Category Archives: Featured

53 Hours With Kafka in St. Louis by Robert Vroman

This was forwarded to me by a friend on Facebook. It is the account of a man arrested by St. Louis Police for a victimless political transgression (I will not deem to even call it a crime or offense). It is laughable, if not so serious, the incompetence, pettiness, indifference, and inefficiency of a so-called criminal justice system. When I read this, it called to mind the story of Henry David Thoreau when he was arrested and jailed overnight for refusing to pay a poll tax. Contrasting the comparative differences between Thoreau’s time and today, the latter presumably more enlightened and evolved, speak to a decreasing disrespect for our fellow-man.

The images painted by the writer, Robert Vroman, are disconcerting to say the least. How man can consciencelessly‎ serve such a machine is nauseating. They must be men devoid of compassion, conscience, and reason. The notion is sickening.

I sent a personal message to Mayor Francis Slay’s Facebook Page https://www.facebook.com/mayorslay?fref=ts, which of course went unanswered, as well as sending a copy of the article to Chris Nagus of KMOV https://www.facebook.com/chrisnagusKMOV

Will anything be done? Probably not. We all reasonably understand the eroding infrastructure of civilized society and government is merely a garbage collector rounding up the dregs and processing them for cataloging and easy disposal at a later date. It is not that mankind is incapable of autonomy and self-governance, but it is the mindset that government will step in and meliorate every society ill, so why bother? We are the mass of dependents portrayed in New Orleans, huddled on the ground of the Super Dome as the waters rise and we look for somebody from government to save us, while dry paths still lie before us, and we too lazy to take the first step to our own salvation.

Of course, the system tends to prey on the poor and ignorant. I could not help but to think how I, possessing this information, would not take proactive measures to defend myself from the sundry of illegal and brutish tactics. I think I would be inclined to either flee or stand my ground. That is easy to say from the safety of my keyboard, but the slope is not only slippery, it is steep and recovering any semblance of liberty in this country may require more personal battles. I’ll cease the pontificating and present you with the article. I wish you luck, Mr. Vroman.

https://www.facebook.com/notes/robert-vroman/53-hours-with-kafka-in-st-louis/601102316644553

I spent the two worst nights of my life in the St. Louis City Justice Center. I did not experience nor witness any physical violence, not even credible threats. What I got was plenty of apathetic incompetence, banal sadism, and agonizing obtuseness. The vast majority of people dragged through this institution are poor and black, though plenty were educated. Their complaints are evidently easily and frequently ignored. I hope to convince people outside that demographic the City Jail really is run absurdly poorly.

I run a small real estate business specializing in North St. Louis City. This winter ravaged my bottom line. Repair costs are running five times over this time last year. I was quickly reduced to a 24 hour cash cycle, so when I got two traffic tickets in the city, and summons for unpaid vacancy code fine in Florissant, I was forced to choose between paying arbitrary fees to the government, or keeping my tenants homes operational. Many of these people are behind on their rent, yet when its 5 degrees out, I still fixed water heaters and roofs every time, with no breathing room left over for my own problems. Thats the decision I made, wise or not, which got me multiple warrants. I was finally pulled over noon Tuesday 2-18-14, at Grand and Shaw for expired plates.

I was politely cooperative, immediately informed cop I have CCW and a pistol. My permission is not asked, but my vehicle is searched. He finds a google route map of every Bank of America in the city. I collect rent in cash in places like Fairground Park. I need to know the closest bank wherever I happen to be. A sergeant arrives and uses this very flimsy evidence to charge me as an “armed fugitive”. This seems pretty farfetched, so I am still mainly concerned about a wasted evening. My passenger was also arrested with no charges or warrants.

An FBI agent arrives to interrogate me at 2nd District station, about what he has been told is a possible bank robbery conspiracy. I talk about my business 10 minutes and he leaves, and person riding with me is released. I hope the sergeant who felt it necessary to bring this matter to the Federal government’s attention is at least embarrassed. I wait in the 2nd Dist holding cell for several hours, with Lovelle Robinson, 26yo Benton Park resident, who by the end of this ordeal, I’d consider a friend. He’s trapped in a vicious cycle of fines he can’t afford which cost his license, and inevitable jail time, which costs his job, six times, and half his demographic is in this snare. What good is providing a transportation network for your citizens, but enforcing rules so draconian –allegedly for their safety– that they are pauperized out of using the system at all?

The sergeant informs me he has graciously dropped the weapons charges and I am being shipped downtown for the traffic warrants. My gun is mailed to Jeff City for a ballistics tests. Allegedly I get it back in 4-6 weeks, assuming I haven’t shot anyone.

4p, we are handcuffed together en route to the Justice Center. We arrive on the loading dock of this monolithic cube, with 15′ ceilings, and are detail searched. Routine processing questions are answered. And now I am expecting some kind of briefing of what are my options and how long until the next step. Instead my questions are deferred to “later” and I am uncuffed and placed in one of four 10’x20’ cells, standing room only, with 25 other prisoners. The door is plexiglass, naturally lots of shouting, very difficult to hear guards.

And the hours begin to pass.

I am hearing from several different repeat visitors that we are waiting to go up “upstairs”, presumably to smaller cells. I am not hearing how and when you can pay money to get out of here. At 6pm we are given a dinner of single slice of bologna on two slices of bread and six very stale tortilla chips.

By 8pm I was eager to make a deal. The atmosphere in the cell was convivial, but grumpy to the say the least. And yet still absolutely no communication of substance from anyone in authority. The blue shirts refer you to the burgundy shirts, who refer you to the white shirts, who say they don’t have your file. And you get one sentence in passing every ten minutes.

Around 11pm we are marched en masse upstairs. And placed in an identical cell, on an identical laid out floor. Two hours pass. Its 1am and dawns on us, this is it, there are no bunks coming. The people who designed this system expect 25 adults to sleep shoulder to shoulder on the concrete floor of a 60degree, urine rank cattle car, regardless of what they came in here wearing, or committing. Some percentage of these people will be found not guilty.

I have a leather coat, and resign myself to optimizing for some pathetic local maximum of comfort. I’ve got to choose between a terrible pillow, or a terrible blanket, nuzzled against total strangers stuck here against their will. I’m not fearful of them, but holy hell, doesn’t mean I’d invite them over to snuggle. Every 45-90 minutes prisoners are swapped for unclear reasons. Its impossible to relax, the anticipation of the next door opening, that my existence will be acknowledged, and I will be given a glimmer of an opportunity to bargain for release, or at least some kind of ETA.

Ambient noise is extremely disruptive, even as most prisoners try to fall asleep. I am very hungry. I doze shallowly until about 4a. I sit up, look around at this tight row of poor wretches, and just jawdrop that this is a normal night here. Every single night our city makes 70-90 citizens submit to this, a majority of them for inconsequential violations, and many of them innocent. I thought this was my night. The second was worse.

At 5a Wednesday, I receive another meager snack and people are starting to be called to court. The entire morning goes by no further updates. 11a at last I hear my name again and I am marched to videocourt, a term I never heard before this incident. I am taken to a camera booth, and an old man glancing over from a flickery monitor. Well isn’t this charmingly Orwellian. Judge Headroom tells me court date is 3-13-14, I owe $50. “Ok” says me. That is the entirety of information I receive about my case. Back to cells. As lunch arrives we enjoy 2hr window only 10 people in the cell. Spirits are lifted as presumably this is the last stop for us in the Justice Center and we’re being stamped for export, either to free world or another facility.

No. By 2pm, cell has filled back up to the 25 headcount which covered the entire squarefootage of floorspace the night before. Now we are getting antsy. Some are supposed to be cut loose, some people going to various County jails like me, or more serious offenders waiting for the Hall Street workhouse, or Bonne Terre.

But nothing happens. Except more prisoners. They are constantly badgering the guards re: pickups, or even where they are wanted. All inquiries totally rebuffed. After dinner Wednesday, headcount hits 29 and stays there for the night. This forces two people to sleep immediately adjacent to the toilet, and two to sit upright all night; all others 4-6 inches apart on their backs on raw concrete. As the evening wears on, I am again dismayed. I can’t believe this is how this place is run, that I am sleeping like this another night. Ironically I had planned to attend a Lewis Reed fundraiser this evening, and now I really have something to talk to him about.

The slightest change in routine is a minor hope that some crack will form in this mindfuck wall of silence. A new batch of guards every 8 hours, means someone might let slip what the hell is going on behind the curtain.

I am struck with how sympathetic this crowd is to each other, its about 80:20 black:white, and there’s an effort to accommodate each other as much as possible in the circumstances. I got along fine with every inmate I met, some of them were fascinating conversation subjects.

The stories I am hearing from them over and over drive home what a paralyzing force the police exert in many Northside and state street neighborhoods. The aggressive tactics, and senseless spillover economic consequences, give powerful vibe of an uncaring occupation, not protective servants.

Around 1a Thursday its beyond shadow of a doubt no more pickups for the night, frustrations get more vocal. An Elliot Davis fan demands an investigation and lawsuit. Our collective action is thwarted by mere lack of a contraband pen. No means to record a contact list among a group that will never naturally convene again.

My opinion on the plan is sought, as the token capitalist present at the birth of the movement. I give a quick lecture on how lobbying works. Have your people blow up your alderman’s phone,  state rep, mayor, sheriff, stake out their office. Demand meetings, call Town Halls. Don’t waste your time waving a sign in his parking lot. Make sure every elected official directly hears this every day.

I unsettle in under unyielding fluorescents. I go fetal in front corner of cell, and just try to endure semi-consciousness. I smell exactly like you’d expect. Around 9a shuffled around the bowels of this monstrosity, and finally loaded into Florissant’s custody about noon.

The contrast is simple but stark. Florissant has a whiteboard listing everyone locked up here, what they did, what they owe, where they’re going next, and when that pick up is. Wow, that is so easy to give a foothold of peace of mind. When I finally got a lumpy plastic mattress and blanket and more than coffin sized personal space, I was so relieved it was almost as good as being free. Having to openly strip naked to change into jumpsuit didn’t even phase me at this point.

My bizarre 53 hour episode concludes around 5p Thursday.

If you were in the Justice Center with me between 2-18-14 and 2-20-14, I would like to hear from you.

If you are responsible for how that place is run, I challenge you to justify yourself.

 

I am the Missouri Republican 5th District committeeman.

I am running for MO 79th State Representative.

Please vote August 5th.

 

Robert Vroman

314-600-0608

vromanrobert@gmail.com

www.votevroman.com

Infamy

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State Passes Law to Legalize Shooting Police

I saw the original story here http://thefreethoughtproject.com/state-passes-law-legalize-self-defense-police/

The law supports many of the previous holdings from other Courts regarding self-defense against unlawful arrest, as posted here http://marcmkkoy.net/law/analysis-and-interpretation/item/125-your-right-of-defense-against-unlawful-arrest.html

As if we need the State to validate one’s natural right to self-defense. The story is a bit uplifting in that the fortified foundation of the blue-clad-brotherhood has experienced a crack.

Finally some rational legislation is passed concerning ‘public servants’ unlawfully entering another person’s property.

All too often, we see examples of cops breaking into the wrong house and shooting the family dog, or worse, killing a member of the family.

Well, Indiana has taken action to “recognize the unique character of a citizen’s home and to ensure that a citizen feels secure in his or her own home against unlawful intrusion by another individual or a public servant.”

This special amendment is no revolutionary new thought, only common sense.

Self-defense is a natural right; when laws are in place that protect incompetent police by removing one’s ability to protect one’s self, simply because the aggressor has a badge and a uniform, this is a human rights violation. Indiana is leading the way by recognizing this right and creating legislation to protect it.

Of course cops have already begun to fear monger the passage of this bill, “If I pull over a car and I walk up to it and the guy shoots me, he’s going to say, ‘Well, he was trying to illegally enter my property,’ ” said Joseph Hubbard, 40, president of Jeffersonville Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 100. “Somebody is going get away with killing a cop because of this law.”

Instead of looking at the beneficial aspect of this law, which creates the incentive for police to act responsibly and just, Hubbard takes the ‘higher than thou’ attitude and is simply worried about himself.

How about questioning the immoral laws that you are enforcing in the first place? Or how about sympathizing with the innocent people whose pets and family members have been slain, due to police negligence?

Who’s to say that a cop pulling you over to extort money from you for the victimless crime of not wearing a seatbelt, isn’t an unlawful act? Or how about breaking down your door in the middle of the night to kidnap you and throw you in a cage for possessing a plant?

Hopefully this legislation will lead to these arbitrary traffic and drug enforcement “laws” in place solely for revenue collection (aka theft), being brought into question.

The law states:

(i) A person is justified in using reasonable force against a public servant if the person reasonably believes the force is necessary to:
(1) protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force;
(2) prevent or terminate the public servant’s unlawful entry of or attack on the person’s dwelling, curtilage, or occupied motor vehicle; or
(3) prevent or terminate the public servant’s unlawful trespass on or criminal interference with property lawfully in the person’s possession, lawfully in possession of a member of the person’s immediate family, or belonging to a person whose property the person has authority to protect.

It is through legislation such as this, which will empower people again and aid in bringing down these tyrants from their pedestals, who are given free rein to murder and pillage without consequence.

 

 

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Government Regulators Target 11-year Old's Cupcake Business

This story http://www.bnd.com/2014/01/26/3021370/troy-11-year-old-turns-cupcakes.html about an industrious, entrapreunorial youngster caught the attention of the Madison County Health Department, inspiring the synaptic-challenged, bureaucratic buffoonery of nanny-state nincompoops to rear its empty head and threaten the child with a sundry of penalties if she does not procure proper permits, licenses, and pay corresponding fees. The story referencing the state-sponsored terrorist threats against a child of insufficient age, to understand legalese or comprehend the law, is here http://www.bnd.com/2014/01/27/3026205/stir-crazy-young-baker-needs-help.html

The story was encapsulated by this brilliant political cartoon, the artist-of-which, I must say, shares some of my DNA. Aside from the over-the-top bullying by the State, this is primarily a litmus test to see how far they can push us, in this case, tugging at our heart strings with an 11 year old girl who has beckoned the ire of the State.

Madison County Cupcake Regulatory Dipshits

A perusal of the county website,http://www.madisonchd.org/index.shtml, shows the chief administrator as:

Toni Corona, B.S., L.E.H.P.
Public Health Administrator
tmcorona@co.madison.il.us
(618) 296-6065

The Board of Health Members roster is here: http://www.madisonchd.org/board-of-health.shtml

Of course, the government does this all under the pretense that they are watching out for our safety; and such regulations are intended to prevent the spread of disease and injury from businesses who fail, or refuse, to implement prudent and reasonable precautions. This power, called the “police power” (which has nothing go do with police as we commonly refer to them) is regarded as in inherent power of the State to provide for the protection of the public health, safety, welfare, and morals. The police power is undefined, broad, and unlimited. It does not derive from any constitution. It’s powers are limited by the constitution, meaning it cannot cause you to be arrested or searched without constitutional limitations applying, but the scope of its legislation is so encompassing that it does need a constitution to bestow it. It is the inherent power of the State.

The purpose of this article is not to provide an in-depth analysis of the police power because first, the discussion on the validity of the State, sovereignty, natural rights, and consent, would need to be analysed. This article is a diatribe against a county regulatory board which has capriciously and zealously targeted a harmless 11 year-old girl with precocious baking abilities, and painting her as a threat to the public health in-need of governmental oversight in order to secure the confidence and soothe the minds of the fearful masses from contracting life-threatening pathogens or disease from the pre-pubescent, dough-flinging wench.

As with most bureaucratic buffoonery, the regulators will allege a violation, yet fail or refuse to cite which specific law is being broken. They will claim that you need a permit or license, or that you can’t do something, but never articulate the specifics supporting their claims. If we are to believe the Health Department’s claim, we need to find the law they refuse to cite. I found 3 possible laws/regulations which could possibly apply. The result of my research revealed the Cottage Food Preparation Act, which addressed ONLY food sold at farmer’s markets.

The first source would be the Madison County Zoning Ordinance – http://www.co.madison.il.us/planning/PDF/ZoningOrdinance.pdf

This would address the use of the home, as zoned, for baking.

The second source would be the Illinois Food Preparation Act – http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=1584&ChapterID=35

And the third would be the Illinois Food Handling Regulation Enforcement Act. – http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=1578&ChapterID=35

The most applicable and plausible regulation is the Food Handling Regulation Enforcement Act (410 ILCS 625/4), which allows for “Cottage food operation”.

If you want to understand legislation, there is no better resource than the House or Senate debates as to the intent and application of that Legislation. I researched what the County failed to define and found some very telling information. It is my contention that the law does NOT apply to Chloe, and others like her who are not corporate entities or otherwise dealing with hazardous foodstuffs being sold to the public.

My research and findings follow. In the mean-time, If I were Chloe, I would continue to do what I do and wait for the paper tiger to bare its fangs and let the chips fall where they may. I seriously doubt there would be any fines or penalties in her case.

Madison County Zoning Ordinance

http://www.co.madison.il.us/planning/PDF/ZoningOrdinance.pdf

PUBLIC HEALTH (410 ILCS 650/) Sanitary Food Preparation Act. ~ http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=1584&ChapterID=35

PUBLIC HEALTH (410 ILCS 625/) Food Handling Regulation Enforcement Act. ~ http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=1578&ChapterID=35

Cottage Food Preparation added by Public Act 097-0393 http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=097-0393&GA=97

SB0840 Enrolled  LRB097 04584 KTG 44623 b

Senate Transcripts

http://www.ilga.gov/search/LISGSApage.asp?target=SB0840&submit1=Go&scope=sentran97

5/3/2011 @ Page 47 This bill relates to food sold at Farmer’s Markets ~ http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans97/09700035.pdf

5/27/2011 @ Page 13 Voting on the Bill ~ http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans97/09700054.pdf

House Transcripts

5/23/2011 @ Page 34 through Page 43 Addresses food sold at Farmer’s Markets and discusses how home bakers are affected. THIS is the important discussion you want to read. In the discussion it states that the Amish are already allowed to sell bake goods, and the Bill does not affect them. On Page 37, it discusses specifically bake sales held by groups or churches and the determination is that it does not affect what they do, it just adds the definition of what a farmer’s market is. At the top of Page 38, Representative Dugan says, “We think… I think, Representative (speaking to Representative Eddy) they’re currently exempt under current law.” ~ http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans97/09700062.pdf

TEXT OF THE ILLINOIS COTTAGE FOOD PREPARATION PROVISION

(410 ILCS 625/4)
Sec. 4. Cottage food operation.
(a) For the purpose of this Section:
“Cottage food operation” means a person who produces or packages non-potentially hazardous food in a kitchen of that person’s primary domestic residence for direct sale by the owner or a family member, stored in the residence where the food is made.
“Farmers’ market” means a common facility or area where farmers gather to sell a variety of fresh fruits and vegetables and other locally produced farm and food products directly to consumers.
“Potentially hazardous food” means a food that is potentially hazardous according to the Federal Food and Drug Administration 2009 Food Code (FDA 2009 Food Code) or any subsequent amendments to the FDA 2009 Food Code. Potentially hazardous food (PHF) in general means a food that requires time and temperature control for safety (TCS) to limit pathogenic microorganism growth or toxin formation. In accordance with the FDA 2009 Food Code, potentially hazardous food does not include a food item that because of its pH or Aw value, or interaction of Aw and pH values, is designated as a non-PHF/non-TCS food in Table A or B of the FDA 2009 Food Code’s potentially hazardous food definition.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this Section, neither the Department of Public Health nor the Department of Agriculture nor the health department of a unit of local government may regulate the service of food by a cottage food operation providing that all of the following conditions are met:
(1) The food is not a potentially hazardous baked
good, jam, jelly, preserve, fruit butter, dry herb, dry herb blend, or dry tea blend and is intended for end-use only. The following provisions shall apply:

(A) The following jams, jellies and preserves are
allowed: apple, apricot, grape, peach, plum, quince, orange, nectarine, tangerine, blackberry, raspberry, blueberry, boysenberry, cherry, cranberry, strawberry, red currants, or a combination of these fruits. Rhubarb, tomato, and pepper jellies or jams are not allowed. Any other jams, jellies, or preserves not listed may be produced by a cottage food operation provided their recipe has been tested and documented by a commercial laboratory, at the expense of the cottage food operation, as being not potentially hazardous, containing a pH equilibrium of less than 4.6.

(B) The following fruit butters are allowed:
apple, apricot, grape, peach, plum, quince, and prune. Pumpkin butter, banana butter, and pear butter are not allowed. Fruit butters not listed may be produced by a cottage food operation provided their recipe has been tested and documented by a commercial laboratory, at the expense of the cottage food operation, as being not potentially hazardous, containing a pH equilibrium of less than 4.6.

(C) Baked goods, such as, but not limited to,
breads, cookies, cakes, pies, and pastries are allowed. Only high-acid fruit pies that use the following fruits are allowed: apple, apricot, grape, peach, plum, quince, orange, nectarine, tangerine, blackberry, raspberry, blueberry, boysenberry, cherry, cranberry, strawberry, red currants or a combination of these fruits. Fruit pies not listed may be produced by a cottage food operation provided their recipe has been tested and documented by a commercial laboratory, at the expense of the cottage food operation, as being not potentially hazardous, containing a pH equilibrium of less than 4.6. The following are potentially hazardous and prohibited from production and sale by a cottage food operation: pumpkin pie, sweet potato pie, cheesecake, custard pies, creme pies, and pastries with potentially hazardous fillings or toppings.

(2) The food is to be sold at a farmers’ market.
(3) Gross receipts from the sale of food exempted
under this Section do not exceed $25,000 in a calendar year.

(4) The food packaging conforms to the labeling
requirements of the Illinois Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and includes the following information on the label of each of its products:

(A) the name and address of the cottage food
operation;

(B) the common or usual name of the food product;
(C) all ingredients of the food product,
including any colors, artificial flavors, and preservatives, listed in descending order by predominance of weight shown with common or usual names;

(D) the following phrase: “This product was
produced in a home kitchen not subject to public health inspection that may also process common food allergens.”;

(E) the date the product was processed; and
(F) allergen labeling as specified in federal
labeling requirements.

(5) The name and residence of the person preparing
and selling products as a cottage food operation is registered with the health department of a unit of local government where the cottage food operation resides. No fees shall be charged for registration.

(6) The person preparing and selling products as a
cottage food operation has a Department of Public Health approved Food Service Sanitation Management Certificate.

(7) At the point of sale a placard is displayed in a
prominent location that states the following: “This product was produced in a home kitchen not subject to public health inspection that may also process common food allergens.”.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this Section, if the Department of Public Health or the health department of a unit of local government has received a consumer complaint or has reason to believe that an imminent health hazard exists or that a cottage food operation’s product has been found to be misbranded, adulterated, or not in compliance with the exception for cottage food operations pursuant to this Section, then it may invoke cessation of sales until it deems that the situation has been addressed to the satisfaction of the Department.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this Section, a State-certified local public health department may, upon providing a written statement to the Department of Public Health, regulate the service of food by a cottage food operation. The regulation by a State-certified local public health department may include all of the following requirements:
(1) That the cottage food operation (A) register with
the State-certified local public health department, which may include a reasonable fee set by the State-certified local public health department notwithstanding paragraph (5) of subsection (b) of this Section and (B) agree in writing at the time of registration to grant access to the State-certified local public health department to conduct an inspection of the cottage food operation’s primary domestic residence in the event of a consumer complaint or foodborne illness outbreak.

(2) That in the event of a consumer complaint or
foodborne illness outbreak the State-certified local public health department is allowed to (A) inspect the premises of the cottage food operation in question and (B) set a reasonable fee for that inspection.

(Source: P.A. 97-393, eff. 1-1-12.)

 

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Collinsville Building Permit Analysis – lies, lies, lies…

The City of Collinsville presumes to impose a building permit requirement for any improvement to your home in excess of $500. I had the pleasure of having one of the Code Enforcers, Officer Wasser, stop by my home when I was having siding replaced. She told me that I needed a building permit since the work was in excess of $500. The only thing Wasser saw was siding partially removed from my home and boxes of siding in the driveway, which I doubt she could positively identify as siding. She did not know what the siding cost, if anything. She did not know if I was putting the siding on myself or having it done by a contractor. She just “assumed” that the value of the materials resulted in an “improvement” to my home in excess of $500, and therefore necessitated a building permit. I asked Wasser to cite the Code provision to which she was referring and she said she could not recall it specifically. I informed her that I would review the Code and if I felt it necessary, would procure the permit. I told her that based on my understanding of the Code and how it is often misapplied, I would not be getting a permit.

I then went on to research the Code, with particular attention to the $500 improvement reference. What I found was this provision. Let’s look at the wording:
Chapter 15.04 – Construction Codes Adopted
Sec. 15.04.080. – Minor repairs; requirements
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require a permit, fee, inspection certificate or approval of any minor repairs made at a cost of less than five hundred dollars ($500.00), but the fire prevention, construction, safety, installation, materials and other standards of the technical codes adopted in Section 15.04.010 shall apply to such work.

Let’s break it down:
Minor repairs – The code does not define repairs, but the dictionary does.
re·pair
1 [ri-pair]
verb (used with object)
1. to restore to a good or sound condition after decay or damage; mend: to repair a motor.
2. to restore or renew by any process of making good, strengthening, etc.: to repair one’s health by resting.
3. to remedy; make good; make up for: to repair damage; to repair a deficiency.
4. to make amends for; compensate: to repair a wrong done.

Repair does not include improvements, modifications, additions, or replacements. It means to bring something from a damaged state or an improved state. To replace one’s siding is not a repair. It is removing siding and replacing with new siding. Maybe I am tired of the color of my otherwise good siding and wish to replace it with siding of a different color. Is that a repair? Wasser apparently believes it is.

Reading further, the Code says:
“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require a permit, fee, inspection certificate or approval of any minor repairs…”
This essentially says that nothing in the Code shall be construed (which means interpreted) to require a permit, fee…. It is curious wording, but it says what it means. The Code does not explicitly require a permit, fee… for minor repairs so you should not construe (imply) that it does. However, it goes on to say …“made at a cost of less than five hundred dollars ($500.00)” How does that change anything? Some people read this to mean, “Nothing in this chapter shall interpreted to require a permit, fee, inspection certificate or approval at a cost of less than $500, but if it is more than $500 I need a permit, fee…”

Another way to read this, as most people do, is “This chapter shall require a permit, fee, inspection certificate or approval of any minor repairs made at a cost of more than five hundred dollars ($500). But it does not say that. If that’s was what is meant it is what would be said. That is like saying, “Nothing in this article shall be construed to mean you are a blithering idiot if you do not read every sentence three times.” Does that mean that you are a blithering idiot if you do not read each sentence three times? Of course not. However, the City is a deceitful and tricky entity that knows it does not have the authority to do much of what it does without your ignorance and apathy to assist it in taking your money at every turn. The code is very adequate at requiring permits and fees for other things, and it is also specific. For instance:

Chapter 15.20 – MOVING BUILDINGS
Sec. 15.20.010. – Permit””Required.
No person shall remove, or cause to be removed, or aid or assist in removing any building into, along or across any street, alley or public ground in the City without first obtaining written permission from the City Manager or his designee, countersigned by the Mayor, and conforming to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed in such permit.

 – Put another way, “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to not require a permit for any person who shall remove, or cause to be removed, or aid or assist in removing any building into, along or across any street, alley or public ground in the City without first obtaining written permission from the City Manager or his designee, countersigned by the Mayor, and conforming to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed.

Chapter 15.28 – DEMOLITION PERMITS
Sec. 15.28.010. – Permit required.
No person, firm, corporation or entity shall demolish any building in excess of two hundred (200) square feet without first securing a demolition permit.

– Put another way, “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to not require a permit for any person, firm, corporation or entity who shall demolish any building in excess of two hundred (200) squre feet.

Sec. 15.40.050. – Development permit.
No person, firm, corporation or governmental body not exempted by State law shall commence any development in the SFHA without first obtaining a development permit from the City through its building inspector. The City through its building inspector shall not issue a development permit if the proposed development does not meet the requirements of this chapter.

– Put another way, “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to not require a development permit of any person, firm, corporation or governmental body not exempted by State law to commence any development in the SFHA.”

Section 17.920 – TELECOMMUNICATION TOWERS
Sec. 17.920.050. – Authorization by administrative permit.
The placement of antennae and support structures are permitted in all nonresidential zoning districts only by administrative permit granted by the Zoning Administrator, as follows

– Put another way, “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to not require an administrative permit for the placement of antennae and support structures in all nonresidential zoning districts.”

Are you beginning to see how saying something one way does not necessarily positively impose something else?

The point being, the Code could impose a permit and fee specifically, if they had the power to do so and could justify the arbitrary dollar limit of $500 on home repairs, and then, extend that to improvements as well. The City has been collecting these fees illegally and many people are happy to just pay it to avoid trouble. Sadly, that is the all-too-often commentary on people resisting tyrannical government.

Below are the applicable provisions of the Code and fees copied from Munilaw.com without modification:

Chapter 15.04 – Construction Codes Adopted
Sec. 15.04.080. – Minor repairs; requirements
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require a permit, fee, inspection certificate or approval of any minor repairs made at a cost of less than five hundred dollars ($500.00), but the fire prevention, construction, safety, installation, materials and other standards of the technical codes adopted in Section 15.04.010 shall apply to such work.

Chapter 15.20 – MOVING BUILDINGS
Sec. 15.20.010. – Permit””Required.
No person shall remove, or cause to be removed, or aid or assist in removing any building into, along or across any street, alley or public ground in the City without first obtaining written permission from the City Manager or his designee, countersigned by the Mayor, and conforming to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed in such permit.

Chapter 15.28 – DEMOLITION PERMITS
Sec. 15.28.010. – Permit required.
No person, firm, corporation or entity shall demolish any building in excess of two hundred (200) square feet without first securing a demolition permit.

Sec. 15.40.050. – Development permit.
No person, firm, corporation or governmental body not exempted by State law shall commence any development in the SFHA without first obtaining a development permit from the City through its building inspector. The City through its building inspector shall not issue a development permit if the proposed development does not meet the requirements of this chapter.

Section 17.920 – TELECOMMUNICATION TOWERS
Sec. 17.920.050. – Authorization by administrative permit.
The placement of antennae and support structures are permitted in all nonresidential zoning districts only by administrative permit granted by the Zoning Administrator, as follows:

Building permits
Sec. 4.01.010. – Established
(8) Building permits.
$50.00 limited building permit
$35.00 electrical permit 100 amp
$45.00 electrical permit 200 amp
$55.00 electrical permit 200 to 400 amp

Collinsville Sign Ordinance Interpretation – A Bair of a Law

This began with a conversation between myself and a landlord in Collinsville, Illinois where I was told of another landlord who placed a for rent sign on another person’s property, with permission and both were cited by the City for an “off premises” sign. The City apparantly made an issue out of the sign being “off premises”; a direct violation of the Code. A lawyer got involved and sent an email inquiry to one of the code enforcers who then forwarded the inquiry on to a Mr. Mitch Bair who is the AICP Community Development Director for the City of Collinsville. Mr. Bair went on over email to explain the “off premises” meaning within the Code and how that applies to real estate signs.

For the unitiated, let’s begin with the basic premise that people in government lie. They lie all the time. It is not a crime to lie. They know that the majority of people never study law, never read the laws, and would rather seek the path of least resistance and pay their petty fees than challenge them. It is up to you to familiarize yourself with the law and the limits of their power. If you allow them to run rough-shod over you then it is your own undoing and you cannot come back at them for your ignorance or apathy.

The story goes, a landlord had a property for rent that was off the public thoroughfare and as such, a for rent sign on the property would not be visible to the public. They made an arrangement with another neighbor to place the sign in their yard so as to direct traffic to the rental and the City cited both the landlord and the neighbor for illegal display of an “off premises” sign. The issue here being, how can two parties be cited for the same offense and is the violation, “off premises sign” applicable to rental signs?

I’ll not use the proper names of the landlords in this piece since retaliation by the City is not a foregone conclusion against people who speak out. I received an email from a Ms. Jane Doe wherein one of the code enforcers, Cassie Meyer, replied to a previous inquiry. Ms. Meyer wrote:

Hello Jane Doe,

You can put one “œFor Rent” sign at the house that is available for rent. Off-premise signs are not permitted, so you cannot put one in your neighbor”™s yard.
 
Open House signs are the exception””you may put one on site and one at the end of the street for the day prior and the day of the Open House. You do not need a permit for that but they must be removed after the event is over.
 
Please make sure that the signs are off of the public right of way, and let me know if you have any further questions. Thank you!
 
Cassie Meyer
Management Analyst
City of Collinsville
(618)346-5200 ext. 128
 
E-MAIL CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE:  The contents of this e-mail message and any attachments are intended solely for the adressee(s) and may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information.  If you are note the intended recipient of this message, or if this message has been addressed to you in error, please immediately alert the sender by reply e-mail and then delete this message and any attachments.  If you are not the intended recipient, you are notified that any use, dissemination, copying, or storage of this message or any attachment is strictly prohibited.

I particularly like the “CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE” that prohibits the “dissemination” of this message. I’ll be waiting. Nevertheless, it was this email that was forwarded to a lawyer named Thomas Spooner who then addressed Ms. Meyer about her interpretation of the Code and directing Jane Doe as to what was legal.

We first need to look at Ms. Meyer’s use of the word “off premises”. The Collinsville Municipal Code is maintained by Municode (http://www.municode.com/). You can access the code by visiting this link http://www2.collinsvilleil.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=105&Itemid=154 or by going to Municode.com, click “Browse the Library”, select “Illinois” and then Collinsville (http://www.municode.com/Library/IL/Collinsville). The ordinance regulating signage comes under Zoning (Title 17), Chapter 17.190 (Signage – General Provisions).Let’s first begin with the City’s General Regulations at Sec. 17.190.030 which state:

A. General prohibitions. Any graphic or sign not expressly permitted by this chapter is prohibited in the City of Collinsville.

