Category Archives: Archive of the Informer

The Genesis of the Emergency / War Power Act

The Informer

The Genesis of the Emergency / War Power Act

Definitions:

Specie—Gold or silver coins of the coinage of the United States. Belford v. Woodward, 158 Ill 122, 41 Ne 1097. Ballentine’s Law Dictionary Third Edition, 1969.

Enemy—The status of a person as an “enemy” for the purpose of the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act is determined with reference to domicile or residence the territory of the nation which is a  belligerent against the United States rather than according to nationality, 56 Am. Jur 1st War Section 83, Ballantines Law Dictionary Third Edition, 1969.

State—In Webster’s 1828 American Dictionary it defines State in 15 different ways. It is how it is defined by a particular group of people when they want it to be applied by statute. It is such a gross misrepresentation when the question is asked, “What is a State,” that it is impossible to answer the question without knowing how the law makers have defined it. But the true meaning of the word State from its very origin means, “To Stand.” Webster’s 1828 Dict. states; “n. L. status, from sto, to stand, to be fixed. State is fixedness or standing.” State in one sense means government, while State in another sense mean people for tax purposes. It also says, “Estate; possession. Now obsolete.”

Estate—n. L. status, from sto, to stand. The roots stb, std and stg, have nearly the same signification, to set, to fix 1. In a general sense, fixedness; a fixed condition; now generally written and pronounced state.” Webster’s 1828 American Dictionary.

Again there are many meanings depending on how one wants to use the word as noted in the definition of State above.
There are a few people who have said that the Emergency and War Power Act written into the Constitution was used by Roosevelt during 1933 to create certain laws that made us the enemy. This statement is true to the extent that Roosevelt made us the “enemy” of the Federal Reserve System. However, we have to go back further in History to find when these powers (Emergency Power /War Power) were first and subsequently used.
………….the INFORMER
The first use of the Emergency and War Power Act
The first use of the Emergency and War Power Act was by George Washington in 1791. Washington used the Emergency Power portion of the Act. This was to enable Washington, at Hamilton’s insistence, to use an existing private bank, controlled by the Crown through its British Board of Trade, to become the first bank of the United States. Jefferson and two other men wrote constantly to Washington telling him that there was no such authority in the Constitution to create a bank. Neither Jefferson nor the other two men could sway Washington. Washington, using the Emergency Powers Act, went ahead and created the First Bank of the United States. Also at this time he overlaid the states into “districts of the United States.” He did this so that those state banks, who after the creation of the first Bank, were forced to contract with the First Bank in New York so they could continue to operate with United States money. Washington did this because the United States deposited all the money it collected into all the private banks in each of the states from before the Revolutionary war to the institution of the first Bank of the United States. The United States wanted to centralize all its accounts in this First Bank while allowing the hundreds of other banks scattered throughout all the states to continue to hold its money.
This is much like the corporate takeovers of today, where a large bank absorbs small banks that continue to operate as satellite banks with all the accounts having to clear through the parent bank. This then allowed the foreign British controlled bank to more easily collect and pay back the debt owed the Crown by the State and United States as was directed in Article VI of the United States Constitution.
The First Bank
The First Bank of the United States was not at all owned by the Congress but was privately controlled by the British Board of Trade stockholders. The Bank, if begun in France, would be called the First Bank of France. Do not let the terminology fool you into thinking that it was a Bank created by Congress. The ownership was foreign. The “foreigners,” noted as Stockholders, were many Americans and therefore, foreigners to the international banking industry. Most of these foreign bankers came from England. Chief Justice John Marshal held the second highest shares in this bank. The documents I have, show that Marshall was considered a “foreign stockholder.” He was foreign because the bank was a foreign concern operating within America. Marshall, being a United States citizen, was a foreign Stockholder.

The Tories were helpful in setting the stage for the inception of the Bank. The Tories were people controlled and working for the King. The King did not want the Rothschilds or the Lombards to take control of the first bank in the United States. The King wanted his bank of England to control the first bank. This setup went back to the Treaty of 1783 and emanated from that treaty and those created after that.
The Second major use of Emergency and War Power Act
Now we come to the second major use of the section in the Constitution. President Lincoln used the War Power portion of the Act during the Civil War to create certain statutes, the most important being 12 Stat 319. One has to read 12 Statutes at Large 319 to see that the southern states people and all others sympathetic to the south were declared “enemies of the State.” The State of course being the United States and not the individual States of the Union. One thing people do not realize is that the word “Estate” is now termed “State” in America. The etymology of the word “Estate,” is described in Webster’s 1828 American Dictionary of the English Language.

After Lincoln was killed and President Johnson took over, he immediately vetoed Lincoln’s War Powers Act, thereby making the south free again and not under the War Power act. However, there was much debate about how the south was forced to attend congressional meetings and really not allowed to secede from the Union. Some northern state Senators were in sympathy to the south’s plight. (One has to remember that the senators were not a part of the Congress as they are today since the passage of the 17th Amendment. The Senators protected the State’s interests at that period in time while the Congress, which today is known as the House of Representatives, protected the people’s interests). The Northern States Congress vetoed President Johnson’s veto of Lincoln’s War Power Act, thereby reaffirming that all Americans are enemies of the State. These acts can be found today in Title 50 sections 212, 213 and 215 and among other U.S. Titles, i.e 28 USC. These are today’s forfeiture laws that the United States uses freely against the people who are still declared “enemies of the State.” The Congress liked this control. It then went on to make the famous Reconstruction Acts of March 2, 1867, which put all the people under the military Rule of the Reconstruction Acts.

Do not confuse this with martial law. It is not martial law. Under military Rule, civil authorities administer the military rule. Under Martial law the military rules and moves aside the civil authorities. Today Americans are still under Military Rule.

The Civil Rights Acts of 1866 failed because there was too much dissention among the states. These Reconstruction Acts of 1867 were made which put into effect the War Power Act. The civil Rights Act s resurrected as the 14th Amendment and passed by the northern states against the wishes of the southern states. The eleven southern States were all put under Military law for a while and then the civil authorities operated after the Reconstruction Acts were completed. The 14th Amendment has been declared unconstitutional by many Law Reviews, The South Carolina Quarterly Law Review and Scholars of law due to the above facts.

Congress had now gained control of the enemy through the 14th Amendment and everyone was therefore made a “United States citizen.” The control would be complete in every southern state including the northern states as well. Now the Constitution cannot have a law applied only to certain states so it had to apply to all, including the northern states as well. Now you know why we are, still to this day, the enemy of the State. Do not think for one moment that you are not the “enemy” of the State. All one has to do is research what The Informer, Montgomery, Stern and a very few other researchers have already uncovered that proves the above points of fact.

Now there is one point that needs to be brought forth which led to Lincoln’s plunder of the people. The Civil War was fought over money, not civil rights of the black man. That point has been made clear in our research. Right before the Civil war the United States and the States were getting ripped off in what was called the “wildcat banking” swindles of the 1830 era.

To protect their assets the United States and the States created an Independent Treasury in 1841. This Independent Treasury was short lived because the Whig party took control from 1842 to 1845 and abolished it. After the Whigs lost the elections in 1846, the Independent Treasury was reestablished in 1846. It dealt in Specie, as demanded by the Constitution of the United States. The private banking cartel of the Bank of England did not like this one bit. They had allowed the plunder of the States money in the 1830 era. French bankers always had control of most of the southern states. The south was known for having about 75 percent of the net worth of the country. This is why the war was fought, so the Bank of England could obtain a bigger bite out of the commerce that was taking place in the south.

