. It was said to Mr. Cook while he was state’s attorney or prosecutor of crimes for the county, and while he was acting in that capacity. Bircher inquired for the state’s attorney and was introduced to him, and stated to him that he wanted to talk with him about a matter he wanted to bring before the grand jury in regard to Gruaz. He laid the matter before Mr. Cook, and charged Gruaz with having stolen his money, and was asked how, and stated how and inquired of Mr. Cook if there was any law in Illinois by which a man could be prosecuted for that.  The grand jury was then in session, and Mr. Cook advised Bircher that he had a good case and directed him to the grand jury-room, and Bircher went before the grand jury. If all this had taken place between Bircher and an attorney consulted by him who did not hold the public position which Mr. Cook did, clearly, the communication would have been privileged and not to be disclosed against the objection of Bircher.  Under the circumstances shown, Mr. Cook was the professional adviser of Bircher, consulted by him on a statement of his case, to learn his opinion as to whether there was ground in fact and in law for making an attempt to procure an indictment against Gruaz.  The fact that Mr. Cook held the position of public prosecutor, and was not to be paid by Bircher for information or advice, did not destroy the relation which the law established between them.  It made that relation more sacred on the ground of public policy.  The avenue to the grand jury should always be free and unobstructed.  Bircher might have gone directly before it without consulting with Mr. Cook, but if he chose to consult him instead of a private counsel, there was great propriety in his doing so.  Any person who desires to pursue the same course should not be deterred by the fear of having what he may say in the confidence of a consultation with a professional adviser, supposed to be the best qualified for the purpose, disclosed afterwards in a civil suit against his objection.   Oliver v. Pate, 43 Ind. 132. By the statute of Illinois in force at the time of this occurrence, it was made the duty of each state’s attorney to ‘commence and prosecute’ all criminal actions, suits, indictments, and prosecutions in any court of record in his county, in which the people of the state or county might be concerned. (Rev. St. 1874, c. 14, § 5, subd. 1.) Under this provision it was the province and the privilege of any person who knew of facts tending to show the commission of a crime, to lay those facts before the public officer whose duty it was to commence a prosecution for the crime. Public policy will protect all such communications absolutely, and without reference to the motive or intent of the informer or the question of probable cause; the ground being that greater mischief will probably result from requiring or permitting them to be disclosed than from wholly rejecting them. Mr. Cook learned from Bircher the things to which he testified, because he occupied the position of public prosecuting officer, and because he was acting at the time as the legal adviser of Bircher in respect to the matter and question which Bircher was laying before him. The free and unembarrassed administration of justice in respect to the criminal law in which the public is concerned, is involved in a case like the present, in addition to the considerations which ordinarily apply in communications from client to counsel in matters of purely private concern. Bircher made his communication to Mr. Cook for the purpose of obtaining professional advice as to his right, and that of the public through him, to have a criminal prosecution commenced by Mr. Cook by the intervention of the grand jury against Gruaz.

But there is another view of the subject. The matter concerned the administration of penal justice, and the principle of public safety justifies and demands the rule of exclusion. In Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487, an action for maliciously and falsely representing to the treasury department of the United States that the plaintiff was intending to defraud the revenue, it was held that the defendant could not be compelled to answer whether he did not give to the department information of supposed or alleged frauds on the revenue contemplated by the plaintiff. The principle laid down in that case was, that it is the duty of every citizen to communicate to his government any information which he has of the commission of an offense against its laws; and that a court of justice will not compel or allow such information to be disclosed, either by the subordinate officer to whom it is given, by the informer himself, or by any other person, without the permission of the government, the evidence being excluded not for the protection of the witness or of the party in the particular case, but upon general grounds of public policy, because of the confidential nature of such communications. The authorities are collected and reviewed in that case. The case of Dawkins v. Rokeby, L. R. 8 Q. B. 255, there cited, was affirmed by the house of lords, L. R. 7 H. L. 744. See, also, 1 Greenl. Ev. § 250; Black v. Holmes, 1 Fox & Sm. 28.

It makes no difference that there was evidence of the speaking of the same words to persons other than Mr. Cook, and that the speaking of them to Mr. Cook was not the sole ground of action or of recovery. The evidence was incompetent, and it must be inferred that it affected the minds of the jury both on the main issue and on the question of damages.

It results from these views that the judgment below cannot be upheld, and that it must be reversed, and the case be remanded to the circuit court, with direction to set aside the verdict and vacate the judgment and take such further proceedings as may be according to law and not inconsistent with this opinion.

My pursuit of criminal charges against Fairview Heights Police for beating me.

Since February, 2009 I have been involved in battling the State of Illinois in attempting to bring criminal charges against Fairview Heights Police officers, Joshua Alemond and Aaron Nyman, for criminal acts resulting from an unlawful traffic stop. On that day I was on my way home from work when I was pulled over for no reason by Joshua Alemond, a Fairview Heights Police Officer. I was ordered out of my truck at gunpoint and subsequently beaten and Tasered by Alemond and with the assistance of Aaron Nyman, another acting Fairview Heights Police Officer. I was charged with 5 offenses, all of which were dismissed, and have since been pursuing criminal charges against Alemond and Nyman as well as filing a civil case. With the assistance of Brendan Kelly, the then Circuit Clerk, and Bob Haida, the then State’s Attorney, officials still refuse to take any action despite my presenting sworn criminal complaints. Circuit Clerk, Brendan Kelly, took possession of my complaints and mis-filed them. I also sent copies to the State’s Attorney and Chief Judge, all of whom refuse to respond or take action. Bob Haida and Brendan Kelly were in possession of the dashboard video which contradicts the complaint filed by the police.

Apparently, it is possible for police to be prosecuted as evidenced in the story here. Brendan Kelly and Bob Haida could learn something from Assistant Cook County State’s Attorney Alexander Vroustouris.

I have been trying to get the State’s Attorney to take notice of the criminal actions of the police and press charges. That story is here.

The charges stemming from this event include:

A bench warrant for failure to appear for a previously dismissed driving without a license charge in 2006. The charge had already been dismissed by Collinsville in 2006 and then improperly filed in St. Clair County outside of the permissible time for filing charges of which I was never lawfully notified.

Improper Lane Usage which allegedly gave rise to reasonable suspicion that I was “intoxicated”. The Joshua Alemond claimed, per his report, that I was “weaving within my own lane”. Watching the dashboard video from Alemond’s patrol car it is clear that I operated my vehicle in a safe manner with no weaving.

Fleeing/Eluding a Peace Officer which stems from my failing to immediately stop when Alemond turned on his emergency lights. The dashboard video and Alemond’s own report states that I slowed down, activated my hazard lights and high beams. I then continued driving safely for about a mile to a lighted side street out of concern for my safety for choosing to not stop on the narrow shoulder of a dark highway at 2am.

Resisting a Peace Officer which stems from my refusing to place my hands behind my back when ordered to do so by Joshua Alemond when the command was being given to me while I was being beaten and Tasered. Both Alemond and Nyman, each weighing over 200 lbs. were on top of me kicking, punching, and Tasering. The command to place my hands behind my back was not given until after they began beating and Tasering me, thereby making it impossible to comply.

No Drivers License which stems from Alemond and Nyman performing an illegal and unconstitutional search of my personal belongings that were inside my truck while I was handcuffed, injured and bleeding in the back of the police cruiser. I was never demanded to produce a drivers license, but instead, because they could not find one they decided to charge me with not having one.

No Insurance which stems from the same circumstances as the drivers license charge.

In essence there was NO probable cause and NO lawful warrant. For reasons yet undetermined, Joshua Alemond decided to initiate a traffic stop and then fabricate charges.