That is a pretty bold and all-encompasing statement, the authority for such not to be addressed in this piece, but bear that statement in-mind when we get into some statements by the City regarding what is/is not permitted.

There is a section titled Definitions at 17.190.020. Despite what a dictionary may say, or your personal experience, a word used on an ordinance, statute, or law means ONLY what is defined in the Definitions, if it is defined there. So, if you think “off premises” means simply something not on a premises then you would be wrong since the word off-premises is defined in the ordinance. The word can have no other meaning once the Code defines it. It does not mean, “In addition to what you THINK the word means, it shall also mean this….” It means that, “We have defined the word here for its application to the Code and this definition shall control regardless of what you think it means.” So many people who have never studied law persume to apply their own interpretation and definitions.

Let’s examine “off premises”, per the Code. If we search the Code for the word “off-premises” (with the hyphen) we find 2 references in Title 17 – Zoning – Definitions:

Billboard. See “off-premises graphic”.

Off-premises graphic means a sign structure advertising an establishment, merchandise, service, or entertainment, which is not sold, produced, manufactured, or furnished at the property on which said sign is located.

At first blush, it would appear that it specifically applies to billboards. It is also a “sign structure”. A sign structure advertising an establishment, merchandise, service, or entertainment. What is an “establishment”?

Establishment means either of the following:

1. An institutional, business, commercial, or industrial activity that is the sole occupant of one (1) or more buildings, or

2. An institutional, business, commercial, or industrial activity that occupies a portion of a building such that:

a. The activity is a logical and separate entity from the other activities within the building and not a department of the whole, and

b. The activity has either a separate entrance from the exterior of the building, or a separate entrance from a common and clearly defined entryway that has direct access to the exterior of the building.

It sppears that an “establishment” has nothing to do with rental property. It deals with institutional, business, commercial, or industrial activity. So an off-premises graphic is a sign structure that advertises commercial activity, merchandise, services, or entertainment not found on the same property as where the sign is located.

So far, we are unconvinced that an “off-premises” sign applies to a stick in the mud with a piece or paper which reads “For Rent”. The evidence points to them being directly related to billboards, and being structures advertising establishments. The Code does go on to further address Off-premises signs. Looking at Sec. 17.190.040 7. – Prohibited, per,mitted and types of signs we find:

Off-premises signs.

a.Off-premises signs are permitted on either side of a federal interstate highway for six hundred sixty (660) feet from the nearest edge of the right-of-way, in accordance with the State Highway Advertising Control Act, 225 ILCS 440/1 through 440/16 and as it may hereafter be amended. See Subsection 17.190.010.B. which also exempts from this chapter the regulation of all advertising signs within six hundred sixty (660) feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way of federal interstate highways.

b.Off-premises signs are permitted on commercial or industrial zone district lots or parcels of land that adjoin Illinois Route 157 right-of-way from Belt Line Road north to the City limits line and from Main Street south to the City limits line and on commercial or industrial zone district lots/parcels of land adjoining Illinois Route 159 right-of-way from Belt Line Road northerly to the City limits line and from S. Clinton south and westerly to the City limits lines, as provided for below in Subsection 5.).

1.) No such off-premises signs shall be located closer than three hundred (300) feet to another off-premises sign, on either side of the highway.

2.) All off-premises signs shall be constructed upon a single pole made of steel or metal of equivalent strength.

3.) No off-premises sign shall exceed thirty (30) feet at its highest point.

4.) Off-premises signs shall not be permitted within or over the public right-of-way.

5.) No more than five (5) off-premises signs are permitted per mile on each side of the highway. Nonconforming off-premises signs shall be included in this determination.

6.) The graphic area allowance for off-premises signs shall not exceed three hundred (300) square feet on property adjoining Illinois Route 157 from Belt Line Road north to the City limits and from Main Street south to the City limits, and on property adjoining Illinois Route 159 from Belt Line Road northerly to the City limits line and from South Clinton south and westerly to the City limits line.

7.) All off-premises signs erected while the moratorium has been in effect and now deemed illegal will be removed.

8.) Regulations contained in Subsections 17.190.020, 17.190.030.B””G., 17.190.040.A, 17.190.040.B., 17.190.050.E. and the administration and enforcement sections apply to off-premises signs.

First, notice how off-premises signs are described as being constructed of “single pole made of steel or metal”, “not exceeding 30 feet”….. This is clearly describing something large, like a billboard. It does NOT mean, “Not being on the premises” as a sole identifier. It has to do with size, construction, placement, and what is advertised.

So, if the City has gone through such lenghts to define “off-premises” signs in the Code, where does the confusion with rental signs come from? Well, the Code also addresses rental signs. Words such as “rental signs”, “real estate signs”, “for sale signs”, are not defined with respect to real estate. However, they are addressed in Sec. 17.190.040 – Prohibited, permitted and types of signs, under Subsection B, 13.

Permitted graphics. Every graphic enumerated below that complies with the indicated requirements may be erected in any zoning district of this City without a permit. The area of such graphics shall not be debited against the displaying establishment’s sign area allowance:

Real estate signs indicating the sale, rental, or lease of the premises on which said signs are located. Such signs on residential property shall not exceed nine (9) square feet in area; on other commercial property such signs shall not exceed thirty-two (32) square feet. No more than one (1) real estate sign per street front shall be placed on any lot. Such signs shall be removed within seven (7) days after the sale, rental, or lease.

The Real estate sign provision does use the word “premises”, but it does not use “off-premises”. Off-premises has already been defined and cannot be applied in this case since the definition already does not apply.

Below is the email thread between Thomas Spooner and Mitch Bair. The email is being used with permission of Mr. Spooner.
Notice how Bair attempts to define the use of real estate signs to suit himself and even cite non-existent provisions of the Code:

This is the email sent by Thomas Spooner to Cassie Meyer, who then forwarded to Mitch Bair for assistance.

From: Cassie Meyer Sent: Monday, January 07, 2013 9:37 AM To:
 Mitch E. Bair Subject: FW: Collinsville Sign Ordinance and Rental
  Property

 What would you like to do with this?

 From: Thomas Spooner [mailto:the.darrow.lawfirm@gmail.com] Sent:
  Saturday, January 05, 2013 10:30 PM To: Cassie Meyer Subject:
 Collinsville Sign Ordinance and Rental Property

 Hello, Ms. Meyer,

 I am contacting you for what I believe to be a
 misinterpretation/misapplication of the Collinsville sign
 ordinance (Chapter 17.190 et seq.) as relayed to me by several
 residents on the subject of property/rental signage. I am
 considering placing signs for property which is for rent, but
 which property is not where the sign will be placed due to
 visibility issues from the actual property. I have been cautioned
 against such practice by some who, subsequent to a
 grape-vine-hearsay rendition of the code’s interpretation by
 yourself and others, that such practice is prohibited and
 considered to be “off premises” signage. I wish to clarify by
 contacting you directly to as to avoid any unnecessary conflict
 or confrontation on the applicability of the Code.

 The advice I was given, and I am paraphrasing, was that, for-rent
  signs must be posted on the property which is for rent, and
 cannot be placed on another property. Such a sign is considered
 by the City as an “off premises” sign. I beg to differ.

 Referring to Sec. 17.190.020 – Definitions of the Code, the only
  reference to “off-premises” relates not to signs, but to
 graphics. I may be splitting hairs, but I wish to speak
 specifically and deliberately. There, we find a definition for
 “Off-premises graphic”, which means, “a sign structure
 advertising an establishment, merchandise, service, or
 entertainment, which is not sold, produced, manufactured, or
 furnished at the property on which said sign is located.” Given
 the nature of renting one’s house/apartment/domicile/abode… I
 fail to find any parity with an “establishment, merchandise,
 service, or entertainment”. Likewise, I am not offering any of
 the like being sold, produced, manufactured, or furnished, at
 said property. Therefore, I believe the classification of a
 rental sign posted somewhere other than where the property for
 rent is located as being an “off-premises” sign misleading,
 irresponsible, specious, and injurious to those upon whom
 penalties are assessed for transgressing an obvious fabrication.
 An “off premises” sign appears to conform more to what one would
 consider a billboard.

 While on the topic of real-estate/rental signs, let me direct you
  to Sec. 17.190.040 B. “Permitted Graphics, which reads to wit,
 “Every graphic enumerated below that complies with the indicated
  requirements may be erected in any zoning district of this City
  without a permit. The area of such graphics shall not be debited
  against the displaying establishment’s sign area allowance:”.
 Furthermore, the nearest definition applying in such a case is
 for 17.190.040 B. 13 – Real Estate signs, which reads, “Real
 estate signs indicating the sale, rental, or lease of the
 premises on which said signs are located. Such signs on
 residential property shall not exceed nine (9) square feet in
 area; on other commercial property such signs shall not exceed
 thirty-two (32) square feet. No more than one (1) real estate
 sign per street front shall be placed on any lot. Such signs
 shall be removed within seven (7) days after the sale, rental, or
 lease.” This is the closest definition to the kind of signs I am
 posting. However, there is nothing _prohibiting_ the placement of
 a rental sign on property different from the rental itself. For a
 sign to meet the definition of a “real estate sign”, the rental
 sign must be placed on the rental property, but it is not
 mandated that it be done as such. There is no definition for the
 type of signs I will be placing, and therefore, outside the
 enforceability of the Code.

 I was also told of a class of sign called “open house signs” that
  can be posted off the public right-of-way and which do not
 require a permit. I fail to find a definition or mention of an
 “open house sign”, in the Code. As I will not be performing an
 open house, I will not concern myself with that fiction until the
 time comes.

 In closing, there is an anecdote involving someone who placed a
 for rent sign on another individual’s property and both parties
 were fined for having violated the sign ordinance. I have not yet
  determined if this is true, but if it is, it is patently illegal
  and unlawful to fine both the landlord and the individual, upon
  whose property the sign was posted. I would be interested in
 your interpretation of that scenario and whether you can confirm
 or deny it ever having taken place. I can assure you, the people
 who are permitting me to place for rent signs on their property
 have been properly versed on the intent and application of the
 Code, as well as the limitations regarding its enforcement upon
 them. Notwithstanding any lawful citation to the contrary, or
 compelling interpretation of the code as it may apply in the
 above circumstances, I will consider the Code inapplicable in
 such circumstances and reserve my prerogative to act accordingly
  considering that silence is acquiescence.

 Thank you for your time and I look forward to your response.

 Sincerely,

 Thomas Spooner

This is the first response from Mitch Bair in response to Spooner’s email to Cassie Meyer.

On 1/7/2013 10:16 AM, Mitch E. Bair wrote:
 Mr. Spooner;

 Ms. Meyer forwarded me your inquiry regarding the advertisement
 of property for sale or lease at a location other than that of
 the location of the property for sale or lease. Unfortunately our
  current code prohibits this approach and requires the signage
 for the property in question to be located on the same premise
 and property of that for sale or lease.

 1.     Section 17.930.150 Definitions Graphic:  Any
 identification or advertising sign visible from the public
 right-of-way or from any parking area used by the general public.
 Sign:  A sign is any object, device, display or structure or part
 thereof, whether located inside or outside a building, which is
 visible from any lot line, and the primary purpose of which is
 the conveyance of an idea, advertising, endorsement,
 identification, or information by means of visual symbols,
 lettering, illustration or any other means of directing attention
 or communicating a message. Off Premises Graphic:  A sign
 structure advertising an establishment, merchandise, service, or
 entertainment, which is not sold, produced, manufactured, or
 furnished at the property on which said sign is located. The
 definitions clearly establish that a graphic is a sign and both a
 graphic and a sign constitute advertising products, services or
 entertainment for sale, rent or lease. Further, off premise
 signage is defined.

 2.     Section 17.930.240 Permitted Graphics: M. “Real estate
 signs indicating the sale, rental, or lease of the premises on
 which said signs are located. Such signs on residential property
 shall not exceed nine (9) square feet in area; on other
 commercial property such signs shall not exceed thirty-two (32)
 square feet. No more than one real estate sign per street front
 shall be placed on any lot. Such signs shall be removed within
 seven (7) days after the sale, rental or lease.” This section
 clearly mandates that all rental signs must be located on the
 same premise or property as that of the property being sold,
 rented or leased and may be placed on said property without a
 permit as long as it meets the requirements of this section.

 3.     Section 17.930.230 Prohibited Graphics or Signs: F.
 “Off-premise signs except as provided in Section 17.930.260G.”
 Any sign or graphic located not on the premise or property as the
  service, product or entertainment for sale, rent or lease is
 defined as an off premise sign and is prohibited. This also
 applies to real estate signs or graphics.

 Regarding the question of this issuance of citations for
 violating these regulations I can only say that we have issued
 citations for violation but can give no other specific details.
 This code is applied consistently as other City codes and
 violations are addressed with citations through our code
 enforcement process. Please be advised that all signage for real
 estate offered either for sale, rent or lease must meet the
 requirements listed above and shall be located on the property
 that is being sold, rented ort leased. If you have any further
 comments or questions please do not hesitate to contact me at
 your convenience and I would be happy to discuss this with you.

 Thank you Mitch

 Mitchell E. Bair, AICP Community Development Director The City of
  Collinsville 125 South Center Street Collinsville, IL  62234
 Email: mbair@collinsvilleil.org<;;mailto:mbair@collinsvilleil.org
 Voice: 618.346.5200 ext. 120 Cell: 618.301.2568 Fax:
 618.343.9192

 E-MAIL CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE:  The contents of this e-mail
 message and any attachments are intended solely for the
 addressee(s) and may contain confidential and/or legally
 privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient of
 this message, or if this message has been addressed to you in
 error, please immediately alert the sender by reply e-mail and
 then delete this message and any attachments. If you are not the
 intended recipient, you are notified that any use, dissemination,
 distribution, copying, or storage of this message or any
 attachment is strictly prohibited.

This is Spooner’s response to Bair’s email.

Mr. Bair,
Thank you for your response.
I must differ with the application of an “off premises graphic”
being applied to rental signs. The definition for off premises
graphic clearly pertains to things having nothing to do with
renting property. Rental property is not an establishment,
merchandise, service, or entertainment.

Where you refer to off-premises signs also applying to real estate
signs, that statement is unsupported by the definition in the
Code, i.e., establishment, merchandise, service, or entertainment.
Your statement, “This also applies to real estate signs or
graphics.” appears to be a personal interpretation and not a direct
code citation.

The code does not mandate that real estate signs be located on the
property being rented/sold/leased. It merely defines what
constitutes a real estate sign. If a rental sign is not placed on
the rental property it does not meet the definition of a real
estate sign and is simply a sign. Notwithstanding the code at Sec.
17.190.030. – General regulations.

A.General prohibitions. Any graphic or sign not expressly permitted
by this chapter is prohibited in the City of Collinsville.
There are free speech concerns present if the matter does not
involve commercial speech.

I will aver that the definition of sign/graphic may embrace the
type of sign I mentioned, but I do not believe that “off-premises”
graphics apply.

For clarification, should a sign be placed on a property other
than the one being rented/leased/sold, would the City seek to cite
both the individual posting the sign on their property or the
individual renting the property; and could you please refer me to
the Code section authorizing any such action?
Thank you again for your time.
Thomas Spooner

This is Bair’s response to Spooner’s response.

On 1/7/2013 12:45 PM, Mitch E. Bair wrote:
 Mr. Spooner;

 The code defines a real estate sign and states where they are
 permitted. If they are not placed on the property then they are a
 commercial sign and fall under the regulations of Section
 17.930.260, “Commercial Zone Districts”. If the property signage is
 not located at that said property it is then an off premise sign by
 definition and thereby prohibited. Given the definition of a real
 estate sign includes the statement of “the premises on which said
 signs are located” this is a regulatory restriction on where these
 signs may be located.

 In the event that a violation of any provision of the Zoning
 Regulations is found the owner of the premise is issued a citation.
 This power is provided in the Zoning Regulations under Section
 17.140, “Violations and Penalties”.

 Thank you Mitch

This is Spooner’s response to Bair’s response.

Mr. Bair,

Thanks again for your quick response. I am not able to reply as
quickly as I would like, as I am traveling with limited access to the
Internet.

I searched the code for Section 17.930.260, with no results. Is this
possibly a typo? Also, your statement, “If they are not placed on the
property then they are a commercial sign” is not supported by the
Code. The Code provides for the dimensions of the rental sign on
either residential or commercial property, but it does not state that
if the real estate sign is not on the premises then it is a commercial
sign. Nothing in the code attempts to redefine a real estate sign as a
commercial sign by virtue of its placement.

I believe we are looking at two interpretations of the work
“premises”. Colloquially, if something is not on a premises then it is
off-premises. The Code specifically defines “off premises” and
therefore, the general interpretation, not being on the premises, does
not apply. The Code is specific when it defines off-premises as a sign
structure advertising an establishment, merchandise, service, or
entertainment, which is not sold, produced, manufactured, or furnished
at the property on which said sign is located. Rental property does
not fit that definition. The use of the word “premises” in the real
estate sign definition cannot be extended to include off-premises,
since off-premises has its own special definition, and premises is not
defined in the Code so the common parlance would apply.
Your reference to “Commercial Zone Districts” deals with
establishments and/or commercial and industrial propertyes.
The code even goes on to define an “establishment”:
Establishment means either of the following:
1.An institutional, business, commercial, or industrial activity that
is the sole occupant of one (1) or more buildings, or
2.An institutional, business, commercial, or industrial activity that
occupies a portion of a building such that:
a.The activity is a logical and separate entity from the other
activities within the building and not a department of the whole, and
b.The activity has either a separate entrance from the exterior of the
building, or a separate entrance from a common and clearly defined
entryway that has direct access to the exterior of the building.
Clearly, the “establishment” defined in the Code pertains to
commercial activity. And as such, rental property not dealing with
merchandise, a service, or entertainment, the definition of
“off-premises”, as defined in the Code, cannot apply to rental property.

Therefore,

The code defines a real estate sign and states where they are
permitted – Agreed
If they are not placed on the property then they are a commercial sign
and fall under the regulations of Section 17.930.260, “Commercial Zone
Districts”. – Unsupported statement lacking citation
If the property signage is not located at that said property it is
then an off premise sign by definition and thereby prohibited. –
Unsupported statement. Off premises has been defined by the Code and
does not embrace real estate signs. The Code definitions even define
Billboard. See “off-premises graphic”.

Given the definition of a real estate sign includes the statement of
“the premises on which said signs are located” this is a regulatory
restriction on where these signs may be located. – Subject to
interpretation. I understand the City does not want real estate signs
littering the landscape, but where a property is removed from the
public thoroughfare and an agreement can be reached with another
individual to place the sign on their property, I think the code
as-written is prejudiced against the individual wishing to rent that
property.
Thank you again for your response.
Thomas Spooner

Having still not received a response from Bair, Spooner sent another email inquiring about the “Open House” sign referenced by Cassie Meyer, which is NOT found in the code.

Mr. Bair,
I still have not received a response to my last email, but in the
mean-time, I also notice part of my original inquiry to Cassie Meyer
was not addressed, particularly the “open house” provision.
I had previously stated, to wit:
“I was also told of a class of sign called “open house signs” that
can be posted off the public right-of-way and which do not require
a permit.”

The Code does not address “open house signs”, and Ms. Meyer made
direct mention of such a sign in one of her communications to another
individual. Can you provide a definition of “open house sign”, per the
code, and the regulations involving the display of such signs? Per Ms.
Meyer, and I am paraphrasing, they may be placed on site and at the
end of the street for the day prior and the day of the Open House.
They do not require a permit, but must be removed after the event is over.
Now, under the City’s legal interpretation of real estate signs, as
you say, “by definition”, this would be an “off premises” sign and
thereby, illegal.

I also find it curious why Ms. Meyer diverted my original inquiry to
you as opposed to answering directly since she is presumed to be a
knowledgeable enforcement officer. If Ms. Meyer is rendering legal
opinions of her own to residents and issuing citations based upon her
interpretation of the code then I would expect her to respond
directly. This is not to say that I find your opinion any less-valid,
but I want to make sure that whatever information I receive is derived
from an authoritative source so as to avoid confusion. Should I
possibly need to speak to corporate counsel on this matter, and to
whom would I address such inquiry?
Thank you in advance. I still await your response.
Thomas Spooner.

Bair finally responded on 1/14/13

Mr. Spooner;

Open House Signs are regulated as Real Estate Signs as they effectively sell real estate. Therefore they fall under the same regulatory guidelines and restrictions (must be placed on the site of the property in question for lease, rent or sale). You inquiry was directed to me as the Director of Community Development as I render the Code interpretations. Ms. Meyer administers the permitting process and does not engage in enforcement and both of those processes are based on Code and my interpretation thereof. Any legal questions should be made to Mr. Steve Giacoletto, Corporate Counsel, whom I have copied on this email.

Thank you
Mitch

Mitchell E. Bair, AICP
Community Development Director
The City of Collinsville
125 South Center Street
Collinsville, IL  62234
Email: mbair@collinsvilleil.org
Voice: 618.346.5200 ext. 120
Cell: 618.301.2568
Fax: 618.343.9192

E-MAIL CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE:  The contents of this e-mail message and any attachments are intended solely for the addressee(s) and may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, or if this message has been addressed to you in error, please immediately alert the sender by reply e-mail and then delete this message and any attachments. If you are not the intended recipient, you are notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, copying, or storage of this message or any attachment is strictly prohibited.

Spooner’s response on 1/15/13 that also went to Cassie Meyer and Corporate Counsel Steve Giacoletto

Mr. Bair,
IF, open house signs are regulated as Real Estate signs, yet they are
not defined in the Code, where does the authority rest for making such
a determination? You had previously stated, “Please be advised that
all signage for real estate offered either for sale, rent or lease
must meet the requirements listed above and shall be located on the
property that is being sold, rented or leased.” Clearly that statement did not
take into account the ad hoc “Open House” provision since you are now
making an allowance for Open House signs which, “effectively sell real
estate” to be placed “off-premises”.

Since, as you say, if a rental sign is not on the premises being
rented it is “by definition” an “off-premises” sign and is prohibited
(your words, not mine). Placing an Open House sign at the end of the
street is no different than placing a for rent sign in a neighbor’s
yard. They are both “off of the premises” in-question, yet you allow
one and not the other?

Off-premises signs are billboards and NOT rental or real estate signs,
or anything else not on a premises. It is a legal term and not
descriptive of a situation.

The code does not define an Open House sign, and are thereby illegal.
Quoting Sec. 17.190.030 A. “General prohibitions. Any graphic or sign
not expressly permitted by this chapter is prohibited in the City of
Collinsville.” Open House signs appear nowhere in the Code and any
decision to “regulate” them must be supported by the Code. Otherwise,
the phrases such as “arbitrary and capricious” and “void for
vagueness” come readily to mind. Perhaps I shall have an “Open House”
for one of my rental properties since it is essentially a Real Estate
sign and although a rental sign in my neighbor’s yard is “considered”,
but not supported by the Code, “off-premises”, the illegal
“off-premises” provision does not apply if I invite the public
directly to view my rental property.

Now, I’ll anticipate your next response by answering, “Open House
signs deal with property for sale and not for rent.” by asking you to
refer to the Code where that distinction is made.

IF you, as you say, are the individual tasked with rendering the
interpretation of the Code then is it you I shall expect to meet in an
adversarial proceeding in Municipal Court following a citation for
violating the Signage regulations? I believe it is the judge who
determines, as they say, “What the law is”. Will you offer testimony
as to the application of the letter-of-the-law to support your
interpretation?

I still have yet to find the code you referenced earlier, “If they are
not placed on the property then they are a commercial sign and fall
under the regulations of Section 17.930.260, “Commercial Zone
Districts.” There is no Section 17.930.260 and the only reference to
Commercial Zone Districts in the signage regulations deals with
Commercial Districts. An “unauthorized off-premises” real estate sign
on residential property does not convert that property to a Commercial
Zone District.

I believe I’ve made a good faith effort to clarify provisions of the
Code which could affect actions I may be taking in the near future. I
have not accepted your application of the Code, or your
interpretation, as I have been provided inconsistencies, inaccuracies,
and opinion unsupported by facts. If yours is simply the official
response for the City’s interpretation of the Code then I am
comfortable proceeding as planned with my understanding of the Code as
a guide.

Thank you again for your time and efforts. I look forward to an
on-point explanation of what has become less-clear than when started.
Maybe Mr. Giacoletto can shed some light on the matter. I expect to
return to the Country within the next few weeks. As I am directing my
proxies to act accordingly, it is important that I, as well as they,
do so under reasonable expectations of how the City may respond with
respect to the Code.
Thomas Spooner

Awaiting a response from either Bair or Giacoletto…

Judge Brian A. Babka and Brendan Kelly, A Drunk Cop's Best Friend

On St. Patrick’s Day, 2012, Fairview Heights Police Sgt., James Krummrich, was arrested for driving under the influence. There was a hearing to rescind the administrative suspension of Krummrich’s driver’s license which was presided over by Judge Brian A. Babka.

I was pulled over by Fairview Heights Police on Feb. 17, 2009, because I was “weaving within my own lane”. Officer Joshua Alemond is the one who followed me while allegedly weaving, and upon my being stopped, I was beaten and Tased by Officer Aaron Nyman. There was never a request for a blood alcohol analysis or field sobriety test. I was not even charged or arrested for driving under the influence, but arrested regardless.

Here, Krummrich is involved in an accident, admits to drinking, and is observed by another officer to appear intoxicated. In my situation, the then Circuit Clerk, Brendan Kelly, fraudulently filed a civil case on my behalf which ended up in front of Babka. The reason for that case is because I swore to criminal complaints that I wished to present to a judge for the purpose of having arrest warrants issued for the crimes committed by Alemond and Nyman. Kelly, who had no right to even touch the complaints, filed a miscellaneous civil case on my behalf. When I appeared before Babka I raised this very issue and he ignored the irregularity.

One of the fatal flaws in Krummrich’s case is the failure of the Belleville Police Officer Anthony Branchini to request Krummrich to take a field sobriety test. Could this possibly shoddy police work on the part of Branchini? Very possible, but after how many arrests for DUI does a cop not request a field sobriety test? This is almost second nature. Although, I have to admit, this is not the first time Branchini has exhibited less than compentent ability in building a case. If you are intetested, then look up Ticket No. 0232640 issued by the Belleville Police Department on June 24, 2006 and read the Officer Narrative Report signed by Branchini. For a dumbed-down read of how the Illinois DUI laws work, read this piece from the Secretary of State, DUI Factbook 2012.

Babka, having possession of sworn criminal complaints by way of the fraudulently filed civil case by Brendan Kelly still played dumb and had me explain why I felt a private individual could bring charges directly to a court. I write about this in detail in another post, but essentially Babka first had me present the case law I was relying upon, then appear again to tell me my case law was good, albeit old, and fatally flawed because it referred to “magistrates”. I then wrote a lengthy brief regarding magistrates and how they are essentially the same as Associate Judges, courtesy the Illinois Constitution of 1970, but the duties still applied, which meant hearing complaints and issuing arrest warrants. Following Babka’s dismissal of the case I wrote a motion to reconsider because he refused to, or was incapable of, understanding the difference between issuing arrest warrants based upon complaints and commencing a prosecution.

Babka will not go against cops, so it seems, and will even disregard testimony of another cop in prosecuting a cop when there is sufficient cause to believe the officer to be intoxicated. In my opinion, Babka is a fraud, liar, and incompetent boob. He knew, or should have known, the difference between a magistrate and an associate judge, realize the case before him was a fraud, and act upon sworn criminal complaints. Instead, he obfuscated, dissembled, and ignored violations of law while committing malfeasance on his own.

With this story, Krummrich, a member of the same police department that alleged that weaving within one’s own lane was probable cause for initiating a traffic stop for driving under the influence, was involved in more serious circumstances for the same offense and given a pass by a drunk cops best friend, Brian A. Babka.

This story has been followed by the Belleville News Democrat. I’ll post links and text from those stories here, along with my commentary, since the News Democrat has blocked me from posting comments to their stories due to my “proselytizing”. That said, what follows is the articles from the BND.

Fairview Heights cop arrested for DUI; sergeant crashes car in Belleville
BY KEVIN BERSETT – News-Democrat -Tuesday, March 20, 2012 at 5:25 AM

http://www.bnd.com/2012/03/20/2107145/fairview-heights-cop-arrested.html

A Fairview Heights police sergeant was arrested for DUI on Saturday in Belleville.
James Krummrich, 47, was booked after he was involved in a traffic accident about 5:45 p.m. in the 900 block of North Illinois, according to Belleville police. He allegedly appeared intoxicated, so he was taken into headquarters where he was released after posting bail.
Krummrich declined to comment for this story.

Krummrich, a 15-year police veteran, has been suspended with pay pending the outcome of an internal investigation, Fairview Heights Police Chief Nick Gailius said. If the investigation turns up any evidence he did something unbecoming of an officer, his case will be turned over to the city’s Board of Police and Fire Commissioners, the chief said.
“It’s important to note that everyone is presumed innocent until proven guilty in court,” Gailius said.

Gailius would not comment on whether Krummrich had ever been previously disciplined by the department. Krummrich was off-duty and not in his police vehicle when the crash occurred, Gailius said.

“We are very thankful that no one was injured in the accident,” Gailius said.
No additional information about Krummrich’s arrest or the crash was released Monday by Belleville police.

Krummrich has been a sergeant since 2008 and is currently paid $86,136 to be a patrol supervisor. He is also an instructor at the Southwestern Illinois Police Academy.
Academy Deputy Director William Sax said he was unaware of Krummrich’s arrest and whether the academy would take any action against him.

Copyright 2012 Belleville News-Democrat. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

Contact reporter Kevin Bersett at kbersett@bnd.com or 239-2535.

Cops versus cops: Fairview officer’s DUI hearing leaves judge undecided
BY KEVIN BERSETT – News-Democrat -Tuesday, May 1, 2012 at 9:15 PM

http://www.bnd.com/2012/05/01/2161390/judge-to-rule-on-whether-officers.html

Questions were raised Tuesday in St. Clair County Circuit Court over the Belleville Police Department’s handling of the St. Patrick’s Day DUI arrest of Fairview Heights Police Sgt. James Krummrich.

Associate Judge Brian Babka thought the factors surrounding the case were so unusual that he quoted a lyric from the ’60s rock band Buffalo Springfield during a hearing held to decide the fate of Krummrich’s driver’s license: “There’s something happening here, what it is ain’t exactly clear.”

Babka said he couldn’t conceive how the arresting officer Anthony Branchini could indicate Krummrich was “fit to drive” on a police report detailing Krummrich’s arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. Babka also mentioned an allegation by the defense that a Belleville police lieutenant, not identified during the hearing and not at the scene of the crash, was the one who made the decision to arrest Krummrich, not the officers at the scene. – ISN’T IT INTERESTING THAT BABKA HAS A SYNAPTIC CONUNDRUM OVER CONFLICTING TESTIMONY, YET A FRAUDULENTLY FILED CASE WITH SWORN CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS COMPLETELY ESCAPE HIM IN MY CASE.

“There’s a lot of irregularities here,” Babka said.

At the conclusion of the hearing, which lasted more than an hour, Babka said he may need up to a week before deciding whether to rescind Krummrich’s driver’s license suspension. The suspension of Krummrich’s license for a minimum of 12 months was set to begin Wednesday.

Krummrich, 47, of Fairview Heights, has been on administrative leave with pay since his arrest. He is the subject of an internal affairs investigation, but the Fairview Heights Board of Police and Fire Commissioners has not scheduled a hearing yet on whether to take disciplinary action against him. – WHEN I TRIED TO FILE MY COMPLAINT AGAINST FAIRVIEW HEIGHTS POLICE JOSHUA ALEMOND AND AARON NYMAN, ACTING CHIEF GALLIUS HAD ME WRITE IT OUT ON A LEGAL PAD. HE DID NOT DIRECT ME TO THE FAIRVIEW HEIGHTS BOARD OF POLICE AND FIRE COMMISSIONERS. HE TOO, IS A FRAUD.

Defense attorney Gregory Skinner had called for Tuesday’s hearing. He is seeking to have the suspension rescinded on the grounds that the Belleville police report was defective and that Branchini did not have reasonable grounds to believe that Krummrich was driving under the influence. – I TOO DEMANDED A PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THE STOP WHERE I WAS ARRESTED AND BEATEN. THE FAIRVIEW HEIGHTS DID NOT APPEAR FOR THE HEARING, SAYING THEY WOULD NOT BE COOPERATING, AND MY CHARGES WERE DISMISSED.

Belleville police accused Krummrich of refusing to submit to sobriety tests after he was involved in a two-vehicle accident about 5:45 p.m. March 17 in the 900 block of North Illinois Street. No one was injured in the crash. A driver who fails to submit to sobriety tests automatically has their license suspended for a minimum of one year on the 46th day following their arrest.

At the hearing, Branchini testified that he arrested Krummrich because he smelled of alcohol, his eyes were glassy and he said he had a few drinks. Krummrich had already admitted to driving the truck involved in the accident, said Branchini, who has been a Belleville police officer since 2009. – THIS SEEMS LIKE MORE EVIDENCE THAN SOMEONE “WEAVING WITHIN THEIR OWN LANE”, YET KRUMMRICH IS ARGUING THERE WAS NOT PROBABLE CAUSE FOR HIS ARREST? PRICELESS, FOR A COP TO MAKE SUCH ASSERTINS, ESPECIALLY WHEN HIS GUYS ARE OUT DOING THE SAME TO OTHER PEOPLE.

Collinsville Police Sgt. Charles Mackin, who was a passenger in Krummrich’s 1995 GMC Sierra pickup, testified for the defense. Mackin said he was with Krummrich or Branchini during the entire time prior to Krummrich’s arrest and never heard him refuse to take a sobriety test. – I WOULD NOT PUT TOO MUCH STOCK IN TESTIMONY FROM ANOTHER COP, ESPECIALLY A COLLINSVILLE COP.