Albert Nock, in his book, “Our Enemy the State” did not bring forth the reasons as I have in this writing. Right after the Reconstruction Acts, the “other” banking cartel, the Rothschilds, started to gain a foothold into the banking system. Before that everything was controlled strictly by the Bank of England and France. You have to remember, the French banks were partially owned by the King of England. The King did not have enough power to control French banks as he did his own in this country.

From the 1867 era until circa 1890 there was much strife with the gold and silver devaluation and the stock market crash. This caused much concern within the banking system. After a long battle between the English banking system and the Independent Treasury; the Girards, Vanderbilts, Goulds, Blairs, Garretts, Rockefellers, Morgans, Astors, Mellons and the like, who were in league with the “other” banking cartel, had a hand in creating the Federal Reserve banking system through their control of government. However the Independent Treasury posed a problem to this cartel, in that the Independent Treasury dealt in specie and U.S. Notes. People’s money, while in the Independent Treasury, was protected, as well as was the States and the United States, because its reserves were adequate to cover all the people’s money.

With much wheeling and dealing in private, with those mentioned in the above paragraph, the Independent Treasury was abolished by the Act of 1920 in the year 1921. At this point those in the Independent Treasury would have lost their jobs if Congress had not created the GAO, which is where most of the treasury people went. The GAO is still the auditor for the United States. The Attorney General and the Treasurer of the United States must report to the GAO all monies collected and disbursed. The Attorney General does this in his or her capacity as Alien Property Custodian. We are considered aliens to the States and United States, therefore our property may be seized under forfeiture laws of the Alien Enemy Act.
“Office Found” and “Estate/State”
As stated by the supreme court of Georgia 14 Ga 438, the people, which is you and me, are not parties to the Constitution, only the States are. That is why the enemy is considered aliens. Do not for one minute think you are the State. The State consisted of the Proprietors, wealthy land owners, Dukes, Earls, Royal Governors and those holding property under grants by the King of his estate and their heirs, forever. Those heirs were to hold the “office found” and are in complete control of the “Estate.” Now all you have to do is convert the word Estate to its legal meaning in America and you have “State” of the compact, which you call Union. The Federal Reserve System then became the Agents of the United States and the States. All the Independent Treasury’s real money and U.S. Notes were to be kept separate from Federal Reserve Notes as stated in the abolition law;
See Title 5 USC 5512, Historical and Revision notes. “Insubsection (b), reference to the ‘General Accounting Office’ issubstituted for ‘accounting officers of the Treasury’ on authority of theAct of June 10, 1921, ch 18, title III, 42 Stat. 23. Reference to the‘Attorney General’ is substituted for ‘Solicitor of the Treasury’ and‘Solicitor’ on authority of section 16 of the Act of March 3, 1933, ch212, 47 Stat. 1517; section 5 of E.O. 6166, June 10, 1933; and section 1of 1950 Reorg. Plan No. 2, 64 Stat. 1261.”
From 1922 to 1929 the private federal reserve agents of the United States used the gold and silver, the “reserves,” in overseas dealing in property and business. They used this for foreign business ventures that fell through as bad deals. If people got wind that the Gold and Silver were depleted and if the Federal Reserve Notes were to be cashed in, there would not be enough reserves left. That would be a national emergency. Then a crash of the stock marked was created to draw the people away from this fact.
The Third major use of Emergency and War Power Act
The Private Federal Reserve then wrote a letter to President Hoover. This letter, written by the lawyers using the War Powers Act of 1917, was the basis for the President to declare a national emergency to cover the Feds stealing of the people’s money. Hoover said no, as it was unconstitutional because the Federal Reserve drafted it so that the people would become the enemy of the banking system. The proposed Act, which subsequently became 48 Stat 1, would convert sec. 5(b) of the 1917 War Powers Act to eliminate the American from the protected class of people and included them as the enemy. Hoover left office on March 4, 1933. The “Hoover Papers” describe what went on from March 1 to March 5 of 1933.

Roosevelt took office on March 5th and immediately did what the Federal Reserve wanted, word for word. On March 9, 1933, he called Congress into special session and told them under Executive Order 2039 that they will pass this 48 Stat 1. This act forbade any American from holding any gold or suffer 10,000 dollars fine and jail time. All of this happened because the people wanted their real money (Specie) from the bank, who was supposed to be protecting it. The banks could not return to the people their own real money. They (the bank), had in essence, stolen it.

Rockefeller was the owner of the Bank of Chicago. This bank was the second largest in the country. If a run on this bank was begun by the people, it would cause the bank to collapse. Rockefeller would probably be hung by the people or at least be brought up on embezzlement charges as would all the other banks in the Federal Reserve system. Rockefeller and Roosevelt were law buddies and Roosevelt had to protect his friend.

This was the third use of the Emergency act. It was used to protect the banks. The first time it was used to create the banks. Now we have the people as the “enemy” of the bank. That is why the banks had to be closed for six days to allow the President to issue to all the banks a license. This license allowed the banks to deal with the “enemy.” That “enemy,” dear reader, was and is, us..!!!

How do you control the enemy?

What was the real reason for the Social Security number? Is that not a license for the enemy, us, so we can trade with the banks and also others that are not the enemy such as your fellow American? When reading the entire 48 Stat 1 and attendant Agriculture Acts and all the alphabet agencies laws created by Roosevelt, we are their enemy and are in need of a license. All one has to do to verify this is to obtain Mr. Gene Schroder’s material as it is too lengthy to go into detail in this writing. Also pull all the statutes, session laws of Congress, Congressional Reports that I have mentioned, and 12 USC 95 (a)& (b) to see what I mean.

You must also pull the two U.S. Supreme Court cases in 1935, cited as 363 U.S. 603 and 301 U.S. 548; the book titled, Social Security: The Fraud in Your Future, by Warren Shore; and finally, “Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session, Part 6, Analysis of the Social Security System, November 27, 1953, Pages 879 to 1521.” In the above cited material it says that; Social Security is not a special Trust Fund. It is not Insurance. It is a gift from government, and not considered income. It is not a contract. It is a flat income tax on employees. The employer matches no funds because the tax on the employer is a separate tax for the privilege of hiring workers. That not one dime goes to a special trust because there is no such trust. All Social Security taxes go into the general treasury. Congress can shut down Social Security anytime it wants as there is no obligation on the Governments part to pay as it is merely statutory benefits. Payments are at the discretion of Congress. Payments are to promote the general welfare of the United States only. There is no vested or inherent right to receive Social Security payments. All these are true statements.

The statement quoted below is from the conclusion of the above mentioned Report and can be found on page 1485 et seq. It will lead you to believe the Social Security number is nothing but a number to track the “enemy” since the number does nothing for you.
“As already indicated, I am one who feels deeply that the level
of social insurance benefits must be kept within proper bounds lest the
system get out of hand and become a means of perpetrating a political
party in power. Once entrenched, the Executive would use social
insurance to enslave people. Hitler’s control of the German
social-insurance system enabled him to force individuals to conform to
his program. Those who deviated stood to lose their benefits. In
social-insurance we are therefore dealing with something that could
become an instrument of dictatorship.”

Truer words were never spoken since no one can do anything without the number. Hitler’s principles rule again and you truly are an enemy slave under the executive military rule. The government has told you in its own words that the Social Security number is nothing more than an “enemies” license number issued for the purpose of trading with the enemy.
SYNOPSIS
The Bank of England caused Washington to create the First bank of the United States in 1791 for the purpose of controlling the money. It then ran into a problem in 1846 when the Independent Treasury was created by the U.S. and the States to protect their own money. President Lincoln then made us the enemy of the Government (State) by 12 Stat 319 in 1862 and Congress continued to keep the status quo by the creation of the Reconstruction Acts in 1867. Then in 1868 the 14th Amendment placed the people of both the north and south under the control of the military rule. The “other” banking system, after gaining a foothold in 1913 by the creation of the Federal Reserve System, caused the demise of the Independent Treasury. To complete the enemy status, Roosevelt finalized us as enemies of the bank in 48 Stat 1, March 9, 1933.