Documents related to the charges, including court transcripts and orders of dismissal:

Transcripts of Proceedings

Record of Proceedings 8-24-09 First Appearance

Record of Proceedings 9-30-09 Second Appearance

Record of Proceedings 10-26-09 Third Appearance

Record of Proceedings 11-30-09 Case Dismissed

Court orders dismissing charges

Order dismissing no DL

Order for fleeing and eluding dismissal

Order dismissing 4 remaining charges

This story is lengthy and has been chronicled piece-meal in various posts so I won’t go into detail here.

In essence, I never entered a plea to any charges when I appeared in court before Randall Kelly. I challenged jurisdiction every step of the way. Upon challenging jurisdiction as well as the alleged reasonable suspicion for arresting me the court then had to allow for a hearing where I challenged probable cause; which in the police report mentions “believing the driver to be intoxicated”. I don’t expect many of you to understand the reasoning behind my Declaration. Whatever our disagreement, it is a document that originates with a moral and philosophical response to what government has become. People have a right to disagree with, and even refuse consent, to that which they find contradictory to their conscience. All things considered, I am a peaceable, non-violent man. If disobedience is a crime then guilty as charged.

I had also been using Freedom of Information Act Requests to try and procure dashboard video and other records which speak to the police report being filled with lies, distortions, and fabrications; as well as containing evidence which would exculpate me of all charges. Fairview Heights Police used a number of tactics to deny the requests and by pressing my rights under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Bailey) the police were required to produce any and all evidence, of which I was permitted a copy. Last month I was provided with certified copies of the dashboard video from both police cars. My 8 month struggle to procure the video had come to an end, and it speaks volumes.

11/30/09, was to be THE day where the probable cause hearing would take place after a number of continuances. I finally had the video, the police report, my supporting case law, and my questions ready to go. However, this time the Alemond and Nyman did not appear.

Judge Randall Kelley called myself and the State’s Attorney, another Kelley (no relation) to the bench. I was asked if I was prepared to proceed to which I replied yes. Then Mr. Kelley was asked if he was prepared to which he replied no. He then asked Judge Kelley for a continuance because the police, his witnesses, were not present. He said he spoke to them on Friday prior to remind them of the appearance and they told him they would not be able to attend.

Judge Kelley then asked me how I felt about the continuance and I explained that I had been more than accommodating in agreeing to necessary continuances in the interest of fairness, all of which did benefit myself and the prosecution, and the last appearance date where we discussed this date took into account the schedules of the Alemond and Nyman. I explained that I had been present and prepared at every appearance and the prosecution had not. Therefore, I felt another continuance would prove unduly burdensome to myself and contrary to due process. I voiced my objection to granting the continuance.

Judge Kelley then asked Mr. Kelley if he had done everything in his power to ensure the appearance of Alemond and Nyman, to which he said yes. Judge Kelley then said that he agreed with me; that I had been present at every appearance and prepared to argue my motion. He said that another continuance for the State would prove unduly burdensome to me and he therefore DISMISSED ALL CHARGES.

So, what does this mean? Well, the police would have to been sworn in prior to their testimony for the hearing. The report and video contradict each other. The video, being the authoritative record of the events, would speak to perjury and fabrication of evidence as well as exculpate me of the charges while showing Alemond and Nyman engaged in a number of misdemeanors and felonies. Alemond and Nyman could NOT appear without jeopardizing themselves by way of the evidence on the record. Therefore, no witness, no case. I also do not believe the State could have prevailed with two obviously compromised witnesses.

What next? With the video in-hand I am looking for an attorney who will pursue civil action against the Alemond, Nyman, and the City of Fairview Heights. I have a number of criminal (misdemeanor and felony) charges that I will be working to have filed against Alemond and Nyman. There is still a lot of work to do, but I am unencumbered with any criminal charges which may tend to cast doubt over my claims against the police.

This whole situation speaks to a systemic problem with what is known as “law enforcement”. Police believe they are above the law, they are the law. We are a nuisance and should we transgress upon their particular sensibilities they may exact whatever justice they may see fit to summon and be indemnified from prosecution because of “departmental policy”. They believe themselves to be a superior class of person and we, the people, the rabble. This debate needs to take place in the public domain and illuminate the self-aggrandizing, megalomaniacal threat that is modern “law enforcement”.

This is my account of what transpired on Feb. 17, 2009

Excessive Use of Force by Fairview Heights, Ill. Police for a traffic stop on 2/17/09 on Highway 159 in St. Clair County, Illinois.

This is all courtesy of the arresting, and beating, “officer”, JOSHUAH M ALEMOND and AARON NYMAN

Statement of Mark McCoy (To the best of my recollection at the time after being beaten, Tasered, and suffering blows to the head)

I got off work at 2a.m. CDT on 2/17/2009. I departed my place of work and proceeded north on Highway 159. I proceeded through Swansea, IL, and then through Fairview Heights, IL. The speed limit from Swansea to Fairview Hts. is 45mph. I maintained my speed within that limit. When I reached Fairview Hts. the limit reduces to 35mph. I continued at that speed until I reached the intersection of Highway 159 and Rt. 50. where I stopped at a light for less than a minute. Looking into my rear view mirror, I noticed headlights approaching from the rear’ Before the vehicle could reach me the light turned green and I resumed my travels northbound on Hwy. 159. I noticed in my rear view mirror that the approaching vehicle turned east on Rt. 50 where a police light-bar was visible on the vehicle. It was a police cruiser.

I continued north on Hwy. 159 through Fairview Hts. and reached the last traffic control light before heading out of the City. This light is at an intersection that leads to a gas station to the right and a shopping plaza to the left. Just past that light is a facility known as “The Fountains”. Past that point it is nothing but 4 lanes of Hwy. 159 leading to Collinsville, Il.

As I reached the last traffic control light I noticed another vehicle approaching rather quickly.  I thought it might be just another person driving fast since a police car just turned west. I maintained my position in the left lane of northbound Hwy. 159, using my high-beams when possible and dimming when another vehicle approached. I proceeded north for about a half mile while noticing the vehicle I saw approaching quickly was now maintaining a distance behind me. I thought nothing of it in particular.

At a little more than a half-mile past the Fountains, that vehicle turned on emergency lights, flashing alternating red and blue. I believed I was about to be pulled over. Looking to the right, there is a very narrow shoulder. Hwy. 159 has no lighting. I looked for a place to stop, but did not consider the shoulder a viable option, especially with prolific video of cars striking other cars on the side of the road; often when stopped by police. I knew of a lighted street down the road since I travel this route 4 nights a week. I intended to stop on that road, Donald Baily Drive, a private driveway for the pipefitters union hall.

Up to this time, I had only seen flashing lights and heard no horn or siren. I was not able to discern any markings on the vehicle which would indicate it was an official police vehicle; nor could I identify the driver of the vehicle as a uniformed officer. I was over  three-quarters of a mile past the Fountains. I was approaching the lighted street and since seeing the flashing lights I reduced my speed by about 5 mph and activated my flashers in effort to acknowledge the signal and to avoid any misperception that I was attempting to flee or elude. At about this time I noticed a siren sound of “whoop whoop” emanating from the vehicle. It was only a short, reasonable time that I turned right onto the lighted way of Donald Bailey Drive, where I then pulled to the right and stopped.

Upon stopping, I rolled down my driver’s side window. I called my wife and had her on my Bluetooth speaker during the stop. I told her that I was being stopped and to stay on the phone if possible. The officer was shouting for me to “show my hands”. I placed both my hands outside the driver’s side window and shouted the question to the officer, “Am I under arrest?” The officer responded with “Exit the vehicle”. I responded again with “Am I under Arrest?” Another command, “Turn around and place your hands on your head. Walk backwards towards my voice”, I asked again, “Am I under arrest?” Another command, “On your knees and cross your ankles!” At this point I accepted the reality that I was under arrest since it now appeared that my freedom of movement was being restricted.