Mackin also testified that based on his 22 years of police experience he would not have arrested Krummrich for DUI. Was Krummrich under the influence of alcohol at the time, Skinner asked. – WHAT MEANT TO SAY, IS THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE ARRESTED A “FELLOW OFFICER” WHO WAS DRUNK. THAT’S HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS.

“No, not at all,” Mackin testified.

Belleville police officer Dusty Kallal, who assisted Branchini, said he asked Krummrich to take a field sobriety test but he declined. Kallal admitted that he failed to mention this in his report.

But Assistant State’s Attorney Julie Elliot argued that Krummrich’s refusal to take a sobriety test was mentioned in Branchini’s report.

Branchini testified that Krummrich refused to take a field sobriety test at the scene and after his arrest he refused to take a breath test at the police station. Branchini said he had a video from his patrol car camera of Krummrich’s original refusal.

There one problem: Prosecutors never turned over this video to the defense during discovery. – IN MY CASE, I RAISED THE ISSUE OF DASHBOARD VIDEO EXCULPATING ME AND WAS NEVER PRODUCED UNTIL THE DAY BEFORE MY PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING WHERE THE PROSECUTION ACTED SURPRISED, EVEN THOUGH I HAD BEEN REFERRING TO IT FOR WEEKS. AFTER I RECEIVED THAT VIDEO FROM FAIRVIEW HEIGHTS, THEY REFUSED TO PURSUE CHARGES BECAUSE THE VIDEO CONTRADICTS THEIR REPORTS AND SHOWS THEM TO BE LIARS.

In response, Babka took off his glasses, put his hands on his head and asked Skinner whether he wanted to request sanctions against the prosecution for its failure to turn over the video as required. Elliot countered that Belleville police never gave her office that video, although they did submit videos from Kallal’s car and the booking area.
“I’m just as blind-sided as you are,” Elliot said to Babka.

Branchini and Kallal would not comment following the hearing. Belleville police spokesman Capt. Don Sax said he was unaware that the prosecutors did not receive all the videos.
“I wouldn’t know why not, without looking into it,” Sax said. “I had no idea they didn’t have everything.”

Belleville police have denied a public records request from the News-Democrat to view all the reports and the videos related to Krummrich’s arrest because the case is ongoing.
In closing arguments, Elliot argued that whether the state could prove Krummrich was under the influence of alcohol should be left to trial. All that the judge should consider when deciding whether to rescind Krummrich’s suspension was whether the officers had reasonable grounds to believe he was under the influence of alcohol.

Skinner countered that it appears the police investigation was not done in a “very competent” manner and that no field test was ever offered for Krummrich to deny.
Babka said the “gold standard” on whether the sobriety test was refused would have been the video from Branchini’s car, but the court didn’t have it. The judge hinted that he would have also liked to have heard Branchini explain why he put down Krummrich as fit to drive on his DUI report. The prosecution, however, never asked the officer that question.
“They’re some unusual features here,” Babka said. – THERE WERE UNSUAL FEATURES IN MY CASE TOO, MR. BABKA. WHY DIDN’T YOU QUESTION THOSE?

Copyright 2012 Belleville News-Democrat. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

Contact reporter Kevin Bersett at kbersett@bnd.com or 239-2535. Follow him on Twitter at twitter.com/KevinBersett

Judge reinstates driver’s license for Fairview police sergeant charged with DUI
BY KEVIN BERSETT – News-Democrat -Friday, May 4, 2012 at 10:12 PM

http://www.bnd.com/2012/05/01/2161390/judge-to-rule-on-whether-officers.html

A St. Clair County judge rescinded on Friday the driver’s license suspension of Fairview Heights Police Sgt. James Krummrich who temporarily lost his license following a St. Patrick’s Day DUI arrest.

Associate Judge Brian Babka sided with the testimony of a Collinsville police sergeant, who was a passenger in Krummrich’s pickup, and questioned the strength of the evidence offered by Belleville police, whose handling of the investigation was scrutinized Tuesday during a hearing over the license suspension.

“I find that the testimony of defendant’s witness, officer Charles Mackin, of the Collinsville Illinois Police Department, was entirely credible, and very probative,” Babka wrote in his order. “An officer with 22 years of experience, his testimony was unimpeached. He stated his opinion was that defendant was not under the influence at all, and that there was not enough evidence to charge the defendant.” – NEVER MIND A WRECKED VEHICLE, AN ADMISSION TO HAVING BEEN DRINKING, AND A NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICERS CITING KRUMMRICH’S APPEARANCE. HE HAD A NOTE FROM HIS MOMMY, SO I’LL LET HIM GO.

James Krummrich

Fairview Heights police sergeant James Krummrich, arrested for DUI on St. Patrick’s Day in Belleville. – Provided/BND

Krummrich, 47, was charged with DUI and improper merging into traffic in connection with a March 17 two-vehicle accident in the 900 block of North Illinois Street that did not result in any injuries. He lost his license under Illinois’ statutory summary suspension law, which strips DUI defendants of their driver’s license for a minimum of 12 months when they refuse to undergo chemical testing.

Defense attorney Gregory Skinner requested Tuesday’s hearing. He was seeking to have the suspension rescinded on the grounds that the Belleville police report was defective and that police did not have reasonable grounds to believe that Krummrich was driving under the influence of alcohol.

Skinner would not comment Friday because he had not yet read the order.
Belleville police testified that they had reasonable grounds to believe Krummrich was under the influence of alcohol because he admitted to having a few drinks, had glassy eyes, smelled of alcohol and refused a field sobriety test.

“We respectfully disagree with the judge’s decision, and we are reviewing it,” State’s Attorney Brendan Kelly said. – WELL, MY CONFIDENCE LEVEL JUST WENT THROUGH THE ROOF. BRENDAN KELLY, THE SAME GUY WHO AS CIRCUIT CLERK MISHANDLED MY COMPLAINTS AND PLACED THEM IN FRONT OF BABKA? GOOD LUCK.

In his order, Babka cited case law that stated officers must show probable cause that someone was driving under the influence, and not act on “mere suspicion” when making an arrest.

A driver involved in an accident and who smells of alcohol must show additional signs of intoxication before they can be arrested for DUI, the case law cited by Babka stated. These signs could include bloodshot eyes, slurred speech or erratic driving, none of which Krummrich displayed, the judge stated. In fact, arresting officer Anthony Branchini described Krummrich as cooperative, orderly and “fit to drive” in his report on the DUI.
Babka reiterated the unusual factors surrounding the case, which he had made note of during the hearing.

“There is a veritable ‘tsunami’ of unusual or irregular events that surround this cause, including the disclosure during the hearing of a video/audio recording of some of the events that was not previously produced to defendant despite a prior discovery request, no record of a field sobriety test being offered by an officer during an investigation of an alleged DUI in his report, a bizarre report by an alleged eyewitness to the accident involved which was found to be completely erroneous, (including the driver and passenger changing seats), mistakes in the investigative officer’s reports such as a (preliminary breath test) being offered, when admittedly, there was no such offer, and other events,” the order states.
Belleville police failed to provide prosecutors with a video from Branchini’s patrol car, which he testified would have shown Krummrich refusing to take a field sobriety test. Assisting officer Dusty Kallal testified Krummrich refused a field sobriety test and later a breath test after his arrest, but did not mention these in his reports. Krummrich’s denials to take the tests were mentioned in Branchini’s report, according to Kallal and Assistant State’s Attorney Julie Elliot.

Mackin testified he never witnessed Krummrich being offered a field sobriety test. He also alleged that a Belleville police lieutenant not on the scene made the decision to arrest Krummrich, not Branchini or Kallal, who testified to having a combined 11 years police experience.

Belleville Police spokesman Capt. Don Sax refused to comment for this story because the case is ongoing. Belleville police have refused to release police reports, 911 tapes and videos related to the case for the same reason.

Krummrich has been on administrative leave with pay since his arrest. No trial date has been set in his DUI case.

Copyright 2012 Belleville News-Democrat. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

Contact reporter Kevin Bersett at kbersett@bnd.com or 239-2535. Follow him on Twitter at twitter.com/KevinBersett

Opinion
Saturday, May. 05, 2012
Baffled by DUI ruling

http://www.bnd.com/2012/05/05/2165976/baffled-by-dui-ruling.html

The Belleville police’s handling of Fairview Heights Police Sgt. James Krummrich’s DUI is, in a word, a mess. It seems like the work of the Keystone cops.

Krummrich was ticketed for DUI on St. Patrick’s Day following a two-car accident.
Why did Belleville officer Anthony Branchini mark on the report that Krummrich was fit to drive after a DUI ticket? Why, if he had a dashboard video of Krummrich refusing to take a field sobriety test, wasn’t that turned over to prosecutors? And what’s this about a lieutenant not at the scene making decisions?

These and other discrepancies will make it difficult, maybe impossible, for the St. Clair County state’s attorney to successfully prosecute Krummrich for DUI. If Belleville Police Chief Bill Clay isn’t already investigating his officers’ handling of this case, he needs to get started.

That said, we are baffled by St. Clair County Associate Judge Brian Babka’s decision to let Krummrich keep his driver’s license. In Illinois accused DUI drivers who refuse chemical tests automatically lose their driving privileges for a year. But Babka ruled that there wasn’t sufficient reason for the police to ask him to take such a test in the first place.
Really? Krummrich was involved in an accident, he admitted he had been drinking and an on-duty police officer said Krummrich smelled of alcohol and his eyes were glassy. That seems like plenty of reason for the police to want to check to see whether he was over the legal limit.

Babka notes that Krummrich wasn’t swaying or slurring his speech, and that his policeman pal who was riding with him testified that Krummrich wasn’t driving impaired. A motorist doesn’t have to be falling down drunk to be impaired. The legal limit in Illinois is a relatively low .08.

As far as the pal’s testimony, he may be too close to the situation to be objective. What else would he say? That he let his friend drive even though he’d had one too many?
We expected Babka to back up the automatic suspension law. How disappointing that instead he found a loophole for Krummrich.

My Letter to the Editor of the Belleville News Democrat which ran on 5/15/12

Police held to a different standard

http://www.bnd.com/2012/05/14/2175928/police-held-to-a-different-standard.html

So, Fairview Heights Police Sgt. James Krummrich admitted to drinking before an accident, and another officer perceived his appearance to be consistent with intoxication. Thanks to a technicality (cop talk), Krummrich found refuge under the robe of St. Clair County Judge Brian Babka.
Did Babka apply the law? I find that hard to believe; especially when I’ve seen Babka directly ignore the law, require me to write a brief, and then refuse to hold a hearing on his ruling denying my motion.
Let’s say that Krummrich was driving his car home at 2 a.m. and an officer observed him “weaving within his own lane,” not speeding or even crossing the lines. According to actual police reports and an absurd assertion by the assistant state’s attorney, the police would have the necessary authority to suspect the driver of being intoxicated, initiate a stop, forgo any questioning or investigation, and then proceed to Tase, beat, and arrest the sober “perp.”
Eventually, the accused would have a case filed on his behalf by the Circuit Clerk, which would then end up in front of Babka, who would acknowledge the apparent “irregularity” with the case file, but proceed nevertheless. Babka may then, after being confronted with “settled law” (Including the Illinois Constitution), scratch his head over the definition of “magistrate,” and further refuse to do his judicial duty in hearing a sworn complaint.
Why didn’t Babka play dumb, like he did in Case 10-MR-212? Why do cops “lawyer up” when it suits them? A malfeasant by any other name. …
Mark McCoy
Collinsville

UPDATE – 7/26/12

State’s Attorney, Brendan Kelly, goes on the record with his decision to not prosecute Fairview Heights police sergeant, James Krummrich, for his alleged drunk-driving-related crash on St. Patrick’s Day, 2012. Kelly goes on the record with stating he investigates and prosecutes police against whom criminal allegations are made, which is an absolute lie, considering how he took complaints from me regarding Fairview Heights Police, Officer Alemond and Officer Nyman, and improperly filed them as a civil case before Judge Brian Babka, who then dismissed the case.

I have made a number of people aware of this, including the Belleville News Democrat, who refuse to print one word involving the ordeal.

This is the story at the Belleville News Democrat

http://www.bnd.com/2012/07/24/2256404/mistakes-were-clearly-made-kelly.html#storylink=omni_popular#wgt=pop

krummrich crash report

Here is Brendan Kelly’s statement in regard to the Krummrich case, in response to a News-Democrat reporter’s questions:

Sgt Krummrich”™s cases are no longer pending. In the interest of the public trust, the problems in this case should be discussed. No one is above the law especially those who have sworn to uphold the law. That’s why my Office has charged nine law enforcement officials with criminal charges in the last nine months. My Office continues to review allegations of unlawful conduct by police officers and will prosecute police officers who have violated the law when the facts and evidence allow us to do so. At the scene, the decision to arrest someone is a police decision, not one made by prosecutors. The patrol officers allegedly had evidence that Sgt. Krummrich had caused an accident after pulling out of the parking lot of a tavern. They also allegedly had evidence that his eyes appeared glossy and that he stated “œ a few” when asked if he consumed any alcoholic beverages that day. I will not criticize the decision to arrest him.

The evidence was insufficient to convict beyond a reasonable doubt for several reasons:

” there was no evidence that Sgt. Krummrich was staggering, unsteady, stumbling or unable to stand in either the on scene video or booking video at the station.

” there was no evidence that Sgt. Krummrich had blood shot eyes or slurred speech.

” there was evidence Sgt. Krummrich admitted to having “œa few” drinks, but no evidence of him admitting to being intoxicated.

” there was no evidence from field sobriety tests because none were performed by Sgt. Krummrich.

” there was no evidence of blood alcohol content because Sgt. Krummrich did not perform a breathalizer test.

” there was no evidence of alcoholic beverage containers in Sgt. Krummrich”™s vehicle. Mistakes were made by the arresting officer that undercut his testimony including

(1) after he arrested Sgt. Krummrich for DUI, he marked in a report that Sgt. Krummrich was “œfit to drive,” and

(2) he testified that on scene, Sgt. Krummrich refused to do sobriety tests, but no such refusal was captured on the audio recordings of the stop.

There is zero evidence to believe the patrol officers purposely made mistakes or did anything unlawful. Mistakes were clearly made, but it is also clear these mistakes were neither malicious nor purposeful. Consequently, I have no credibility concerns about these Belleville officers. Officer Branchini logged a copy of his squad car recording into evidence. A prosecutor requested a copy of this recording listed in the evidence receipt. A separate officer tendered to that prosecutor a copy of the booking area video and a recording that turned out to be from Officer Kallal”™s squad car. Copies of these recordings were tendered to the defense. Nothing indicated this recording was anything but what was documented on the evidence receipt. This mistake came to light at the hearing and was rectified by getting a copy of Officer Branchini”™s recording that was then provided to the defense. However, neither of the recordings from the squad cars captured anything incriminating against Sgt. Krummrich. After the hearing, my Office ordered an 88 page transcript of the hearing to precisely review the testimony of all the witnesses. At the end of this review and in light of the court”™s very detailed, factual findings, it was clear that the right thing to do- the only thing to do- was to dismiss the DUI case. We can”™t make up evidence. I can”™t prosecute someone based on my personal feelings about a situation. I”™ve got to have evidence. The remaining traffic charge(improper merging into traffic) was disposed of only after the attorney of the victim involved in the accident made clear his client no longer wished to proceed in any case. The finding of guilty on this charge had nothing to do with the dismissal of the DUI case. With summary suspension hearings, judges can rule against the prosecution in two ways”¦first, a judge can find there was a procedural / technical violation such as the officer failed to read verbatim the warnings to motorist. Second, a judge can find there were no reasonable grounds or probable cause that the driver was intoxicated. If the Judge had ruled in favor of the defendant on a procedural technicality, and the evidence had been stronger, we may have moved forward with the criminal case. He did not do so. Instead, the judge made a legal conclusion based upon findings of fact from evidence presented at the hearing. The judge found that “œthere is no credible evidence that defendant was intoxicated.” It is not unusual to dismiss a case after the court makes such a finding. This is because once a judge has decided there is no probable cause the driver was intoxicated, it will be a practical and legal impossibility to prove intoxication at trial beyond a reasonable doubt. At our request, Belleville officers conducted some final additional investigations seeking proof Sgt. Krummrich purchased alcohol around the time of the crash. No evidence could be found. In addition, a witness to the accident initially claimed that the driver and front seat passenger of Sgt. Krummrich”™s vehicle had switched after the accident, and then returned to the scene after he confronted them. My Office requested the Belleville Police to investigate this very serious claim. When questioned by Belleville detectives, this witness said he was not 100% sure they switched. Also, the detectives checked unsuccessfully for any video recording devices that may have captured the accident or where Sgt. Krummrich”™s vehicle was driven after the accident. On scene, Sgt. Krummrich stated he was the driver at the time of the accident. The driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident repeatedly stated on scene that Charles Mackin was not the driver of Sgt. Krummrich”™s vehicle. After the investigation, there was insufficient evidence to support this claim that the occupants of Sgt. Krummrich”™s truck had switched seats. The credibility of these officers will be reviewed on a case by case basis as is the credibility of every witness in a case.

No one is above the law, but neither is anyone below the law. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies to a charged police officer as well as any civilian. The evidence is what the evidence is no matter who you are or who you know. This is true for the other officers and public officials being prosecuted by my Office right now. John Adams said, “œfacts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passion, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.” The facts in this case are especially stubborn. Political perception and cynicism about the system made this a frustrating case to have to dismiss. But a prosecutor’s decisions have to be made on the law and the evidence. In the end that may be a prosecutor”™s most important duty regardless of the potential criticism. Mr. Romanik is free to discuss his cases, but prosecutors do not have that luxury. We cannot and will not comment on his cases because they are still pending. We will not compromise his right to a fair trial.

Belleville Police video of Fairview Heights Police Sgt. James Krummrich’s arrest on March 17 after a car crash. DUI charges were later dropped and Krummrich pleaded guilty to improper merging.

This is a letter I submitted via email to the Letters to the Editor (letters@bnd.com) on 7/26/12, regarding Kelly’s statement about prosecuting police who violate the law:

Allow me to quote State”™s Attorney, Brendan Kelly, from his statement to the BND regarding the Krummrich case:

“œMy Office continues to review allegations of unlawful conduct by police officers and will prosecute police officers who have violated the law when the facts and evidence allow us to do so.”

I have a question for Mr. Kelly; since when?

When Mr. Kelly was Circuit Clerk he personally took sworn criminal complaints from me where I allege violations of law by Fairview Heights Police officers Alemond and Nyman, under the guise of properly filing them for review by the then State”™s Attorney, Bob Haida. I have emails between Mr. Kelly and myself where this was discussed at length until I brought up the contradictions and hypocrisy in his statements regarding how the charges should be handled.

Consequently, Miscellaneous Remedy Case 10-MR-212 was filed by Mr. Kelly and set for hearing before Judge Babka, another dissembling, disingenuous lackey for the corrupt powers-that-be who acknowledged irregularities with the case and confirmed my supporting case law was good, but who still refused to hear the complaints.

Tell me something Mr. Kelly, what of the complaints and supporting evidence you have in your possession regarding Fairview Heights Police? Where is your law enforcement fervor with respect to those charges? Where is the BND reporting on all of this, especially when I have provided them with the same evidence?

To you all I say, liars, hypocrites, despots, frauds, thugs, thieves, and psychopaths. There”™s more at http://www.markmccoy.com

UPDATE 8/8/12

Well, the BND edited my letter and left off the last paragraph.
http://www.bnd.com/2012/08/07/2275716/double-standard-of-justice.html

The last paragraph which reads:

“There’s more at http://www.markmccoy.com.&#8221;

originally read:

“To you all I say, liars, hypocrites, despots, frauds, thugs, thieves,
and psychopaths. There?s more at http://www.markmccoy.com&#8221;

So, they won’t let me call them liars, hypocrites, despots, frauds, thugs, thieves, and psychopaths….

Some newspaper.

8/11/12

There has been one reply to my post

http://www.bnd.com/2012/08/07/2275716/double-standard-of-justice.html

where I was somehow allowed to reply after being previously banned. I’m posting a screenshot of my reply since I expect the BND to delete my post.

and of course, not too long afterward, I was censored. Here’s a screenshot of my post being removed:

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North Carolina Says No To The Free Exchange of Ideas for Nutrition Blogger

A man who has blogged about his success in overcoming diabetes is under fire from the North Carolina Board of Dietetics/Nutrition for his allegedly giving “advice” to people regarding how to manage their diabetes. Steve Cooksey is not selling advice, drugs, or requesting any sort of compensation. He is recounting his experience, knowledge, and success in overcoming his previous diabetic condition. When the state refers to his needing a license to give advice, they are in essence saying they are the sole authority on what is viable or worthless information regarding medical issues. They would not take issue with Mr. Cooksey’s writings as long as he paid the State’s extortion fee for being able to freely communicate. Mr. Cooksey could be a complete quack and provide dangerous information, as long as he had a license from the State. Of course, getting a license probably means proving you have completed some sort of “approved” training or possess a degree in the field you are professing to be knowledgeable in, but that is still no bar to someone giving bad information.

There is a statement on diabetes-warrior.net that states:

I am not a doctor, dietitian nor nutritionist¦ in fact I have no medical training of any kind. If I can figure this out so should they¦ if it wasn’t for their ¦

A) Intellectual Laziness

B) Willful ignorance

C) Greed

D) All of the Above 🙂

Apparently Mr. Cooksey makes no attempt to profess himself to be any sort of license professional. As a matter of fact, Mr. Cooksey clearly takes exception to the current established medical industry. People who read Mr. Cooksey’s blog and see this information, and who are promoters of inferior western medicine, would not be inclined to follow Mr. Cooksey’s recommendations. Those who visit Mr. Cooksey’s blog and see his disclaimer but continue to read his blog are most likely distrusting and suspicious of failed western medicine and looking for an alternative.

Medical doctors give bad advice all the time. They dispense dangerous pharmaceuticals which cause sometimes unpredictable and life-threatening side effects. They subject people to unnecessary and dangerous tests and perform unnecessary surgery. Doctors possess licenses, as well as being indemnified to some degree for their incompetence or negligence. On the other hand, there are very good, competent doctors who are careful and compassionate with their patients. Being, or not being, in possession of a State license can empower the bad doctor to harm others or prevent the good doctor from helping others. The State is really in no position to say who may, and who may not, give advice. To say Mr. Cooksey is in no position to recommend to others a  non-pharmaceutical, non-surgical, non-medical alternative to the conventional “bad medical advice” is no business of the State of North Carolina.

The State attempts to keep people who give “advice” in the same box. You must conform to a set of approved and accepted standards before you can give advice. Yet, the State has the monopoly of approving and accepting based on their corporate lackeys and professional benefactors and their secured interest in money in giving advice. Someone who persevere in succeeding in alternative, non-accepted approaches are then encumbered with devoting time and money in jumping through brainwashing hoops in hopes of carrying favor with the State before they can give advice. The only advice the State wants others to give is that which funnels people into the same failed and hackneyed remedies which line the pockets of government agencies, ignorant or incompetent doctors, and pharmaceutical companies. The State is not to be trusted, because there is no “license” to run for office or be appointed. The biggest nincompoop can be elected or appointed to a position that then wields such influence as is being wielded against Mr. Cooksey. They have no training or expertise, yet, they are empowered with determining what may be published or licensed. Do you really want to put your access to information in the hands of such nincompoops? The State is incompetence incarnate.

Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the individual to vet the information they act upon. The saying, “caveat emptor” (buyer beware) holds true with any advice. Doctors are given a pass for their mistakes because there is a doctrine of “fully informed consent”. If a doctor prescribes a medicine, you will receive a pamphlet of information on the drugs side-effects, precautions, and intended uses. Much of it contains medical jargon that most do not understand. Nevertheless, you have been “informed” and have little or no recourse if you choose to take the drug and suffer negative or harmful effects.

I encourage Mr. Cooksey to  persist with his endeavor and not change a thing on his blog. I’ll even go so far as to offer space on my blog for Mr. Cooksey to post his information if the State of North Carolina shuts him down. I also encourage people to review Mr. Cooksey’s blog and follow his advice, since he has found a holistic way of combating diabetes. I am always trying to get people I know with diabetes to adopt a healthier lifestyle and essentially follow Mr. Cooksey’s approach, even though I had no awareness of Mr. Cooksey until recently. How serendipitous.  That said, you can get off of insulin, meds, and harmful health consequences from diabetes if you modify your diet and lifestyle. My “ADVICE” to diabetics is to follow Mr. Cooksey’s successful approaches to overcoming diabetes. There, all that said and I have no license either.

An article regarding the matter follows.

http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display_exclusive.html?id=8992

State Threatens to Shut Down Nutrition Blogger

Nutrition board says he needs a license to advocate dietary approaches

Apr. 23rd, 2012
CHARLOTTE “ The North Carolina Board of Dietetics/Nutrition is threatening to send a blogger to jail for recounting publicly his battle against diabetes and encouraging others to follow his lifestyle.

Chapter 90, Article 25 of the North Carolina General Statutes makes it a misdemeanor to “practice dietetics or nutrition without a license. According to the law, “practicing nutrition includes “assessing the nutritional needs of individuals and groups and “providing nutrition counseling.

Steve Cooksey has learned that the definition, at least in the eyes of the state board, is expansive.

When he was hospitalized with diabetes in February 2009, he decided to avoid the fate of his grandmother, who eventually died of the disease. He embraced the low-carb, high-protein Paleo diet, also known as the “caveman or “hunter-gatherer diet. The diet, he said, made him drug- and insulin-free within 30 days. By May of that year, he had lost 45 pounds and decided to start a blog about his success.

But this past January the state diatetics and nutrition board decided Cooksey’s blog “ Diabetes-Warrior.net “ violated state law. The nutritional advice Cooksey provides on the site amounts to “practicing nutrition, the board’s director says, and in North Carolina that’s something you need a license to do.

Unless Cooksey completely rewrites his 3-year-old blog, he could be sued by the licensing board. If he loses the lawsuit and refuses to take down the blog, he could face up to 120 days in jail.

The board’s director says Cooksey has a First Amendment right to blog about his diet, but he can’t encourage others to adopt it unless the state has certified him as a dietitian or nutritionist.

The seminar

Jan. 12, Cooksey attended a nutrition seminar at a church in Charlotte. The speaker was the director of diabetes services for a local hospital.

“She was giving all the wrong information, just like everyone always does “ carbs are OK to eat, we must eat carbs to live, promoting low-fat, etc., Cooksey said. “So I spoke up.

After the meeting he handed out a couple of business cards pointing people to his website.

Three days later, he got a call from the director of the nutrition board.

“Basically, she told me I could not give out nutritional advice without a license, Cooksey said.

He said she also told him that his website was being investigated and gave him some suggestions about how to bring it into compliance.

If he does not go along, the board could file an injunction and “essentially shut the website down, Cooksey said.

The law

Charla Burill, the board’s director, told Carolina Journal she could not discuss the details of Cooksey’s case because his website is still under investigation, but agreed to talk about the law in the hypothetical.

It’s not necessarily against the law to give your sister or your friend nutritional advice, she said. And it’s not necessarily against the law to use a blog to tell people what they should eat.

Where it crosses the line, Burill said, is when a blogger “advertises himself as an expert and “takes information from someone such that he’s performing some sort of assessment and then giving it back with some sort of plan or diet.

Cooksey posted a link (6.3 MB PDF download) to the board’s review of his website. The document shows several Web pages the board took issue with, including a question-and-answer page, which the director had marked in red ink noting the places he was “assessing and counseling readers of his blog.

“If people are writing you with diabetic specific questions and you are responding, you are no longer just providing information “ you are counseling, she wrote. “You need a license to provide this service.”

The board also found fault with a page titled “My Meal Plan, where Cooksey details what he eats daily.

In red, Burril writes, “It is acceptable to provide just this information [his meal plan], but when you start recommending it directly to people you speak to or who write you, you are now providing diabetic counseling, which requires a license.

The board also directed Cooksey to remove a link offering one-on-one support, a personal-training type of service he offered for a small fee.

Cooksey posts the following disclaimer at the bottom of every page on his website:

“I am not a doctor, dietitian, nor nutritionist ¦ in fact I have no medical training of any kind.

In fact, he brags about his lack of formal training throughout his blog.

“It’s so simple, he told CJ. “I cut carbs, I reduced my drugs and insulin until I didn’t need them at all. If I can figure that out, why in the hell can’t all these other people [in the medical field]?

Burill said the disclaimer may not protect a nutrition blogger from the law.

“If I’ve given you reason to not worry that I don’t have a license because I have all these other reasons I’m an expert, you could still harm the public, she said. “At least you’re not trying to mislead the public, but you’re trying to get the public to trust you.

It’s a fine line between what’s legal and what’s not when it comes to talking about nutrition.

“Anyone can talk about anything they want, Burill said. “That’s a First Amendment right, so to speak.

For example, a person could write a blog advocating vegetarianism, she said.

“Now if you advertised that you’d taken classes in nutrition, you’ve worked at [the federal government’s Food and Nutrition Service] for three years, and you say I believe everyone should be a vegetarian, and I’m here to help you if you want to change your diet’ [that could be crossing the line], Burill said.

“A vegetarian diet would be a little bit harder [to prosecute] because a vegetarian is not really like a medical diet.

Burill said if Cooksey refuses to come into compliance with the law, the board could file for an injunction.

Free speech

Declan McCullagh, a CBSNews.com correspondent who writes about online free speech, says the board probably is violating Cooksey’s First Amendment rights.

“The First Amendment says state and federal governments shall make no law’ abridging freedom of speech, McCullagh said. “It doesn’t say except for what annoys the North Carolina Board of Dietetics and Nutrition.’

McCullagh pointed to a sentence in Cooksey’s blog the board didn’t approve of: “I do suggest that your friend eat as I do and exercise the best they can.

“If that language appeared in a book or a magazine article, do you think the board would complain? McCullagh asked. “How about if someone said that to a friend over dinner at a restaurant? Of course not. But because it’s on the Web, they seem to think that the First Amendment no longer applies.

McCullagh said the board may be on more solid ground in its complaint about the telephone support packages Cooksey offers. “But ¦ if customers are paying $97 or $149 or $197 a month to have someone listen, that sounds a lot like life coaching, which doesn’t require a license.

“In general, I think that as long as someone is very clear that they’re not a licensed dietician, state officials can probably find better uses of their time, he said.

Cooksey said the board both has violated his freedom of speech and done a disservice to the people of North Carolina. He said all he’s trying to do with his blog is provide an alternative to the nutritional advice pushed by mainstream sources on what they say people should be eating.

Cooksey said he’s seeking legal assistance in case the state decides to take further action against him.

Sara Burrows is an associate editor of Carolina Journal.

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Sovereign Citizens – Walk Like a Citizen, Talk Like a Citizen, Guess What… You're Not Sovereign.

I’m seeing more-and-more about the phenomena called “Sovereign Citizens”. People subscribing to this theory assert that the government is not something that can compel one to follow its laws, pay its taxes, or otherwise claim legitimate authority over an individual. As a result, one would attempt to claim their rightful place in the hierarchy of authority, and call themselves sovereign citizens. Many of the followers employ a number of tactics to divest themselves of government control and act within their sovereign prerogatives. They will create their own ID’s, license plates, courts, and official documents. Many of the followers base their sovereignty on biblical principles. I believe sovereign citizens fail on a number of levels, but agree with the basic premise that in essence, people are the true authority over government. However, in many reports about sovereign citizens we see commentators and officials impugning the sovereign citizen movement because it fails to acknowledge or accept equal claims of sovereignty by government. We will examine this and determine just whose claim of sovereignty is legitimate.

The main questions we have to examine here are:

1.)  What is sovereignty?

2.) Who is sovereign?

3.) Is government superior to the individual?

4.) Do people have a right to deny government authority?

There are many definitions of sovereignty. The word itself has been used in a number of ways from the ancient Greeks to modern political theorists. I won’t touch on all of the ways sovereignty has been used, but I’ll look at the relationship between the individual and the State, and competing claims of sovereignty. Here are two examples of how sovereignty is defined:

1. The word “sovereign” is defined in the 6th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, published in 1990, as being, “A person, body, or state in which independent authority is vested; a chief ruler with supreme power; a king or other ruler in a monarchy.” Prior to the War for American Independence, the British king was the sovereign and the American people were his subjects. The war’s outcome changed all this:The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to the collective body of the people – and he who before was a “subject of the king” is now “a citizen of the State.” – State v. Manuel, North Carolina, Vol. 20, Page 121 (1838)

It will be sufficient to observe briefly, that the sovereignties in Europe, and particularly in England, exist on feudal principles. That system considers the prince as the sovereign, and the people as his subjects; it regards his person as the object of allegiance… No such ideas obtain here; at the revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects… and have none to govern but themselves… – Chisholm v. Georgia, Dallas’ Supreme Court Reports, Vol. 2, Pages 471, 472 (1793)

2.  The supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent state is governed; supreme political authority; the supreme will; paramount control of the constitution and frame of government and its administration; the self-sufficient source of political power, from which all specific political powers are derived; the international independence of a state, combined with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign dictation; also a political society, or state, which is sovereign and independent.

The power to do everything in a state without accountability, –to make laws, to execute and to apply them, to impose and collect taxes and levy contributions, to make war or peace, to form treaties of alliance or of commerce with foreign nations, and the like.

Sovereignty in government is that public authority which directs or orders what is to be done by each member associated in relation to the end of the association. It is the supreme power by which any citizen is governed and is the person or body of persons in the state to whom there is politically no superior. The necessary existence of the state and that right and power which necessarily follow is “sovereignty.” By “sovereignty” in its largest sense is meant supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power, the absolute right to govern. The word which by itself comes nearest to being the definition of “sovereignty” is will or volition as applied to political affairs.