It is the Congress that has enslaved the people of this country in order to placate the international bankers of the Federal Reserve System and those of the “300.” This is a little known group of controlling people that operate above the law in this country and control the Congress. The people were never in control of anything since day one (1787) and before. It is all smoke and mirrors for the purpose of deceiving you and plundering. The total object from the 1791 Act by Washington, to the 1933 Act by Roosevelt was to totally control the money and the labor of the people. This encroachment on the people’s liberty took place over an extended period of time so as to not make obvious that which would be otherwise intolerable. The Social Security number plays but a small part in the overall scheme. Before the number existed, your lineage were considered the enemy under the 1867 Reconstruction Acts and you, being their heirs, are still the enemy today.

To the informed reader this paper gives the “why and how” , to the novice it gives “food for thought”. To both I ask the question “what is the remedy or recourse.?” Do you throw up your hands, totally give up and continue submitting to our enemy, “the State” by licensure, remain in banking and all the attendant snares that entrap you, or do you finally “draw your line in the sand ?”. Control of Money was the first step in your enslavement which has been nearly accomplished. Now, fingerprinting, compelled use of the enemy’s SS (Social Slave) number in everything you do, retina eye scans, plastic credit cards, body microchips, and national I.D. similar to old Germany and Russian control of their people are on the horizon as the final step. Each reader has a talent, whether a leader or a follower, and both must understand the task at hand. Individually we must make a difference and work with others of the same mindset, because if we don’t ……………………………

You wanted to be a citizen – So why complain?

The Informer
YOU WANTED TO BE A CITIZEN – SO WHY COMPLAIN?

The use of the word citizen in law, showing how a citizen is the subject of government and not the other way around as preached by patriots for centuries without understanding what the law says about citizen. I do not need to elaborate how you are a slave to the system that you yourself did you in when wanting to be a citizen of anything, whether a town, city, county, state or United States . Note the key word Allegiance . This is why there are very few Christians left in America . I would venture out of 300 million, maybe 10,000 really exist. You are not one of them if you are a citizen of any one I mentioned four sentences back. You forsook the Lord when you left His citizenship, Eph 2:19 and clung to Mammon giving Mammon allegiance. You can give only one and that’s why he said he cannot help you if you left Him and clung to Mammon. Now you can see why everyone loses when attacking Mammon in Mammon’s courts. You are an insurgent, as I wrote in the War Powers acts if you, as a citizen thereof, complain of taxes, ad infinitum as a “member of the community” who has given allegiance freely and voluntarily when claiming “my Constitution… yada, yada, yada, …and the government protects my rights and so on.

Really? When you took back the allegiance owed to the Lord who gave you all those natural rights and transferred it to Mammon and got only privileges that they call rights of the subject (citizen),what did you expect, a better life? Read on to see what you have done to yourself, voluntarily. So the question begs, did the government force you to Leave the Lord and cling to them? You got what all citizens want, someone to tell them what to do and repeatedly rob them over and over and incarcerate them in droves. Did the Lord ever keep prisons; make you register your means of travel and charge you a license; ever charge property tax on the land he gave freely to everyone; to be forced chemicals in medical situations, to get a license to marry; to build a house? How about the term UNDER IT’S CONSTITUTION? Did the Lord have but 10 commandments compared to all the laws the citizen has to abide by as a member of Mammon’s community as a citizen? Did the Lord ever give out passports like Mammon does? How about birth certificates that put you in commerce? See how you are looked upon in Black’s fourth Ed, Law dictionary in legal terms, when the Lord only dealt in words. Civil rights are not natural law rights by any means. And, lastly; To the Lord, are you a MAN He created, or a person that mammon created? Do all statutes made by mammon address the Creation of the Lord, namely MAN or do they only apply to the fiction called person? Find any statute that uses a man instead of person, the artificial character they say you operate as? I put no comments in this but only highlight words and phrases so you can see how bad a hand you dealt yourself. Did the ”government” hold a gun to your head and say you owe me allegiance and I will shoot you if you don’t become a citizen member of our corporation and deny the Lord Almighty? Then who do you have to blame?

CITIZEN. A member of a free city or ‘jural society, (civitas,) possessing all the rights and privileges which can be enjoyed by any person under its constitution and government, and subject to the corresponding duties . “Citizens” are members of community inspired to common goal, who, in associated relations, submit themselves to rules of conduct for the promotion of general welfare and conservation of individual as well as collective rights. In re McIntosh, D. C.Wash., 12 F. Supp. 177.

The term appears to have been used in the Roman government to designate a person who had the freedom of the city, and the right to exercise all political and civil privileges of the government. There was also, at Rome, a partial citizenship, including civil, but not political rights.

Complete citizenship embraced both. Thomason v. State, 15 Ind. 451; 17 L.Q.Rev. 270; 1
SeL Essays in Anglo-Amer. L.H. 578.

A member of a nation or body politic of the sovereign state or political society who owes
allegiance, Luria v. U. S. , 34 S.Ct. 10, 19, 231 U.S. 9, 58 L.Ed. 101; U. S. v. Polzin, D.C.Md., 48 F.Supp. 476, 479.

A member of the civil state entitled to all its privileges. Coeley, Const.Lim. 77. One of the sovereign people. A constituent member of the sovereignty synonymous with the people. Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 404, 15 L.Ed. 691.

In American Law

One who, under the Constitution and laws of the United States , or of a particular state, is a member of the political community, owing allegiance and being entitled to the enjoyment of full civil rights. Amy v. Smith, 1 Litt: ( Ky. ) 331; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 22 L.Ed. 627.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States , and subject to the jurisdiction thereof , are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside . Amend. XIV, Const.U.S.; Nyman v. Erickson, 100 Wash. 149, 170 P. 546, 547.

The term may include or apply to an elector qualified to vote in an election, Belmont v. Town of Gulfport , 97 Fla. 688, 122 So. 10; children of alien parents born in United States, Von Schwerdtner v. Piper, D.C.Md., 23 F.2d 862, 863; U. S. v. Minoru Yasui, D.C.Or., 48 F.Supp. 40, 54; children of American citizens born outside United States, Hoaland v. Attorney General of United States, D.C.Md., 42 F.Supp. 13, 22; Indians’, United States v. Hester, C.C.A. OkL, 137 F.2d 145, 147; State v. McAlhaney, 220 N.C. 387, 17 S.E.2d 352. 354; national banks, American Surety Co. v. Bank of California, C.C.A.Dr., 133 F.2d 160, 162; Ezzell v. First Nat. Banks, 218 Ala. 462,.119 So. 2, 3; negros and whites, United States v. Ellis, D.C.S.C., 43 F.Supp. 321,324; nonresident who has qualified as administratrix of estate of deceased resident, Williams’ Code Tenn. § 8236. Hunt v. Noll, C.C.A.Tenn., 112 F.2d 288,289; persons entitled to privileges and immunities conferred upon same terms upon which they are conferred upon other citizens, Austin v. ‘United States, D.C.IlL, 40 li’.SuPp. 777, 778.

The terms “citizen” and “citizenship” are distinguishable from “resident” or ”’inhabitant.” Jeffcott v. Donovan, C.C.A. Ariz., 135 F.2d 213, 214; and from “domicile,” Wheeler v. Burgess, 263 Ky. 693, 93 S. W.2d 351, 354; First Carolinas Joint Stock, Land Bank of Columbia v. New York Title & Mortgage Co., D.C. S.C., 59 F.2d 350, 351. The words “citizen” and “citizenship,” however, usually Include the idea of domicile, Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Petrowsky, C.C.A. N.Y. , 250 F. 554, 557; citizen inhabitant and resident often synonymous, Jonesboro Trust Co. v. Nutt, 118 Ark. 368, 176 S.W. 322, 324; Edgewater Realty Co. v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co., D.C.Md., 49 F. Supp. 807, 809; and citizenship and domicile are often synonymous. Messick v. Southern Pa. Bus Co., D.C. Pa. ; 59 F. Supp. 799, 800.