I complied with the last command and, with my back towards the officer, dropped to my knees and placed my hands behind my head and crossed my ankles. I sensed the officer approaching from the rear and expected to be cuffed. Instead, unexpectedly and suddenly I experienced a force pushing me towards the pavement. My natural reaction was to stiffen and maintain my balance since I believed possible injury was imminent without the use of my hands as they were restrained from behind. The unknown officer pushed my head forward and continuing to exert pressure upon my neck and head, causing great pain. It felt as if the weight of the officer was assigned to one knee which resided upon my neck and head. My face was directly upon the concrete road. I could feel my glasses give way and my lip split. Hoping that the worst was over I waited for the cuffs, but instead sensed what appeared to be a Taser placed against the base of my skull at the back. I could hear the “clack, clack, clack,… of the sparks and my neck experienced what felt like hundreds of bee stings. The sensation seemed to last forever, and I sensed no sign of letting up.

I began to fear I may be seriously injured or killed. In self-defense and desperation, I tried to reach back to knock his hand away. The officer pressed harder, both on my neck with his knee, and with the Taser. I resigned to accept whatever fate should this continue and after going limp I was cuffed and left to lie on the ground.

While on the ground, I could not see much and I believe other officer arrived during the beating; which later would be shown that there were actually two officers, only one of which I was initially aware. I soon found myself in the back seat of the patrol car, but the timeframe between being Tasered and moving to the car is fuzzy. I may have blacked out or become disoriented. I sat in the back seat and just bled for some time while other police arrived and went through my truck. My glasses were off and presumed broken so I could not discern much from where I was. It is all rather fuzzy at this point. The police attempted to ask me some questions, to which I replied since I was under arrest I would reserve any statements for counsel.

I was placed in the back of the cruiser and left for what seemed like about a half-hour. In that time I experienced an irregular heartbeat, shortness of breath, and difficulty swallowing. I believe possibly because of my neck muscles contracting from the shock and closing off my windpipe, but I’m not certain. The sensation subsided after about 10 or 15 mins, but reoccurred every so often for a minute or two. One of the patrolmen opened the driver-side rear door and asked me if I required medical attention. This was after about a half-hour of no inquiry. I requested medical attention. He asked if I wanted an ambulance at the scene or to wait for EMS at the station. I said I wanted an ambulance at the scene. The patrolman commented that my injuries appeared superficial and he would have EMS waiting at the station. He then slammed the door and walked away. There were two EMS personnel, at the station who did a cursory cleaning of debris from my facial wounds.

My wife arrived and sat on Hwy. 159 to observe from the side of Hwy. 159. I was eventually transported to Fairview Heights Police Station and processed.

The salient points of this store are; 1. I never identified myself or showed any identification. Who did this man believe he was beating and why would he feel this level of force is necessary? It appears to me that he preemptively ran my plates and discovered an outstanding “bench warrant”. I believe he was running plates with NO reasonable suspicion and looking for a warrant hit. There are SO many of these things out there that you can throw a rock at someone who has one for merely missing a court date, not completing the payment of a fine…… and most aren’t even seen or signed by a judge. After this man got a hit on a warrant he contrived “swerving” as reasonable suspicion. 2. I am essentially under arrest immediately for a traffic infraction, if there is no warrant component. Why, if the man was so afraid of me, did he not maintain a safe distance with his weapon and me in my truck while he called for backup? 3. Why did they pry a lock off my rear passenger-side storage compartment? The keys were on the ring with my ignition key. 3. Why kick a man to the ground from behind while he is on his knees and defenseless, as well as exhibiting no overt threat? 4. Why, when I asked if I am “under arrest”, did he not answer? A simple “yes” would have sufficed. 4. His statement to me, “If you would have pulled over when I lit you up this never would have happened.” This essentially says that “If you would have read my mind and pulled over when I thought you should you would not have suffered under punishment determined by me for transgressing my arbitrary and unannounced sensibilities.” 6. I was denied medical attention when requested. I was left alone, injured, with no inquiry as to my condition; especially after being Tasered in the back of the neck. 7. After receiving a copy of the report, I discovered there were two patrolmen on the scene when I was beaten and Tasered. Why such force when a man on his knees and hands on his head? 8. I was not informed of my rights at any time, nor was I afforded an opportunity to speak with counsel while in custody.

So, what do we have? Perjury for falsifying an “information” (ticket) in fabricating reasonable suspicion for the stop. Unlawful imprisonment for detaining me under color of law and with the threat of deadly force when the impetus for the stop was never lawful (fruit of the poison tree). Assault, battery, and cruel and unusual punishment for the injuries inflicted upon me for violating “his” law. Unlawful search and seizure. The tape from my recorder as well as the broken lock in my rear passenger compartment constitute a violation of the 4th Amendment protection from search without a warrant or probable cause. Nowhere in the stop for a bench warrant or improper lane usage did any probable cause of a “crime” arise. I was not apprised of my rights or afforded counsel. I was denied medical treatment.

I transcribed Alemond’s report for easier reading and for making notations. You are free to compare it with the PDF version to check for inaccuracies.

Report by Joshua Alemond:

On 02/17/09 at approximately 0211 hrs, I was traveling northbound on Hwy 159 in my marked patrol vehicle, when I observed a red Chevrolet pickup truck, bearing Illinois registration 69128L, traveling northbound in the innermost traffic lane, crossing over I-64. While behind the vehicle, I conducted a computer check of the vehicle’s registration, at which time it revealed it was registered to MARK MCCOYof 41 Grandview, Collinsville, Illinois, 62234. The vehicle was clear and valid, with an expiration of 03/3009. As I continued to follow the vehicle, I observed it begin to weave within its own traffic lane, going from the outer far line to the inner far dash line on several occasions. Believing the driver of the vehicle to be intoxicated, I activated my overhead lights in an attempt to conduct a vehicle stop. This was conducted on northbound Hwy 159, just north of the Fountains Parkway. The vehicle refused to stop and continued to travel northbound in the innermost traffic lane, keeping to the 45 mph speed limit. After the vehicle failed to stop for my overhead lights, I activated my siren and air horn on several occasions, in an effort to stop the vehicle, however; ignoring this, the vehicle continued to travel northbound. At one point the driver activated his bright headlights and applied his hazards as he changed from the innermost traffic lane to the outermost traffic lane. It should be noted that I could not see into the cab of the pickup truck due to the heavy window tint on the rear window. I informed FHPD dispatch of the vehicle’s license plate and that he was refusing to stop. I continued to follow the vehicle past Milburn School Road, and the entrance to the Stonewolf subdivision. The vehicle then made a sudden and aggressive right turn from Hwy 159 onto Donald Bailey Drive, a dead end private roadway to the Pipefitters Union Hall.

It should be noted that while following the vehicle for a mile and a half, I conducted a further computer check of the vehicle’s registration, discovering that one of the registered owners, that being MARK R. MCCOY, M/W, DOB: 08/11/59, was wanted through St. Clair County Sherriff’s department, per warrant number 06TR0058724.

As the vehicle made this sudden turn onto Donald Bailey Drive, it continued traveling forward for several feet coming to a sudden and abrupt stop. After the vehicle came to a stop, still not being able to see the interior or what the occupant or occupants were doing, and for my safety I initiated a felony vehicle stop. I drew my department issued weapon and ordered the driver of the vehicle to show me his hands. I repeated this command several times receiving the response from the driver after which he showed me his hands “Am I arrested?” I ordered the driver to exit the vehicle, keeping his hands raised, to which he eventually complied. I then had the driver walk, with his hands raised, backwards towards my vehicle. I then ordered the driver down on his knees. The driver continued to ask, “Am I under arrest?” I ordered the driver down on his knees, to cross his legs, to cross his ankles, and place his hands on top of his head. The driver initially refused every order I had given him forcing me to repeat my command. It should be noted that during the stop my commands were clear, concise, and in a loud voice. I observed the driver to be a middle aged male white.