We see constant references made to the “state”, and its ability to make and enforce laws. This brings two things to mind. From where ds the state originate, and where ds it get its authority? The state is not a thing that comes into existence by an act of nature. It has not existed since the beginning of time, and is not self-perpetuating. Many articles make reference to the state, as though it were an omnipotent and self-aware entity that could compel allegiance and dispense punishment. The state cannot exist without people. People are not, by nature, compelled to be a member of, or otherwise recognize, the state. People must first recognize it, desire to associate with it, and choose to observe and obey it. It can be said, that without people the state is just an abstraction, and in its fundamental sense, the state is nothing but people acting collectively in a political fashion, but possessing no inherent or natural authority over any other who ds not choose to likewise participate. For instance, the word sovereign/sovereignty is used in the Federalist Papers 93 times.

I will quote from one of the first Supreme Court cases in Illinois, which in my opinion is one of the most oppressive and corrupt states in the union, but from a time when the court recognized the source of political power as being that of the individual:

What is ment by the term constitution as applied to government? It is the form of government instituted by the people in their sovereign capacity, in which first principles and fundamental law are established. The constitution is the supreme, permanent and fixed will of the people in their original, unlimited and sovereign capacity, and in it are determined the condition, rights and duties of every individual of the community.”
“From the decrees of the constitution there can be no appeal, for it emanates from the highest source of power, the sovereign people. Whatever condition is assigned to any portion of the people by the constitution, is irrevocably fixed, however unjust in principle it may be. The constitution can establish no tribunal with power to abolish that which gave and continues such tribunal in existence. But a legislative act is the will of the legislature, in a derivative and subordinate capacity. The constitution is their commission, and they must act within the pale of their authority, and all their acts, contrary or in violation of the constitutional charter, are void.
An act of the legislature is different, and if it contravenes the constitution, no repetition of it can render it valid.” – Justice Samuel LockwoodPhbe. V. Jay1 Ill. 268, December 1828

 

[nggallery id=2]

Phbe v.Jay Images

Phbe v. Jay Google Books

It would appear that Justice Samuel Lockwood was espousing many of the same sovereign citizen rhetoric we see today. It is not so absurd to view people as sovereigns, since before there can be a state there must be people who draft a constitution which creates that state, and in order for the people to have that ability they must first be free of any duty, allegiance, or submission to another authority, thereby placing them in a position of sovereignty to create a state. It would also follow that should the state move against the people, in violation of the powers enumerated to it by the people through the constitution, the people have the power and right to alter the state or abolish it. In doing so, it is not necessary to take physical measures to rail against that which has become so big, oppressive, and violent; it is merely that the people refuse to further support, obey, or acknowledge the state. It can be said that the state exists only as long as people support, obey, and acknowledge it.

Now remember, as Justice Lockwood said, it is the “people in their sovereign capacity”, not the citizen. For one to be a citizen there must first be a state for which to apply that citizenship. Citizenship is a political condition, not a natural one. Once the state, an un-natural thing deriving its existence from natural people, is created the people then relate to it through their citizenship. People cannot interract with un-natural things. Citizehship is that condition by which people relate to the thing they created. Claiming to be a sovereign citizen is to mix two conditions, natural and un-natural, one beholding to nothing and the second beholding to a political body.

To quote from this article from canadafreepress.com, the writer aptly states:

Under the Articles of Confederation, which preceded the Constitution as the foundational document and framework of organization of the United States, stated categorically in Article II, Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence. Nowhere in the Constitution is this retention of inherent sovereignty surrendered. The so-called sovereignty clause found in Article Six of the Constitution obviously gives precedence to the laws and treaties made by the Federal government it ds not however expressly say anywhere in the document that the States surrendered or forfeited their inherent sovereignty. If it had it never wouldve been ratified. As expressly stated in the 10th Amendment neither the States nor the people surrendered their sovereignty to the Federal Government, they delegated it. There is a difference between these two actions. To surrender is to give entirely and irrevocably to another while delegation is a temporary action based upon continued agreement between the parties involved.

Another strong argument can be made that since all governments are the products of a social contract between those who govern and those governed sovereignty ultimately resides in the people and governments are therefore merely agents of the peoples will.  According to this line of thought all governments wield delegated powers and can have no more power in and of themselves than the moon has light without the sun.

Amendment is the only legitimate process for change under the Constitution. If the design calls for a decentralized diffused sovereignty in an asymmetrical system how was change achieved from that to the current system of highly centralized power and control? Was it by amendment or practice? Is it possible for an illegitimate practice to become a legitimate tradition? Is it possible for an illegitimate tradition to set a legitimate precedent?

All of these historically based academic discussions aside and for all intents and purposes the argument about who is sovereign was forever settled by Abraham Lincoln.  When the South attempted to secede, an action not prohibited by the Constitution they were beat back into submission to the Federal Government. Debate over. Question answered. The Federal Government is supreme. However, though this is the reality of our circumstance since the Civil War this is a reality imposed through the use of military force not to be confounded with the original condition based upon the voluntary agreement between the people, the states and the national government in Constitution.

For years this question of who is sovereign has see-sawed back and forth. Today the Progressives and their two headed government party seek to make the exaltation of the central government permanent. If this stands unchallenged, America has devolved from the defused model established under the Constitution to a centralized version reminiscent of its original absolutist definition. If this new normal is enshrined as reality it will become increasingly obvious as States strive to assert their rights and people seek to preserve their freedom. For if the central government is now absolutely sovereign it will eventually crush all rivals. If the people are sovereign, in time theyll find their voice, reassert their power, re-establish the federal system, and return to the social contract as ratified in the Constitution.

As the writer points out, it was ultimately the use of force, in contravention of the Constitution which formed the United States Government, and which concordantly breathed life into the office of Mr. Lincoln’s presidency, that laid to rest the question of whether the States retained, or relinqished, their sovereignty when forming the union. It was this force, violent, destructive, blood-spilling force, wielded by Mr. Lincoln which subdued the rebellious south and “saved the union”.

Let’s now look at two recent mainstream stories regarding the sovereign citizen movement and how it is described. One is from ABC News and the other from Vegas News Review. The ABC News story was titled, “Sovereign Citizens: Radicals Exercising ‘God-Given Rights’ or Fueling Domestic Terrorism?“. The Vegas News Review story similarly was titled, “Sovereign Citizens – American citizens or domestic terrorists?” Notice how there is a recurring reference to “domestic terrorism”. This is the light being cast upon sovereign citizens. If someone wishes to remove themselves from the government, then that government implies they are engaging in domestic terrorism.

Quoting from the ABC News story:

Sovereign citizens are a loosely-organized collection of groups and individuals who believe they are both above the law and “true defenders of the Constitution.”

They follow their own set of rules and many refuse to pay taxes. The movement’s followers believe, in large part, that the existing government in the United States is illegitimate and needs to be “restored.” Many sovereigns refer to themselves as “patriots” or “constitutionalists.” Driver’s licenses, license plates, and insurance are not required, many sovereign believe, going as far as making their own identification badges and gun permits. Some members are known to turn violent against law enforcement and are notoriously hostile towards the media.

Federal government officials describe sovereign citizens as an “extremist anti-government group” and the FBI is concerned about members of the group becoming more violent, accusing them of “comprising a domestic terrorist movement.”

Quoting from the Vegas News Review story:

SCs are a growing group of radicals who claim no allegiance to the government and its rules, laws and representatives.  They have their own mishmash of gibberish they consider laws that they follow and enforce, sometimes with deadly results. In the United States, over 100,000 have dedicated themselves to the cause of Sovereign Citizenry with another 200,000 involved in one way or another.

Bear in mind, that the American political system is a bottom-up model,where monarchy was a top-down model. Kings and princes were placed on par with God on earth. They were accountable to no one, and their authority was without question. After the American Revolution, which resulted from people being tired of the abuses of monarchy, they felt it best to leave power with themselves and delegate only what they felt a government would need to secure their safety and happiness, never surrendering their sovereignty, but endowing the newly created State with power which rendered it as a sovereign power against all other powers that would lay a claim to govern or subjugate the people. It can be said that the Founding Fathers were, in a sense, sovereign citizens. They too, were radicals who claimed no allegiance to government or its rules, laws, and representatives. Both articles seem to be describing the very men who overthrew the shackles of monarchy and formed the United States of America.

 Truth be told, I claim no allegiance to the government nor follow its rules, yet, I am not a sovereign citizen. I do not consider myself to be a citizen of any political body. I fail to find one worthy of my allegiance or participation. The current system of government we have before us is violent, thieving, and oppressive. I am, in the words of Justice Lockwood, sovereign. I have unlimited power to do as I see fit with the self-imposed limitation that I do not transgress upon the like-rights and sovereignty of others. I am not extremist in any sense other than I regard myself as the only authority over my life. Government, on the other hand, could be viewed as extreme in that it believes it has power to pass and apply laws to anyone it wishes, tax their labor, and imprison or kill them for failing to obey. Who is the extremist?

Both stories fail because they rely upon the presupposition that the United States Government is legitimate, and has the legitimate authority to do the things it ds. Likewise, they fail to recognize the the source of governmental power, the people, and their right to “alter or abolish” the government. There is a very strong inference that the government, as now constituted, exists of its own volition and has plenary authority over everything. I won’t waste time here going tit-for-tat over everything the government says about sovereign citizens also applying to actions of government. However, for every negative aspect of sovereign citizens, there are equally and more heinous actions taken by government but it gives itself a pass because it is our master. Enough said.

So, if the people are sovereign and create a government which has limited power and uses that power in a way not intended or agreed upon by some citizens of that government, then when reclaiming their rightful place and exerting their sovereignty, why would they emulate or take on the characteristics of that government? If you are sovereign, why would you need to issue drivers licenses, license plates, and other official documents similar to those issued by government? If you are sovereign, then you need no license or plates on your vehicle. They cling to the notion of the “republic”, when the republic is a political body that required allegiance and surrendering some of your sovereignty.

Sovereign citizens exhibit many of the same tendencies people using such theories as the “Strawman“, or “Redemption Process” espouse.  Again, these are people claiming to be sovereign, yet resorting to an amalgamation of convoluted machinations found in government. If I am sovereign, I have no court, no official currency, and need for licensure. I cannot sue since civil procedure and remedies are a product of a government, and I renounce that government. It’s like canceling your membership to the YMCA, but claiming some divine right to go there and swim because no one has the right to confine hydrogen and oxygen in a pool and away from everyone else. In essence, sovereign citizens exhibit many of the same characteristics as government, but they do not agree with the government when it ds those very things. They rebel against government issued license plates and legal processes by creating their own license plates and legal processes.

The ABC News story makes reference to the sovereign citizens being “defenders of the Constitution”. Why would someone want to defend the Constitution when, as Lysander Spooner said, “But whether the Constitution really be one thing, or another, this much is certain – that it has either authorized such a government as we have had, or has been powerless to prevent it. In either case, it is unfit to exist.” People in the sovereign citizen movement, the patriot movement, and other movements hold the Constitution in almost ecclesiastical reverence. They don’t realize that every action taken by government, upon which they disagree, is justified by government as originating with the Constitution. As a matter-of-fact, it is not even their constitution to defend. The Supreme Court has even commented that people in the States, have no claim to the Constitution. The case is Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore – 32 U.S. 243 (1833), and the court said:

The question thus presented is, we think, of great importance, but not of much difficulty. The Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual States. Each State established a constitution for itself, and in that constitution provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government as its judgment dictated. The people of the United States framed such a government for the United States as they supposed best adapted to their situation and best calculated to promote their interests. The powers they conferred on this government were to be exercised by itself, and the limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and we think necessarily, applicable to the government created by the instrument. They are limitations of power granted in the instrument itself, not of distinct governments framed by different persons and for different purposes.

So, you see, the Constitution has no connection with individuals in the States. It stands apart as a source of political power. The respective States have their own constitutions, written by the sovereign people belonging the the political body creating such, but each retains their sovereignty. A body of people cannot draft a constitution that then binds people who do not consent to be ruled the ensuing laws. It is not majority rule. If such were the case, we could dispense with constitutional formality and just have people voting to what to do to whomever. There is a fundamental issue of law which supersedes even government and constitutions. The sovereign citizens call this “God’s law”.

As with anything, when you limit or define rights as deriving from something, you run the risk of deciding who interprets those laws or rights. The majority of sovereign citizens are Christian, therefore, it can be implied that if someone is not Christian they do not acknowledge your rights if, even though similar, derive from a deity not of the Christian persuasion. Likewise, they refer to biblical principles in justifying or supporting their position. What if someone ds not find any legitimacy with the Bible, or worships in accordance with the Quran? As with government, religion can be just as tyrannical.

In my opinion, individuals are sovereign, for lack of a better word. We are born into this world with all the power, rights, and abilities we will ever possess. There may be enormous disparity in circumstances or opportunity by which to exercise such, but we possess them regardless. People are not created alike  with physical attributes, but no one has any right to determine how or by what means another may try to make the best life they can for themselves. Government, tasting the blood of the ignorant and apathetic, becomes more aggressive, until some point it takes on a life of its own, manned by armies of supporters, bureaucrats, agents, and subjects who twist and bend so-called laws for the conquest and subjugation of other people, many of whom do not consent nor agree with that government. Do people have a right to rebel? Of course they do. However, successfully executing that rebellion is another thing to be considered. Being right ds not make you successful.

Do I disagree with sovereign citizens? I find the term oxymoronic. I agree with people abandoning government and functioning in their own society without interference from anyone else. I find it pointless to emulate that which with you disagree. I fail to see how one can claim to be sovereign, and yet, be a citizen. If you are going to take the step to be sovereign, then do it and do it totally. I find the two stories referenced to be nothing but propaganda against a growing movement of people who have had it with this government, and who are at a loss for expressing their ultimate displeasure and no other recourse for asserting their sovereignty. Both stories presuppose the legitimacy of government and discount the source of its power. Government causes more harm under claimed sovereignty than citizens do, and government ds it offensively where the sovereign citizens do it defensively. The government acts as an aggressor causing people to scramble for a defensive position, and having been indoctrinated in government schools, are left with limited options.

If you are truly free and sovereign, then just act like it. The government is not a behemoth immune to being dismantled, but it must be done individual-by-individual. It must rot and crumble from within, because it prepares its defenses for assaults from without. It has no control over you, other than what you provide by surrendering your mind to it. As the support weakens, the more vulnerable it becomes to, not bullets, but ideas. I recommend reading this article I previously posted. It is a very good analysis of the nature of governmental power. You do not need to take up arms against the tyrant, you only need to resolve to serve no more. That is the nature of true sovereignty.

1. http://www.civil-liberties.com/pages/art1.html

2. http://www.hawaii-nation.org/sovereignty.html

 

Tracking the Sovereign Citizen Buzz on the Net.

From:

http://www.pickenssentinel.com/view/full_story/18858776/article-Piedmont-man-faces-charges-in-Pickens-County-burglary-possibly-tied-to-domestic-terrorism-group

Title:

Piedmont man faces charges in Pickens County burglary possibly tied to domestic terrorism group

Excerpt:

The sovereign citizen movement, in all its various forms, poses a clear threat to the safety of our community because its an attempt to disengage from the rules which govern everyone, said Pickens County Sheriff David Stone. A person who fervently believes that he is not subject to the law, and can essentially dictate his own law, is potentially very dangerous. In result, theres not much difference between that type of individual and a jihadist who follows a radical form of Islam. In both cases, their belief structures convince them that what they are doing is right, regardless of the effect on society as a whole.

Commentary:

I would differ that the current rules govern “everyone”. Government clearly sets special rules aside for itself, indemnifying or absolving its actions, even when those actions “affect society as a whole”. But you see, government sets the rules to preserve its order, and not that of society. The government fervently believes it is not subject to the law because they dictate their own law. Government is that threat to society because when society finds its own rules for peaceful intercourse government intervenes claiming some overriding necessity to keep us safe or level the playing field. Police kill with relative impunity provided the killing could be justified as an officer being in fear for his safety, but let an individual kill a police officer, even in self-defense, and badges come from miles around to support “their” fallen brethren, as if they stand apart from the rest of us. Sure, to me, sovereign citizens are either misguided, ignorant, or opportunistic bottom-feeders using the same rules as bottom-feeding government bureaucrats to use a system for intimidation and theft.

 

From:

http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/schaeffer-cox-takes-stand-detail-when-deadly-force-justified?page=0,0 

Title:

Schaeffer Cox takes stand to detail when deadly force is justified

Excerpt:

The only time that the use of force is morally justified is to stop someone from hurting you, Cox said from the witness stand, prompted by a question from his attorney. The use of violence to protect your family is morally justified. The use of violence to promote your fancies is not…

Commentary:

I do not know much about Schaeffer Cox, but aside from his sovereign citizen position and common law courts, I admire his tact. I believe he falls short of the philosophical mark about the illegitimacy of government in-general, but we’ll see how the jury takes to his charm. All things considered… good luck Mr. Cox.

 

From:

http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2012/aug/08/sovereign-citizens-arrested-after-swat-team-stando/

Title: http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2012/aug/08/sovereign-citizens-arrested-after-swat-team-stando/

Excerpt: Knezovich joined SWAT team negotiators because self-proclaimed sovereigns typically recognize the sheriff as the highest law enforcement authority, he said.

Commentary: I posted the following response to the story:

I’m concerned more about the government extremist mentality posting comments on this story. As usual, delusional sycophants supporting government power chime in to justify some illusory authority superior to the individual rights or people.

Sovereign citizen arguments fail on many levels, but what fails worse is government’s claim they have any natural or a priori sovereign right over individuals, which is not true.

I wrote at length on Sovereign Citizens and the concept of individual sovereignty trumping government’s claims of sovereignty. http://wp.me/p1uj3C-Ai

People are sovereign, citizens are not. That said, there is no obligation or duty for people to obey everything malignancy called “law”that flows from the legislative pens of thugs and usurpers. Of course, being violence incarnate, will resort to terrorism and violence in order to suppress any notion that people are superior to government and strike fear in the contemplative rebels.

This government has payback coming and it is moving now to further establish itself as the parens patriae for every human being who inhabits the soil within its fictitious boundaries.

People need to begin resisting and disobeying en masse, and overwhelm this corrupt system and shine the light on murderous police and despotic judges. Most people, who are by nature cowards and predisposed to following whatever edict passes the lips of their keepers, will blindly follow any man in in authority in placing the collective boot upon their neighbors necks.

This is just the beginning, and otherwise good men and women serving the Leviathan had better reconsider where their allegiance lies.

Marc MkKoy
http://www.marcmkkoy.com

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My Expatriation from the United States – An Epilogue

I wanted to take this opportunity to reflect back on my Declaration of Sovereignty, Expatriation, and Dissolution of all Previous National and Political Allegiance, which I signed in December of 2007. With that Declaration, I renounced any real or implied allegiance to the government of the United States, as well as any consent to be provided any protection under its laws or obligation to obey them. I have heard nothing from anyone representing the US Government in refuting or acknowledging my Declaration, notwithstanding numerous visits from various government domains to my website, and more specifically, to my Declaration.

I have to admit, I wrote my Declaration at a time when I was having serious reservations about what I had been witnessing over some time; an ever-encroaching police state, fewer freedoms, more violence, apathetic populace, fear…. I could have retreated to my television or You Tube to disengage from the uneasiness, but instead, I chose to embrace it. Why did I feel like this? What is the reason? Was the answer “government”? No. The answer was me. For all of the things that caused me to feel uneasy, I could trace a source of conflict back to me. It was I who did not speak out. It was I who thought my obligation ended with voting someone else to correct the world’s ills. It was I who turned my head when law enforcement stepped out of bounds. It was I who had allowed myself to become de-natured in exchange for accepting a system that flourishes on fear and ignorance. I was just a man, and any tacit or explicit allegiance to a political system which brought much of the pain and suffering upon people everywhere was a voluntary approval of that system.

With that said, some have asked why pick on the ‚ United States? There are more oppressive political systems in the world; why not speak out against them? Well, because it is the United States that confronts me directly and provides the means for its petty tyrants to interject themselves into my life. I would say the same about any political society. I am an Anarchist. I do not believe in borders, governments, force. What makes the United States the object of my disdain is that it was allegedly founded on individual liberty, and in revolt to monarchy. It was founded in blood, and is maintained in blood. The patriotic platitudes still spew from the lips of politicians to perpetuate the anachronistic notions of individual liberty, but the actions of this government say otherwise. In the final discourse, it resorts to fear in garnering our consent. I do not support the Unites States, and having previously deemed to be one of its subjects, my Declaration is the catharsis for correcting that assumption. I likewise do not support other governments, but none have asked for my support, so to speak to each specifically is not required. My Declaration is my separation from all that is the United States government. From that point on, I will choose to associate myself with whatever political society I may so choose, but do so voluntarily and with fully-informed consent, reserving my right to withdraw that consent at any time.

Some have commented that since I did not follow statutory protocols in renouncing my citizenship that my renunciation therefore was not proper and I am considered to still be a citizen. What the US Government or any of its agents believe or perceive is of no consequence to me. They still deem to treat me as though I was a US citizen and for the purposes of confiscating my wealth. However, how I am treated by the US Government is no evidence as to what I say I am. It is I who determines my political status because I have to make the admission or seek a benefit or the protection of that government to fall within its jurisdiction. My presence in America is situational, where the jurisdiction of the US Government is political, and not territorial. For it to claim dominion over a plot of soil, absent a political precursor, is null and void. My political bonds have been disavowed and are no longer binding upon me with respect to them.

The reason for the lack of response from the US Government is two-fold. For them to challenge or refute my Declaration they would have to admit having read or being in receipt of it. They would have to either accept or deny its application, and more importantly, the right of people to associate or dis-associate themselves to or from political affiliations. If they accept it, then I am free from all political encumbrances, and likewise, anyone else who asserts their sovereignty; if not, then we have no choice but to succumb to the occupying forces and must therefore submit without recourse.

The United States Government, and their assorted municipal enclaves called “States”, have usurped and stolen from me over the years. I have been successful in keeping all of my earnings in some cases, and in others, been punitively withheld by so-called “employers”. I do not receive federal benefits because, in my opinion, I am not eligible due to not being a US citizen. However, I am not certain that I am willing to allow them to totally abscond with all that is rightfully mine without firing back. I have been placed at a disadvantage, having had the fruits of my labor stolen over the years. I only have a couple of options, as I see it. I can engage the government as though I were a citizen, taking benefits and filing their forms, or I can resort to more subtle and devious measures to recoup what is mine. It may come down to my having to lie, cheat, borrow, or steal to regain my property. As far as I’m concerned, there is no shame in lying or stealing from an entity which engages in lying and stealing to further its own ends. The only downside is if you are caught, and knowing how this government plays, it is wise to plan all moves accordingly.

I do not plan on staying in the US. I’ve been looking at other options abroad for some time. I won’t say where, but I’m sure they think they have it figured out since many of my trips involve Mexico, but traveling through Latin America and even out of the country is relatively easy once you are off US shores. I feel being a US citizen is in-fact more of a liability then a benefit since many countries look unkindly upon Americans and will lash out violently in response to the carnage and inhumanity left in the wake of US presence in many countries. It is not wise to travel with the blood of innocent people on your US Passport and wear the badge of imperialistic citizenship.

I am often asked, “Does the US recognize your expatriation?” I can’t say, but if so, they have erred greatly in allowing me to remain in the alleged “US”, working and living as usual. If they react in either way they are publicly on-notice and any inconsistency in their actions will be proof of their hypocrisy and arrogance. If I am not, then they are misapplying their laws to me and allowing me to remain in the “country”. If I am, then my Declaration means nothing and we have no option but to succumb to their occupation. I say I am not, and therefore will have to resort to “other means” to reclaim my property.

I harbor no love or allegiance for the US. As a country, it is a patent failure in self-determination, democracy, individual freedom, and liberty. It was never my government, as I have no need for it. There are plenty of good people, but that can be said for any spot on the globe. There is nothing special about people just because of where they may be found upon the soil. However, more-and-more “Americans” are resigned to simply obey the edicts of a corrupt, violent, and deceitful government than challenge any legitimacy on the grounds it violates natural rights or individual liberty. The people, in large part, have succumbed to materialism, immediate gratification, greed, ignorance, and fear. There is little foundation upon which to build a cohesive society which recognizes fundamental individual rights and adheres to principles of tolerance, peace, and autonomy. I welcome all peaceful people and admonish those who rally in support of the Leviathan.

What has changed, following my Declaration? In some respects, not much. There is greater peace of mind and comfort in being able to step back and see the US for what it is, and having the resolve and purpose to disassociate myself from it. I am now operating under the law of necessity, and will do all that is “necessary and proper” for me, by “any means necessary”. Let the bureaucrats and keepers of the plantation mull those words over for awhile. They love to engage in double-speak and abstractions. I will remain true to my commitment to peace and tolerance, but as for government, that abstract legal fiction of coercive control, peace rests with its demise.

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Disecting the Drivers License Law – in progress….

INTRODUCTION

I will try to make this as simple as possible, but you will have to pay very close attention and abandon everything you have previously believed regarding drivers licenses. Despite what you believe about what you “think” should be done to regulate others who use their vehicle for personal transportation, keep in mind that the government has not been endowed with general authority in requiring people to apply for, and possess, licenses for their private actions. There are words which you will need to pay close attention to, and not assume you know the meaning, since they have been specifically defined in the statutes. Words such as, “resident”, “natural person”, “State”, “licensee”, “drive, “motor vehicle”…etc. Do not automatically assume the words have the same meaning as your everyday usage. Do not automatically assume the definitions apply to you.

The Illinois Vehicle Code was enacted by P.A. 76-1586, effective July 1, 1970. The Code constitutes a consolidated recodification of various earlier laws and acts including the Illinois Motor Vehicle Law of 1957.‚ There has not always been licensing for drivers. As with any new thing, people were allowed to engage as they saw fit until government identified either a taxable nexus or some contrived intervention through public safety. Early automobiles were crude, and sometimes dangerous. They definitely did not afford the optimal protection for the occupants. Back in the day, the government used to intervene under what is called the police power, and generally for the regulation of businesses or occupations only. Of the states I researched, that seems to be the methodology for evolving driver licensing regulations. I am using Illinois as the example because it is where I have lived the longest and had access to state records and proceedings which chronicle the driver licensing legislation. The other states have the same constitutional limitations on licensing, and have also a similar history in implementing the driver license laws. This began with an individual state purpose for regulating commercial activities, and has evolved into a quasi-federal regulated use of the roads as a privilege for residents.

Besides the obvious questions in a discussion such as this, there are other questions as well. What is a State? What is a person? What is driving? Who were the first licensed drivers? Are traffic violations crimes? Is everyone required to have a license? Are licensing laws federal in nature, or state law? I’ll attempt to answer these questions without having to go into detail about the nature and types of law, as well as what is within the control of legislatures to license. Every law, must find its source in the constitution of the state or federal government. Constitutions do not give government unbridled authority except for what we say they “can’t do”, but they have limited authority by way of what we say then “can do”.

 

BACKGROUND ON INTERPRETING LAW AND WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY – “WHAT YOU TALKING ABOUT WILLIS”

When reading law, you can’t assume words mean the same as the common parlance of the day. There are complicated, and sometimes convoluted, ways if “interpreting” the law. I don’t know why legislators can’t write what they mean, but it seems apparent that there may be an intent to obfuscate in order to keep the real meaning and application of some laws out of the reach of the common man. There are doctrines such as “void for vagueness” which render some laws moot, but for the most part there are rules for interpreting law. This is called statutory interpretation.

Without belaboring this subject and further complicating the issue, I’ll summarize briefly and leave you to inquire further about the various canons and doctrines for interpretation. For the purpose of this article, below are the common canons of construction considered. To the left of the canon I will provide an abbreviation which will later be used to signify its application to the text. For example, Plain meaning will be represented with (PM), and appear at the end of a text indicating that is the canon used in interpreting the text. There may be multiple canons used in interpreting a text.

(PM) – Plain meaning
When writing statutes, the legislature intends to use ordinary English words in their ordinary senses. The United States Supreme Court discussed the plain meaning rule in Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), reasoning “[i]t is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain… the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.” And if a statute’s language is plain and clear, the Court further warned that “the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.”

(EG) – Ejusdem generis (“of the same kinds, class, or nature”)
When a list of two or more specific descriptors is followed by more general descriptors, the otherwise wide meaning of the general descriptors must be restricted to the same class, if any, of the specific words that precede them. For example, where “cars, motor bikes, motor powered vehicles” are mentioned, the word “vehicles” would be interpreted in a limited sense (therefore vehicles cannot be interpreted as including airplanes).

(EU) – Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (“the express mention of one thing excludes all others”)
Items not on the list are assumed not to be covered by the statute. However, sometimes a list in a statute is illustrative, not exclusionary. This is usually indicated by a word such as “includes” or “such as”.

(IP) – In pari materia (“upon the same matter or subject”)
When a statute is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined in light of other statutes on the same subject matter.

(NS) – Noscitur a sociis (“a word is known by the company it keeps”)
When a word is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined by reference to the rest of the statute.

(RS) – Reddendo singula singulis (“refers only to the last”)
When a list of words has a modifying phrase at the end, the phrase refers only to the last, e.g., firemen, policemen, and doctors in a hospital.

(GS) – Generalia specialibus non derogant (“the general does not detract from the specific”)
Described in The Vera Cruz (1884) 10 App. Cas. 59 as: “Now if anything be certain it is this, that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any evidence of a particular intention to do so.” This means that if a later law and an earlier law are potentially‚”but not necessarily‚”in conflict, courts will adopt the reading that does not result in an implied repeal of the earlier statute. Lawmaking bodies usually need to be explicit if they intend to repeal an earlier law.

‚ LEGAL DEFINITIONS – A ROSE, BY ANY OTHER NAME, MAY BE A FIRM, COPARTNERSHIP, ASSOCIATION, OR CORPORATION

So, just what is a “license to drive”? Well, by definition a license is permission to do something that is otherwise illegal.

License:‚ http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/license‚ -‚ The permission granted by competent authority to exercise a certain privilege that, without such authorization, would constitute an illegal act, a‚ Trespass‚ or a‚ tort.‚ The certificate or the document itself that confers permission to engage in otherwise proscribed conduct.

Notice the word “privilege”. It is used throughout the statutes as well. You will often hear that “driving is a privilege”. In a sense, that is true, since driving is a specific activity and not necessarily what many of you do with your automobile.‚  Let’s look at what a privilege is:

Privilege:‚ http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/privilege‚ -‚ privilege n. a special benefit, exemption from a duty, or immunity from penalty, given to a particular person, a group or a class of people.

Look at it like this. Everyone has the right to use the roads for getting from one place to another. We can’t drive our cars across lawns and fields. The State, which is the people, have taken the land in common use and paved roads for convenience and safety in moving about. However, if someone would then attempt to use those roads which were provided by all, for the purpose of conducting business they would be profiting from something paid for, and maintained, by others. That is a privilege. I can set up a lemonade stand in my yard, but can’t just go to my neighbor’s yard and set one up. I have ‚ no right to use his yard without permission. That permission is a license. The same applies to using the roads. We have freedom of mobility. We cannot be denied the right to use what has been provided for all by requiring people to first apply for and be issued a license. You cannot license a right.

“Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may be completely monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look to see the most sacred of their liberties taken from them one by one, by more or less rapid encroachment.” -Robertson vs. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash 133,147

“Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion — to go where and when one pleases — only so far restrained as the Rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another’s Rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct.” [emphasis added] American Jurisprudence 1st. Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p 1135.

So, if privileges apply to a particular group or class of people, who are they? Well, first we have to look at just “who” can be regulated and what they are doing. This will fall under the state’s “police power“. What is the “police power”? It is the inherent power of the State to legislate for the healty, safety, welfare, and morals of its citizens.‚  It is primarily limited to businesses or professional occupations. Keep this in mind because I’ll refer back to it later.

There are essentially two types of “persons”, residents and non-residents. We will first look at residents. A resident is defined thusly:

(625 ILCS 5/1-173) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-173)
Sec. 1-173. Resident.
(a) Every natural person who resides in this state shall be deemed a resident of this State.
(b) In the case of a firm, copartnership or association, if the principal place of business of such firm, copartnership or association is located in the State of Illinois, then such firm, copartnership or association shall be deemed a resident of the State of Illinois.
(c) In the case of a corporation, if the corporation was incorporated under the laws of the State of Illinois or if the principal place of business of such corporation is in the State of Illinois, then such corporation shall be deemed a resident of the State of Illinois.
(Source: P.A. 76-1586.)

There are a couple of things to note. The use of the term “natural person” and “this State”. We know that corporations are considered persons under the law, and we assume that persons always includes people, but such is not the case. You must look at the object of the legislation and then at the definitions. A “person” may, in some cases depending on the legislation, mean only corporations. Likewise, “natural persons” do not mean only people. By the same token, “person” does not necessarily mean people. The Vehicle Code defines “person” as:

(625 ILCS 5/1-159) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-159)
Sec. 1-159. Person.
Every natural person, firm, copartnership, association or corporation. (EG) (EU)
(Source: P.A. 76-1586.)

So, regarding “persons”, we have reference to natural persons, and corporate entities. Seeing as how they are hanging their hat on “natural persons”, we need to investigate how that is used throughout other laws.

Here are a couple of examples:

Under former clause 5 of ‚¶1 of former chapter 1 (now this paragraph) providing that the word “person” or “persons,” as well as all words referring to or importing persons, might extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate as well as individuals, a dram shop license might be issued to a corporation as well as an individual. People, on Inf. of Healy v. Heidelberg Garden Co., 1908, 84 N.E. 230, 233 Ill. 290. Intoxicating Liquors

The word “parties” in the Venue Act (see, now, ch. 110, ‚¶501 et seq.) refers to and imports persons and includes corporations. Commercial Ins. Co. v. Mehlman, 1868, 48 Ill. 313, 95 Am.Dec. 543.

Corporations are included in the word “person” in the attachment law. Mineral Point R. Co. v. Keep, 1859, 22 Ill. 9, 74 Am.Dec. 124.

The term “natural person” or “natural persons,” used in the Banking Act (ch. 16 1/2 , ‚¶101 et seq.), extends to and applies to “bodies politic” and “corporate.” Fidelity Inv. Assn. v. Emmerson, 1924, 235 Ill.App. 518, reversed on other grounds 318 Ill. 548, 149 N.E. 530.