A corporation is a citizen of state under whose laws it is created and a nonresident of every other state. Jackson Securities & Investment Co. v. State, 241 Ala. 288, 2 So.2d 760, 764. It is not a citizen within meaning of federal constitution declaring citizens of each state entitled to privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states or within Fourteenth Amendment prohibiting states from abridging privileges and immunities of citizens of United States, J. D. L. Corporation v. Bruckman, 11 N.Y. S.2d 741, 746, 171 Misc. 3; but see In re Thermiodyne Radio Corporation, D.C. De L, 26 F.2d 713,714; nor within statute authorizing citizens of United States to prosecute appeal to Circuit Court of Appeals without prepaying costs or giving security, Atlantic S. S. Corporation v. Kelley, C.C.A. Fla., 79 F.2d 339, 340; nor within statute authorizing permission to citizens to sue in forma pauperis, Quittner v. Motion Picture Producers & Distributors of America, C.C.A.2,70 F.2d 331, 332; nor within statute requiring suit in district wherein either plaintiff or defendant resides, Standard Stoker Co. v. Lower, D.C. Md., 46 F.2nd. 678, 684; Sutherland v. U. S., C.C.A. Neb., 74 F.2d 89, 2.

Insurance companies, Incorporated under state law. are “citizens of this state” within statute requiring foreign Insurance companies to file bonds for payment of their obligations to such citizens. Republic Ins. Co. v. Cunningham , Tex. Civ. App.. 62 S.W.2d 339, 343. The term “citizen” will not be construed to include a corporation, unless the general purpose and import of the statutory or constitutional provision seems to require it. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. State, 120 Ark. 182, 179 S.W. 342, 343, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 873; Jennings v. Idaho Ry., Light & Power Co., 26 Idaho, 703, 146 P. 101, 102, L.R.A.1915D, 115, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 359.

Neither a corporation nor a partnership is a citizen of the United States entitled to Immunity from service of summons by substituted service, Western Mut. Fire Ins. CO. V. Lamson Bros. & Co., D.C. Iowa , 42 F. Supp. 1007, 1012.

Fillipinos are not citizens of United States, De Cano v. State, 7 Wash.2d 613, 110 P.2d 627, 631; People v. Cordero, 50 Ca L App.2d 146, 122 P.2d 648, 649: but see holding that Filipinos are within provision of Neutrality Act defining “citizen” as including any individual owing allegiance to the United States. Suspine v. Compania Transatlantica Centroamericana, S. A., D.C.N.Y., 37 F.Supp. 268, 271.

A state cannot be a citizen. Query v. 206 Cases of Assorted Liquor, D.C.S.C., 49 F.Supp. 693, 695.

But a state and the federal government each has citizens of its own, and the same person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a state.

The government of the United States can neither grant nor secure to its citizens rights or privileges which are not expressly or by implication placed under its jurisdiction . All that cannot be so granted or secured are left to the exclusive protection of the states. U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588.

With reference to the jurisdiction and power of federal courts and removal of actions a citizen of the District of Columbia is not a “citizen of a state”, Neild v. District of Columbia, 110 F.2d ‘246, 249, 71 App. D.C. 306; Glaeser v. Acacia Mut. Life Ass’n, D. C. Cat, 55 F. Supp. ‘925, 926; a corporation is a citizen of the state where it is organized, and a foreign corporation does not become a citizen of another state where it is authorized to carry on business, Van Buren v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., D. C. Mass. , 42 F. Supp. 279, 280; a municipal subdivision, such as county, city, town, 01’ school district, is a citizen, Siegel v. City of Detroit, Department of Street Railways, D.C. Mich., 52F.Supp. 669; Pettibone v. Cook County, Minn., C.C.A. Minn., 120 F.2d 850, 852; a national. bank is a citizen of state where it has its principal place of business, American Surety Co. of New York v. Bank of California, D.C. Or., 44 F. Supp. 81, 83; Atwood v. National Bank of Lima, C.C.A. Ohio , 115 F.2d 861, 862; a state. Is not a citizen, Board of Health of Township of Hillside v. Mundet Cork Corporation, 126 N.J. Eq. 100, 8

A.2d 105, 106, 107; State of North Dakota v. National Milling & Cereal Co., C.C.A. N.D., 114 F.2d 777, 779; State Highway Commission of Wyoming v. Utah Const. Co., (Wyo.) 49 S. Ct. 104, 106, 278 U.S. 194, 73 L. Ed. 262; a turnpike commission is a citizen, Hunkin.-Conkey Const. Co. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, .D.C. Pa., 34 F. Supp. 26, 28; an association is not a citizen, Rife v. Lumber Underwriters, C.C.A. Tenn., 204 F. 32, 35; Village Mills Co. v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, Tex. Civ. App., 186 S. W. 785, 788; domicile. and citizen are synonymous in federal courts, Earley v. Hershey Transit Co., D.C. Pa., 55 F. Supp. 981, 982; inhabitant, resident and citizen are synonymous, Standard Stoker Co. v. Lower, D.C.Md., 46 F.2d 678, 683.

In English Law

An inhabitant of a city. 1 Rolle, 138. The representative of a city, in parliament. 1 Bl.Comm. 174.

The word “subject” is used to designate an inhabitant of the country, or one amenable to the laws of the nation.

CITIZENSHIP. (q. v.).

CITY.

The status of being a citizen Bit

In England

An incorporated town or borough which is or has been the See of a bishop. Co.Litt. 108; 1 Bl. Camm. 114; Cowell; 1 Steph.Comm. 115. State v. Green, 126 N.C. 1032, 35 S.K 462.

There is said, however, to be no necessary connection between a city and a see. Oxford Dict., citing Freeman. A large town incorporated with certain privileges. The’ inhabitants of a city. The citizens. Worcester.

In America

A municipal corporation; Streat v. Vermilya, 268 Mich. 1, 255 N.W. 604, 606; also’the territory within the corporate limits. Municipal Power Transmission Co. v. City of Lyndon , 127 Kan. 59, 272 P.158, 160.

A large town or municipal corporation, State v. Haynes, 175 Ark. 645. 300 S.W. 380, 382; a political entity or subdivision for governmental purposes, Nolan v. Jones, 215 Ky. 238, 284

S.W. 1054, 1056; a public institution for self-government, Loeb v. City of. Jacksonville , 101 Fla. 429, 134 So. 205, 207; a’ public corporation for public purposes, Chase v. Inhabitants of Town of Litchfield, 134 Me. 122, 182 A. 921, 924.

A state agency for carrying on local government. Hudson Motor Car Co. v.’Clty of Detroit, 282 Mich. 69, 275 N. W. 770, 773, 113 A.L.R. 1472; a voluntary association or corporation.

State ex reI. McQueen v. Brandon, 244 Ala. 62, 12 So.2d 319, 322; Leviton v. Board of Education of City of Chicago , 374 Ill. 594, 30 N.E.2d 497, 500.

The fundamental distinction between town and city organization is that in the former all the qualified inhabitants meet together to deliberate and vote as individuals, each in his own right, while in the latter all municipal functions are performed by deputies; the one being direct, the other representative. In re Opinion of the Justices, 229 Mass. 601, 119 N.E. 778, 781.