Officer Aaron Nyman, DSN 171, responded to the scene to provide cover. I asked the driver if there was anyone else in the vehicle, to which he responded “No”. With Officer Nyman providing cover, I holstered my weapon and approached the subject. I began to lay the subject on the ground for the purpose of handcuffing, at which time he refused to give me his right hand. As he lay face down on the ground with his left hand behind his back, his right hand was lying under him near his waistband. The subject began to resist by pulling his right hand away from me; I ordered him on several occasions to place his hands behind his back, to which he ignored.

Seeing this resistance, Officer Nyman left his cover position and assisted while I struggled with the subject to place him in handcuffs. While attempting to place his hands behind his back and due to his uncooperative behavior, I struck the subject in the right side of his torso in an attempt to gain pain compliance. At this point, I was aware that Officer Nyman had initiated a dry stun to the subject with his department issued taser. The struggle continued for several seconds until Officer Nyman and I pinned the subject to the ground using our legs and body weight and successfully placed him in handcuffs. After being placed in handcuffs, the resistance ceased and the struggle stopped.

While Officer Nyman was securing the driver, I then cleared the interior of the pickup truck, finding no other occupants.

A search incident to arrest revealed no weapons or items of contraband. After picking him off the ground I observed that his face was bleeding. The subject had sustained minor abrasions and lacerations to his face and lip during the struggle. I also observed that the eyeglasses the subject had been wearing were broken and lying on the ground, along with a cell phone and Bluetooth earpiece. During the search incident to arrest, I was unable to find a driver’s license for the subject. Knowing that the vehicle’s registered owner, Mark R. McCoy, to be wanted I asked if he was this subject. The driver refused to answer, stating “I want counsel”. During this time he did ask what he was being arrested for, at which time Officer Nyman informed him Fleeing and Eluding as well as Resisting Arrest.

The driver was secured in the rear of my marked patrol vehicle. Sgt. Krummrich, DSN 141, was notified and responded to supervise the scene.

Officer Nyman and I conducted a search incident to arrest of the interior of the vehicle, finding no weapons or contraband. We did locate a laptop computer, two cell phones, an audio voice recorder, as well as three digital cameras, and a video recorder. Officer Nyman also located several anti-government and anti-police pamphlets and reading material.

When asked why he had refused to stop for my marked patrol vehicle, the subject stated that he was looking for a safe place to stop. It should be noted that this section of State Highway 159 is a four lane highway with a center turn lane and wide shoulder for both north and southbound traffic.

The subject requested medical attention, at which time he was informed that MedStar EMS ALS had been contacted and would respond to FHPD for treatment and evaluation.

While conducting a search of the interior of the vehicle, I located a US Passport, belonging to the registered owner and driver of the vehicle, that being MARK R. MCCOY, M/W, DOB: 08/11/59. FHPD dispatch confirmed the warrant through computer hit conformation as being active per warrant number 06TR0058724, bond amount $1,000, 10% applying.

McCoy was transported to the FHPD after being placed under arrest for his outstanding warrant, as well as Resisting a Peace Officer. He was issued Non-Traffic Complaint 1115419 for this charge. He was also issued Illinois Traffic Citations 1159154 for Improper Lane Usage, 1159155 for Fleeing/Attempting to Elude Police, 1159156 for No Valid Driver’s License and 1159157 for Operating an Uninsured Vehicle. Copies of the Citations are attached to this report. Upon arrival at the FHPD, McCoy was properly booked for the aforementioned charge.

Prior to his booking, MedStar EMS had arrived to treat McCoy’s minor injuries.

While still on the scene with McCoy’s vehicle, Officer Nyman prepared FHPD 112, this department’s Towed Vehicle Report. A copy of which was provided to McCoy. Walter’s Towing responded and towed the vehicle to their facility.

A check of McCoy’s criminal history indicated a total of two arrests with two convictions, including one charge with one conviction for Larceny, one charge with zero convictions for Forgery. McCoy’s last arrest was by the FHPD on 04/16/80.

Upon completion of all booking procedures of McCoy was released from FHPD custody after posting the required cash only bond. At this time, he was provided all his appropriate copies of the Towed Vehicle Report, Non-Traffic Complaint, as well as his Illinois Traffic Citations.

Items Discovered During Search Subsequent To Arrest

Item of note:
Per Aldemon’s report, page 5 of 6, he states, “Nyman also located several anti-government and anti-police pamphlets and reading material.
Here is a list of the reading material in my possession and where it was located:

Pursuant to the warrantless search incident to arrest, the inventory of my vehicle contained:

Healing Our World, The other piece of the puzzle by Dr. Mary J. Ruwart

Asset Protection Secrets,  by Arnold Goldstein J.D., LLM, Ph.D
DSC Power 832 Security System

Pioneer DEH-P7700MP Stereo

Under The Hood by TechOnline

Owners Manual – 1998 Chevy S-10

http://lawfulgov.org/justsayno.htm

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Prince

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State

Civil Liberties and the Bill of Rights, by Professor John E. Finn

Mother Earth News, Issue No. 228

www.whoismarkmccoy.com

American Juror, Newsletter of the Fully Informed Jury Association and the American Jury Institute, Volume 20, Issue 1 Spring 2008

The Philosopher’s Handbook, by Stanley Rosen “Essential Readings from Plato to Kant”

Philosophy for Dummies by Tom Morris, Ph.D.

The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States of America, autographed by 2004 Libertarian Presidential Candidate, Michael Badnarik

That’s it as far as “printed material” aside from some cell phone plan tri-folds and business cards.

Apparently, Alemon and Nyman have a distorted view of what constitutes “anti-government” and “anti-police”. Notwithstanding their hyperbolic and exaggerated interpretation of my reading material genre, it was in-fact police working for government who violated my rights, beat, and shocked me. Of course, to be accurate, it was ignorant, violent, oppressive, and lying men in costumes who used their delusional belief in being morally or lawfully superior to others by virtue of the color of their clothes, or possession of weapons which harmed me. Police and government are fictions, and possess no conscience. Alemon and Nyman, concordantly, are flesh who choose not to embrace their conscience, or have instead adopted despots as their external conscience.

Analysis of charges, in the order of they allegedly occurred.

Improper Lane Usage (Probable cause for the initial stop). The report states that, “As I continued to follow the vehicle, I observed it to begin to weave within its own traffic lane, going from the outer far line to the inner far dash line on several occasions. Believing the driver of the vehicle to be intoxicated, I activated my overhead lights in an attempt to conduct a vehicle stop.” The statute below at (a) states “…within a single lane…” which is what the report confirms, “…within its own traffic lane…”

(625 ILCS 5/11-709) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-709)
Sec. 11-709. Driving on roadways laned for traffic. Whenever any roadway has been divided into 2 or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others consistent herewith shall apply.
(a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.
(b) Upon a roadway which is divided into 3 lanes and provides for two-way movement of traffic, a vehicle shall not be driven in the center lane except when overtaking and passing another vehicle traveling in the same direction when such center lane is clear of traffic within a safe distance, or in preparation for making a left turn or where such center lane is at the time allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the same direction that the vehicle is proceeding and such allocation is designated by official traffic control devices.
(c) Official traffic control devices may be erected directing specific traffic to use a designated lane or designating those lanes to be used by traffic moving in a particular direction regardless of the center of the roadway and drivers of vehicles shall obey the directions of every such device. On multi-lane controlled access highways with 3 or more lanes in one direction or on any multi-laned highway with 2 or more lanes in one direction, the Department may designate lanes of traffic to be used by different types of motor vehicles. Drivers must obey lane designation signing except when it is necessary to use a different lane to make a turning maneuver.
(d) Official traffic control devices may be installed prohibiting the changing of lanes on sections of roadway and drivers of vehicles shall obey the directions of every such device.
(Source: P.A. 84-1311.)

Fleeing/attempting to elude.