The word “company” in an act relating to the right to operate a street railway could not, under ‚¶1 of former chapter 1 (now this paragraph) be construed to include a natural person. Goddard v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 1903, 104 Ill.App. 526, affirmed 202 Ill. 362, 66 N.E. 1066.

The word “person” authorizes a recovery upon the complaint of a body politic or corporate. Durbin v. People, 1894, 54 Ill.App. 101.

A city was a “person” within Workmen’s Compensation Act, ‚§ 3 (ch. 48, ‚¶136, repealed), in view of ‚¶1 of former chapter 1 (now this paragraph). Smith v. City of Hamilton, 1924, 231 Ill.App. 482.

So, based on the foregoing, we cannot assume that a “natural person” necessarily means people in-general. It is reasonable to conclude that a natural person is a human being, but a human being acting as a representative for a corporation or having a duty as an officer of a corporation. Since you cannot impose a duty or obligation upon a incorporeal entity, like a corporation, you can upon an individual who is charged with executing the by-laws of the corpration. There must be a flesh-and-blood individual responsible for carrying forth the operations of the corporation.

If “persons” and “natural persons” may mean people, cities, corporations, how do we determine who is bound by the law? Let’s look at the definition further. A resident is distinguished by two means, the “natural person” and the “un-natural person”, aka, corporation. This illustrates what I have just explained above. However, pay attention to the location of residency. Natural persons reside in “this State” and corporations reside in the State of Illinois.

Natural Persons – (a) Every natural person who resides in this state shall be deemed a resident of this State.

Corporations not incorporated in the State of Illinois – (b) In the case of a firm, copartnership or association, if the principal place of business of such firm, copartnership or association is located in the State of Illinois, then such firm, copartnership or association shall be deemed a resident of the State of Illinois.
Corporations Incorporated in the State of Illinois – (c) In the case of a corporation, if the corporation was incorporated under the laws of the State of Illinois or if the principal place of business of such corporation is in the State of Illinois, then such corporation shall be deemed a resident of the State of Illinois

There are two things to note. Notice how in (a), there are two spellings of “this state”, one being with a lower case (s) state, and the other with an upper case (S) State. This is no accident, and when read actually makes no apparent sense. Here are a few ways to possibly interpret that phrase:

(a) Every human being who resides in illinois shall be deemed to be a resident of Illinois

(a) Every human being having a duty or obligation as an officer or agent for a corporation who resides in illinois shall be deemed to be a resident of Illinois

(a) Every human being having a duty or obligation as an officer or agent for a corporation who resides in‚ this state shall be deemed to be a resident of Illinois

(a) Every human being‚ who resides in Illinois shall be deemed to be a resident of this State.

(a) Every human being who resides in this state shall be deemed to be a resident of Illinois

As you can see, it really makes no sense if “this state” and “this State” means the State of Illinois. So, what is “this (s)(S)tate”? In the case of natural persons, it is residency. In the case of corporations, it is their place of business or incorporation. If it applies to corporations, the phrase “State of Illinois” is used, and in the case of natural persons it is “this state”.

We must determine what exactly a “state”/”State” is. I will prove that there is a state, other than the State of Illinois, which is used for the Illinois Vehicle Code. The Illinois Statutes define “State” differently in certain statutes.

(5 ILCS 70/1.14) (from Ch. 1, par. 1015)
‚ Sec. 1.14. “State,” when applied to different parts of the United States, may be construed to include the District of Columbia and the several territories, and the words “United States” may be construed to include the said district and territories. (EG) (EU) (RS)
(Source: Laws 1945, p. 1717.)

1. District of Columbia – The District of Columbia is a “state” within the proviso of ch. 110 1/2 , ‚¶6 (see, now, ch. 111, ‚¶5506), permitting certified public accountants holding certificates issued under laws of another “state” to practice in Illinois. Gore v. National Ass’n of Certified Public Accountants, 1924, 231 Ill.App. 38., 5 I.L.C.S. 70/1.14, IL ST CH 5 ‚§ 70/1.14

There are parts of the Illinois Compiled Statutes which have gone to lenghts to actually define “State”, or “this State”.

AIR TRANSPORTATION
(620 ILCS 5/) Illinois Aeronautics Act.
(620 ILCS 5/7) (from Ch. 15 1/2, par. 22.7)
http://marcmkkoy.com/mark/ilcs/ilcs3d5c4.html?ActID=1803&ChapterID=48
Sec. 7. “State” or “this State” means the State of Illinois; and “Department” means the Division of Aeronautics of the Department of Transportation of this State. (PM)
(Source: P.A. 81-840.)

We can infer from the use of state in other statutes that there is a difference between Illinois, and parts of the Unites States; meaning that things other than the several 50 states can be States. So far, we have determined that persons can be people or legal entities. We have also determined that, as far as the Vehicle Code is concerned, when referring to persons, the definition specifies “natural persons”, and that “natural persons” can be both people and legal enties. As an example, let’s look at another part of the Transporation Statutes, in this case, Roads and Bridges, and see how they define a “person”:

ROADS AND BRIDGES
(605 ILCS 5/) Illinois Highway Code.
(605 ILCS 5/2-216) (from Ch. 121, par. 2-216)
http://marcmkkoy.com/mark/ilcs/ilcs41783.html?DocName=060500050HArt.+2+Div.+2&ActID=1745&ChapterID=45&SeqStart=1100000&SeqEnd=3200000
Sec. 2-216. Person-Any person, firm, partnership, association, public or private corporation, organization or business or charitable trust. (EG) (EU)
(Source: Laws 1959, p. 196.)

I fail to find the term “natural person” used for the Illinois Highway Code. So, to what does that code apply? Does it apply to “this State”, or “the State of Illinois”?

(605 ILCS 5/1-103) (from Ch. 121, par. 1-103)
Sec. 1-103.
This Code applies to all public highways in the State of Illinois, except highways under the exclusive jurisdiction (1) of any department, board, commission or agency of this State other than the Department of Transportation or (2) of any municipal corporation other than a city, village or incorporated town.
(Source: P.A. 77-173.)

 

ARE YOU LIVING IN A state OF CONFUSION OVER THE state OF THE state OF this State?

Now, this is telling in that the Code applies to all public highways in the State of Illinois, except highways under the exclusive jurisdiction of another agency of “this State” other than the Department of Transporation or of a municipal corporation other than a city, village, or incorporated town. It can also be worded to say, “This Code applies to all public highways in the State of Illinois except areas under the exclusive jurisdiction of something other than the Department of Transportation or a municipal corporation that is not a city, village, or town.” So, as far as the Illinois Highway Code is concerned, there are public highways in the State of Ilinois, and those under the exclusive jurisdiction of “this State”, or a municipal corporation other than a city, village, or incorporated town, which can include a municipal corporation of the Unites States which is also called a State, such as:

625 ILCS 5/1-195) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-195)
Sec. 1-195. State.
A state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or a province of the Dominion of Canada.
(Source: P.A. 76-1586

To complicate matters further, but to illustrate a dual and overlapping jurisdiction of state and federal authority, we will look at Illinois in another light, that being, as a federal territory:

DIVISION 1. SYSTEMS OF HIGHWAYS
http://marcmkkoy.com/mark/ilcs/ilcs4367d.html?DocName=060500050HArt.+2&ActID=1745&ChapterID=45&SeqStart=500000&SeqEnd=3200000
(605 ILCS 5/2-202) (from Ch. 121, par. 2-202)
Sec. 2-202. Highway-any public way for vehicular travel which has been laid out in pursuance of any law of this State, or of the Territory of Illinois, or which has been established by dedication, or used by the public as a highway for 15 years, or which has been or may be laid out and connect a subdivision or platted land with a public highway and which has been dedicated for the use of the owners of the land included in the subdivision or platted land where there has been an acceptance and use under such dedication by such owners, and which has not been vacated in pursuance of law. The term “highway” includes rights of way, bridges, drainage structures, signs, guard rails, protective structures and all other structures and appurtenances necessary or convenient for vehicular traffic. A highway in a rural area may be called a “road”, while a highway in a municipal area may be called a “street”.
(Source: Laws 1959, p. 196.)

Now, notice how there is a “Territory of Illinois” distinguished from “this State”. Illinois ceased being a territory with the Ordinance of 1818 when it was allowed statehood. However, the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over its territories. Notice the “Source” date on the statute. It is 1959. There was no Illinois Territory in 1959, or was there? What exactly do they mean by Territory of Illinois? Let’s look at the definition of a “territory”:

http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/territory
TERRITORY. Apart of a country, separated from the rest, and subject to a particular jurisdiction. The word is derived from terreo, and is so called because the magistrate within his jurisdiction has the power of inspiring a salutary fear. Dictum cat ab eo quod magistratus intra fines ejus terrendi jus habet. Henrion de Pansy, Auth. Judiciare, 98. In speaking of the ecclesiastical jurisdictions, Francis Duaren observes, that the ecclesiastics are said not to have territory, nor the power of arrest or removal, and are not unlike the Roman magistrates of whom Gellius says vocationem habebant non prehensionem. De Sacris Eccl. Minist. lib. 1, cap. 4. In the sense it is used in the constitution of the United States, it signifies a portion of the country subject to and belonging to the United States, which is not within the boundary of any of them.
2. The constitution of the United States, art. 4, s. 3, provides, that “the congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the United States; and nothing in this constitution shall be construed, so as to preclude the claims of the United States or of any state.”
3. Congress possesses the power to erect territorial governments within the territory of the United States; the power of congress over such territory is exclusive and universal, and their legislation is subject to no control, unless in the case of ceded territory, as far as it may be affected by stipulations in the cessions, or by the ordinance of 1787, 3 Story’s L. U. S. 2073, under which any part of it has been settled. Story on the Const. Sec. 1322; Rawle on the Const: 237; 1 Kent’s Com. 243, 359; 1 Pet. S. C. Rep. 511, 542, 517.
4. The only organized territories of the United States are Oregon, Minnesota, New Mexico and Utah. Vide Courts of the United States.

This essentially says that a territory is separate from the rest of the country and subject to particular jurisdiction under the full control of Congress, including land ceded to the federal government and governed by stipulations. I posit, the stipulations are the accepting federal highway dollars for roads and other transportation uses, thereby subjecting the “highways” to the control of Congress, the area over which it legislates is referred to as, “this State”. I am speculating that when it comes to the drivers license, the State of Illinois does not have the right to license the use of roads under the jurisdiction of the United States, and any alleged violation for not possessing a license can be removed to federal court for lack of standing on the part of the state government.

Here is a sampling of how the federal monies are used over certain roads and the corresponding jurisdiction over those roads:

http://marcmkkoy.com/mark/ilcs/ilcs4c9b1.html?DocName=060500050HArt.+3&ActID=1745&ChapterID=45&SeqStart=3200000&SeqEnd=5200000
(605 ILCS 5/3-104.2) (from Ch. 121, par. 3-104.2)
Sec. 3-104.2. The Department, or the Department in cooperation with municipal corporate authorities or county authorities, is authorized to receive and expend, by agreement or otherwise, federal funds for the construction, reconstruction and improvement of public roads not on any Federal-aid system, being improved under the Federal Aid Road Act.
Any Federal-aid project as authorized in this Section may be undertaken jointly at the expense of the federal government and the State of Illinois, or jointly at the expense of the federal government, a municipality or municipalities, or a county or counties, or jointly at the expense of the federal government, the State of Illinois, a municipality or municipalities or a county or counties, or any of the above jointly with any other public or private entity or public utility.
The authority having jurisdiction over a public road not on any federal-aid system prior to its improvement as a federal-aid project shall continue to be responsible for maintenance, at its own expense.
For the purposes of this Section, “public road” means any road under the jurisdiction of and maintained by a public authority and open to public travel and which is not on a federal-aid system.
(Source: P.A. 84-298.) – (Notice how the term “State of Illinois” is used instead of “this State”)

I apologize if I have deviated from my original intent, but I feel that foundation is important in supporting my analysis. All of this will come together to help you realize that the drivers license laws, although initially under the control of the States as a valid exercise of their police power in licensing and regulating drivers (chaffeurs) who accept compensation for carrying on a business, has now, through federal encroachment, become a plenary object of congress and an agreement between the States and Federal Government to establish a murky jurisdiction. Remember, the Federal Government has no authority within the boundaries of a State without that sovereignty being waived or ceded to the Federal Government, and upon doing so, thereby creates an area of concurrent jurisdiction where a federal State is found within the boundaries of one of the several States. From this, grew the National Driver Register, mandatory seat-belt laws, sobriety checkpoints, and more.

I believe it can be further speculated, that the Governor of the State of Illinois violates his oath of office by acting as an ambassador/administrator for the Federal Government in binding the people to federal regulations without clear constitutional authority or mandate. The nail in the coffin is the Illinois Highway Safety Law. I will reference the law, the Governor’s role, and a telling phraseology of what “this State” is in relation to establishing a federal territory in the State of Illinois for the purpose of receiving federal highway funds, which then provide the nexus for federal regulations imposed upon the states.

(625 ILCS 5/Ch. 17 heading)
CHAPTER 17. ILLINOIS HIGHWAY SAFETY LAW
http://marcmkkoy.com/mark/ilcs/ilcs43c49.html?DocName=062500050HCh.+17&ActID=1815&ChapterID=49&SeqStart=153100000&SeqEnd=153300000
(625 ILCS 5/17-101) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 17-101)
Sec. 17-101. Powers and duties of governor. The Governor, in addition to other duties and responsibilities conferred upon him by the constitution and laws of this State is empowered to contract and to do all other things necessary in behalf of this State to secure the full benefits available to this State under the Federal Highway Safety Act of 1966, as amended, and in so doing, to cooperate with Federal and State agencies, agencies private and public, interested organizations, and with individuals, to effectuate the purposes of that enactment, and any and all subsequent amendments thereto. The Governor is the official of this State having the ultimate responsibility for dealing with the Federal Government with respect to programs and activities pursuant to the National Highway Safety Act of 1966 and any amendments thereto. To that end he shall coordinate the activities of the Secretary of State and the State Board of Education and of any and all departments and agencies of this State and its subdivisions, relating thereto.
(Source: P.A. 81-1508.)

‚ Let’s analyze this statute line-by-line.

1. The Governor, in addition to other duties and responsibilities conferred upon him by the constitution and laws of this State – The duties and responsibilities of the Governor of Illinois are conferred only by the Constitution of Illinois. The laws do not confer duties and responsibilities. His office is a Constitutional office and the duties and responsibilities are found in the Constitution of Illinois. I would argue that this statute is unconstitutional. The question is, what, exactly, are the duties and responsibilities conferred upon the Governor by “the laws of this State”, which is a federal territory or federal municipal corporation under the jurisdiction imposed by the Federal Highway Safety Act of 1966.

2. The Governor is the official of this State having the ultimate responsibility for dealing with the Federal Government with respect to programs and activities pursuant to the National Highway Safety Act of 1966 and any amendments thereto. – This wording is very suspect, as how did the Governor become the “official of this State”, and where to the responsibilities for dealing with the Federal Government arise in the Illinois Constitution? Since the Governor is a creature of the Constitution, and his duties and obligations are Constitutinal in-nature, let’s look to the Constitution for any “offical of this State” designation or responsibility to the Federal Government:

Illinois Constitution
Article 5, SECTION 8. GOVERNOR‚”SUPREME EXECUTIVE POWER
http://www.ilga.gov/commission/lru/Ilconstitution.pdf
The Governor shall have the supreme executive power, and shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the laws.
This is the first of several sections setting forth the powers of the Governor. This section states the powers that are most general. The Illinois Supreme Court has commented that this provision does not empower the Governor to establish new legal requirements by executive order or otherwise; as to persons not under his jurisdiction, he may only execute and enforce existing law.
The Governor does have control over agencies under him through his power to remove subordinates and his authority (recognized under Article 13, section 2) to establish ethical standards for agencies under him. – I see no obligation to the Federal Government imposed by the Illinois Constitution.‚ I see no designation for “official of this State”, or any other such‚ designation.

 

SKELETONS IN THE LEGISLATIVE CLOSET – CHRONOLOGY OF LICENSING LAWS

‚ What I think we have established, or have othewise made a very strong argument for or raised serious questions to, is the object and intent of the Drivers License laws, the proper jurisdiction involved, and whether this is a State law or Federal Law.

‚ As I said, this may have began with a proper exercise of the police power of the State in legislating for the health, safety, welfare, and morals of its Citizens, but has become something more invasive and encroaching. The issue is not whether we agree with the laws, or whether they serve any compelling state interest or protect public safety, it is by what authority do these laws exist? I’m going to go back to some of the earliest motor vehicle legislation and quote verbatim from that legislation, showing that in the beginning, the only objects of regulation were those using motor vehicles in the pursuit of a pecuniary benefit.

Smith’s Illinois Revised Statutes – 1921
Page 1720
MOTOR VEHICLES
AN ACT in relation to motor vehicles and to repeal a certain act therein named. [Approved June 30, 1919]
Page 1725
228. Chauffers – Regulations – License – Fees, etc.]
‚§27. An application for a license to operate motor vehicles as a chauffer, who is hereby defined to mean any person operating a motor vehicle as a mechanic or employee, and who directly or indirectly receives pay or any compensation whatsoever

Page 1726
for any work or services in connection with the operation of a motor vehicle or the transportation of passengers or merchendise with a motor vehicle for hire or for pecuniary profit, shall be made by mail or othewise to the Secretary of State, or his duly authorized agent, upon blanks prepared under his authority….
(Last paragraph on left column of page)
No person shall operate or drive a motor vehicle as a chauffer upon a public highway of this State, unless such person shall have complied in all respects with the requirements of this section: Provided, however, that a non-resident chauffeur who has registered under the provisions of the law in force in the city, state, foreign country or province, territory or Federal district, of his residence, substantially equivalent to the provisions of this section shall be exempt from license hereunder, while temporarily sojouring within this State, only to the extent that under the laws of the city, state, foreign country or province, territory or Federal district of his residence like privileges are granted to persons duly licensed and registered as chauffeurs under the laws of this State, and who are residents of this State.
230. Chauffeur or operator must be licensed.]
‚§29. No person or corporation shall employ, as a chauffeur or operator of a motor vehicle, any person not specially licensed as aforesaid.

Smith-Hurd
Illinois Revised Statutes
With cross references
1923
Essentially the save verbiage.

Smith-Hurd
Illinois Revised Statutes
With cross references
1925
Essentially the save verbiage.

Cahill Illinois Revised Statutes
Keyed to Annotated Statutes
1927
Essentially the save verbiage.

Smith-Hurd
Illinois Revised Statutes
With cross references
1929
Essentially the save verbiage.

Illinois Revised Statutes
With cross references
1925
State Bar Association Edition
Chap. 95 1/2 section 33 Page 2125
32b. Licenses of chauffeurs for 1938.]
‚§26b. All the provisions of law in force prior to the passage of this amendatory Act relating to the licensing and regulation of chauffeurs shall remain in full force and effect with respect to all chaiffeurs licensed for the year 1938. The provisions of this amendatory Act relating to the licensing and regulation of chauffeurs shall not apply to chauffeurs so licensed for the year 1938. Added by act filed July 12, 1938. L.1938, First Sp.Sess., p.39.
S.H.A. 95 1/2 Section 32b; J.A. 85.032(2).
33. Chauffeurs – License – Application – Examination – Fee – Age – Form of license-school bus and vehicle of common carrier- Record in office of Secretary of State-Non-resident chauffeurs-Renewal of licenses.]
‚§27. An application for a license to operate a motor vehicle as a chauffeur, who is hereby defined to mean any person whose principal occupation is that of operating a motor vehicle as a mechanic or employee, or who directly or indirectly receives pay or any compensation whatsoever for any work or services in connection with the operation of a motor vehicle for the transportation of passengers or merchendise for hire, shall be made by mail or othewise to the Secretary of State, or his duly authorized agent, upon blanks prepared under his authority. Provided, however, that no person shall be held to be a chauffeur, and subject to the provisions hereof, who operates a motor vehicle incidentally to some other and principal occupation and where such motor vehicle is so perated solely in furtherance of such other and principal occupation and is not used for the transportation of passengers or merchendise for hire; and, provided, further, that no person shall b eheld to be a chauffeur and subject to the provisions hereof who operates a motor vehicle in the service of the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps of the United States or who operates a road machine, farm tractor or implement of husbandry temporarily drawn, moved, or propelled on a highway; and, provided, further, that any garage which repairs or services motor vehicles and operates a service car shall have at least one licensed chauffeur who insofar as it is possible, shall take care of all testing and outside service work.

Chap. 95 1/2 section 33 Page 2126
34a. License as chauffeur or operator required – Exemptions.]
‚§28a. On and after May 1, 1939 in the case of operators and on and after January 1, 1939 in the case of chauffeurs, no person except those herinafter expressly exempted, shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this State, unless such person has a valid license as an operator or chauffeur under the provisions of this Act, an operator being hereby defined to mean any person, other than a chauffeur, who is in actual physical control of a motor vechicle upon a highway. Any person holding a valid chauffeur’s license hereunder need not procure an operator’s license. Provided, however, that the following persons are exempt from the requirements of this section:
1. Any person while operating a motor vehicle in the service of the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps of the United States;
2. Any person while driving or operating a road machine, farm tractor or implement of husbandry temporarily drawn, moved, or propelled on a highway;
3. A non-resident of this State who is at least fifteen years of age and who has in his immediate possession a valid operator’s license issued to him in his home State or Country, may operate a motor vehicle in this State only as an operator;
4. A non-resident who is at least eighteen years of age and who has in his immediate possesion a valid chauffeur’s license issued to him in his State or Country may operate a motor vehicle in this State either as an operator or chauffeur except that any such person must be licensed as a chauffeur hereunder before accepting employment as a chauffeur from a resident of this State;
5. Any non-resident who is at least fifteen years of age, whose home State or Country does not require the licensing of operators, while operating a motor vehicle as an operator only, for a period of not more than 90 days in any calendar year, if in the home State or Country of such non-resident.
The provisions of this section granting exemptions to non-residents shall be operative only when under the laws of this State, foreign country or province, territory or federal district of such non-resident, like exemptions and privileges are granted to licensed resident operators and chauffeurs of this State. Added by act filed July 12, 1938. L.1938, First Sp. Sess., p.39

This is where “Operators” came to be and to require licenses. This is the beginning of the “drivers license”.

Given the foregoing, let’s look at the current law and see just “who” is required to have a driver’s license:

(625 ILCS 5/6-101) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-101)
Sec. 6-101. Drivers must have licenses or permits.
(a) No person, except those expressly exempted by Section 6-102, shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this State unless such person has a valid license or permit, or a restricted driving permit, issued under the provisions of this Act.
(b) No person shall drive a motor vehicle unless he holds a valid license or permit, or a restricted driving permit issued under the provisions of Section 6-205, 6-206, or 6-113 of this Act. Any person to whom a license is issued under the provisions of this Act must surrender to the Secretary of State all valid licenses or permits. No drivers license or instruction permit shall be issued to any person who holds a valid Foreign State license, identification card, or permit unless such person first surrenders to the Secretary of State any such valid Foreign State license, identification card, or permit.
(b-5) Any person who commits a violation of subsection (a) or (b) of this Section is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor, if at the time of the violation the person’s driver’s license or permit was cancelled under clause (a)9 of Section 6-201 of this Code.

Who, is exempt?

http://marcmkkoy.com/mark/ilcs/ilcs47662.html?DocName=062500050HCh.+6&ActID=1815&ChapterID=49&SeqStart=72100000&SeqEnd=90800000
(625 ILCS 5/6-102) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-102)
Sec. 6-102. What persons are exempt. The following persons are exempt from the requirements of Section 6-101 and are not required to have an Illinois drivers license or permit if one or more of the following qualifying exemptions are met and apply:
1. Any employee of the United States Government or any member of the Armed Forces of the United States, while operating a motor vehicle owned by or leased to the United States Government and being operated on official business need not be licensed;
2. A nonresident who has in his immediate possession a valid license issued to him in his home state or country may operate a motor vehicle for which he is licensed for the period during which he is in this State;
3. A nonresident and his spouse and children living with him who is a student at a college or university in Illinois who have a valid license issued by their home State.
4. A person operating a road machine temporarily upon a highway or operating a farm tractor between the home farm buildings and any adjacent or nearby farm land for the exclusive purpose of conducting farm operations need not be licensed as a driver.
5. A resident of this State who has been serving as a member of the Armed Forces of the United States outside the Continental limits of the United States, for a period of 90 days following his return to the continental limits of the United States.
6. A nonresident on active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States who has a valid license issued by his home state and such nonresident’s spouse, and dependent children and living with parents, who have a valid license issued by their home state.
7. A nonresident who becomes a resident of this State, may for a period of the first 90 days of residence in Illinois operate any motor vehicle which he was qualified or licensed to drive by his home state or country so long as he has in his possession, a valid and current license issued to him by his home state or country. Upon expiration of such 90 day period, such new resident must comply with the provisions of this Act and apply for an Illinois license or permit.
8. An engineer, conductor, brakeman, or any other member of the crew of a locomotive or train being operated upon rails, including operation on a railroad crossing over a public street, road or highway. Such person is not required to display a driver’s license to any law enforcement officer in connection with the operation of a locomotive or train within this State.
The provisions of this Section granting exemption to any nonresident shall be operative to the same extent that the laws of the State or country of such nonresident grant like exemption to residents of this State.
The Secretary of State may implement the exemption provisions of this Section by inclusion thereof in a reciprocity agreement, arrangement or declaration issued pursuant to this Act.
(Source: P.A. 96-607, eff. 8-24-09.)

The power to license rests with the legislature, and their exercise of the police power. I believe the State of Illinois exceeds its police power authority in the current drivers license laws because it does not serve to protect the citizens from a threat to the health, safety, welfare, or morals; and is equally violative of the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment in excluding some from complying with the licensing requirements. There can be no exclusion for some where the compelling state interest does not differentiate between classes of individuals in carrying forth the provisions of the law. In the case of Mahony v. Township of Hampton, 539 Pa. 193, 651 A.2d 525 (1994), Mahony argued that the government could not be exempt from one ordinance and he be obligated to it. By those under number 1. above being exempt with no rational basis in driver competency, I believe it is violative of the equal protection clause and an invalid exercise of the police power when causing some to be licensed and not others. In-fact, it can be said that the state fails in exercising its police powers because people now can renew their licenses without having to take a competency road test or exam every time their license expires. Theoretically, driver competency can diminish over this time and the state, thereby, places drivers “legally” upon the road who pose an articulable danger to other drivers.

…..More to come……….

 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES/DEFINITIONS/CASES CITED

Illinois Vehicle Code Definitions:

(625 ILCS 5/1-154.1) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-154.1)
Sec. 1-154.1. Operate. To ride in or on, other than as a passenger, use or control in any manner the operation of any device or vehicle whether motorized or propelled by human power.
(Source: P.A. 85-830.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-154.2) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-154.2)
Sec. 1-154.2. Operator. Every person who operates or is in actual physical control of any device or vehicle whether motorized or propelled by human power.
(Source: P.A. 85-830.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-115.8)
Sec. 1-115.8. Drive. To drive, operate, or be in physical control of a motor vehicle.
(Source: P.A. 90-89, eff. 1-1-98.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-116) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-116)
Sec. 1-116. Driver.
Every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.
(Source: P.A. 76-1586.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-209.5)
Sec. 1-209.5. Transportation. The actual movement of property or passengers by motor vehicle, together with loading, unloading, and any other accessorial or ancillary service provided by the carrier in connection with movement by motor vehicle.
(Source: P.A. 90-89, eff. 1-1-98.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-133) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-133)
Sec. 1-133. Interstate or Interstate Commerce.
Transportation between 2 or more States or transportation originating in one State and passing into or through other States for delivery in another State, and which is not intrastate.
(Source: P.A. 76-1586.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-133.05)
Sec. 1-133.05. Interstate carrier of property. Any person who is engaged in the transportation of property only by motor vehicle in whole or in part in interstate or foreign commerce in this State either with or without authority issued from the Interstate Commerce Commission.
(Source: P.A. 90-89, eff. 1-1-98.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-133.1) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-133.1)
Sec. 1-133.1. Interstate highway. Any highway which is now, or shall hereafter be, a part of the national system of interstate and defense highways within this State.
(Source: P.A. 85-830.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-134) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-134)
Sec. 1-134. Intrastate or Intrastate Commerce.
Transportation originating at any point or place within this State and destined to any other point or place within this State, irrespective of the route, highway or highways traversed, and including transportation which passes into or through another State before delivery is made within this State, and including any act of transportation which includes or completes a pickup within Illinois for delivery within Illinois.
(Source: P.A. 76-1586.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-145) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-145)
Sec. 1-145. Motor carrier.
An operator of For-Hire vehicles pursuant to the Illinois Motor Carrier of Property Law.

(625 ILCS 5/1-122.5) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-124)
Sec. 1-122.5. For-hire. The operation of a vehicle for compensation and subject to federal regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission or to state regulation by the Illinois Commerce Commission and those vehicles governed by Chapters 8 and 9 under this Code and regulated by the Secretary of State.
(Source: P.A. 90-89, eff. 1-1-98.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-153) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-153)
Sec. 1-153. Not-For-Hire.
Operation of a commercial vehicle in furtherance of any commercial or industrial enterprise but not For-Hire.
(Source: P.A. 76-1586.)

(625 ILCS 5/8-101) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 8-101)
Sec. 8-101. Proof of financial responsibility – Persons who operate motor vehicles in transportation of passengers for hire.
(a) It is unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to operate any motor vehicle along or upon any public street or highway in any incorporated city, town or village in this State for the carriage of passengers for hire, accepting and discharging all such persons as may offer themselves for transportation unless such person, firm or corporation has given, and there is in full force and effect and on file with the Secretary of State of Illinois, proof of financial responsibility provided in this Act. – (Source: P.A. 76-1586.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-207) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-207)
Sec. 1-207. Traffic.
Pedestrians, ridden or herded animals, vehicles, streetcars and other conveyances either singly or together while using any highway for purposes of travel.
(Source: P.A. 76-1586.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-217) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-217)
Sec. 1-217. Vehicle. Every device, in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway or requiring a certificate of title under Section 3-101(d) of this Code, except devices moved by human power, devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks and snowmobiles as defined in the Snowmobile Registration and Safety Act.
For the purposes of this Code, unless otherwise prescribed, a device shall be considered to be a vehicle until such time it either comes within the definition of a junk vehicle, as defined under this Code, or a junking certificate is issued for it.
For this Code, vehicles are divided into 2 divisions:
First Division: Those motor vehicles which are designed for the carrying of not more than 10 persons.
Second Division: Those vehicles which are designed for carrying more than 10 persons, those designed or used for living quarters and those vehicles which are designed for pulling or carrying property, freight or cargo, those motor vehicles of the First Division remodelled for use and used as motor vehicles of the Second Division, and those motor vehicles of the First Division used and registered as school buses.
(Source: P.A. 92-812, eff. 8-21-02.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-146) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-146)
Sec. 1-146. Motor vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails, except for vehicles moved solely by human power, motorized wheelchairs, low-speed electric bicycles, and low-speed gas bicycles. For this Act, motor vehicles are divided into two divisions:
First Division: Those motor vehicles which are designed for the carrying of not more than 10 persons.
Second Division: Those motor vehicles which are designed for carrying more than 10 persons, those motor vehicles designed or used for living quarters, those motor vehicles which are designed for pulling or carrying freight, cargo or implements of husbandry, and those motor vehicles of the First Division remodelled for use and used as motor vehicles of the Second Division.
(Source: P.A. 96-125, eff. 1-1-10.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-157) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-157)
Sec. 1-157. Passenger car.
A motor vehicle of the First Division including a multipurpose passenger vehicle, that is designed for carrying not more than 10 persons.
(Source: P.A. 78-343.)

(625 ILCS 5/6-101) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-101)
Sec. 6-101. Drivers must have licenses or permits.
(a) No person, except those expressly exempted by Section 6-102, shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this State unless such person has a valid license or permit, or a restricted driving permit, issued under the provisions of this Act.
(b) No person shall drive a motor vehicle unless he holds a valid license or permit, or a restricted driving permit issued under the provisions of Section 6-205, 6-206, or 6-113 of this Act. Any person to whom a license is issued under the provisions of this Act must surrender to the Secretary of State all valid licenses or permits. No drivers license or instruction permit shall be issued to any person who holds a valid Foreign State license, identification card, or permit unless such person first surrenders to the Secretary of State any such valid Foreign State license, identification card, or permit.
(b-5) Any person who commits a violation of subsection (a) or (b) of this Section is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor, if at the time of the violation the person’s driver’s license or permit was cancelled under clause (a)9 of Section 6-201 of this Code.

(625 ILCS 5/6-112) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-112)
Sec. 6-112. License and Permits to be carried and exhibited on demand. Every licensee or permittee shall have his drivers license or permit in his immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle and, for the purpose of indicating compliance with this requirement, shall display such license or permit if it is in his possession upon demand made, when in uniform or displaying a badge or other sign of authority, by a member of the State Police, a sheriff or other police officer or designated agent of the Secretary of State. However, no person charged with violating this Section shall be convicted if he produces in court satisfactory evidence that a drivers license was theretofor issued to him and was valid at the time of his arrest.
For the purposes of this Section, “display” means the manual surrender of his license certificate into the hands of the demanding officer for his inspection thereof.
(Source: P.A. 76-1749.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-138) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-138)
Sec. 1-138. License to drive.
Any driver’s license or any other license or permit to operate a motor vehicle issued under the laws of this State including:
1. Any temporary license or instruction permit;
2. The privilege of any person to drive a motor vehicle whether or not such person holds a valid license or permit.
3. Any nonresident’s driving privilege as defined herein.
(Source: P.A. 76-1586.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-138.1) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-138.1)
Sec. 1-138.1. Licensee. A person licensed or required to be licensed under Sections 5-101, 5-102, 5-201 and 5-301 of this Code.
(Source: P.A. 83-1473.)