The word “city,” however, is often used to include an incorporated town. Noble v. State, 112 Tex.Cr.R. 676, 18 S. W.2d 619, 620; and to ‘include villages, People v. City of Chicago , 349 Ill. 304, 182 N.E. 419, 431. It has also been held that, under statutes, the term includes all municipal corporations and corporate authorities, such as a board of park commissioners; People v. Kesner, 321 Ill. 230, 151 N. E. 481, 483; but that it does not include a village; Village of Depue v. Banschbach, 273 Ill. 574, 113 N.E. 156, 159.

The Bill of Rights Fraud Part I

The Bill of Rights Fraud Part I

After having this case and others for 16 years, and posting to the internet with no response, I figured it shook to the core beliefs that people do not accept the facts as stated in numerous legal books that the Bill of Rights was never intended for the people like you and I in the states. You, of course, like to cite the Constitution and Bill of Rights all the time, little knowing that in doing so you put yourself at their feet groveling as a slave should do.

This case and others to follow in Part II, if understood, will show just how corrupt the founding fathers were in keeping to themselves the contract between themselves and no others in the states. Just as Lysander Spooner stated, the Constitution was of no authority. Why people have not found out by now shows how good the fraud has been, and how brainwashed the average American is. To keep the articles from becoming too long to digest I break the whole article in two parts. This first part is all the John Barron case with no comments interjected so I don’t make any confusing statements. The Part II has a brief injection of my comments, otherwise it’s all from the Constitutional Law book. To tell you how it will shake your core beliefs to the foundation, I had a paralegal friend here for a visit. I brought up the subject that the Bill of Rights was not his. He immediately reacted with ‘no it isn’t so’. Well I walked to my office and brought out what you will read in Part II. After reading maybe five pages, he said ‘no, it can’t be’, let me see the Barron case itself. Now mind you, he is sharper than most attorneys and other paralegals and did not want to believe what he was reading. So I handed him the Barron Case , which you will read here and it has never been overturned to this day. After reading it he said, why those… [expletive deleted], no wonder why we lose in all cases. I am reading it and still find it hard to believe they would do this. So when he asked to whom does it apply, I brought out various other certified documents and showed him. Then his core beliefs just had an ice cold ice pick driven through them and he was shook up to say the least. Now in Part II you will read how they incorporated those Bill of Rights into your life which gave them more control over you than if they hadn’t done a thing.

Does 14th Amendment mean anything to you? Do you know that only 14th Amendment people can use the Bill of Rights and when you do invoke any of the original ten Bill of Rights you admit to being covered by the 14th and the Ashwander doctrine will bury you? So beware, you will go into cognitive dissonance, guaranteed because your core beliefs will be shattered to say the least and you will not think the same things you have for all your life to this point, IF it does sink in what this criminal government has done to all of us today, and all your family all the way back to 1776.

The Informer

9-23-2006

32 U.S. 243

ON WRIT OF ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
WESTERN SHORE OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND

Syllabus

The provision in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
declaring that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the
Government of the United States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the
States.

The Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United
States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of
individual States. Each State established a constitution for itself, and in that
constitution provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular
government as its judgment dictated. The people of the United States framed such
a government for the United States as they supposed best adapted to their
situation, and best calculated to promote their interests. The powers they conferred
on this government were to be exercised by itself, and the limitations on power, if
expressed in general terms, are naturally and necessarily applicable to the
government created by the instrument. They are limitations of power granted in the
instrument itself, not of distinct governments framed by different persons and for
different purposes.

This case was instituted by the plaintiff in error, against the City of Baltimore,
under its corporate title of “The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,” to recover
damages for injuries to the wharf property of the plaintiff, arising from the acts of
the corporation. Craig & Barron, of whom the plaintiff was survivor, were owners
of an extensive and highly productive wharf in the eastern section of Baltimore,
enjoying, at the period of their purchase of it, the deepest water in the harbor. The
city, in the asserted exercise of its corporate authority over the harbor, the paving
of streets, and regulating grades for paving, and over the health of Baltimore,
diverted from their accustomed and natural course certain streams of water which
flow from the range of hills bordering the city, and diverted them, partly by
adopting new grades of streets, and partly by the necessary results of paving, and
partly by mounds, [p*244] embankments and other artificial means purposely
adapted to bend the course of the water to the wharf in question. These streams
becoming very full and violent in rains, carried down with them from the hills and
the soil over which they ran large masses of sand and earth, which they deposited
along, and widely in front of the wharf of the plaintiff. The alleged consequence was
that the water was rendered so shallow that it ceased to be useful for vessels of an
important burden, lost its income, and became of little or no value as a wharf. This
injury was asserted to have been inflicted by a series of ordinances of the
corporation, between the years 1815 and 1821; and that the evil was progressive;
and that it was active and increasing even at the institution of this suit in 1822.

At the trial of the cause in the Baltimore county court, the plaintiff gave
evidence tending to prove the original and natural course of the streams, the various
works of the corporation from time to time to turn them in the direction of this
wharf, and the ruinous consequences of these measures to the interests of the
plaintiff. It was not asserted by the defendants, that any compensation for the injury
was ever made or proffered, but they justified under the authority they deduced
from the charter of the city, granted by the legislature of Maryland, and under
several acts of the legislature conferring powers on the corporation in regard to the
grading and paving of streets, the regulation of the harbor and its waters, and to the
health of the city. They also denied, that the plaintiff had shown any cause of action
in the declaration, asserting that the injury complained of was a matter of public
nuisance, and not of special or individual grievance in the eye of the law. This latter
ground was taken on exception, and was also urged as a reason for a motion in
arrest of judgment. On all points, the decision of Baltimore county court was
against the defendants, and a verdict for $4,500 was rendered for the plaintiff. An
appeal was taken to the court of appeals, which reversed the judgment of
Baltimore county court, and did not remand the case to that court for a further trial.
From this judgment, the defendant in the court of appeals prosecuted a writ of
error to this court. [p*245]

The counsel for the plaintiff presented the following points: the plaintiff in error
will contend that apart from the legislative sanctions of the state of Maryland, and
the acts of the corporation of Baltimore, holding out special encouragement and
protection to interests in wharves constructed on the shores of the Patapsco river,
and particularly of the wharf erected by Craig and the plaintiff, Barron; the right and
profit of wharfage, and use of the water at the wharf, for the objects of navigation,
was a vested interest and incorporeal hereditament, inviolable even by the state
except on just compensation for the privation; but the act of assembly and the
ordinance of the City are relied on as enforcing the claim to the undisturbed
enjoyment of the right.

This right was interfered with, and the benefit of this property taken away from
the plaintiff by the corporation avowedly, as the defence showed, for public use,
for an object of public interest — the benefit more immediately of the community of
Baltimore, the individuals, part of the population of Maryland, known by the
corporate title of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. The “inhabitants” of
Baltimore are thus incorporated by the Acts of 1796, ch. 68. As a corporation,
they are made liable to be sued, and authorized to sue, to acquire and hold and
dispose of property and, within the scope of the powers conferred by the charter,
are allowed to pass ordinance and legislative acts, which it is declared by the
charter shall have the same effect as acts of assembly, and be operative, provided
they be not repugnant to the laws of the state, or the constitution of the state, or of
the United States. The plaintiff will contend accordingly:

1. That the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, though viewed even as a
municipal corporation, is liable for tort and actual misfeasance, and that it is a tort,
and would be so even in the state, acting in her immediate sovereignty to deprive a
citizen of his property, though for public uses, without indemnification; that,
regarding the corporation as acting with the delegated power of the state, the act
complained of is not the less an actionable tort.

2. That this is the case of an authority exercised under a [p*246]

State, the corporation appealing to the legislative acts of Maryland for the
discretional power which it has exercised.