(625 ILCS 5/11-204) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-204)
Sec. 11-204. Fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer.
(a) Any driver or operator of a motor vehicle who, having been given a visual or audible signal by a peace officer directing such driver or operator to bring his vehicle to a stop, willfully fails or refuses to obey such direction,increases his speed, extinguishes his lights, or otherwise flees or attempts to elude the officer, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. The signal given by the peace officer may be by hand, voice, siren, red or blue light. Provided, the officer giving such signal shall be in police uniform, and, if driving a vehicle, such vehicle shall display illuminated oscillating, rotating or flashing red or blue lights which when used in conjunction with an audible horn or siren would indicate the vehicle to be an official police vehicle. Such requirement shall not preclude the use of amber or white oscillating, rotating or flashing lights in conjunction with red or blue oscillating, rotating or flashing lights as required in Section 12-215 of Chapter 12.
(b) Upon receiving notice of such conviction the Secretary of State shall suspend the drivers license of the person so convicted for a period of not more than 6 months for a first conviction and not more than 12 months for a second conviction.
(c) A third or subsequent violation of this Section is a Class 4 felony.
(Source: P.A. 93-120, eff. 1-1-04.)

Resisting Peace Officer

(720 ILCS 5/31-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 31-1)
Sec. 31-1. Resisting or obstructing a peace officer, firefighter, or correctional institution employee.
(a) A person who knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer, firefighter, or correctional institution employee of any authorized act within his official capacity commits a Class A misdemeanor.
(Source: P.A. 95-801, eff. 1-1-09.)

 

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Footprints in the sand… Who has been here? Visitors of the month.

As with my “keywords” page, I thought it would be interesting to show “who” has been here. Although I can’t identify the individual, I can identify the network or service provider used by visitors to my site. This information indicates the various sources where the “curious” reside. Pay attention to government offices who have claim of not being informed.

Service Providers and networks  from Dec. 1, 2010 thru Dec. 31, 2010

1h ltd.
411 computers
754th electronic systems group
abonnes adsl de fdn
acceptance insurance agency
accord corporation
adams networks inc.
admin ofc us courts
adsl-go-plus
advanced business group llc
advocatehealth.com
airbaud inc
alameda county office of education
alice dsl
allied barton security services llc – consh
alltel sip customers – little rock
america online inc
america online inc.
apps communications
arcor ag
area 6 lth
assigned client hosting enviroments.
at&t internet services
at&t services inc.
at&t worldnet services
avenue-broadband-westville
barristers chambers limited
basepoint properties limited
belcan corporation
bell sympatico
bellsouth.net inc.
birg meltser ltd-060614054411
birmingham home static
bon ton
bryn mawr
bslam106 le lamentin bloc 2
bsren258 rennes bloc 1
bt-adsl
btc broadband service
cass cable tv inc.
cassiday schade & gloor
cat wireless 99 moo 3 chaeng watthana road bangkok
cbeyond communications llc
cedar falls utilities
cellco partnership dba verizon wireless
charter communications
chcgil adsl se12 pppox
chicago transit authority
chtd chunghwa telecom co. ltd.
chunghwa telecom data communication business group
ci – dickinsonwrightpllc sid-15334
city of fairview heights
city of redlands
city of santa fe
city of warrenville
city of waukegan fire dept
clear rate communications inc.
clearwire us llc
codero
cogeco cable canada inc.
cogeco cable solutions
cogent communications
cole taylor bank
college boreal
comcast business communications inc.
comcast cable communications
comcast cable communications holdings inc
comcast cable communications inc
comcast cable communications inc.
comcast cable communications ip services
comite gestor da internet no brasil
commercial bank
compas cable/city of morganton
computers unlimited
consolidated communications inc.
continental broadband florida inc dba webunited
copper valley telephone cooperative incorporated
core ip network development
covad communications co.
cox communications
cox communications inc.
cpe customers nl
customers ie
customers procono
cypress communications inc.
daimler ag
department of homeland security
deutsche telekom ag
dls internet services
donekoservice ltd
dsl extreme
dupage county
dynamic pools
earthlink inc
easynet ltd
eircom
elisa oyj
embarq corporation
emp. regional de tel. valle del cauca
equity residential properties
erwin-martinkus and cole ltd
exalead
ezeeweb.com inc
fibercity
fidelity communication international inc.
fire security systems
foley & lardner llp
frontier communications of america inc.
fuse internet access
gala ballyfermot vl 5.4 sector 1 – 90deg
gbb-vismin-ip-pool
general communication inc.
gerrys information technology (pvt) ltd
get as
gi partners llc dba
global crossing
global mobile operator
globe-wimax-ip-pool
grossinger city toyota
gulf coast claims service
harrisonville telephone
harvard university
haskoli islands
heartland solutions group-090306191500
hofnet communications inc.
hughes network systems
hughes supply
hunziker walton llc-100216172023
husch eppenberger
idnet broadband pool addresses
iinet limited
ill assoc of park dist-071101010600
illinois century network
illinois institute of technology
imagine telecommunications ltd
indian river county – mia
information services agency
infrastructure em – dhcp assignments residential users
insight communications company l.p.
institute for transfusion medicine
international islamic university of malaysia
internet connect inc.
internet service provider
ip pools
iseek communications
itc xxi century volgodonsk
james e. dahl
joseph v roddy
k lawler-050727162518
kaplan inc
knology inc.
krnic
l-3 communications corporation
level 3 communications inc.
lisburn city council
logonix corporation
macmillan india ltd
mci communications services inc. d/b/a verizon business
mckeown fitzgerald
mediacom communications corp
mediacom communications corporation
medstar health
megapath networks inc.
mem adsl cbb
mia adsl cbb
mia adsl eeua
microsoft corp
monroe township boe
morgan lewis bockius
motricity inc
mr. kemph
mt. vernon.net inc.
mtco communications
nadejda.net ltd
national central university
national law school of india university
navigant consulting
netscape communications corp.
new haven public schools
new mexico institute of mining and technology
new wave communications
northern arizona university
northern illinois university
northland cable television
ntt america inc.
nuvox communications inc.
nzgate aggregate networks
odelson sterk
olin corp.
onenet communications inc. dynamic dial
opal telecom dsl
opticomp *
optimum online (cablevision systems)
optus internet – retail
pace suburban bus co
paetec communications inc.
pe khersontelecom
penteledata inc. – cable
pe-tdperx2-lacnic
pickens city council – gsp
please send abuse/spam complaints to abuse@012.net.il
pppox pool – bras1.ksc2mo.726113
pppox pool – bras2 stlsmo 062104-1903.615166
pppox pool – bras4.hstntx-1173231961
pppox pool – rback1 frsn01.18162
pppox pool – rback1.chcgil-1236042061
pppox pool – rback1.pltnca 05182006-1157.50713
pppox pool – rback18 hstntx #2
pppox pool – rback18.emhril-1243383660
pppox pool – rback3.tul2ok 013006 1320
pppox pool – rback4 irvnca
pppox pool – rback4.covlil
pppox pool – rback6.chcgil 062704-1045.689170
pppox pool – rback7.ltrkar 112105-1840
pppox pool – se1.chmpil – 022207-1602
pppox pool – se1.covlil-1181799961
pppox pool – se1.covlil-1181806262
pppox pool – se15.chcgil-1239841860
pppox pool – se2.covlil 012408 0155
pppox pool – se2.covlil-1223251861
pppox pool – se2.covlil-1241747461
pppox pool – se2.emhril-1256599560
pppox pool – se3.emhril-1192494963
pppox pool – se3.stl2mo-1251413160
pppox pool – se3.stl2mo-1273198260
pppox pool – se6.chcgil-1196758261
pppox pool – se7.chcgil-1200084662
pppox pool – se7.chcgil-1245304261
pppox pool – se7.chcgil-1258079761
pppox pool – se7.emhril-1195140962
pppox pool rback24.chcgil 012607 0430
pppox pool rback39.snfcca.1
pppox pool se1.covlil 041007-0132
pppox pool se10.chcgil 121007 0944
pppox pool se10.chcgil 121707 0104
pppox pool se11.emhril 121007 1110
pppox pool se13.chcgil 121007 0923
pppox pool se13.chcgil 121707 0105
pppox pool se14.emhril 121007 1051
pppox pool se3.chcgil 041007 1220
pppox pool se4.chcgil 041007 1222
pppox pool se5.emhril 041007 1246
pppox pool se5.emhril 062507 0310
pppox pool se9.emhril 121007 1044
private customer – sbc internet services
psinet inc.
pt telekomunikasi indonesia
pt telkom indonesia s customer.
qwest communications company llc
rackspace hosting
raytheon company
rback22c.irvnca
rback35.irvnca.20060509
rcn corporation
rcom-wireless-1x-mumbai
rcsntx adsl bras26 pppox
research in motion limited
ripley s believe it or not
riverside community college district
rmo adsl cbb
road runner holdco llc
robbins salomon & patt
rogers cable inc. bloor
rogers cable inc. etob
rtr tv-channel network
sasktel wide area network engineering center
scansafe inc.
schnuck markets inc
sdf adsl eeua
se4.bcvloh pppox
se8.sfldmi pppox
sears direct response
service provider corporation
sfo bridged circuits
shaw communications inc.
shawneelink corporation
smart broadband incorporated
softlayer technologies inc.
so-net entertainment corporation
sonic.net inc.
southern illinois university at edwardsville
spectra networks- ltd-
speednet llc
sprint dsl network
sprint nextel corporation
starhub cable vision ltd
state of illinois
state of wi dept. of administration
static links
storino- ramello and durkin law
streamyxbusiness-northern-as
student village foundation
suddenlink communications
super micro computer inc
supranet communications inc.
surewest broadband
sympatico hse
t6 broadband
tds telecom
teknikbyran broadband customers
telefonica de argentina
telefonica de espana sau
telefonica de espana sau (ncc#2008052974)
telekom malaysia berhad
telenor business solutions as
telstra internet
telus communications inc.
terry darst-090722152626
texas health resources
texas mid-gulf cablevision lp
the george washington university
the village at gainesville
the village of carol stream
the village of shiloh
tishman speyer properties lp
t-mobile usa inc.
tradition north america
tsystems
tw telecom holdings inc.
u.s. securities & exchange commission
unite private networks llc.
united states senate
university of maryland
university of minnesota
university of missouri – dba the missouri research and education
university of petroleum & energy studies
university of western ontario
upc slovakia s.r.o
us courts
vassar college
verizon internet services
verizon online llc
viacom inc.
videotron ltee
village of elk grove
vincent f cornelius-070226091014
vtr banda ancha s.a.
wabash independent networks
walgreens
wanadoo adsl customers with static addresses
washington university
wave broadband
webster bank
webster-061220164319
whitt law
wideopenwest illinois
wideopenwest michigan
windstream communications inc
wingis
xdsl access and service provider in norway
xmission l.c.
xo communications
yediot technologies
yhti inc.
zscaler inc.