(625 ILCS 5/5-101) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 5-101)
Sec. 5-101. New vehicle dealers must be licensed.
(625 ILCS 5/5-102) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 5-102)
Sec. 5-102. Used vehicle dealers must be licensed.
(625 ILCS 5/5-201) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 5-201)
Sec. 5-201. Transporters must apply for in-transit plates.
(625 ILCS 5/5-301) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 5-301)
Sec. 5-301. Automotive parts recyclers, scrap processors, repairers and rebuilders must be licensed.

(625 ILCS 5/1-110) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-110)
Sec. 1-110. Cancellation of driver’s license.
The annulment or termination by formal action of the Secretary of a person’s driver’s license because of some error or defect in the license or because the licensee is no longer entitled to such license, but, with the exception of Sections 6-107, 6-108 and 6-201, the cancellation of a license is without prejudice and application for a new license may be made at any time after such cancellation.
(Source: P.A. 86-1450.)
(625 ILCS 5/6-107) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-107)
Sec. 6-107. Graduated license.
(625 ILCS 5/6-108) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-108)
Sec. 6-108. Cancellation of license issued to minor.
(625 ILCS 5/6-201)
(Text of Section from P.A. 97-208)
Sec. 6-201. Authority to cancel licenses and permits.

ARTICLE II. CANCELLATION, SUSPENSION, OR
REVOCATION OF LICENSES AND PERMITS

(625 ILCS 5/6-201)
(Text of Section from P.A. 97-208)
Sec. 6-201. Authority to cancel licenses and permits.
(a) The Secretary of State is authorized to cancel any license or permit upon determining that the holder thereof:
(SEE FULL CITATION)

(625 ILCS 5/6-202) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-202)
Sec. 6-202. Non-residents and Unlicensed Persons-Revocation and Suspension-Reporting Convictions.
(a) The privilege of driving a motor vehicle on highways of this State given to a nonresident hereunder and the privilege which an unlicensed person might have to obtain a license under this Act shall be subject to suspension or revocation by the Secretary of State in like manner and for like cause as a drivers license issued hereunder may be suspended or revoked.
(b) The Secretary of State is authorized, upon receiving a report of the conviction in this State of a nonresident driver of a motor vehicle of any offense under the laws of this State relating to operation, custody or ownership of motor vehicles, to forward a copy or abstract of such report to the motor vehicle administrator of the State wherein the person so convicted is a resident.
(c) (Blank.)
(d) This section is subject to the provisions of the Driver License Compact.
(Source: P.A. 96-962, eff. 7-2-10.)

(625 ILCS 5/6-206)
(Text of Section from P.A. 96-1551)
Sec. 6-206. Discretionary authority to suspend or revoke license or permit; Right to a hearing.
(a) The Secretary of State is authorized to suspend or revoke the driving privileges of any person without preliminary hearing upon a showing of the person’s records or other sufficient evidence that the person:
(SEE FULL CITATION)

(625 ILCS 5/6-209) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-209)
Sec. 6-209. Notice of Cancellation, Suspension or Revocation – Surrender and Return of License. The Secretary of State upon cancelling, suspending or revoking a license or permit shall immediately notify the holder thereof in writing and shall require that such license or permit shall be surrendered to and retained by the Secretary of State. However, upon payment of the reinstatement fee set out in subsection (g) of Section 6-118 at the end of any period of suspension of a license the licensee, if not ineligible for some other reason, shall be entitled to reinstatement of driving privileges and the return of his license if it has not then expired; or, in case it has expired, to apply for a new license.
(Source: P.A. 81-462.)

(625 ILCS 5/6-212) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-212)
Sec. 6-212. Court Review. The provisions of the Administrative Review Law, and all amendments and modifications thereof, and the rules adopted pursuant thereto, shall apply to and govern all proceedings for the judicial review of final administrative decisions of the Secretary of State hereunder.
(Source: P.A. 82-783.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-159) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-159)
Sec. 1-159. Person.
Every natural person, firm, copartnership, association or corporation.
(Source: P.A. 76-1586.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-173) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-173)
Sec. 1-173. Resident.
(a) Every natural person who resides in this state shall be deemed a resident of this State.
(b) In the case of a firm, copartnership or association, if the principal place of business of such firm, copartnership or association is located in the State of Illinois, then such firm, copartnership or association shall be deemed a resident of the State of Illinois.
(c) In the case of a corporation, if the corporation was incorporated under the laws of the State of Illinois or if the principal place of business of such corporation is in the State of Illinois, then such corporation shall be deemed a resident of the State of Illinois.
(Source: P.A. 76-1586.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-115.6)
Sec. 1-115.6. Domiciliary. A person who is domiciled.
(Source: P.A. 90-89, eff. 1-1-98.)

(625 ILCS 5/1-195) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-195)
Sec. 1-195. State.
A state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or a province of the Dominion of Canada.
(Source: P.A. 76-1586.)

 

ILLINOIS COMPILED STATUTES – ANNOTATED

ILCS Ch. 625, Act 5, Ch. 1, References and Annotations
Illinois Annotated Compiled Statutes

ENACTMENT
<The Illinois Vehicle Code was enacted by P.A. 76-1586, effective July 1, 1970. The Code constitutes a consolidated recodification of various earlier laws and acts including the Illinois Motor Vehicle Law of 1957.>

INTRODUCTORY COMMENT–1969
The definitions are primarily based upon those found in the old Illinois Vehicle Law (I.V.L.) and the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic (U.A.R.T.).
There were a number of duplicated definitions in those two acts, and the following standards were followed in drafting this bill:
Where a definition related primarily to registration, the I.V.L. definition was used. Where it related to traffic, the U.A.R.T. definition was used.
Since the 1967 amendments to the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic conformed a substantial number of traffic definitions to those in the Illinois Vehicle Law, the vast majority of the definitions in this bill (HB 195) are based on the Illinois Vehicle Law. However, the following definitions relating to traffic matters were based on the U.A.R.T. definitions:
1-106. Bicycle.
1-131. Improved highway.
1-132. Intersection.
1-135. Lane-control signal.
1-154. Official traffic-control devices.
1-155. Owner.
1-156. Park or Parking.
1-157. Passenger car.
1-167. Railroad signs or signal.
1-175. Reversible lane.
1-177. Right-of-way.
1-200. Stop or stopping.
1-219. Yield Right-of-Way.
The 1968 amendatory bills relating to various definitions of “recreational vehicles”, were relied upon for the following definitions:
1-109. Camper.
1-127. House Car.
1-128. House trailer.
1-165. Private living coach.
1-169. Recreational vehicle.
The definition of “Motor vehicle” in Section 1-146 combines the I.V.L. and U.A.R.T. definitions as amended in 1967 so that it is clear that vehicles of the First Division are passenger cars, and all other vehicles are vehicles of the Second Division. Also, see Section 1457 defining “Passenger car”.
There is a deletion in Section 1-111 defining “Chauffeur”. The old law had an additional paragraph relating to an exemption for farm operations. New Section 6-102(5) provides for driving without a license, of road machinery or a farm tractor between the home farm and nearby farm lands. This deletion resulted from HB 1951 which revised the driver license law in 1967 effective January 1, 1969.

CROSS REFERENCES
Abandoned mobile homes, transportation over public streets, registration plates, see 210 ILCS 117/40.
Appropriation for administration of Illinois Vehicle Code, see 30 ILCS 105/8.3. Arson, damage to vehicles, see 720 ILCS 5/20-1.
Automobile junkyards, control and location, see 415 ILCS 95/1 et seq.
Bail, traffic offenses, see 725 ILCS 5/110-15; S. Ct. Rule 501 et seq.
Child passenger protection, see 625 ILCS 25/1 et seq.
Cigarettes, vehicle as constituting place of business within tax act, see 35 ILCS 130/1. Consumer Fraud Act, retail sales of motor vehicles, see 815 ILCS 505/2L. Crimes, vehicles used in commission, see 720 ILCS 5/36-1 et seq.
Crimes, vehicular hijacking, see 720 ILCS 5/18-3.
Criminal trespass to vehicles, see 720 ILCS 5/21-2.
Deadly weapons, concealing in vehicle, see 720 ILCS 5/24-1.
Department of Public Safety, enforcement of motor vehicle laws, see 20 ILCS 2610/16. Driver Education Act, see 105 ILCS 5/7-24 et seq.
Enforcement of motor vehicle law, power of Department of Public Safety, see 20 ILCS
2610/16.
Enforcement of motor vehicle laws by state highway police, see 20 ILCS 2610/16. Enforcement of motor vehicle ordinances by sheriff as supervisor of safety, see 55 ILCS
5/3-6036.
Firearms, concealment in vehicle as unlawful use, see 720 ILCS 5/24-1.
Garbage hauling vehicles, license, see 55 ILCS 5/5-8002.
Group vehicle insurance, policy requirements and mandatory requirements under code, see 215 ILCS 5/388a.
Highways,
Depositing matter likely to cause punctures, see 605 ILCS 5/9-121.
Protection in general, see 605 ILCS 5/9-102 et seq.
Indemnification for injuries caused by police officer, see 65 ILCS 5/1-4-6. Installment contracts, see 815 ILCS 375/1 et seq.
Insurance, domestic surplus line insurer, restrictions, see 215 ILCS 5/445a.
Insurance against hazards resulting from ownership, maintenance or use of automobile, see 215 ILCS 5/4, 5/378 et seq.
Livestock auction sales, record of motor vehicles delivering livestock, see 225 ILCS
640/7.
Loss and restoration of rights, application of law, see 730 ILCS 5/5-5-5.
Motor fuel tax, see 35 ILCS 505/1 et seq.
Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act, see 815 ILCS 375/1 et seq.
Motor vehicles, financing affiliates, licensing, see 625 ILCS 5/5-101.1.
Municipalities,
Code hearing departments, adjudicatory authority, see 65 ILCS 5/1-2.2-10.
Licensing and control of commercial vehicles, see 65 ILCS 5/11-41-1, 5/11-41-2. Regulation of vehicles, see 65 ILCS 5/11-40-1 et seq.
Taxes on vehicles, see 65 ILCS 5/8-11-4.
Wrecked motor vehicles, dealer regulation, see 65 ILCS 5/11-42-3.
Notary’s fee for filling out automobile applications, see 5 ILCS 312/3-104.
Public utilities motor vehicle lines, terminable permits, see 65 ILCS 5/11- 89-1 et seq. Punctures, deposit in highway of matter likely to cause, see 605 ILCS 5/9- 121.
Races and stunt events, permit in counties of 500,000 or less, see 55 ILCS 5/5-9001, 5/5-
9002.
Railroads, operation of motor vehicles for transportation of persons and property, see 610 ILCS 60/1.
Reckless homicide in driving of a motor vehicle, see 720 ILCS 5/9-3. Retail installment sales of motor vehicles, see 815 ILCS 375/1 et seq. Sale and distribution of driver’s information, see 625 ILCS 5/2-123.
Sales tax, see 35 ILCS 120/3.
Schools,
Driver education courses, see 105 ILCS 5/27-24.2.
Safety education, see 105 ILCS 5/27-17.
Serial numbers, altering or destroying manufacturer’s motor vehicle serial numbers, see 720 ILCS 335/1.
State highway police, enforcement of motor vehicle laws, see 20 ILCS 2610/16. State owned motor vehicles, identification, see 30 ILCS 610/0.01 et seq.
Traffic offense defined, bail, see S. Ct. Rule 501.
Uniform Foreign Money–Judgments, personal jurisdiction based on operation of motor vehicle, see 735 ILCS 5/12-622.
Use tax, see 35 ILCS 105/9.
Vehicular endangerment, see 720 ILCS 5/12-2.5. Vehicular invasion, see 720 ILCS 5/12-111
Warrant to search, see 725 ILCS 5/108-3.
Weighing, state highway police, see 20 1LCS 2610/16.
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES
Manufacturer’s duty to design automobiles to be safe. 55 Ill.B.J. 238 (1966).
State and local tax changes in 1965, 54 Ill.B.J. 112 (1965).
I.L.C.S. Ch. 625, ACT 5, Ch. 1, Refs & Annos, IL ST Ch. 625, ACT 5, Ch. 1, Refs &‚ Anos
Current through P.A. 94-1054, P.A. 94-1056 to P.A. 94-1068 of the 2006 Reg. Sess.
END OF DOCUMENT
625 ILCS 5/1-116
Formerly cited as IL ST CH 95 1/2 1-116
Chapter 625. Vehicles
Act 5. Illinois Vehicle Code (Refs & Annos)

Chapter 1. Title and Definitions (Refs & Annos)

5/1-116. Driver
⤠1-116. Driver. Every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.
CREDIT(S)
P.A. 76-1586, ⤠1-116, eff. July 1, 1970.
FORMER REVISED STATUTES CITATION
Formerly Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 95 1/2 , 1-116.
SOURCE COMMENT
Section 1-112 of the Motor Vehicle Law of 1957 was taken verbatim from a similar definition contained in the Uniform Vehicle Code prepared by the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances. Subsection (c) of former section 8 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic (Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, ⤠106(c) ) was also identical.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws:
Laws 1935, p. 1247, art. I, ⤠9.
Laws 1957, p. 2706, ⤠1-112.
I11.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 95 1/2 , ‚§‚§ 1-112, 106.
CROSS REFERENCES
Driver education, see 105 ILCS 5/27-24 et seq. Driver training schools, see 625 ILCS 5/6-401 et seq.
RESEARCH REFERENCES Treatises and Practice Aids
IL Pattern Jury Instructions – Criminal 23.67, Definition of Transportation of Alcoholic Liquor in a Motor Vehicle-Driver.
625 I.L.C.S. 5/1-116, IL ST CH 625 ⤠5/1-116
Current through P.A. 94-1054, P.A. 94-1056 to P.A. 94-1068 of the 2006
Reg. Sess.
END OF DOCUMENT

625 ILCS 5/1-126
Formerly cited as IL ST CH 95 1/2 11-126
Chapter 625. Vehicles
Act 5. Illinois Vehicle Code (Refs & Annos) ‘Chapter 1. Title and Definitions (Refs & Annos) 5/1-126. Highway
⤠1-126. Highway.
The entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel or located on public school property.
CREDIT(S)

P.A. 76-1586, ⤠1-126, eff. July 1, 1970. Amended by P.A. 92-780, 5, eff. Aug. 6,2002.
FORMER REVISED STATUTES CITATION
Formerly Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 95 1/2 ,t1-126.
SOURCE COMMENT
The 1919 Motor Vehicle Law defined the term “Improved Highway” to include roads of concrete, brick, asphalt, macadam and gravel. The original Motor Vehicle Law enacted in 1907 defined the term “Public Highways” as follows:
“Public highways shall include any highway, county road, state road, public street, avenue, alley, park, parkway, driveway, or public place in any County, City, Village, Incorporated Town or Towns.”
The same definition was reenacted in Section 20 of the 1911 Motor Vehicle Law, with the exception of the word “park”, which was eliminated. The terms “street” or “highway” were again defined by the Illinois Legislature in the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic enacted in 1935. Streets or highways were defined:
“The entire width between property lines of every way or place of whatever nature when any part thereof is open to the use of the public as a matter of right, for purposes of vehicular traffic.” Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, ch. 95 1/2, ‚§ 109(a).
It is to be noted that the main difference between the definition of the term “highway” set out in the Uniform Traffic Act and that found in the Illinois Motor Vehicle Law lay in the addition of the phrase “as a matter of right”. Traffic safety officials preferred the definition in the Illinois Motor Vehicle Law since in their opinion traffic laws should apply if the public was using the highways regardless of whether or not they used the highway as a “matter of right”.
The term “highways” was again defined in 1953 by the Legislature in the Drivers License Act and such definition was identical with the definition found in the Motor Vehicle Law. The phrase “open to the use of the public as a matter of right” was interpreted by the Court in the case of Cihal v. Carver, 1948, 334 Ill.App. 234, 79 N.E.2d 82, to include any street or highway given to the public for public use and which every citizen had the right to use.
The Courts of Illinois stated, in the case of People v. Linde, 1930, 341 Ill. 269, 173 N.E. 361, 72 A.L.R. 997, that “the right to use public streets for purposes of travel is not absolute”. The Courts of Illinois have also stated that “no one has any inherent right to use the streets or highways as a place of business”. See People ex rel. Johns v. Thompson, 1930, 341 Ill. 166, 173 N.E. 137.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws:
Laws 1919, p. 668, ‚§‚§ 1, 44.

Laws 1931, p. 780, ⤠1.

Laws 1935, p. 1247, Art. I, ⤠12.

Laws 1945, p. 1059, ⤠1.

Laws 1953, p. 476, ⤠6.

Laws 1953, p. 1578, ⤠1.

I11.Rev.Stat.1955, ch. 95 1/2, ‚§‚§ 1, 69, 73.6.

Laws 1957, p. 575, ⤠1.

Laws 1959, p. 177, ⤠1.

Laws 1959, p. 1772, ⤠1.

Laws 1959, p. 2209, ⤠1.

Laws 1961, p. 3627, ⤠1.

Laws 1963, p. 964, ⤠1.

Laws 1967, p. 3172, ⤠1.
I11.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 95 1/2. ‚§‚§ 1-121, 109.
CROSS REFERENCES
Highways defined, size, weight and load, see 625 ILCS 5/15-100. Through highways, see 625 ILCS 5/1-205.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Automobiles .13.
Westlaw Topic No. 48A. C.J.S. Motor Vehicles ⤠20.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Encyclopedias
Illinois Law & Prac. Automobiles & Mtr. Vehicles ⤠3, Definitions.
Treatises and Practice Aids
IL Pattern Jury Instructions – Criminal 23.39, Definition of Driving While Driver’s License is Suspended or Revoked.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions – Criminal 23.65, Definition of Speeding.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions – Criminal 23.67, Definition of Transportation of Alcoholic Liquor in a Motor Vehicle-Driver.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions – Criminal 23.69, Definition of Possession of Alcoholic Liquor in a Motor Vehicle-Passenger.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions – Criminal 11.97B, Definition of Highway.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Construction and application 2
Parking lots 5
Prior law 1
Public character of way 4 Regulation of use 3
1. Prior law
If public’s right to use drives, which were situated on state university campus, was not qualified or denied under proper grant of authority, roads were used by the public “as a matter of right,” within meaning of II 11-601 of former chapter 95 1/2 prohibiting speeding on a highway, defined in this paragraph as a way open to use of the public as a matter of right; in such case, speeding charge could properly be prosecuted under. People v. Tadd, App. 2 Dist.1973, 12 Ill.App.3d 391, 299 N.E.2d 8. Automobiles c.13
Driving of motor vehicle in privately owned parking lot by defendant, whose driver’s license had been suspended, did not constitute violation of Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 95 1/2,
6-303 (repealed. See ⤠6-303 former chapter 95 1/2 , prohibiting driving of motor vehicle on highway of state after suspension of license. People v. Kozak, App.1970, 130 Ill.App.2d 334, 264 N.E.2d 896. Automobiles c326
The phrase, “open to the use of the public as a matter of right,” in former ‚§ 109(a) of former chapter 95 1/2 defining street or highway, means street or highway given to public for public use and which every citizen has right to use. Cihal v. Carver, App.1948, 79 N.E.2d 82, 334 Ill.App. 234. Highways ‚£7,18; Municipal Corporations .c.–,703(1)
Former ‚§‚§ 98, 109, 111(a) and 187(a) of chapter 95 1/2 , having been a remedial statute relative to the parking of a motor vehicle, all general provisions, terms, phrases and expressions had to be liberally construed in order that the true intent and meaning of the Legislature could be fully carried out. Stine v. Union Elec. Co. of Ill., App.1940, 26 N.E.2d 433, 305 Ill.App. 37. Automobiles 12
2. Construction and application
Law relating to the movements of automobiles on a public highway, had regard to the traffic or use ordinarily made of such public highway, and contemplated the public use of every public highway for any lawful purpose. Fitzsimmons v. Snyder, 1913, 181 Ill.App. 70.
Chapter 11 of the Illinois Vehicle Code may not be enforced on privately maintained subdivision roads absent compliance with ⤠11-209.1, except that articles IV and V of the chapter may be enforced on private as well as public ways, as may other sections which specifically so provide. 1991 Op.Atty.Gen. No. 91-043.
3. Regulation of use
The State, in exercise of its police power, may regulate the use of its streets and highways in the public interest; thus, the State may empower one of its agencies, such as the board
of regents, to regulate the use of streets and roads located on a college campus in furtherance of particular needs and uses of the university; such regulation includes power to deny use of roads to the general public as a matter of right. People v. Tadd, App. 2 Dist.1973, 12 Ill.App.3d 391, 299 N.E.2d 8. Highways
No one has any inherent right to use streets or highways as a place of business. People ex rel. Johns v. Thompson, 1930, 173 N.E. 137, 341111. 166. Automobiles Municipal Corporations c669
4. Public character of way
Defendant who rode his motorcycle on streets located in village subdivision was riding on highways, as opposed to private roads, and thus, evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for operating motor vehicle on highway when his license was suspended; plat showed that streets in subdivision were dedicated to village, village expressly accepted the dedication, village’s role in ensuring maintenance of streets justified characterizing the streets as “publicly maintained,” and developer, in carrying out its contractual responsibility to maintain streets, acted under aegis of village and essentially performed public function. Village of Lake Villa v. Bransley, App. 2 Dist.2004, 284 Ill.Dec. 250, 348 IlLApp.3d 280, 809 N.E.2d 816. Automobiles c326
Even if maintenance was not physically undertaken by village employees or coordinated by department of the village government, streets which were located in subdivision in village were “publicly maintained” and, as such, constituted “highways” within meaning of statute defining “highway” as entire width between boundary lines of every way “publicly maintained” when any part thereof is open to use of public for purposes of vehicular travel and statute providing that any person who drives vehicle on “highway” when his license is suspended shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Village of Lake Villa v. Bransley, App. 2 Dist.2004, 284 Ill.Dec. 250, 348 Ill.App.3d 280, 809 N.E.2d 816. Automobiles 326
Whether “street” or road is public highway may be proved by parol evidence. People v. Kyle, 1930, 173 N.E. 75, 341111. 31. Criminal Law c400(1)
A “public highway” includes public ways of every description which public have right to use for travel, such as city streets, footways, sidewalks, alleys, turnpikes, plank roads, and bridges. Manimina v. Alexander Auto Service Co., 1928, 164 N.E. 173, 333 Ill. 158.
Fact that a particular road is privately maintained does not necessarily make such a road a “private road”. 1975 Op.Atty.Gen. No. S-858.
5. Parking lots
Publicly maintained parking lot that was open to public use was public highway for purposes of summary driver’s license suspension statute, so that driver asleep in parking lot with his car engine running impliedly consented to blood alcohol test. People v. Culbertson, App. 2 Dist. 1994, 196 Ill.Dec. 554, 258 Ill.App.3d 294, 630 N.E.2d 489.
Automobiles 144.1(1.11)
Word “highway,” within this paragraph is broad enough to encompass publicly maintained parking lots. People v. Jensen, App. 1 Dist.1976, 37 Ill.App.3d 1010, 347 N.E.2d 371.
Defendant was driving on a “highway” and, therefore, was in violation of statutory proscription when he drove his vehicle in a parking lot of a forest preserve district while his driver’s license was under suspension. People v. Jensen, App. 1 Dist.1976, 37 Ill.App.3d 1010, 347 N.E.2d 371. Automobiles 4‚º.326
625 I.L.C.S. 5/1-126, IL ST CH 625 ⤠5/1-126
Current through P.A. 94-1054, P.A. 94-1056 to P.A. 94-1068 of the 2006 Reg. Sess.
END OF DOCUMENT

625 ILCS 5/1-173
Formerly cited as IL ST CH 95 1/2 1-173
West’s Smith-Hurd Illinois Compiled Statutes Annotated Currentness
Chapter 625. Vehicles
Act 5. Illinois Vehicle Code (Refs & Annos) ‘0-Chapter 1. Title and Definitions (Refs & Annos) 45/1-173. Resident
⤠1-173. Resident. (a) Every natural person who resides in this state shall be deemed a resident of this State.
(b) In the case of a firm, copartnership or association, if the principal place of business of such firm, copartnership or association is located in the State of Illinois, then such firm, copartnership or association shall be deemed a resident of the State of Illinois.
(c) In the case of a corporation, if the corporation was incorporated under the laws of the State of Illinois or if the principal place of business of such corporation is in the State of Illinois, then such corporation shall be deemed a resident of the State of Illinois.

CREDIT(S)
P.A. 76-1586, ⤠1-173, eff. July 1, 1970.
FORMER REVISED STATUTES CITATION
Formerly Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 95 1/2 , 1-173.
SOURCE COMMENT
This term was not defined in the 1919 Motor Vehicle Law nor was it defined in the Uniform Vehicle Code. The original 1907 Motor Vehicle Law provided an exemption for non-resident’s registration of their motor vehicles provided the owner thereof had complied with the law requiring the registration of motor vehicles in force in the State of his residence, and further provided that the registration number was conspicuously displayed on the motor vehicle. This exemption was continued in the 1911 Motor Vehicle Law and a “non-resident” was defined: “to mean a person residing in another State and temporarily sojourning within this State for a period of 60 days or less in any one year”. The exemption for non-residents was set out in Section 20 of the 1919 Motor Vehicle Law. The exemption was restricted however and “foreign corporations” owning or maintaining or operating places of business in Illinois and using motor vehicles or motor bicycles in connection with such places of business were required to register such motor vehicles or motor bicycles so used in connection with such places of business. Exemptions from registration for non-residents was further qualified by the addition of a requirement that “like exemptions and privileges” were granted to motor vehicles and motor bicycles duly registered under the laws of and owned by residents of Illinois by the State of residence of such non-resident. The definition of “non-resident” as set out in the 1911 Motor Vehicle Law was continued in Section 20 of the Motor Vehicle Law of 1919. The 1919 Motor Vehicle Law was amended in an Act of 1931 deleting this paragraph defining a non-resident.
There had been no determinations prior to adoption of the Motor Vehicle Law of 1957 by Illinois courts of whether or not the term resident was synonymous with the term domicile in regard to natural persons, but it had generally been regarded as having the same meaning as domicile by the enforcement authorities. “Residents” were defined to include partnerships, firms or associations if their principal place of business was located in the State of Illinois. The determination of “principal place of business” was a factual determination, however, in general it was the place where the partners transacted their principal business, kept their central file of records and maintained their principal executive offices.
A. corporation was deemed to be a resident of the State of Illinois if it was either incorporated in the State of Illinois, or if its principal place of business was in the State of Illinois. Prior to the effective date of Illinois Motor Vehicle Law on January 1, 1958, a corporation was deemed a resident of the State of Illinois if it were incorporated in the State of Illinois. (See Home Life Ins. Co. of New York v. State, 2 Ill.Ct.C1. 50 and Thornton v. Nome & Sinook Co., 260 Ill.App. 76). It was the purpose of the Illinois
Motor Vehicle Law, former section 1-155 of this chapter, to require the registration of vehicles using Illinois highways by foreign corporations, incorporated in other states such as Delaware, if their “principal place of business” was located in Illinois.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws:
Laws 1957, p. 2706, ⤠1-155.

Ill. Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 95 1/2, ⤠1-155.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Encyclopedias
Illinois Law & Prac. Automobiles & Mtr. Vehicles ‚§ 268, Process‚”Service on Secretary cf State for Nonresident Defendants–Persons Subject to Substituted Service.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Prior law 1
1. Prior law
Term “resident” is synonymous with “domicile” for purposes of 10-301 of former diapter 95 1/2. Hatcher v. Anders, App. 2 Dist. 1983, 72 Ill.Dec. 769, 117 Ill.App.3d 236, 453 N.E.2d 74. Automobiles 235
6’25 I.L.C.S. 5/1-173, IL ST CH 625 ‚§ 5/1-173
Current through P.A. 94-1054, P.A. 94-1056 to P.A. 94-1068 of the 2006 Reg. Sess.
END OF DOCUMENT

625 ILCS 5/6-700
Formerly cited as IL ST CH 95 1/2 6-700
Chapter 625. Vehicles
Act 5. Illinois Vehicle Code (Refs & Annos)
10-Chapter 6. The Illinois Driver Licensing Law (Refs & Annos) Article VII. Driver License Compact (Refs & Annos) 4-700. Defm!tions
⤠6-700. Definitions. As used in this compact:
(a) “State” means a state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(b) “Home state” means the state which has issued and has the power to suspend or revoke the use of the license or permit to operate a motor vehicle.
(c) “Conviction” means a conviction of any offense related to the use or operation of a motor vehicle which is prohibited by state law, municipal ordinance or administrative rule or regulation, or a forfeiture of bail, bond or other security deposited to secure appearance by a person charged with having committed any such offense, and which conviction or forfeiture is required to be reported to the licensing authority.
CREDIT(S)
P.A. 76-1586, ⤠6-700, added byP.A. 76-1615, ⤠1, eff. July 1, 1970. FORMER REVISED STATUTES CITATION
Formerly Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 95 1/2 , ⦠6-700.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws:
Laws 1963,p.3161, 1.
I11.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 95 1/2 , ⤠501.
Complementary Legislation:
Ala.‚”Code 1975, 32-6-30 to 32-6-36.
Ariz.–A.R.S. ‚§ 28-1851 to 28-1855.
ArL‚”A.C.A. 27-17-101 to 27-17-106.
Cal.‚”West’s Ann.Cal.Vehicle Code, 15000 to 15003, 15020 to 15028.
Colo..‚”West’s C.R.S.A. 24-60-1101 to 24-60-1107.
Dei.–21 Del.C. 8101.
D.C.‚”D.C. Official Code, 2001 Ed. 50-1001, 50-1002.
Fla.‚”West’s F.S.A. H 322.43 to 322.48.
Hawaii–HR S ‚§‚§ 286C-1, 286C-2.

Idaho–I.C. ‚§‚§ 49-2001 to 49-2003.

Illinois–S.H.A. 625 ILCS 5/6-700 to 5/6-708.
Ind.-West’s A.I.C. 9-28-1-1 to 9-28-1-6.

Iowa–I.C.A. ‚§‚§ 321C.1, 321C.2.

Kan.–K.S.A. 8-1212.
La.–LSA-R.S. 32:1420 to 32:1425.

Maine–29-A M.R.S.A. ‚§‚§ 1451 to 1475.

Md.-Code, Transportation, ‚§‚§ 16-701 to 16-708.
Mass.–M.G.L.A. c. 90, ‚§ 30B.

Minn.–M.S.A. ‚§‚§ 171.50 to 171.56.

Miss.–Code 1972, ‚§‚§ 63-1-101 to 63-1-113.

Mo.–V.A.M.S. ‚§‚§ 302.600, 302.605.

Mt.-M.C.A. 61-5-401 to 61-5-406.

Neb.–R.R.S. 1943, ‚§A1-113.

Nev.–N.R.S. 483.010 to 483.630.

N.H.–RSA 263.77.
N.J.–N.J.S.A. 39:5D-1 to 39:5D-14.
N.M.–NMSA 1978, ‚§‚§ 66-5-49 to 66-5-51.
N.Y.–McKinney’s Vehicle & Traffic Law, ‚§ 516.
N.C.–G.S. ‚§‚§ 20-4.21 to 20-4.30.
Ohio–R.C. ‚§‚§ 4507.60 to 4507.63.
Ok1.–47 Okl.St.Ann. ‚§‚§ 781 to 788.
Pa.–75 Pa.C.S.A. ‚§‚§ 1581 to 1585.
S.C.–Code 1976, ‚§‚§ 56-1-610 to 56-1-690.
Tex.–V.T.C.A., Transportation Code ‚§‚§ 523.001 to 523.011.

Utah–U.C.A. 1953, 53-3-601 to 53-3-607.
Vt.–23 V.S.A. ‚§‚§ 3901 to 3910.
Va.–Code 1950, ‚§‚§ 46.2-483 to 46.2-488.
Wash.–West’s RCWA 46.21.010 to 46.21.040.
W.Va.-Code, 17B-1A-1, 17B-1A-2.
Wyo.–Wyo.Stat.Ann. ‚§‚§ 31-7-201, 31-7-202.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
States
Westlaw Topic No. 360.
C.J.S. States ‚§‚§ 31 to 32, 143.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Encyclopedias
Illinois Law & Prac. Automobiles & Mtr. Vehicles ⤠112, Out-Of-State Misconduct or Convictions.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Conviction 1
1. Conviction
Georia judgment upon plea of nob o contendere to driving under influence charge constitutes “conviction” for purposes of driver license compact. Rigney v. Edgar, App. 1 Dist.1985, 90 Ill.Dec. 548, 135 I1l.App.3d 893, 482 N.E.2d 367. appeal denied. Automobiles .,( 144.1(3)
625 5/6-700, IL ST CH 625 ⤠5/6-700
Current through P.A. 94-1054, P.A. 94-1056 to P.A. 94-1068 of the 2006 Reg. Sess.
END OF DOCUMENT

 

CASE FROM MOBILE ALABAMA ILLUSTRATING THE COMMERCIAL NATURE OF LICENSING UNDER POLICE POWER

36 L.R.A. 615,112 Ala. 654,21 So. 344
Supreme Court of Alabama.
DAVIS V. PETRINOVICH, TAX COLLECTOR. E1 Rehearing denied February 4, 1897.
Nov. 24, 1896.
Appeal from chancery court, Mobile county; W. H. Tayloe, Chancellor.
Suit by Franklin P. Davis against Frank Petrinovich, tax collector. Bill dismissed, and complainant appeals. Reversed.
*344 The mayor and general council of the city of Mobile, on March 16, 1896, adopted a general license ordinance, levying a license tax against all trades and occupations carried on in said city, and included therein a license tax on bicycles. The appellant in this case, Franklin P. Davis, a citizen and taxpayer of the city of Mobile, filed the present bill against the appellee, Frank Petrinovich, tax collector of the city of Mobile, under the provisions of section 45 of the act granting a charter to the city of Mobile (Acts 1886-87, p. 223), to enjoin the collection of said license tax. The complainant owned and used a bicycle, solely and exclusively for his pleasure and convenience, and his bicycle was not used in any way for the transportation of goods or merchandise, and was not kept for hire at any place in the city of Mobile. The other facts of the case are sufficiently stated in the opinion. The defendant moved to dissolve the temporary injunction which was issued, and to dismiss the bill for want of equity. This motion was considered on the final hearing. Upon the final submission of the cause, on the pleadings and proof, the chancellor decreed that the motions were well taken; and ordered that the cause be dismissed, and that the injunction theretofore issued be dissolved.