3. That this exercise of authority was repugnant to the constitution of the United
States, contravening the fifth article of the amendments to the constitution, which
declares that “private property shall not be taken for public use, without just
compensation,” the plaintiff contending, that this article declares principles which
regulate the legislation of the states for the protection of the people in each and all
the states, regarded as citizens of the United States or as inhabitants subject to the
laws of the Union.

4. That under the evidence, prayers, and pleadings in the case, the
constitutionality of this authority exercised under the state must have been drawn in
question, and that this court has appellate jurisdiction of the point, from the
judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the highest court of that state, that
point being the essential ground of the plaintiff’s pretention in opposition to the
power and discussion of the corporation.

5. That this court, in such appellate cognisance, is not confined to the
establishment of an abstract point of construction, but is empowered to pass upon
the right or title of either party, and may therefore determine all points incidental or
preliminary to the question of title and necessary in the course to that inquiry; that
consequently, the question is for this court’s determination whether the declaration
avers actionable matter, or whether the complaint is only of a public nuisance, and
on that head, the plaintiff will contend, that special damage is fully shown here,
within the principle of the cases where an individual injury resulting from a public
nuisance is deemed actionable, the wrong being merely public only so long as the
law suffered in the particular case is no more than all members of the community
suffer.

Upon these views, the plaintiff contends that the judgment of the court of
appeals ought to be reversed. [p*247]

Opinions

Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the court.

MARSHALL, C.J., Opinion of the Court

Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the court.

The judgment brought up by this writ of error having been rendered by the court of a State, this
tribunal can exercise no jurisdiction over it unless it be shown to come within the provisions of the
25th section of the Judiciary Act. The plaintiff in error contends that it comes within that clause in
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution which inhibits the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation. He insists that this amendment, being in favor of the liberty of the
citizen, ought to be so construed as to restrain the legislative power of a state, as well as that of
the United States. If this proposition be untrue, the court can take no jurisdiction of the cause.

The question thus presented is, we think, of great importance, but not of much difficulty. The
Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves, for
their own government, and not for the government of the individual States. Each State established
a constitution for itself, and in that constitution provided such limitations and restrictions on the
powers of its particular government as its judgment dictated. The people of the United States
framed such a government for the United States as they supposed best adapted to their situation
and best calculated to promote their interests. The powers they conferred on this government
were to be exercised by itself, and the limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are
naturally, and we think necessarily, applicable to the government created by the instrument. They
are limitations of power granted in the instrument itself, not of distinct governments framed by
different persons and for different purposes.

If these propositions be correct, the fifth amendment must be understood as restraining the
power of the General Government, not as applicable to the States. In their several Constitutions,
they have imposed such restrictions on their respective [p*248] governments, as their own
wisdom suggested, such as they deemed most proper for themselves. It is a subject on which
they judge exclusively, and with which others interfere no further than they are supposed to have
a common interest.

The counsel for the plaintiff in error insists that the Constitution was intended to secure the people
of the several States against the undue exercise of power by their respective State governments,
as well as against that which might be attempted by their General Government. It support of this
argument he relies on the inhibitions contained in the tenth section of the first article. We think that
section affords a strong, if not a conclusive, argument in support of the opinion already indicated
by the court. The preceding section contains restrictions which are obviously intended for the
exclusive purpose of restraining the exercise of power by the departments of the General
Government. Some of them use language applicable only to Congress, others are expressed in
general terms. The third clause, for example, declares, that “no bill of attainder or ex post facto
law shall be passed.” No language can be more general, yet the demonstration is complete that it
applies solely to the Government of the United States. In addition to the general arguments
furnished by the instrument itself, some of which have been already suggested, the succeeding
section, the avowed purpose of which is to restrain State legislation, contains in terms the very
prohibition. It declares, that “no State shall pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law.” This
provision, then, of the ninth section, however comprehensive its language, contains no restriction
on State legislation.

The ninth section having enumerated, in the nature of a bill of rights, the limitations intended to be
imposed on the powers of the General Government, the tenth proceeds to enumerate those
which were to operate on the State legislatures. These restrictions are brought together in the
same section, and are by express words applied to the States. “No State shall enter into any
treaty,” &c. Perceiving, that in a constitution framed by the people of the United States, for the
government of all, no limitation of the action of government on [p*249] the people would apply
to the State government, unless expressed in terms, the restrictions contained in the tenth section
are in direct words so applied to the States.

It is worthy of remark, too, that these inhibitions generally restrain State legislation on subjects
intrusted to the General Government, or in which the people of all the States feel an interest. A
State is forbidden to enter into any treaty, alliance or confederation. If these compacts are with
foreign nations, they interfere with the treaty-making power, which is conferred entirely on the
General Government; if with each other, for political purposes, they can scarcely fail to interfere
with the general purpose and intent of the Constitution. To grant letters of marque and reprisal,
would lead directly to war, the power of declaring which is expressly given to Congress. To coin
money is also the exercise of a power conferred on Congress. It would be tedious to recapitulate
the several limitations on the powers of the States which are contained in this section. They will
be found generally to restrain State legislation on subjects intrusted to the government of the
Union, in which the citizens of all the States are interested. In these alone were the whole people
concerned. The question of their application to States is not left to construction. It is averred in
positive words.

If the original Constitution, in the ninth and tenth sections of the first article, draws this plain and
marked line of discrimination between the limitations it imposes on the powers of the General
Government and on those of the State; if, in every inhibition intended to act on State power,
words are employed which directly express that intent; some strong reason must be assigned for
departing from this safe and judicious course in framing the amendments before that departure
can be assumed. We search in vain for that reason.

Had the people of the several States, or any of them, required changes in their Constitutions, had
they required additional safeguards to liberty from the apprehended encroachments of their
particular governments, the remedy was in their own hands, and could have been applied by
themselves. A [p*250] convention could have been assembled by the discontented State, and
the required improvements could have been made by itself. The unwieldy and cumbrous
machinery of procuring a recommendation from two-thirds of Congress and the assent of
three-fourths of their sister States could never have occurred to any human being as a mode of
doing that which might be effected by the State itself. Had the framers of these amendments
intended them to be limitations on the powers of the State governments, they would have imitated
the framers of the original Constitution, and have expressed that intention. Had Congress
engaged in the extraordinary occupation of improving the Constitutions of the several States by
affording the people additional protection from the exercise of power by their own governments
in matters which concerned themselves alone, they would have declared this purpose in plain and
intelligible language.

But it is universally understood, it is a part of the history of the day, that the great revolution
which established the Constitution of the United States was not effected without immense
opposition. Serious fears were extensively entertained that those powers which the patriot
statesmen who then watched over the interests of our country deemed essential to union, and to
the attainment of those invaluable objects for which union was sought, might be exercised in a
manner dangerous to liberty. In almost every convention by which the Constitution was adopted,
amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recommended. These amendments
demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the General Government — not
against those of the local governments. In compliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed,
to quiet fears thus extensively entertained, amendments were proposed by the required majority
in Congress and adopted by the States. These amendments contain no expression indicating an
intention to apply them to the State governments. This court cannot so apply them.

We are of opinion that the provision in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution declaring that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation is intended solely as
a limitation on the exercise of power by the [p*251] Government of the United States, and is not
applicable to the legislation of the States. We are therefore of opinion that there is no repugnancy
between the several acts of the general assembly of Maryland, given in evidence by the
defendants at the trial of this cause, in the court of that State, and the Constitution of the United
States. This court, therefore, has no jurisdiction of the cause, and it is dismissed.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Court of Appeals for the
Western Shore of the State of Maryland, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof,
it is the opinion of this Court that there is no repugnancy between the several acts of the General
Assembly of Maryland given in evidence by the defendants at the trial of this cause in the court of
that State and the Constitution of the United States; whereupon it is ordered and adjudged by
this court that this writ of error be, and the same is hereby, dismissed for the want of jurisdiction.