1h ltd.
411 computers
754th electronic systems group
abonnes adsl de fdn
acceptance insurance agency
accord corporation
adams networks inc.
admin ofc us courts
adsl-go-plus
advanced business group llc
advocatehealth.com
airbaud inc
alameda county office of education
alice dsl
allied barton security services llc – consh
alltel sip customers – little rock
america online inc
america online inc.
apps communications
arcor ag
area 6 lth
assigned client hosting enviroments.
at&t internet services
at&t services inc.
at&t worldnet services
avenue-broadband-westville
barristers chambers limited
basepoint properties limited
belcan corporation
bell sympatico
bellsouth.net inc.
birg meltser ltd-060614054411
birmingham home static
bon ton
bryn mawr
bslam106 le lamentin bloc 2
bsren258 rennes bloc 1
bt-adsl
btc broadband service
cass cable tv inc.
cassiday schade & gloor
cat wireless 99 moo 3 chaeng watthana road bangkok
cbeyond communications llc
cedar falls utilities
cellco partnership dba verizon wireless
charter communications
chcgil adsl se12 pppox
chicago transit authority
chtd chunghwa telecom co. ltd.
chunghwa telecom data communication business group
ci – dickinsonwrightpllc sid-15334
city of fairview heights
city of redlands
city of santa fe
city of warrenville
city of waukegan fire dept
clear rate communications inc.
clearwire us llc
codero
cogeco cable canada inc.
cogeco cable solutions
cogent communications
cole taylor bank
college boreal
comcast business communications inc.
comcast cable communications
comcast cable communications holdings inc
comcast cable communications inc
comcast cable communications inc.
comcast cable communications ip services
comite gestor da internet no brasil
commercial bank
compas cable/city of morganton
computers unlimited
consolidated communications inc.
continental broadband florida inc dba webunited
copper valley telephone cooperative incorporated
core ip network development
covad communications co.
cox communications
cox communications inc.
cpe customers nl
customers ie
customers procono
cypress communications inc.
daimler ag
department of homeland security
deutsche telekom ag
dls internet services
donekoservice ltd
dsl extreme
dupage county
dynamic pools
earthlink inc
easynet ltd
eircom
elisa oyj
embarq corporation
emp. regional de tel. valle del cauca
equity residential properties
erwin-martinkus and cole ltd
exalead
ezeeweb.com inc
fibercity
fidelity communication international inc.
fire security systems
foley & lardner llp
frontier communications of america inc.
fuse internet access
gala ballyfermot vl 5.4 sector 1 – 90deg
gbb-vismin-ip-pool
general communication inc.
gerrys information technology (pvt) ltd
get as
gi partners llc dba
global crossing
global mobile operator
globe-wimax-ip-pool
grossinger city toyota
gulf coast claims service
harrisonville telephone
harvard university
haskoli islands
heartland solutions group-090306191500
hofnet communications inc.
hughes network systems
hughes supply
hunziker walton llc-100216172023
husch eppenberger
idnet broadband pool addresses
iinet limited
ill assoc of park dist-071101010600
illinois century network
illinois institute of technology
imagine telecommunications ltd
indian river county – mia
information services agency
infrastructure em – dhcp assignments residential users
insight communications company l.p.
institute for transfusion medicine
international islamic university of malaysia
internet connect inc.
internet service provider
ip pools
iseek communications
itc xxi century volgodonsk
james e. dahl
joseph v roddy
k lawler-050727162518
kaplan inc
knology inc.
krnic
l-3 communications corporation
level 3 communications inc.
lisburn city council
logonix corporation
macmillan india ltd
mci communications services inc. d/b/a verizon business
mckeown fitzgerald
mediacom communications corp
mediacom communications corporation
medstar health
megapath networks inc.
mem adsl cbb
mia adsl cbb
mia adsl eeua
microsoft corp
monroe township boe
morgan lewis bockius
motricity inc
mr. kemph
mt. vernon.net inc.
mtco communications
nadejda.net ltd
national central university
national law school of india university
navigant consulting
netscape communications corp.
new haven public schools
new mexico institute of mining and technology
new wave communications
northern arizona university
northern illinois university
northland cable television
ntt america inc.
nuvox communications inc.
nzgate aggregate networks
odelson sterk
olin corp.
onenet communications inc. dynamic dial
opal telecom dsl
opticomp *
optimum online (cablevision systems)
optus internet – retail
pace suburban bus co
paetec communications inc.
pe khersontelecom
penteledata inc. – cable
pe-tdperx2-lacnic
pickens city council – gsp
please send abuse/spam complaints to abuse@012.net.il
pppox pool – bras1.ksc2mo.726113
pppox pool – bras2 stlsmo 062104-1903.615166
pppox pool – bras4.hstntx-1173231961
pppox pool – rback1 frsn01.18162
pppox pool – rback1.chcgil-1236042061
pppox pool – rback1.pltnca 05182006-1157.50713
pppox pool – rback18 hstntx #2
pppox pool – rback18.emhril-1243383660
pppox pool – rback3.tul2ok 013006 1320
pppox pool – rback4 irvnca
pppox pool – rback4.covlil
pppox pool – rback6.chcgil 062704-1045.689170
pppox pool – rback7.ltrkar 112105-1840
pppox pool – se1.chmpil – 022207-1602
pppox pool – se1.covlil-1181799961
pppox pool – se1.covlil-1181806262
pppox pool – se15.chcgil-1239841860
pppox pool – se2.covlil 012408 0155
pppox pool – se2.covlil-1223251861
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private customer – sbc internet services
psinet inc.
pt telekomunikasi indonesia
pt telkom indonesia s customer.
qwest communications company llc
rackspace hosting
raytheon company
rback22c.irvnca
rback35.irvnca.20060509
rcn corporation
rcom-wireless-1x-mumbai
rcsntx adsl bras26 pppox
research in motion limited
ripley s believe it or not
riverside community college district
rmo adsl cbb
road runner holdco llc
robbins salomon & patt
rogers cable inc. bloor
rogers cable inc. etob
rtr tv-channel network
sasktel wide area network engineering center
scansafe inc.
schnuck markets inc
sdf adsl eeua
se4.bcvloh pppox
se8.sfldmi pppox
sears direct response
service provider corporation
sfo bridged circuits
shaw communications inc.
shawneelink corporation
smart broadband incorporated
softlayer technologies inc.
so-net entertainment corporation
sonic.net inc.
southern illinois university at edwardsville
spectra networks- ltd-
speednet llc
sprint dsl network
sprint nextel corporation
starhub cable vision ltd
state of illinois
state of wi dept. of administration
static links
storino- ramello and durkin law
streamyxbusiness-northern-as
student village foundation
suddenlink communications
super micro computer inc
supranet communications inc.
surewest broadband
sympatico hse
t6 broadband
tds telecom
teknikbyran broadband customers
telefonica de argentina
telefonica de espana sau
telefonica de espana sau (ncc#2008052974)
telekom malaysia berhad
telenor business solutions as
telstra internet
telus communications inc.
terry darst-090722152626
texas health resources
texas mid-gulf cablevision lp
the george washington university
the village at gainesville
the village of carol stream
the village of shiloh
tishman speyer properties lp
t-mobile usa inc.
tradition north america
tsystems
tw telecom holdings inc.
u.s. securities & exchange commission
unite private networks llc.
united states senate
university of maryland
university of minnesota
university of missouri – dba the missouri research and education
university of petroleum & energy studies
university of western ontario
upc slovakia s.r.o
us courts
vassar college
verizon internet services
verizon online llc
viacom inc.
videotron ltee
village of elk grove
vincent f cornelius-070226091014
vtr banda ancha s.a.
wabash independent networks
walgreens
wanadoo adsl customers with static addresses
washington university
wave broadband
webster bank
webster-061220164319
whitt law
wideopenwest illinois
wideopenwest michigan
windstream communications inc
wingis
xdsl access and service provider in norway
xmission l.c.
xo communications
yediot technologies
yhti inc.
zscaler inc.