HARALSON, J.
1. The fact of the pendency of another suit by one Rolston against the defendant in this case, in the same court with this suit, and in reference to the same subject-matter, is not well taken. It was admitted on the trial of this case, that the case of Rolston was instituted in the Mobile chancery court, on the 24th March, 1896; that it “was substantially the same in object and almost identical in language with that of Davis v. Petrinovich, Tax Collector [this case], and that it was brought in behalf of all parties in interest by Hugh Rolston, but was amended on the hearing, so as to be only on his own account,” and that the “said Rolston bill was answered, evidence taken and case submitted and argued on the pleadings and testimony, at the same time with this, the Davis case.” What disposition, if any, has been made of the Rolston case,-whether or not it has been decided,-is not shown, nor is it shown, that said cause was submitted on the same evidence even, as that on which this cause was submitted and tried. That cause, then, confessedly, is not between the same parties as those to this case, though relating to the same subject-matter; is between different parties; is not shown to be on the same evidence on which this cause was tried, and is still pending undetermined in said court. All that is shown is, that in said suit, the plaintiff in this cause contributed one dollar towards paying the expenses of conducting it. These facts furnished no ground for abating the present suit. Foster v. Napier, 73 Ala. 595.
2. That a bicycle comes properly within the definition of a carriage or vehicle, we apprehend can no longer admit of dispute. A vehicle is defined to be, “any carriage moving on land, either on wheels or on runners; a conveyance; that which is used as an instrument of conveyance, transmission, or communication.” Cent. Dict. And a carriage in the same lexicon is defined as, “that which is used for carrying or transporting, especially on or over a solid surface. A wheeled vehicle for the conveyance of persons.” In Taylor v. Goodwin, 4 Q. B. Div. 228, it was held, that a person riding a bicycle on a highway at such a place as to be dangerous to passers-by, may be convicted under an act to prevent any person riding any horse or beast, or driving any sort of carriage furiously, so as to endanger the life or limb of any passenger. The court said: “It may be that bicycles were unknown at the time when the act passed, but the legislature clearly desired to prohibit the use of any sort of carriage in any manner dangerous to the life or limb of any passenger. The question is, whether a bicycle is a carriage within the meaning of the act. I think the word ‘carriage’ is large enough to include a machine such as a bicycle which carries the person who gets upon it, and I think such person may be said to drive it.” In Williams v. Ellis, 5 Q. B. Div. 175, it was held, in construction of the act allowing tolls to be collected at a gate on a turnpike road, that a bicycle was not embraced within the purview of the act imposing a toll of 6 pence, “for every *** sociable, chariot, berlin, landau, &c., or other such carriage,” for the reason, that the act imposed a toll on particular carriages which were described as, “or other such carriages,” which latter must be ejusdem generis with the carriages previously specified. The case of Taylor v. Goodwin was referred to in this later decision with approval. It is a *345 matter of common knowledge, that the bicycle is now used for the purpose of the conveyance of parties owning or hiring the wheels, largely for the purpose of pleasure and exercise, and that in cities and towns, especially, they are coming to be used for the transportation, from point to point, of packages of goods and merchandise such as they are fitted to carry. What further possibilities await the bicycle as a means of the transportation of persons, goods and merchandise, it is not important now to consider or predict. They remain to be developed. On principle and authority, however, it may be said, that it has taken its place safely with the vehicles and carriages of the time, entitled to the rights of the road and street equally with them, and is subject in its use to the same liabilities. Its use upon the highways of the country and upon the streets and sidewalks of towns and cities may be regulated under legislative and delegated municipal authority. Potter’s Law of Road & Roadside, 157; Elliott, Roads & S. pp. 331, 635; Horr & B. Mun. Ord. ‚§ 247; Clemenston, Road Rights, ‚§‚§ 99, 106-109; Mercer v. Corbin, 117 Ind. 450,20 N. E. 132; Holland v. Bartch, 120 Ind. 46,22 N. E. 83, and authorities supra; Thompson v. Dodge, 58 Minn. 555, 60 N. W. 545.
3. Section 26 of the charter of Mobile (Acts 1886-87, p. 240), provides, that “the general council is authorized and empowered to levy and collect for each year of its existence, upon all real and personal property, and all subjects of state taxation within said city of Mobile, except the tax levied on polls, a tax of not exceeding six-tenths of one per cent. of the value of such property, or subjects of taxation during the year preceding that for which the general council may assess and levy the tax above provided for.” By section 21 of the amended charter (Acts 1894-95, p. 387), the regulation of “hackney-coaches, carriages, wagons, carts and drays,” was conferred upon the general council, and section 40 of said amended charter provides, “that the said general council shall, besides the tax heretofore authorized (section 26), have the authority to assess and collect from all persons and corporations, trading and carrying on any business, trade or profession, by an agent or otherwise, within the limits of said corporation, a tax license which shall be fixed and declared each year by an ordinance of said corporation, and the license so said shall be issued and the amount imposed shall be collected as may be provided by ordinance of said corporation *** A vehicle license may be imposed in addition to business license, provided that said license shall only apply to vehicles used in the transportation of goods and merchandise, and vehicles used for hire at the public stands; *** that in addition to the license tax imposed on livery stables, there shall be an additional license tax not exceeding one dollar for every carriage, and fifty cents for every buggy owned and used for hire by such livery stable.”
4. On the 16th March, 1896, the general council of Mobile adopted a general license ordinance, providing, “That a license-tax for the fiscal year, beginning on the 16th March, 1896, and ending on the 14th March, 1897, is hereby imposed and assessed on each person, firm, association, or corporation trading, or carrying on any business, trade or profession, by agent or otherwise within the limits of the city of Mobile,” followed by a schedule of special licenses required in each instance, among others, specifying bicycles,-“including tags furnished for same,-$1.00.” The imposition of such a license tax, it has been well said, is such as may be referred to the taxing power, or to the police power,-to the latter, when its object is merely to regulate, and the amount levied is merely to pay the expenses of enforcing the regulation; including reasonable compensation for the additional expense of municipal supervision over the particular business or vocation; and to the taxing power, if its main object is revenue. If, however, it appears that the legislature has not bestowed the right to tax under either of these delegated powers, but has omitted it, the imposition of the tax is without legislative sanction and void. City of St. Louis v. Green, 7 Mo. App. 468; Id., 70 Mo. 562; 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. ‚§ 357; Burroughs, Tax’n, ‚§ 77; Van Hook v. City of Selma, 70 Ala. 361.
5. The only authority, then, appearing in the charter of said city, for levying a distinctive license tax on vehicles of any description, apart from the general police power to regulate them, is confined by the terms of the act (section 21) to “hackney coaches, carriages, wagons, hacks and drays,” and to such only of these, as are used in the transportation of goods and merchandise; to vehicles used for hire at the public stands, and on carriages and buggies owned and used for hire by livery stables. If a business man in Mobile pays a business license tax, as he may be required under the charter to do, he may be also required, under the charter, to pay an additional license tax on any vehicle he uses in his business, in the transportation of goods and merchandise, and he is relieved from such a tax on other vehicles he may own. It was not within the contemplation of the legislature, as is evident from the text, that an inhabitant of that city should be required to pay such a tax on his pleasure carriage or vehicle, of whatever description, if not used in the business of transportation of goods and merchandise. The policy of the legislature seems to have been to confine the license tax on vehicles, whether imposed under the police or taxing power, to such of them as are used in the transportation of goods and merchandise, and those kept for hire, and to relieve all other carriages from such a tax. City of St. Louis v. Green, 46 Mo. 574; City of Hannibal v. Price, 29 Mo. App. 280.
6. In the charter (Acts 1886-87, p. 223), in section 45, after limiting the rate of taxation, *346 it is provided: “Nor shall said general council levy any tax for any other purpose than those specially stated in this act, and any tax or license charges other than those authorized by said sections 26 and 40 (of the charter) which said general council may levy or attempt to levy, shall be null and void and not collectible, and any tax-payer may enjoin by bill in chancery, and restraining without bond, the tax-collector of the city of Mobile from collecting any tax which said general council may levy or attempt to impose beyond the aforesaid tax and license charges. The provisions of this act shall not be enlarged, or extended so as to be made applicable to or for any other purposes than those stated in this act.” It is manifest, therefore, that the levy of said bicycle tax was outside of the powers of the general council to levy, and was illegally levied. It is provided again, that the taxes levied shall have the force and effect of a judgment against the person assessed therewith, to which a preference is given over all other securities and incumbrances, and for the collection of which a lien is given on all the real and personal property of the tax payer; that the mayor shall certify on the tax book, that said taxes have been fixed and levied, and append his warrant, directed to the tax collector, authorizing and commanding him to collect the taxes so levied, and shall deliver said tax book and warrant to the tax collector, whose duty it is made forthwith to notify the public by advertisement for 30 days in some newspaper published in the city, that he is ready to receive payment of the taxes so levied; that the tax collector shall be charged with the whole amount of the assessed taxes for the year; that he shall issue garnishment process for the collection of taxes and licenses as on judgment returnable to any court having jurisdiction of the amount; that after the expiration of 90 days from the first publication of the tax collector’s notice, as aforesaid, he may levy upon and seize any personal property, if any there be, or if there be none, or not sufficient personal property, then upon the real estate of the delinquent tax payer; and that he shall be charged with and accountable for the whole amount of the assessed taxes for the year, and shall only discharge himself from such accountability by showing that the amounts unpaid could not have been collected by the exercise of the means given him. Sections 31, 32, 36, 39 of original charter (Acts 1886-87, pp. 242,243; Amendatory Acts 1894-95, p. 387, ‚§ 6). Without these provisions, it may be, that the tax being illegal, there would be an adequate remedy at law against its collection, and chancery would not enjoin (High, Inj. ‚§ 543, 545); and that, $20 being the fixed minimum of chancery jurisdiction, the court would not entertain a bill to enjoin the collection of a tax of $1. Hall v. Cannte, 22 Ala. 650; Campbell v. Conner, 78 Ala. 211. But, the statute takes the case from the influence of any such rules as are applicable to the general exercise of the jurisdiction of equity courts; and any taxpayer is authorized by the charter, as we have seen, to enjoin the levy and collection of any illegal tax levied and assessed by the general council. The act in terms bestows the right of injunction without bond, in favor of the taxpayer, whenever the general council “may levy or attempt to impose (any tax or license) beyond the aforesaid tax and license charges,” which may not be rightfully levied and collected. It is idle to say, that the general council have not levied and attempted to impose this illegal tax, or that the collector has no intention of collecting the same, because it is illegal. It has been levied, and the collector is charged with it, and by the terms of the charter, must account for and pay it himself unless he has been unable to do so after he has used all means conferred on him for its collection, and the collector in this suit is seeking to maintain the legality of said levy. The wrong done the appellant was in the imposition of said illegal tax, and it was not incumbent on him to delay filing his bill until the further wrong of a levy on his property had occurred or his creditors were garnished. If so, the very purpose of the legislature in granting relief against such unlawful menaces of the taxpayer’s rights would thereby be defeated. 1 High, Inj. ‚§ 18.
7. The proofs showed that appellant was a taxpayer of the city; that this illegal tax had been levied, and there was an attempt to impose it on his property; that the collector had made the publication as required by the statute; that the bicycle was his private carriage, used alone for the purposes of pleasure, and not for the transportation of goods and merchandise. The bill should not have been dismissed for want of equity, but the motion to dismiss it on that account should have been overruled, and the injunction perpetuated. Reversed, and a decree will be here rendered, restoring the injunction that had been granted, and making it perpetual. Reversed and rendered.

Ala. 1896.
Davis v. Petrinovich
36 L.R.A. 615, 112 Ala. 654, 21 So. 344
END OF DOCUMENT

 

OTHER NOTES AND SOURCES

S.H.A. ch. 95‚½, ‚§‚§ 6-101 et seq.
Driver’s license as privilege or property right see 11 De Paul L.Rev. 125 (1961).
11 De Paul L.Rev. 125 (1961)

References

⤠97. Nature and Effect of License; Transfer

Legal Encyclopedias

C.J.S., Motor Vehicles ⤠159
A license to operate a motor vehicle is a mere privilege.
A license to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways is a mere privilege and is not a property right. [Foot Note 38]

While the Illinois Driver Licensing Law no longer provides for chauffeur’s licenses, as discussed supra ‚§ 93, the licensing of chauffeurs was a grant, personal to the applicant, did not extend to anyone else, [Foot Note 39] and a chauffeur’s license was not transferable. [Foot Note 40]
[Foot Note 38] See 1947 Op.Atty.Gen. 115.

[Foot Note 39] Use by son of father’s license

Boy under age of eighteen years, ineligible to obtain a chauffeur’s license, has no legal right to operate father’s taxicab, although father has a chauffeur’s license.‚”See 1926 Op.Atty.Gen. 507.

[Foot Note 40] See 1916 Op.Atty.Gen. 910.
END OF SECTION
Illinois Law & Practice
Automobiles and Motor Vehicles
Chapter 9. Crimes and Prosecutions
B. Particular Offenses

Correlation Table  References

‚§ 425. Driving without Driver’s License

Legal Encyclopedias

C.J.S., Motor Vehicles ⤠639(1)
It is a punishable offense for any person to drive a motor vehicle unless such person has a valid license or permit.
Under the Illinois Vehicle Code, [Foot Note 97] and under some municipal ordinances, [Foot Note 98] it is a punishable offense for any person to drive a motor vehicle unless such person has a valid license or permit. [Foot Note 99]

It is essential for a conviction of failure to have a driver’s license when operating a motor vehicle that there be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was driving the automobile at the time in question. [Foot Note 1]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT

Cases:

Driver’s arrest outside jurisdiction of arresting officer was within officers statutory authority to arrest, where officer observed driver commit traffic infraction forming sufficient basis for stop while within officer’s jurisdiction and formed initial suspicion that driver was driving with suspended license while driver was within officer’s jurisdiction. People v. Schaefer, 343 Ill. App. 3d 159, 277 Ill. Dec. 600, 796 N.E.2d 686 (2d Dist. 2003).
[END]
4 Ill. Law and Prac. Automobiles and Motor Vehicles ⤠91

Illinois Law & Practice
Automobiles and Motor Vehicles
Chapter 4. Licensing and Regulation of Drivers
A. In General

References

⤠91. General Considerations
AutomobilesKey Symbol130, 136, 145

Legal Encyclopedias

C.J.S., Motor Vehicles ‚§‚§ 146 et seq.

Forms

Modern Legal Forms, Automobiles
No person except those expressly exempted may drive a motor vehicle on an Illinois highway unless he has a valid license or permit.
Under the Illinois Driver Licensing Law, which is part of the Illinois Vehicle Code of 1969, effective July 1, 1970, and which regulates the privilege of operating motor vehicles on the highways, no person except those expressly exempted shall drive any motor vehicle on a highway in the State of Illinois unless he has a valid license or permit, or a restricted license or permit, issued under the Act. [Foot Note 1]

The Secretary of State is charged with the administration of the Act and may make and enforce rules and regulations relating to its administration. [Foot Note 2]

The failure of a driver to have a license has no logical relevance to the issues of negligence or contributory negligence. [Foot Note 3]

Local regulations. Within constitutional limitations, municipalities may regulate and license drivers of motor vehicles to the extent that authority has been delegated by the General Assembly; [Foot Note 4] but any person licensed as a driver under the Driver Licensing Law may not be required by any city, village, incorporated town or other municipal corporation to obtain any other license to exercise the privilege thereby granted. [Foot Note 5]

Under the Cities and Villages Act, municipalities have the power to license, tax, and regulate hackmen, draymen, omnibus drivers, carters, cabmen, porters, expressmen, and all others pursuing like occupations, and to prescribe their compensation; [Foot Note 6] and motor trucks, motor driven commercial vehicles, and motor vehicles which are used for public hire are excepted from the prohibition of a municipal tax or license fee. [Foot Note 7]

The City of Chicago has the right to enact ordinances restricting the use of its streets as a place of business by taxicab drivers unless they are properly licensed. [Foot Note 8] It has been held that an ordinance which compels a person who uses his automobile for his private business and pleasure only to submit to an examination and to take out a license imposes a burden on one class of citizens in the use of the streets not imposed on the others, and that it is beyond the power of a municipality and void. [Foot Note 9]

In any event an ordinance which is unreasonable and arbitrary is invalid. [Foot Note 10]

Driver’s license medical review. A Driver’s License Medical Advisory Board has been established within the Office of Secretary of State, to establish standards for determining the degree to which a person’s medical condition constitutes a limitation to the person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle or causes the person to be a driving hazard. Cases shall be referred to the Board by the Secretary, for medical evaluation of the person under review, and to determine what medical conditions exist that may impair the individual’s ability to operate a motor vehicle safely. [Foot Note 10.5]

Driver’s duty to report medical condition. Every driver shall report to the Secretary any medical condition that is likely to cause loss of consciousness or any loss of ability to safely operate a motor vehicle within 10 days of the driver becoming aware of the condition. [Foot Note 10.10]
[Foot Note 1] S.H.A. ch. 95‚½, ‚§‚§ 6-101 et seq.

S.H.A. ch. 95‚½, ‚¶‚¶6-101 et seq., is now 625 ILCS 5/6-101 et seq., recodified effective January 1, 1993.

See 1958 Op.Atty.Gen. 218; 1961 Op.Atty.Gen. 16.

Driver’s license as privilege or property right see 11 De Paul L.Rev. 125 (1961).

People v. Frye, 1983, 4 Dist., 447 N.E.2d 1065, 69 Ill.Dec. 630, 113 Ill.App.3d 853 (possession of valid license at any time is prima facie proof that holder must have driven upon highways of state as predicate for application of implied consent statute).

[Foot Note 2] S.H.A. ch. 95‚½, ‚§ 6-211.

S.H.A. ch. 95‚½, ‚¶6-211, is now 625 ILCS 5/6-211, recodified effective January 1, 1993.

Revocation of driving school license

Perez v. Edgar, 1982, 436 N.E.2d 639, 62 Ill.Dec. 613, 106 Ill.App.3d 981.

[Foot Note 3] Perry v. Richerson, 1954, 122 N.E.2d 75, 3 Ill.App.2d 338.

[Foot Note 4] Power conferred by charter

City of Chicago Charter, ‚§ 1, cls. 7, 9, 66, delegating police power to the city, and giving power over its streets, authorized it to pass Code Ordinances 1911, ‚§ 2696, prohibiting the use of automobiles in the transportation of passengers or merchandise by a person not competent who has not been examined and licensed.‚”City of Chicago v. Kluever, 1913, 100 N.E. 917, 257 Ill. 317.

[Foot Note 5] S.H.A. ch. 95‚½, ‚§ 6-101(c).

S.H.A. ch. 95‚½, ‚¶6-101(c), is now 625 ILCS 5/6-101(c), recodified effective January 1, 1993.

[Foot Note 6] S.H.A. ch. 24, ⤠11-42-6.

S.H.A. ch. 24, ‚¶11-42-6, is now 65 ILCS 5/11-42-6, recodified effective January 1, 1993.

[Foot Note 7] S.H.A. ch. 24, ⤠8-11-4.

S.H.A. ch. 24, ‚¶8-11-4, was amended in 1983 (provision deleted).

Ordinance requiring license

Cities and villages may adopt ordinances not inconsistent with Motor Vehicle Law requiring all persons operating cars for public hire or commercial purposes to secure a license so to do.‚”See 1914 Op.Atty.Gen. 1131.

[Foot Note 8] City of Chicago v. Dorband, 1939, 18 N.E.2d 107, 297 Ill.App. 617.

People v. Thompson, 1922, 225 Ill.App. 567.

[Foot Note 9] City of Chicago v. Banker, 1904, 112 Ill.App. 94 (Chicago ordinance of June 30, 1902).

[Foot Note 10] Ambulance driver

Portion of ordinance prohibiting issuance of ambulance attendant-driver’s license to any person at any time after conviction of crime involving use of deadly weapon, traffic in narcotic drugs, infamous crime against nature, incest or rape did not bear any relationship to public health or safety, was unreasonable and arbitrary and was invalid as to ambulance attendant-driver who owned ambulance service and had been convicted of armed robbery 17 years prior to application for license.‚”Roth v. Daley, 1970, 256 N.E.2d 166, 119 Ill.App.2d 462.

[Foot Note 10.5] S.H.A. ch. 95‚½ ‚¶‚¶6900 et seq. is now 625 ILCS 5/6-900 et seq., recodified in 1993.

S.H.A. ch. 95‚½, ‚¶‚¶6-900 et seq., added in 1992.

[Foot Note 10.10] 625 ILCS 5/6-116.5, added in 1996.
IL-LP AUTOS ⤠91

END OF SECTION

C.J.S., Motor Vehicles ‚§‚§ 146 et seq.

60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles ⤠262

Corpus Juris Secundum
Motor Vehicles
By John Bourdeau, J.D., Paul Coltoff, J.D., Edward K. Esping, J.D., of Professional Publishing Associates, Inc., John R. Kennel, J.D. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Sonja Larsen, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D., Thomas Muskus, J.D., Charles Nagy, J.D., Carmela Pellegrino, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, J.D., of Professional Publishing Associates, Inc.
V. License and Regulation of Drivers or Chauffeurs
A. Control and Regulation
3. Persons Subject to License Regulations
a. In General

Topic Summary‚  Correlation Table

⤠262. Generally

License regulations apply to the driver of a motor vehicle, and must be complied with by all coming within the terms of such regulations.
Generally, by virtue of statutory provisions or regulations, only persons who hold licenses as chauffeurs or operators may lawfully operate or drive motor vehicles upon the public highways.[Foot Note 1] Where the operator of a private commercial carrier is obligated by law to obtain a commercial driver’s license, this requirement applies to all persons regularly engaged as operators of such carriers.[Foot Note 2] In some jurisdictions, a person who operates a motor vehicle for hire must obtain a special license,[Foot Note 3] but if a vehicle is operated for purposes other than furnishing transportation for hire no special license is required.[Foot Note 4]

Where every operator is required to obtain a license, the license is personal to the particular person who operates the motor vehicle and must be obtained by, and issued to, him or her.[Foot Note 5] Therefore, a corporation or partnership which owns or controls a motor vehicle is not entitled to a license to operate it.[Foot Note 6]

Where statutorily provided that no person may operate a motor vehicle for hire or as a chauffeur unless specially licensed so to do, an owner who is licensed merely as an operator, and not as a chauffeur, is not authorized to operate his or her automobile for hire.[Foot Note 7] However, a person holding a license as a commercial operator or chauffeur is not required to have an ordinary operator’s license.[Foot Note 8]

Unless expressly exempted, state officers and employees come within the requirements of licensing provisions broad enough in their terms to include such persons.[Foot Note 9] A municipality operating busses running through another city is required to comply with reasonable regulations concerning the qualifications of drivers of such busses.[Foot Note 10]
Steering towed car.

A person steering a disabled motor vehicle which is being towed by another car is not operating or driving a motor vehicle within the meaning of a statutory provision requiring an operator or driver to be licensed.[Foot Note 11]
[Foot Note 1] Tex.‚”Leatherman v. Starkey, 356 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo 1962), writ refused n.r.e., (Oct. 6, 1962).

Intent to change residence as affecting residence, see C.J.S., Domicile ‚§‚§ 14 to 17.

License not required for driver on unfinished road

W.Va.‚”State v. Boyles, 112 W. Va. 125, 163 S.E. 814 (1932).
No operating or driving where vehicle not started

N.Y.‚”Ricciardi v. McMahon, 163 Misc. 659, 299 N.Y.S. 440 (City Ct. 1937).
Intention to change residence

D.C.‚”Bush v. District of Columbia, 78 A.2d 234 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1951).

[Foot Note 2] Driver employed by railroad

Miss.‚”Lumpkin v. Birdsong, 212 Miss. 616, 55 So. 2d 230 (1951).

[Foot Note 3] Operation for hire construed

R.I.‚”State v. Brown, 97 R.I. 95, 196 A.2d 138 (1963).

[Foot Note 4] R.I.‚”State v. Brown, 97 R.I. 95, 196 A.2d 138 (1963).

[Foot Note 5] N.H.‚”Emerson Troy Granite Co. v. Pearson, 74 N.H. 22, 64 A. 582 (1906).

Legal name requirement valid

U.S.‚”Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), judgment aff’d, 405 U.S. 970, 92 S. Ct. 1197, 31 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1972).

[Foot Note 6] N.H.‚”Emerson Troy Granite Co. v. Pearson, 74 N.H. 22, 64 A. 582 (1906).

Registration of the vehicle in corporate or partnership name, see ⤠168.

[Foot Note 7] Mass.‚”Griffin v. Hustis, 234 Mass. 95, 125 N.E. 387 (1919).

[Foot Note 8] Cal.‚”Sogawa v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 100 Cal. App. 2d 181, 223 P.2d 269 (2d Dist. 1950).

[Foot Note 9] Mo.‚”City of St. Louis v. Carpenter, 341 S.W.2d 786, 87 A.L.R.2d 1219 (Mo. 1961).

[Foot Note 10] Ohio‚”Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Village of North Olmsted, 130 Ohio St. 144, 4 Ohio Op. 31, 198 N.E. 41, 101 A.L.R. 426 (1935).

[Foot Note 11] Ohio‚”City of Toledo v. Burks, 100 Ohio App. 127, 60 Ohio Op. 104, 136 N.E.2d 150 (6th Dist. Lucas County 1955).
END OF SECTION
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles ⤠256

Corpus Juris Secundum
Motor Vehicles
By John Bourdeau, J.D., Paul Coltoff, J.D., Edward K. Esping, J.D., of Professional Publishing Associates, Inc., John R. Kennel, J.D. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Sonja Larsen, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D., Thomas Muskus, J.D., Charles Nagy, J.D., Carmela Pellegrino, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, J.D., of Professional Publishing Associates, Inc.
V. License and Regulation of Drivers or Chauffeurs
A. Control and Regulation
1. In General

Topic Summary‚  Correlation Table

⤠256. Purpose

Motor vehicle operators and chauffeurs are generally licensed by the state in the interest of public safety.
Generally, the purposes of requiring chauffeurs and operators to be licensed are to insure the competency of the operators of motor vehicles and to regulate the use of this means of rapid transit on the public highways, in the interest of public safety.[Foot Note 1] It is also the purpose of such licensing to furnish a further guaranty that proper use of the vehicle will be made,[Foot Note 2] and that it will be operated in compliance with applicable statutory provisions.[Foot Note 3] The purpose of requiring the operator of a motor vehicle to report changes of address to the commissioner of motor vehicles is identification of drivers and the facilitation of communication with them.[Foot Note 4]
[Foot Note 1] Nev.‚”State, Dept. of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety v. Miles, 111 Nev. 681, 895 P.2d 1316 (1995).

[Foot Note 2] State may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care

Neb.‚”Russell v. State, Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 247 Neb. 885, 531 N.W.2d 212 (1995).

[Foot Note 3] N.H.‚”Emerson Troy Granite Co. v. Pearson, 74 N.H. 22, 64 A. 582 (1906).

Purpose of requirement that epilepsy patients be disclosed to licensing authority

U.S.‚”Harden v. Allstate Ins. Co., 883 F. Supp. 963 (D. Del. 1995).

[Foot Note 4] Conn.‚”State v. Baltromitis, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 72, 242 A.2d 99 (App. Div. 1967).
END OF SECTION
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles ⤠257

Corpus Juris Secundum

Motor Vehicles
By John Bourdeau, J.D., Paul Coltoff, J.D., Edward K. Esping, J.D., of Professional Publishing Associates, Inc., John R. Kennel, J.D. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Sonja Larsen, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D., Thomas Muskus, J.D., Charles Nagy, J.D., Carmela Pellegrino, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, J.D., of Professional Publishing Associates, Inc.
V. License and Regulation of Drivers or Chauffeurs
A. Control and Regulation
1. In General

Topic Summary‚  Correlation Table

⤠257. Right to operate as privilege
AutomobilesKey Symbol130, 132 to 136, 143
The right to operate a motor vehicle is, generally, a privilege, not a right.
A license is, generally, merely a personal privilege,[Foot Note 1] which may be revoked.[Foot Note 2] Where a license is deemed a personal privilege, it is not a vested right,[Foot Note 3] nor is it considered a natural right[Foot Note 4] or a civil right.[Foot Note 5] A driver’s license is also not a contract or property right[Foot Note 6] in any legal or constitutional sense.[Foot Note 7] Neither is it a right of such a nature that it may be sold or assigned.[Foot Note 8] The payment by the licensee of the required fees upon the issuance to him or her of the operator’s license does not convert the privilege granted into a property right.[Foot Note 9]

In some jurisdictions, however, while still recognizing that a license is a personal privilege, a license is deemed in the nature of a right.[Foot Note 10] In other jurisdictions, a license is both a personal privilege and a property right.[Foot Note 11] In still other jurisdictions, a license to operate a motor vehicle is more of a property interest.[Foot Note 12] A license may also be determined to be a vested property right in the individual.[Foot Note 13]
[Foot Note 1] La.‚”State v. Jackson, 764 So. 2d 64 (La. 2000).

Highway driving a privilege, not a right

Ill.‚”People v. Jung, 192 Ill. 2d 1, 248 Ill. Dec. 258, 733 N.E.2d 1256 (2000).
Privilege not constitutionally guaranteed

N.D.‚”North Dakota Dept. of Transp. v. DuPaul, 487 N.W.2d 593 (N.D. 1992).
Conditional privilege

Va.‚”Walton v. Com., 255 Va. 422, 497 S.E.2d 869 (1998).
Important and valued privilege

Vt.‚”Bolio v. Malloy, 126 Vt. 424, 234 A.2d 336 (1967).
Limited right

Pa.‚”Com. v. Vivio, 209 Pa. Super. 90, 224 A.2d 777 (1966).
Qualified right

Mo.‚”Blydenburg v. David, 413 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1967).

[Foot Note 2] Mont.‚”Nelson v. Driscoll, 1999 MT 193, 295 Mont. 363, 983 P.2d 972 (1999).

Revocation or suspension of license, generally, see ‚§‚§ 290to 293.

[Foot Note 3] Cal.‚”O’Connor v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 3d 107, 153 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1st Dist. 1979).

Not right entitled to protection against governmental interference or restriction

Colo.‚”People v. Zinn, 843 P.2d 1351 (Colo. 1993).

[Foot Note 4] Kan.‚”State v. Bowie, 268 Kan. 794, 999 P.2d 947 (2000).

Not absolute right

Ohio‚”Dobbins v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 75 Ohio St. 3d 533, 664 N.E.2d 908 (1996).

[Foot Note 5] Tex.‚”Allen v. State, 410 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App. Houston 1966).

[Foot Note 6] Ohio‚”Dobbins v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 75 Ohio St. 3d 533, 664 N.E.2d 908 (1996).

[Foot Note 7] Cal.‚”Department of Motor Vehicles v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. App. 3d 936, 130 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1st Dist. 1976).

[Foot Note 8] N.Y.‚”City of Rochester v. Falk, 170 Misc. 238, 9 N.Y.S.2d 343 (City Ct. 1939).

[Foot Note 9] Kan.‚”State v. Finley, 198 Kan. 585, 426 P.2d 251 (1967), opinion withdrawn on other grounds on reh’g, 199 Kan. 615, 433 P.2d 414 (1967).

License fees, see ‚§‚§ 281to 283.

[Foot Note 10] N.D.‚”State ex rel. Hjelle v. A Motor Vehicle Described as a 1973 Brockway Tractor License No. 237342, Serial No. 79629, Trailer SN No. 75-2531-LB-150, 299 N.W.2d 557 (N.D. 1980).

Nonfundamental right

Va.‚”Walton v. Com., 255 Va. 422, 497 S.E.2d 869 (1998).

[Foot Note 11] Pa.‚”Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Quinlan, 47 Pa. Commw. 214, 408 A.2d 173 (1979).

[Foot Note 12] W.Va.‚”Abshire v. Cline, 193 W. Va. 180, 455 S.E.2d 549 (1995).

Substantial right

N.Y.‚”Pringle v. Wolfe, 88 N.Y.2d 426, 646 N.Y.S.2d 82, 668 N.E.2d 1376 (1996).
Real value

N.Y.‚”Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup 1954).

[Foot Note 13] N.Y.‚”People v. Emmanuel, 82 Misc. 2d 298, 368 N.Y.S.2d 773 (City Crim. Ct. 1975).