The Bill of Rights Fraud Part II

The Bill of Rights Fraud Part two

The following is gleaned from a book called Cases in Constitutional Law, last published 1967, Library of Congress Card 68-18704, by Robert E and Robert F Cushman. It contains 159 cases and over 100 cases commented on or referred to in the 159 cases. The book is 1168 pages. The book tells you how the Bill of Rights was nationalized..

I conversed with a friend named Fred and wrote this to him concerning another patriot that debunked my findings when he would not let truth sink into his core beliefs. Since then he has capitulated and now sees it but it took him over 6 years to come to terms with the fraud, realizing it has been a fraud all along. All bold type in Part two is straight out of the Book. My comments are regular type.

Hopefully after reading these two parts you will come to realize Spooner was right. The con job was just that, a con job of immense proportions. How the fraud lived so long is only due to the fact our family tree parents, going back to 1776/1787 were led by the nose as are the people of today. You have to have a core belief, and that, my friends is based on a lie. So as all foundations are either true or false, hopefully you will find what you have been brought up to believe is one huge fraud.

The Informer
11-3-06

Hi Fred, Well now that I let off some steam, here is more on Barron. It wasn’t just as someone we know said that, the supreme court brought it up in 2001. They brought Barron up way before 2001. I have a constitutional law book Titled Cases in Constitutional Law. It is ripe with cases on Barron and many more in its 1168 pages of knowledge. There are cases that they did not bring up that are just as important, one being Hepburn and Dundas v Ellezy, 2 Cranch 445. The heading of the case states:
“A citizen of the District of Columbia cannot maintain an action against a citizen of Virginia in the circuit court for the district of Virginia. A citizen of the District of Columbia is not a citizen of a state, within the meaning of the Constitution.”

Reading this, it goes way over people’s heads and they are not aware. As Montgomery found out, that President Washington created the states as districts in 1791, hence the phrase “district of Virginia” in the above case. It is an important case and you must get it because it is ripe with info that will wipe out the myth that people have had on the jurisdiction. A passage in the case so states after the Court gets rid of the notion that the people of the states are on the same footing as the people of the District of Columbia and said the plaintiff could not sue in Virginia. This is the defense position statement.
“Even if the Constitution of the United States authorizes a more enlarged jurisdiction that the Judiciary Act of 1789 has given, yet the court can take no jurisdiction which it is not given by the Act. I, therefore, call for the law which gives a jurisdiction in this case.” .

A response was given by Plaintiff to rebut the above statement. The court then gave it’s decision and sided with Defense when Chief Justice Marshall said,
“The opinion to be certified to the circuit court is, that that court has no jurisdiction in the case.”

So basically the Judiciary Act of 1789 gives what jurisdiction the federal courts have, NOT the Congress as so many people believe and as the Defense attorney said, if it’s not to be found (jurisdiction) in that Act the fed court does not have it. Here we have direct admission that lawyers back then were dictating the parameters in which the courts had jurisdiction. The Informer, in his new history, brought this up when he cited the History of The American Bar by Charles Warren. I believe you have that book of the Informer. Might pay to reread it in light of this “revelation” the guy I was talking about had.

Now back to Barron. In the notes of the Constitutional Cases (BOOK) printed 1968, it states.
“While most rights in the Bill of Rights now do apply to the states, they do so only because they are essential to due process of law. The ruling in the present case that the Bill of Rights does not apply directly to the states has never been over ruled. ”

Brown v Walker (1896) Barron was again broached on self incrimination case. The BOOK had his to say;

“In 1956 the Court reaffirmed the Brown decision in U1Imann v. United States . It rejected the defendant’s argument that “the impact of the disabilities imposed by federal and state authorities and the public in general-such as loss of ]ob, expulsion from labor unions, state registration and investigation statutes, passport eligibility, and general pubIic opprobrium–is so oppressive that the statute does not give him true immunity.” The statute, like the Fifth Amendment provision, protects the witness only from having to give “testimony which may possibly expose him to a criminal charge.”
Since Congress need not grant immunity from state prosecution in order to compel testimony, the question arises whether it may do so if it wishes. The control over evidence admissible in state courts is traditionally a question of state power, and even the Supreme Court in administering the due process clause has been reluctant to interfere with this state prerogative. In Adams v. Maryland (1954) the Court held that Congress could, under the supremacy doctrine, forbid a state to use testimony given before a congressional committee. Adams had been summoned before the Senate Crimes Investigation (Kefauver) Committee and had bared his soul concerning his boob making activities. The state of Maryland , which had been unable to get other evidence against Adams , read the transcript of the committee hearing into the trial record as a confession, and he was convicted of illegal gambling. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that 859 forbade the use of such testimony “in any criminal proceeding against him in any court …. “While Congress could not compel testimony under the statute, such testimony as was given was protected; and the phrase “in any court” included state courts as well as federal. Forbidding such use of the testimony) was held to be a necessary and proper way of securing testimony. The Immunity Act of 1954 uses this same language, and the Adams interpretation was reaffirmed by the Court in the Ullmann case.
In the present case a federal grand jury was investigating charges against a railroad that it had granted discriminatory rates and rebates. Brown, who was an officer of the railroad, was called as a witness but refused to answer certain questions on the ground that the answers would tend to accuse am incriminate him. He was adjudged in contempt for his refusal to answer.

Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the Court, saying in part;

It is true that the Constitution does not operate upon a witness testifying in state courts , since we have held that the first eight amendments are limitations only upon the powers of Congress and the Federal courts, and are not applicable to the several states , except so far as the 14th Amendment may have made them applicable. Barron v. Baltimore [1833] …. There is no such restriction, however, upon the applicability of Federal statutes ….[The Court here quotes the supremacy clause in Article VI.]
The act in question contains no suggestion that it is to be applied only to the Federal courts. It declares broadly that “no person shall be excused from attending and testifying . . . before the Interstate Commerce Commission . . . on the ground . . . that the testimony . . . required of him may tend to criminate him, etc. But no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may testify,” etc. It is not that he shall not be prosecuted for or on account of any crime concerning which he may testify, which might possibly be urged to apply only to crimes under the Federal law…; but the immunity extends to any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may testify, which clearly indicates that the immunity is intended to be general and to be applicable whenever and in whatever court such prosecution may be had.
But even granting that there were still a bare possibility that by his disclosure he might be subjected to the criminal laws of some other sovereignty, that . . . is not a real and probable danger, with reference to the ordinary operations of the law in the ordinary courts, but “a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct.” Such dangers it was never the object of the provision to obviate.
The same answer may be made to the suggestion that the witness is imperfectly protected by reason of the fact that he may still be prosecuted and put to the annoyance and expense of pleading his immunity by way of confession and avoidance. This is a detriment which the law does not recognize. There is a possibility that any citizen, however innocent, may be subjected to a civil or criminal prosecution, and put to the expense of defending himself, but unless such prosecution be malicious, he is remediless, except so far as a recovery of costs may partially indemnify him ….
. . . While the constitutional provision in question is justly regarded as one of the most valuable prerogatives of the citizen, its object is fully accomplished by the statutory immunity, and we are therefore of opinion that the witness was compellable to answer, and that the judgment of the court below must be affirmed.

Mr. Justice Shiras, with whom Mr. Justices Gray and White concurred, wrote a dissenting opinion. Mr. Justice Field wrote a separate dissent.”

In Powell v Alabama (1932) Barron was brought up again . Then in Palko v Connecticut (1937 Barron was again brought up and this is the BOOK’s comment .