How did you get here? Keywords of the month.

Of all the traffic I see come to this site I often wonder just “how” people found me. It is interesting to see what was entered into search engines when arriving at markmccoy.com

I thought I would share some search engine analytics with you each month. Maybe you will see your search term in this list. How did you get here?

Keywords – Dec. 1, 2010 thru Dec. 31, 2010

Keyword
mark mccoy
under the provisions of the court reform and revision act of 1979, municipal judges in missouri cities with a population of more than 7,500 must be
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illinois administrative code violations
illinois police powers
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illinois motor vehicle act
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zina cruse
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blood is the new black mark mccoy
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cathexis mark mccoy
chicago police officer thomas giovenco fired
collinsville illinois ordinances
education and the rise of the corporate state
http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:http://markmccoy.com/wp/2010/10/09/illinois-administrative-procedure-act-contested-hearings/
ilcs firefighter bill of rights discharge
ill.app.3d 113, 788 n.e.2d 62
illinois city or village prohibiting outdoor furnances
illinois compiled statutes improper lighting
illinois local election official cannot certify candidate if statute prohibits certification
illinois municipal police jurisdiction
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illinois volunteer fire fighter governing driving rules
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judge zina illionis
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softlayer security has identified the following scanning tos/aup violation in reference to an ip hosted on your server
stanbuck v. kusper
the right to resist an unlawful arrest in virginia
unlawful arrest defense
vincent lopinot
city of peoria”” 600 imrf standard
335 ill. app. 3d”” “”lawlor””
65 ilcs 5/7-4-8″”
betterment of society”” platitude
certification of ballot”” “”illinois””
chicago heights”” nonpartisan elections
enabling legistlation”” “”hidalgo county water improvment district””
flesh and blood”” “”complaining party””
fourth year of james the first””
mark mccoy”” “”dallas””
maximum age”” become fire department chicago
municipal officers electoral board rules””
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tami springer”” illinois
# ^ see generally article 2 of the illinois municipal code, 65 ilcs 5/2‑1‑1 et seq.
10-3-7 motor vehicle act illinois
2-164-010(b)
20 illinois admin code 420
20th judicial circuit illinois haida
3.1-55-10 50 ilcs 105/3 65 ilcs
367j illinois municipal
6. county of cook v. john sexton contractors company, 75 ill. 2d 494, 27 ill. dec. 489, 38 n.e. 2d 553
6.19 salaries of employees in the police service
65 illinois compiled statutes annotated § 5/3.1-10(a)
7 ill. reg. 7501
735 ilcs 5/2-114
80 illinois administrative code
820 ilcs 305/8(d)(1) firefighter
83 ill. adm. code §420
92 illinois administrative code section 2-118
92 lll. adm. code 1001.100(n)
a recent change in state law now allows deputy registrars to sign up voters anywhere in illinois
aaron nyman police officer
aaron nyman st.
adjudication laws il
administrative adjudication municipal violations
age to become an auxiliary police officer in bartonville illinois
alarm detection + court case + lisle woodridge
am i allowed to speak for my wife in a traffic court?
ambulance service law fire districts in illinois
anti government-movement-guidebooklaw-handbook
apollo 11 hoax pictures
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apollo 11 sheilding
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are backdoor referendum still legal in illinois?
are illinois municipalities subject to rule 224
are municipal elections in il non partisan
belleville il “”brendan kelly””
board of electoral commission for city of chicago, petition for judicial review
book lunar landing hoax
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brendan kelly states attorney
brian kodish is a loser
cache:http://markmccoy.com/wp/2010/10/09/illinois-administrative-procedure-act-contested-hearings/
california + “”attorney general opinions”” + “”chief of police”” + “”part time””
can a mayor of a township in illinois appoint a treasurer who does not live within the city limits?
can an illinois home rule municipality limit the authority of a regional airport authority?
case laws people v. polk
chapter 92 illinois administrative code section 1001.440
chicago “”building code”” summons
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conservator of the peace”” as defined in the illinois municipal code, article 3.1, division 15,
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dalitsch
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do citizens have the right to defend themselves against unlawful arrest?
does 625 ilcs 5/12-101(a) go against an illinois drivers license
does an email offer a tete a tete?
does binding with paper clip violate illinois election law
does filing of statement of economic interests’ forms affect ballot placement in illinois
does the statement of economic interest get attatched to the statement of candidacy?
dui ordinance violations illinois
dupage “”administrative order”” 05-7
election code illinois — filing motion for expedited hearing
eminent domain case village of algonquin 1961
every city or town must have a municipal code book
factory 189 district 8 il cigar stamp
fagiano v. police board, 98 ill. 2d 277
failure to file statement of financial interest il election law
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fax machine collinsville il
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filing petitions at same time in illinois municipal election
first district case cited by respondent, held that the failure to specify the precise office sought on petitions for nomination per se renders nominating papers invalid even where the specific office is identified on other nominating papers.
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forming an electoral board il
forms of illinois municipal government
forms of illinois municipalities
ga jurisdiction unlawful arrest
glock talk
glock talk showthread
glocktalk
glocktalk mark mccoy
glocktalk rss
hagans v lavine 415 u. s. 533
harrison parker chicago
higgins v. city of galesburg
history of mark mccoy of waukegan ,illinois, who died in late november 2010
hoax moon
home rule laws relating to police demotions
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home rule population
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how appeal evanston ordinance violation
how can i claim my sovereignty
how do i remove the siteground link
how does the declaration define liberty, sovereignty, and law?
how is municipal law police power made
how to be a perfect man by mark mccoy
i am a sovereign man/woman, i do not consent
if a defendant did not know that the statute of limitation for an alleged crime had run out, what can be done?
if a police officer commits a felony while acting in official capacity
il case law how many signatures are needed to run for mayor in st clair county il
il fire and police commission handbook
il municipal election & petition
il municipal police border
il police officer injured vacation benefits
il statute acting police chief 120 days in fiscal year
il. appeal court decision on creditable service chicago police pension
ilcs ch. 65, act 5, §§ 7-4-7 and 7-4-8.
illagel use of force and illagl arrest
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illinois 1972 op.atty.gen. no. s-509
illinois admin procedure act
illinois administrative code chapter 2 section 1001
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illinois administrative code title 92
illinois administrative code title 92 550
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illinois apa section 9
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illinois can a mayor appoint himself to the zoning commission
illinois compiled statutes 65 ilcs 11-31-1