Substantial property interest that may not be deprived without due process of law

N.Y.‚”Pringle v. Wolfe, 88 N.Y.2d 426, 646 N.Y.S.2d 82, 668 N.E.2d 1376 (1996).
Basis of change in view from privilege to vested property right

N.Y.‚”People v. McAnarney, 28 Misc. 2d 778, 210 N.Y.S.2d 340 (County Ct. 1961).
END OF SECTION

60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles ⤠260

Corpus Juris Secundum
Motor Vehicles
By John Bourdeau, J.D., Paul Coltoff, J.D., Edward K. Esping, J.D., of Professional Publishing Associates, Inc., John R. Kennel, J.D. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Sonja Larsen, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D., Thomas Muskus, J.D., Charles Nagy, J.D., Carmela Pellegrino, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, J.D., of Professional Publishing Associates, Inc.
V. License and Regulation of Drivers or Chauffeurs
A. Control and Regulation
2. Power to License

Topic Summary‚  Correlation Table

⤠260. State

Within constitutional limits, a state legislature may require drivers of motor vehicles on the public highways to be licensed and may impose reasonable conditions under which the license is to be issued.
The granting or withholding of licenses to operators of motor vehicles is a method of exercise of the state’s regulatory power over public highways.[Foot Note 1] The state legislature, under this power, has control of the licensing of those who, as chauffeurs or operators, drive such vehicles.[Foot Note 2] In the absence of constitutional restrictions, it may require that, before a person is entitled to operate or drive a motor vehicle upon the public highways, he or she must obtain a license as a chauffeur or operator and pay a prescribed license fee.[Foot Note 3]

In the exercise of this power, the legislature may classify the persons to whom the prescribed regulations will apply, provided such classification is not unreasonable and arbitrary.[Foot Note 4] Thus, the legislature may reasonably distinguish between individuals on the basis of maturity and judgment, physical capacity or ability, and similar matters which would affect the competency of a person to safely operate a motor vehicle upon the highway.[Foot Note 5] The state may prescribe the conditions under which the privilege of operating such vehicles may be granted[Foot Note 6] and exercised.[Foot Note 7] The legislature may reserve this power exclusively to the state[Foot Note 8] in order to establish, throughout the state, a uniform system regarding the licensing of chauffeurs and operators.[Foot Note 9] The legislature may also vest exclusive authority to issue licenses in a state board or commission.[Foot Note 10] Additionally, a legislature may be authorized to enact a statutory provision granting state courts the right to issue judicial driving permits.[Foot Note 11]
[Foot Note 1] N.C.‚”Smith v. Walsh, 34 N.C. App. 287, 238 S.E.2d 157 (1977).

Purpose

Ohio‚”City of Kettering v. Baker, 42 Ohio St. 2d 351, 71 Ohio Op. 2d 322, 328 N.E.2d 805 (1975).

[Foot Note 2] Mich.‚”Nicholas v. Secretary of State, 74 Mich. App. 64, 253 N.W.2d 662 (1977).

[Foot Note 3] U.S.‚”Wood v. Wm. B. Reilly & Co., 40 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Ga. 1941).

Persons subject to license regulations, generally, see ‚§‚§ 262to 264.

License fees, generally, see ‚§‚§ 281to 283.

[Foot Note 4] Cal.‚”Ex parte Stork, 167 Cal. 294, 139 P. 684 (1914).

Taxicab license

Wash.‚”Tarver v. City Commission In and For City of Bremerton, 72 Wash. 2d 726, 435 P.2d 531 (1967).

[Foot Note 5] Wash.‚”State v. Scheffel, 82 Wash. 2d 872, 514 P.2d 1052 (1973).

Qualifications or eligibility for license, generally, see ‚§‚§ 268to 271.

[Foot Note 6] S.D.‚”Blow v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 83 S.D. 628, 164 N.W.2d 351 (1969).

Reasonable regulation

U.S.‚”Quetawki v. Prentice, 303 F. Supp. 737 (D.N.M. 1968).

[Foot Note 7] N.Y.‚”People v. Frank, 61 Misc. 2d 450, 305 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup 1969).

[Foot Note 8] Tex.‚”Ball v. City of McKinney, 286 S.W. 341 (Tex. Civ. App. Dallas 1926), writ refused, (Nov. 10, 1926).

[Foot Note 9] N.Y.‚”Boord v. Wallander, 195 Misc. 557, 89 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sup 1949), judgment modified on other grounds, 277 A.D. 253, 98 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep’t 1950), judgment aff’d on other grounds, 302 N.Y. 890, 100 N.E.2d 177 (1951).

[Foot Note 10] Neb.‚”Johnston v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 190 Neb. 606, 212 N.W.2d 342 (1973).

Duty as to medically suspect drivers

La.‚”Fowler v. Roberts, 526 So. 2d 266 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1988), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 278 (La. 1988) and writ granted, 531 So. 2d 257 (La. 1988) and judgment aff’d, 556 So. 2d 1 (La. 1989).
Control over other governmental agencies

Cal.‚”Yeoman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 273 Cal. App. 2d 71, 78 Cal. Rptr. 251 (4th Dist. 1969).

[Foot Note 11] Ill.‚”People v. Inghram, 118 Ill. 2d 140, 113 Ill. Dec. 65, 514 N.E.2d 977 (1987).
END OF SECTION
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles V Refs.

Corpus Juris Secundum

Motor Vehicles
By John Bourdeau, J.D., Paul Coltoff, J.D., Edward K. Esping, J.D., of Professional Publishing Associates, Inc., John R. Kennel, J.D. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Sonja Larsen, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D., Thomas Muskus, J.D., Charles Nagy, J.D., Carmela Pellegrino, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, J.D., of Professional Publishing Associates, Inc.
V. License and Regulation of Drivers or Chauffeurs

Topic Summary‚  Correlation Table

Research References
Drinking/Driving Litigation Criminal and Civil (2d ed.) (DRNKDRIVING)

A.L.R. Library

West’s A.L.R. Digest, AutomobilesKey Symbol129 to 145
A.L.R. Index: Automobiles and Highway Traffic; Certificates of Title; Driver’s Licenses; Driving While Under the Influence of Drugs; Guest Statute; Passengers; Pedestrians; Reckless Driving; Speed and Speeding; Traffic Offenses and Violations
Denial Of Accused’s Request For Initial Contact With Attorney‚”Drunk Driving Cases, 109 A.L.R. 5th 611
Admissibility, In Motor Vehicle License Suspension Proceedings, Of Evidence Obtained By Unlawful Search And Seizure, 23 A.L.R. 5th 108
Validity And Application Of Statute Or Regulation Authorizing Revocation Or Suspension Of Driver’s License For Reason Unrelated To Use Of, Or Ability To Operate, Motor Vehicle, 18 A.L.R. 5th 542
Automobiles: Necessity Or Emergency As Defense In Prosecution For Driving Without Operator’s License Or While License Is Suspended, 7 A.L.R. 5th 73
Validity, Construction, Application, And Effect Of Statute Requiring Conditions, In Addition To Expiration Of Time, For Reinstatement Of Suspended Or Revoked Driver’s License, 2 A.L.R. 5th 725
Automobiles: Validity And Construction Of Legislation Authorizing Revocation Or Suspension Of Operator’s License For ‚“Habitual‚, ‚“Persistent‚, Or ‚“Frequent‚ Violations Of Traffic Regulations, 48 A.L.R. 4th 367
Construction And Effect Of Statutes Which Make Parent, Custodian, Or Other Person Signing Minor’s Application For Vehicle Operator’s License Liable For Licensee’s Negligence Or Willful Misconduct, 45 A.L.R. 4th 87

Treatises and Practice Aids

Nichols Drinking/Driving Litigation: Criminal and Civil (2d ed.) ‚§‚§ 7:1 to 7:25, 8:1 to 8:5, 9:14, 9:27, 11:1, 11:16 to 11:19, 11:30, 11:37

END OF SECTION
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles ⤠263

Corpus Juris Secundum
Motor Vehicles
By John Bourdeau, J.D., Paul Coltoff, J.D., Edward K. Esping, J.D., of Professional Publishing Associates, Inc., John R. Kennel, J.D. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Sonja Larsen, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D., Thomas Muskus, J.D., Charles Nagy, J.D., Carmela Pellegrino, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, J.D., of Professional Publishing Associates, Inc.
V. License and Regulation of Drivers or Chauffeurs
A. Control and Regulation
3. Persons Subject to License Regulations
a. In General

Topic Summary‚  Correlation Table

⤠263. Chauffeur or operator
AutomobilesKey Symbol129, 130, 132 to 137
A distinction is sometimes recognized between an operator and a chauffeur, as “chauffeur” often refers to one who is paid for driving an automobile.
In some jurisdictions, a distinction is made between a chauffeur and an operator. An operator is any person, other than a chauffeur, who operates or drives a motor vehicle.[Foot Note 1] A person need not be a chauffeur in order to secure a chauffeur’s license.[Foot Note 2] The fact that a driver holds such a license does not necessarily make such driver a chauffeur, unless he or she receives pay for the services.[Foot Note 3] Therefore, one who holds a chauffeur’s license, but is not a chauffeur, and who drives upon the highway may be just an operator.[Foot Note 4]

The term chauffeur has a general meaning, as well as a restrictive meaning.[Foot Note 5] In the general sense, a chauffeur is one who operates and propels,[Foot Note 6] or drives and operates,[Foot Note 7] or manages the running of,[Foot Note 8] an automobile. In a more restricted sense, a chauffeur is a person who drives an automobile for hire.[Foot Note 9] Chauffeur may also have different meanings, dependent on the terms of the statutory provision in which it appears.[Foot Note 10] As used in regulations requiring a person who desires to operate a motor vehicle as a chauffeur, or as a paid operator, first to obtain a chauffeur’s or driver’s license, it means a paid operator or employee, that is, a person who is employed and paid by the owner of a motor vehicle to drive and attend to the car.[Foot Note 11] In such case, the term chauffeur does not include operators who are not employed and paid for operating the motor vehicle.[Foot Note 12] Moreover, it does not include an employee who receives his or her compensation for services rendered, other than the operation of motor vehicles, although in performing such services he or she may incidentally operate a motor vehicle.[Foot Note 13] An employee of a public utility, who incidentally uses a motor vehicle in his or her business of repair, is not a chauffeur, and is not required to obtain a chauffeur’s license.[Foot Note 14] There is, however, authority to the contrary.[Foot Note 15]

Owner as driver.

An owner of a motor vehicle who has obtained an operator’s license may not, unless otherwise permitted, drive his or her vehicle as a public service vehicle for hire without a chauffeur’s license.[Foot Note 16] An owner who acts as an independent contractor in the operation of his or her vehicle is not, however, required to take out a chauffeur’s license.[Foot Note 17] This includes a person who, in delivering goods for one person, drives a motor vehicle which he or she has borrowed from a third person.[Foot Note 18]
[Foot Note 1] Cal.‚”Sogawa v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 100 Cal. App. 2d 181, 223 P.2d 269 (2d Dist. 1950).

[Foot Note 2] Cal.‚”Sogawa v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 100 Cal. App. 2d 181, 223 P.2d 269 (2d Dist. 1950).

[Foot Note 3] Cal.‚”Sogawa v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 100 Cal. App. 2d 181, 223 P.2d 269 (2d Dist. 1950).

Whether driver is chauffeur dependent on terms of applicable statutory provision, see ⤠263.

[Foot Note 4] Cal.‚”Sogawa v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 100 Cal. App. 2d 181, 223 P.2d 269 (2d Dist. 1950).

[Foot Note 5] La.‚”Day v. Bush, 18 La. App. 682, 139 So. 42 (2d Cir. 1932).

[Foot Note 6] Mo.‚”State v. Swagerty, 203 Mo. 517, 102 S.W. 483 (1907).

[Foot Note 7] Ill.‚”Christy v. Elliott, 216 Ill. 31, 74 N.E. 1035 (1905).

[Foot Note 8] Neb.‚”Woodring v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 122 Neb. 734, 241 N.W. 285 (1932).

[Foot Note 9] Neb.‚”Woodring v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 122 Neb. 734, 241 N.W. 285 (1932).

[Foot Note 10] Ala.‚”Turner v. State, 226 Ala. 269, 146 So. 601 (1933).

Uniformed patrolmen not chauffeurs

Mo.‚”State ex rel. Beach v. Beach, 325 Mo. 175, 28 S.W.2d 105 (1930).
American soldier not chauffeur

Tex.‚”American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Struwe, 218 S.W. 534 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1920), writ refused, (Apr. 6, 1921).

[Foot Note 11] U.S.‚”State of Md. for Use of Weaver v. O’Brien, 140 F. Supp. 306 (D. Md. 1956).

Test

U.S.‚”Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cronholm, 32 F. Supp. 375 (S.D. Tex. 1940), judgment aff’d on other grounds, 116 F.2d 494 (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1940).

[Foot Note 12] Ky.‚”Winslow v. Everson, 221 Ky. 430, 298 S.W. 1084 (1927).

[Foot Note 13] W.Va.‚”State v. Wimmer, 117 W. Va. 498, 186 S.E. 133, 105 A.L.R. 67 (1936).

Services of son

Cal.‚”Hunton v. California Portland Cement Co., 50 Cal. App. 2d 684, 123 P.2d 947 (4th Dist. 1942).

[Foot Note 14] N.Y.‚”People v. Dennis, 166 N.Y.S. 318 (County Ct. 1915).

[Foot Note 15] N.Y.‚”People v. Fulton, 96 Misc. 663, 162 N.Y.S. 125 (County Ct. 1916).

[Foot Note 16] Mo.‚”Stack v. General Baking Co., 283 Mo. 396, 223 S.W. 89 (1920).

Chauffeur defined

Tex.‚”Peniche v. Aeromexico, 580 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Civ. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1979).

[Foot Note 17] N.Y.‚”People v. Ritter, 120 Misc. 852, 200 N.Y.S. 816 (County Ct. 1922).

[Foot Note 18] Ind.‚”A. E. Norris Coal Co. v. Jackson, 80 Ind. App. 423, 141 N.E. 227 (Div. 1 1923).

CJS MOTORVEH ⤠263

END OF SECTION

 

NOTES ON POLICE POWER

Corpus Juris Secundum

Constitutional Law
by Francis Amendola, J.D.; John Bourdeau, J.D.; Paul M. Coltoff, J.D.; John Dvorske, J.D.; John Glenn, J.D.; Glenda K. Harnad, J.D., of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc.; John Kennel, J. D., of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc.; Sonja Larsen, J.D.; Stephen Lease, J.D.; Jack K. Levin, J.D.; Richard J. Link, J.D.; Lucas Martin, J.D.; Thomas Muskus, J.D.; Karl Oakes, J.D.; Kimberly Simmons, J.D.; Eric C. Surette, J.D.; Carmela Pellegrino, J.D.; Barbara Van Arsdale, J.D.; Elizabeth Williams, J. D.; Lisa Zakolski, J.D.
VIII. Police Power
A. In General

Topic Summary‚  References

‚§‚ ‚  610. Nature of power

Constitutional Law‚ ‚  81

The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which exists without any reservation in the constitution as an essential element in all orderly governments.

The police power is a governmental function,[FN1] an inherent attribute of sovereignty,[FN2] and the greatest and most powerful attribute of government.[FN3] Although the basis of the police power lies in the constitution which regards the public welfare, safety, and health of the citizens of the state,[FN4] and although it may be given to the people of the state by the constitution,[FN5] the power exists without any reservation in the constitution,[FN6] being founded on the duty of the state to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.[FN7]

The police power, in its nature, is very broad and comprehensive,[FN8] and the laws enacted for the purpose of regulation thereunder may be impolitic, harsh, and oppressive.[FN9] It corresponds to the right of self-preservation in the individual,[FN10] and is an essential element in all orderly governments,[FN11] because it is necessary to the proper maintenance of the government and the general welfare of the community.[FN12]

The power comprehends reasonable preventative measures no less than the punishment of perpetrated offenses,[FN13] and it may act to prevent apprehended dangers as well as to control those already existing.[FN14] The police power depends on the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property, and it has been said to be the very foundation on which our social system rests.[FN15] It has for its object the improvement of economic[FN16] and social conditions affecting the community at large and collectively with a view of bringing about “the greatest good of the greatest number.”[FN17]

The constitution presupposes the existence of the police power and is to be construed with reference to that fact,[FN18] and police regulations presuppose conditions which, unless controlled, will operate to a public disadvantage.[FN19]

[FN1] U.S.‚”Aldens, Inc. v. LaFollette, 552 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977).

Ala.‚”City of Decatur v. Robinson, 251 Ala. 99, 36 So. 2d 673 (1948).

[FN2] U.S.‚”City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 85 S. Ct. 577, 13 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1965).

Cal.‚”Pleasant Hill Bayshore Disposal, Inc. v. Chip-It Recycling, Inc., 91 Cal. App. 4th 678, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 708 (1st Dist. 2001), as modified on denial of reh’g, (Sept. 13, 2001).

Colo.‚”CF & I Steel, L.P. v. United Steel Workers of America (USWA), 74 P.3d 513 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).

Okla.‚”Fine Airport Parking, Inc. v. City of Tulsa, 2003 OK 27, 71 P.3d 5 (Okla. 2003).

Exercise not dependent on emergency

Police power is permanent right of sovereignty, and its exercise is not dependent on emergency.

N.J.‚”In re North Jersey Title Ins. Co., 120 N.J. Eq. 148, 184 A. 420 (Ch. 1936), aff’d, 120 N.J. Eq. 608, 187 A. 146 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936).

[FN3] Pa.‚”Com. v. Widovich, 295 Pa. 311, 145 A. 295 (1929).

[FN4] U.S.‚”Ziffrin, Inc. v. Martin, 24 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Ky. 1938), aff’d, 308 U.S. 132, 60 S. Ct. 163, 84 L. Ed. 128 (1939) (abrogated on other grounds by, Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 161 L. Ed. 2d 796 (U.S. 2005)).

[FN5] Vt.‚”Sowma v. Parker, 112 Vt. 241, 22 A.2d 513 (1941).

[FN6] Ohio‚”Vincent v. Elyria Bd. of Ed., 7 Ohio App. 2d 58, 36 Ohio Op. 2d 151, 218 N.E.2d 764 (9th Dist. Lorain County 1966).

Tex.‚”Martin v. Wholesome Dairy, Inc., 437 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1969), writ refused n.r.e., (June 25, 1969).

Wash.‚”Reesman v. State, 74 Wash. 2d 646, 445 P.2d 1004 (1968).

Not referable to any single provision

Md.‚”Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 48 A.2d 754 (1946).

[FN7] Md.‚”Linkus v. Maryland State Bd. of Heating Ventilation, Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration Contractors, 114 Md. App. 262, 689 A.2d 1254 (1997).

N.M.‚”In re McCain, 84 N.M. 657, 506 P.2d 1204 (1973).

Tex.‚”Jefco, Inc. v. Lewis, 520 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1975), writ refused n.r.e., (July 23, 1975).

Duty to act

(1) Legislature has a duty to enact laws providing for general welfare and safety of people within state.

Ind.‚”State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 225 Ind. 360, 74 N.E.2d 914 (1947).

(2) There is no constitutional provision which imposes a duty on a state to provide services to its citizens.

U.S.‚”New York State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. N.Y. 1973).

Public necessity

Police power is founded in public necessity, which justifies its exercise.

Conn.‚”State v. Heller, 123 Conn. 492, 196 A. 337 (1937).

[FN8] N.Y.‚”Dobrzenski v. Village of Hamburg, 277 A.D.2d 1005, 715 N.Y.S.2d 819 (4th Dep’t 2000).

Okla.‚”State v. Nevins, 1980 OK CR 30, 611 P.2d 251 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).

W. Va.‚”State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 167 W. Va. 155, 279 S.E.2d 622 (1981).

Almost infinite variety of subjects embraced

U.S.‚”Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, 393 U.S. 186, 89 S. Ct. 354, 21 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1968).

[FN9] Cal.‚”D’Amico v. Brock, 122 Cal. App. 2d 63, 264 P.2d 120 (3d Dist. 1953).

Iowa‚”Jacobs v. City of Chariton, 245 Iowa 1378, 65 N.W.2d 561 (1954).

W.Va.‚”State ex rel. Morris v. West Virginia Racing Commission, 133 W. Va. 179, 55 S.E.2d 263 (1949).

Strict liability

In exercise of power, state may impose liability without fault.

Ala.‚”Walker v. State, 356 So. 2d 672 (Ala. 1977).

[FN10] U.S.‚”Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Commission of Kansas, 294 U.S. 613, 55 S. Ct. 563, 79 L. Ed. 1090 (1935).

Ala.‚”Jones v. State, 56 Ala. App. 280, 321 So. 2d 247 (Crim. App. 1975).

N.Y.‚”DeLury v. City of New York, 51 A.D.2d 288, 381 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1st Dep’t 1976).

[FN11] U.S.‚”Comtronics, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 409 F. Supp. 800 (D.P.R. 1975), judgment aff’d, 553 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1977).

Ky.‚”Roe v. Com., 405 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1966).

Wash.‚”Spokane County v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 69 Wash. 2d 712, 419 P.2d 993 (1966).

Law of necessity

Police power is law of necessity.

N.J.‚”Jamouneau v. Harner, 16 N.J. 500, 109 A.2d 640 (1954).

[FN12] Ariz.‚”Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. City of Tucson, 23 Ariz. App. 385, 533 P.2d 693 (Div. 2 1975).

Tenn.‚”H & L Messengers, Inc. v. City of Brentwood, 577 S.W.2d 444, 12 A.L.R.4th 835 (Tenn. 1979).

Tex.‚”Texas State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Gibson’s Discount Center, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1976), writ refused n.r.e., (Mar. 9, 1977).

[FN13] U.S.‚”Jung v. City of Winona, 71 F. Supp. 558 (D. Minn. 1947).

N.J.‚”State v. Gaynor, 119 N.J.L. 582, 197 A. 360 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1938).

Assumptions unprovable or unproved

(1) Unprovable assumption may be acted on by states in areas of public control.

U.S.‚”Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1973).

(2) Legislatures properly may rely on scientifically unproven assumptions both in regulation of commercial and business transactions and for protection of broad social interests in order and morality.

D.C.‚”U. S. v. Moses, 339 A.2d 46 (D.C. 1975).

Blocking evasive techniques

In area of regulation, statute may push beyond debatable limits in order to block evasive techniques.

Cal.‚”Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Sup’rs, 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (3d Dist. 1968).

[FN14] U.S.‚”Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925).

Colo.‚”People v. Hoehl, 193 Colo. 557, 568 P.2d 484 (1977).

N.Y.‚”McCallin v. Walsh, 64 A.D.2d 46, 407 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1st Dep’t 1978), order aff’d, 46 N.Y.2d 808, 413 N.Y.S.2d 922, 386 N.E.2d 833 (1978).

Delayed impact

Authority of state to control activities of its citizens is not limited to activities which have a present and immediate impact on public health or welfare.

Alaska‚”Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).

Possession of devices or products

Mere possession of dangerous or deleterious devices or products may be forbidden by state under its police powers.

D.C.‚”Smith v. District of Columbia, 436 A.2d 53 (D.C. 1981).

[FN15] Ga.‚”De Berry v. City of La Grange, 62 Ga. App. 74, 8 S.E.2d 146 (1940).

N.C.‚”State v. McGee, 237 N.C. 633, 75 S.E.2d 783 (1953).

Va.‚”Mumpower v. Housing Authority of City of Bristol, 176 Va. 426, 11 S.E.2d 732 (1940).

Giving up rights for public benefit

Power to pass laws regulating persons and property stems from theory that when persons choose to live in groups they must give up some individual freedom for good of group.

La.‚”City of Shreveport v. Curry, 357 So. 2d 1078 (La. 1978).

[FN16] Wis.‚”Gross v. Woodman’s Food Market, Inc., 259 Wis. 2d 181, 2002 WI App 295, 655 N.W.2d 718 (Ct. App. 2002), review denied, 2003 WI 32, 260 Wis. 2d 752, 661 N.W.2d 100 (2003).

[FN17] Md.‚”Maryland Coal & Realty Co. v. Bureau of Mines of State, 193 Md. 627, 69 A.2d 471 (1949).

Mich.‚”People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 17 N.W.2d 193 (1945).

N.C.‚”Morris v. Holshouser, 220 N.C. 293, 17 S.E.2d 115, 137 A.L.R. 733 (1941).

Interest of public paramount

Fla.‚”Egan v. City of Miami, 130 Fla. 465, 178 So. 132 (1938).

[FN18] Fla.‚”McInerney v. Ervin, 46 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1950).

La.‚”City of Baton Rouge v. Ross, 654 So. 2d 1311 (La. 1995).

N.D.‚”State ex rel. City of Minot v. Gronna, 79 N.D. 673, 59 N.W.2d 514 (1953).

[FN19] Ky.‚”Commonwealth for Use and Ben. of City of Wilmore v. McCray, 250 Ky. 182, 61 S.W.2d 1043 (1933).

Utah‚”State v. Packer Corporation, 77 Utah 500, 297 P. 1013 (1931).

END OF SECTION

CJS CONSTLAW ‚§‚  610

Corpus Juris Secundum

Constitutional Law
by Francis Amendola, J.D.; John Bourdeau, J.D.; Paul M. Coltoff, J.D.; John Dvorske, J.D.; John Glenn, J.D.; Glenda K. Harnad, J.D., of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc.; John Kennel, J. D., of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc.; Sonja Larsen, J.D.; Stephen Lease, J.D.; Jack K. Levin, J.D.; Richard J. Link, J.D.; Lucas Martin, J.D.; Thomas Muskus, J.D.; Karl Oakes, J.D.; Kimberly Simmons, J.D.; Eric C. Surette, J.D.; Carmela Pellegrino, J.D.; Barbara Van Arsdale, J.D.; Elizabeth Williams, J. D.; Lisa Zakolski, J.D.
XV. Privileges and Immunities of Citizens and Related Matters
C. Denial of Privileges and Immunities
2. Police Power and Regulation

Topic Summary‚  References

‚§‚ ‚  1067. State’s exercise of police power

Constitutional Law‚ ‚  206(1), 207(1), 207(6)

While a state, in the exercise of its police power, may pass laws for the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of persons within its jurisdiction, such exercise of power must not discriminate arbitrarily between citizens.

Neither the guaranty contained in the original United States Constitution of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states, nor that contained in the Fourteenth Amendment, takes away or impairs the police power of the several states to pass reasonable laws for the promotion of the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of persons subject to their jurisdiction.[FN1] The privileges and immunities clause applies only to protect citizens of one state from discriminatory treatment in another state, and does not limit the state’s police power over its own citizens.[FN2]

It has been held that the privileges and immunities clauses have no application to statutes enacted in the exercise of that power.[FN3] On the other hand, it has been held that the police power is subject to the constitutional guaranty of equality of privilege,[FN4] and an exercise of the police power must not arbitrarily discriminate between citizens.[FN5] Nevertheless, the protections afforded by constitutional clauses protecting privileges and immunities of citizens are not absolute and will yield to reasonable exercise of state police powers.[FN6]

While in the matter of police regulation, the powers of the state are very broad, it cannot single out a corporation, any more than a natural person, and subject it to burdens which are not cast on others similarly situated, without contravening the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.[FN7]

[FN1] U.S.‚”Sullivan v. Shaw, 6 F. Supp. 112 (S.D. Cal. 1934).

Fla.‚”Stephens v. Stickel, 146 Fla. 104, 200 So. 396 (1941).

Mo.‚”State ex rel. Becker v. Wellston Sewer Dist. of St. Louis County, 332 Mo. 547, 58 S.W.2d 988 (1933).

N.Y.‚”People ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 213 A.D. 414, 210 N.Y.S. 269 (4th Dep’t 1925), aff’d, 241 N.Y. 405, 150 N.E. 497, 43 A.L.R. 909 (1926), aff’d, 278 U.S. 63, 49 S. Ct. 61, 73 L. Ed. 184, 62 A.L.R. 785 (1928).

Or.‚”Daniels v. City of Portland, 124 Or. 677, 265 P. 790, 59 A.L.R. 512 (1928).

Tenn.‚”Mensi v. Walker, 160 Tenn. 468, 26 S.W.2d 132 (1930).

W.Va.‚”Tweel v. West Virginia Racing Commission, 138 W. Va. 531, 76 S.E.2d 874 (1953).

[FN2] Me.‚”State v. Hayes, 603 A.2d 869 (Me. 1992).

[FN3] Wash.‚”Frach v. Schoettler, 46 Wash. 2d 281, 280 P.2d 1038 (1955).

[FN4] N.C.‚”State v. Scoggin, 236 N.C. 1, 72 S.E.2d 97 (1952).

[FN5] Ind.‚”City of Richmond v. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112, 28 N.E. 312 (1891).

S.C.‚”Schloss Poster Advertising Co. v. City of Rock Hill, 190 S.C. 92, 2 S.E.2d 392 (1939).

[FN6] Mont.‚”State v. Barnes, 232 Mont. 405, 758 P.2d 264 (1988).

[FN7] U.S.‚”Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Town of Calhoun, 287 F. 381 (W.D. S.C. 1923).

END OF SECTION

CJS CONSTLAW ‚§‚  1067

Corpus Juris Secundum

Constitutional Law
by Francis Amendola, J.D.; John Bourdeau, J.D.; Paul M. Coltoff, J.D.; John Dvorske, J.D.; John Glenn, J.D.; Glenda K. Harnad, J.D., of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc.; John Kennel, J. D., of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc.; Sonja Larsen, J.D.; Stephen Lease, J.D.; Jack K. Levin, J.D.; Richard J. Link, J.D.; Lucas Martin, J.D.; Thomas Muskus, J.D.; Karl Oakes, J.D.; Kimberly Simmons, J.D.; Eric C. Surette, J.D.; Carmela Pellegrino, J.D.; Barbara Van Arsdale, J.D.; Elizabeth Williams, J. D.; Lisa Zakolski, J.D.
XVI. Equal Protection of the Laws
B. Nature and Scope of Prohibitions

Topic Summary‚  References

‚§‚ ‚  1115. Exercise of police power

Constitutional Law‚ ‚  212

The prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment against denial of equal protection of the laws does not deprive the states, or the political subdivisions thereof, of their power, commonly called the police power, to pass laws for the protection of the public health, safety, welfare, or morals.

The prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment against denial of equal protection of the laws does not deprive the states, or the political subdivisions thereof, of their power, commonly called the police power,[FN1] to pass laws for the protection of the public health, safety, welfare, or morals,[FN2] and indeed, the state has wide discretion to do so under the equal protection clause.[FN3] Furthermore, it does not interfere with the proper exercise of that power.[FN4]

However, according to the weight of authority, an exercise of the police power is subject to the constitutional limitation that no state shall deny the equal protection of the laws to any person within its jurisdiction;[FN5] and the Fourteenth Amendment invalidates enactments that are arbitrary, unreasonable, and unrelated to the public purpose sought to be attained.[FN6] In other words, equal protection requires that the exercise of police power be wholly free of unreason and arbitrariness.[FN7] It is necessary that a police regulation shall apply equally or uniformly to all persons similarly situated or within a class.[FN8] Thus, the lawmaking authority may, under its police power, enact regulations that are not all-embracing, and it may legislate with reference to degrees of evil and to situations in which the evil is demonstrably more harmful, without denying equal protection of the law;[FN9] but an exercise of the police power must not be discriminatory in operation.[FN10]

The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution does not take from a state or municipal corporation the power to classify in the adoption of police laws or regulations,[FN11] but admits of the exercise of a wide or broad scope of discretion in that regard.[FN12]

[FN1] Del.‚”In re Auditorium, Inc., 46 Del. 430, 84 A.2d 598 (Super. Ct. 1951).

[FN2] Fla.‚”Florida League of Cities, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 603 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1992).

Ohio‚”St. Ann’s Hosp. v. Arnold, 109 Ohio App. 3d 562, 672 N.E.2d 743 (10th Dist. Franklin County 1996).

Pa.‚”Pennsylvania Turnpike Com’n v. Com., 855 A.2d 923 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004), as amended, (Aug. 4, 2004).

[FN3] U.S.‚”Lee v. State, 869 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994).

Colo.‚”Buckley Powder Co. v. State, 70 P.3d 547 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, 2003 WL 21222805 (Colo. 2003) and cert. denied, (May 27, 2003).

[FN4] U.S.‚”Lacoste v. Department of Conservation of State of Louisiana, 263 U.S. 545, 44 S. Ct. 186, 68 L. Ed. 437 (1924); Chambers v. Bachtel, 55 F.2d 851 (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1932).

Kan.‚”Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974).

[FN5] U.S.‚”Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 68 S. Ct. 269, 92 L. Ed. 249 (1948); Szeto v. Louisiana State Bd. of Dentistry, 508 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. La. 1981).

Fla.‚”Junco v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 390 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1980).

[FN6] Ill.‚”Rawlings v. Illinois Dept. of Law Enforcement, 73 Ill. App. 3d 267, 29 Ill. Dec. 333, 391 N.E.2d 758 (3d Dist. 1979).

[FN7] N.J.‚”515 Associates v. City of Newark, 132 N.J. 180, 623 A.2d 1366 (1993).

[FN8] U.S.‚”Alabama State Federation of Labor, Local Union No. 103, United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 65 S. Ct. 1384, 89 L. Ed. 1725 (1945); Berry v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes, 420 F. Supp. 934 (D. Wyo. 1976).

Cal.‚”Elysium Institute, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 232 Cal. App. 3d 408, 283 Cal. Rptr. 688 (2d Dist. 1991).

Neb.‚”Distinctive Printing and Packaging Co. v. Cox, 232 Neb. 846, 443 N.W.2d 566 (1989).

[FN9] Fla.‚”Pacheco v. Pacheco, 246 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1971).

[FN10] U.S.‚”Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161, 3 A.L.R.2d 441 (1948).

Ariz.‚”State v. Norcross, 26 Ariz. App. 115, 546 P.2d 840 (Div. 1 1976).

[FN11] U.S.‚”Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 77 S. Ct. 1344, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1485 (1957) (overruled on other grounds by, City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S. Ct. 2513, 49 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1976)); Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 66 S. Ct. 850, 90 L. Ed. 1096 (1946).

Tenn.‚”Wyatt v. A-Best Products Co., 924 S.W.2d 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995), as modified on reh’g, (Dec. 28, 1995).

As to legislative classifications, generally, see ‚§‚  1110.

[FN12] U.S.‚”City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 77 S. Ct. 1344, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1485 (1957) (overruled on other grounds by, City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S. Ct. 2513, 49 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1976)); Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, 825 F.2d 367 (11th Cir. 1987).

Ill.‚”People v. Toliver, 251 Ill. App. 3d 1092, 191 Ill. Dec. 290, 623 N.E.2d 880 (2d Dist. 1993).

Tenn.‚”Wyatt v. A-Best Products Co., 924 S.W.2d 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995), as modified on reh’g, (Dec. 28, 1995).

END OF SECTION

CJS CONSTLAW ‚§‚  1115

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