illinois compiled statutes 775 ilcs 5/1-101 et seq
illinois compiled statutes 820 ilcs 315 line of duty compensation act
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illinois department of transportation tort immunity act
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illinois law on volunteer fire fighters vehicles
illinois laws yield fire stations
illinois legal codes ,procedures, precedents in substance abuse treatment
illinois liquor commission code procedure for violations and fines
illinois motor vehicle act of 1911
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illinois municipal code mayors power to appoint
illinois municipal code requires that to run for mayor of a town in illinois
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illinois municipal code+1971 code, §2-1-1
illinois municipal code, article 3.1, division 15, paragraph 25
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illinois traffic ticket ch 625 act 5/11 sec 605.1
illinois trustee ballot order
illinois vehicle code 6 205a2
illinois vehicle code 625 ilcs 5/7-602 and tax
illinois vehicle code illegal use of flashing blue lights
illinois village trustee and conservator of the peace
illinois+law enforcement+garcia act
in re marriage of cook, 117 ill.app.3d 844, 453 n.e.2d 1357, 73 ill.dec. 222 (1st dist. 1983)
inconsistencies in the lunar landing photos
independent candidate versus non partisan illinois
indiana case law regarding resisting illegal arrest
indiana case unlawful arrest 2006
is a city attorney’s statutroy ruling binding on a municipality in illinois
is a warrant hit on a vehicle registration reasonable suspicion for traffic stops?
is is up to the municipal clerk to review candidacy nomination papers in illinois
is it ilegal to register to vote for a non u.s. citesen
is neon light against the law in the state of illinois
is the government putting viruses on wikileaks
john bad elk v. u.s., 177 u.s. 529
joshua alemond
joshuah alemond
judge c philip nichols jr
judge cruse, sinclair county il
judge john prystalski
judge randall kelley
judge zina cruse rulings
judge zina cruse st claire county il
kerner “”illinois supreme court”” resignation “”19 ill.2d 506″”
kirk verbeck, illinois
knobeloch v. electoral board for the city of granite city, 788 n. e. 2d 130 (5th district 2003)
lagrange il municipal election results
land v. board of education of the city of chicago, 202 ill. 2d 414, 426 (2002).
landing on the moon discrepiences
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law enforcement officer vs peace officer
lawlor v. municipal officer electoral board 1975
le cleyre cooperative memphis
life safety code village of worth
list the 5 forms of municipal government in illinois
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mark mccoy.com
marriage “”three-way contract””
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member of multiple school boards incompatibility of office il
michael kusper v. chicago electoral board
michelle kumarich lawyer
minister mark mccoy
missouri cities with a population of more than 7,500 must be
moon landing discrepancies
moon probe
motin to dismiss due process seatbelt ticket
municipal adoption of codes and records act, 50 ilcs 220/0.01 et seq.
municipal code of chicago fire and police commission illinois
municipal code sect.28-43 et. seq. chicago heights illinois
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municipal election rules illinois
municipal fine questions chicago il
municipal ordinance double jeopardy
mutual assistance fire department in il
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nadia brahler
new campaign finance law illinois and aldermanic elections
new st clair county il district attorney
new york state statute of limitations for false testimony
nomination papers must include term illinois
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non-traffic citation illinois code enforcement
north riverside illinois noise regulations
obama speech on race analysis
opyt amaco
ordinance ticket double jeopardy
orland fire protection district v. intrastate piping and controls, inc.
other shows showinh hoax about apollo moon landing
paper clip on petition papers inillinois
parking adjudication ordinance
pat clifford, st. louis county
peace officer versus police officer
peace officer vs law
penalty for code violations springfield illinois
people 2d
people are not sovereign in the us
petition to form park district in illinois
pledge of allegiance mark mccoy
police hit and run in sugar grove il 20/10
police marked me down as us citizen on my arrest how i fix this
police power common law immunity illinois
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powered by tickbar
powers given to cities and towns in illinois so they pass ordinances without legislation from the general assembly
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prospect heights local ordinance 3-5-2
provision of water as police power
qildro for guys
qualified to run for village trustee in illinois
quotes on intentional harm
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revison act of 1979 missouri
right to use resaonable force to defend against arrest
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rosemont police auxiliary
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state v haile 1970
state v. robinson, 145 me. 77, 72 atl. 260
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stay with the letter of the law
stearns v. board of fire & police
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steven fluhr illinois
substantial compliance with notary stamps on election petitions in illinois
supreme court, athority to affect an arrest
taxation of workers compensation benefits illinois public safety officer
the right to defend against unlawful arrest
these principles apply as well to an officer attempting to make an arrest, who abuses his authority and transcends the bounds thereof by the use of unnecessary force and violence, as they do to a private individual who unlawfully uses such force and violence.
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tom courtney>attorney>chicago
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under the provisions of the court reform and revision act of 1979, municipal judges in missouri cities with a population of more than 7,500 must be?
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village of spillertown board of trustees
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walsh v. board of fire & police commissioners of orland park, 96 ill. 2d 101, 106, 70 ill. dec. 241, 449 n.e.2d 115 (1983)
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wells v. board of education of community consolidated school district no. 64, cook county,
what does it mean, a hold harmless right of entry addendum before entering, definition
what form of government operates in chicago heights
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what is difference between peace officer and police officer
what is the court reform and revision act of 1979?
when did the apollo 11 capsule appear at the illinois state fair
where can i find any pending il legislation on cdl requirement for vehicle weighing under 10,000 lbs?
where is mark mccoy
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which source of law precedence in the following situation and why? a municipal ordinance conflicts with the us constitution.
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who is judge zina cruse?
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who is the head of the legislative branch in illinois and what is the title
who’s who in st clair county illinois
why wikileaks remove is on my computer
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wwhich contitutional rights were withdrawn in ca with the merger of municipal and superior court?
zina cruse illinois
zina cruse judge
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dan opyt amaco, so. holland, il
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il. appeal court decision on creditable service of the chicago police pension
illinois municipal code resident case law
illinois park district commissioners police powers code
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