With the decision in Powell v. Alabama it appeared that the long struggle to nationalize the Bill of Rights might at last be bearing fruit. The Court had acknowledged that it no longer felt bound by the Hurtado reasoning; the application to the states of the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation and the First Amendment rights of free speech, press, religion, and assembly showed that some of the Bill of Rights guarantees could be applied to the states through due process of law. And now, in Powell, the Court for the first time had found one of the rights of persons accused of crime to be essential to due process.
‘The Palko case, printed below, made clear that the Court was not prepared to abandon earlier decisions such as Hurtado and Twining. Instead, it undertook to explain why some rights, such as the rights to counsel and free speech, are absorbed into due process; and why others, like jury trial and grand jury indictment, are not. It should be emphasized that the cases “absorbing” rights into the Fourteenth Amendment do not overrule Barron v. Baltimore (1820). The provisions of the federal Bill of Rights still limit directly only the federal government; it is the Fourteenth Amendment which limits the states. What the Court has done is to reverse the practical effect of the rule in Barron v. Baltimore with respect to part, but not all, of the Bill of Rights. Some of these rights are still not considered by the Court to be so fundamental as to be required by due process of law . The Court in case after case has been classifying the provisions of the Bill of Rights into those which are essential to due process of law and thus bind the states through the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment and those which are not essential to due process and by which ‘the states are not bound. In effect, the Court has established an “honor roll” of superior rights which bind both state and national governments. The opinion in the present case is important since it gives an official summary of this classification up to 1937 and states clearly the principles upon which the ‘classification rests.
In another situation, and for a very different purpose, the Court classified the provisions of the federal Bill of Rights. In fixing the constitutional status of territories after the war with Spain, the Court held that in governing “unincorporated” territories, such as Puerto Rico and the Philippines, Congress was restricted only by those guarantees in the Bill of Rights which are basic and fundamental, and not by those which are merely “procedural” or “remedial,” such as the guarantee of trial by jury. See Balzac v. Porto Rico (1922). This classification is essentially the same as that in Palko v. Connecticut .
One question which the Palko case failed to answer satisfactorily was what was meant by “absorption” or “incorporation” of a Bill of Rights guarantee into due process. Did it mean that the right, as listed in the Bill of Rights and interpreted by the Supreme Court in federal cases, was made applicable to the states? Or was the right as applied to the states a more general right, less clearly defined and permitting more leeway and discretion on the part of the states? Clearly, incorporation of the First Amendment has meant its application to the states exactly as it is applied to the national government. Justices Brandeis and Holmes, in their dissent in the Gitlow case, suggested that the free speech applicable to the states perhaps “may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation than is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs or ought to govern the laws of the United States .” The Court, however, has never acknowledged such a distinction, and the same rules for deciding such cases are applied to the states and the nation alike.
With the gradual extension of due process to include other rights, an important controversy developed as to how these rights would apply to the states. This problem is discussed in connection with the specific rights in the chapter below.”

Another case is United States v Lanza (1922). This is what the court stated then I will go to the BOOK comments and bear in mind what happened at the Ruby Ridge trial against the government agent and put into that what the BOOK states.

Chief Justice Taft delivered the opinion:

“We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory. Each may, without interference by the other, enact laws to secure prohibition, with the limitation that no legislation can give validity to acts prohibited by the Amendment. Each government, in determining what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity, is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.
It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both, and may be punished by each. The 5th Amendment, like all the other guaranties in the first eight amendments, applies only to proceedings by the Federal government (Barron v. Baltimore [1833]) and the double jeopardy therein forbidden is a second prosecution under authority of the Federal government after a first trial for the same offense under the same authority. Here the same act was an offense against the state of Washington , because a violation of its law, and also an offense against the United States under the National Prohibition Act. The defendants thus committed two different offenses by the same act, and a conviction by a court of Washington of the offense against that state is not a conviction of the different offense against the United States, and so is not double jeopardy ….
If Congress sees fit to bar prosecution by the Fedearl courts for any act when punishment for violation of state prohibition has been imposed, it can, of course, do so by proper legislative provision; but it has not done so. If a state were to punish the manufacture, transportation, and sale of intoxicating liquor by small or nominal fines, the race of offenders to the courts of that state to plead guilty and secure immunity from Federal prosecution for such acts would not make for respect for the Federal statute, or for its deterrent effect. But it is not for us to discuss the wisdom of legislation; it is enough for us to hold that, in the absence of special provision by Congress, conviction and punishment in a state court, under a state law, for making, transporting, and selling intoxicating liquors, is not a bar to a prosecution in a court of the United States, under the Federal law, for the same acts ….
Judgment reversed.

Now for the comment by the BOOK:

It was one of the universal maxims of the common law that no man should be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense. Protection against double jeopardy is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment against invasion by the federal government, while a similar clause is found in the bills of rights of most of the state constitutions. A person is held to be in jeopardy when his trial has progressed to the point where he actually confronts the jury. If convicted, he may waive his immunity from double jeopardy by an appeal to a higher court which may allow him a new trial; but if acquitted, further proceedings against him by the prosecuting authorities are barred, the government not even being allowed to appeal the case on the ground of error of law. See United States v. Sanges (1892). Moreover, if he appeals his conviction and is granted a new trial the defendant can only be retried on the charge of which he was convicted. Thus in Green v. United States (1957) a person who was indicted and tried for first degree murder but was found guilty by the jury of second degree murder could not, after successfully appealing the second degree murder charge, be retried on the original charge of first degree murder. He had already been once in jeopardy for that cr/me and had not waived his protection by appealing his conviction for a different crime.
In certain recognized circumstances a court can declare a mistrial and subject the accused to a second trial without violating the protection against double jeopardy. This is true where it turns out that a juror is disqualified, see Thompson v. United States (1894); and in United States v. Perez (1824) it was held permissible where the jury could not agree on a verdict; “The prisoner has not been convicted or acquitted, and may again be put upon his defense. We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances which would render it proper to interfere.” The double jeopardy clause would prevent declaring a mistrial and ordering a new trial solely to permit the government more time to secure evidence against the accused. In Downum v. United States (1963) the government asked that the jury be discharged when it discovered two of its key witnesses were missing. Two days later a new jury was empanelled and Downurn was convicted. The Court conceded that a new jury could be empanelled after the discharge of the first where there is “an imperious necessity to do so,” or in “very extraordinary and striking circumstances.”

Here the government had simply started the trial before it had located all its witnesses.
A move such as this does not, however, amount to a denial of due process when done in a state court. In Brock v. North Carolina (1953) the state court had declared a mistrial and ordered a continuance of the case in order to permit the state to deal with some of its own witnesses who had unexpectedly refused to testify on pleas of self-incrimination. Citing the Palko case, the Court held that the double jeopardy provision was not incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, and this particular action was not shocking enough to make the trial unfair. In 1967 the Court declined to decide whether or not the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment would be extended to the states. Although it had granted certiorari to decide the question, on a full hearing of the case it agreed that the state action did not amount to double jeopardy and dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. See Cichos v. Indiana .

Since one is not in jeopardy until his trial actually begins, indictment for crime does not put a person in jeopardy, and therefore repeated indictments do not constitute double jeopardy. Moreover, the government can appeal the dismissal of an indictment, and such an appeal gives the Supreme Court an opportunity to pass upon the constitutionality of criminal legislation which a lower court holds unconstitutional. See discussion in the note to Muskrat v. United States .
It does not constitute double jeopardy to try a person each time he commits the same offense over again . Thus a conscientious objector who has sewed a prison sentence for refusing to register for the draft may be tried and convicted again if he continues in his refusal. The same is true of a person who is punished for contempt for refusing to give testimony. Where, however, a witness is asked to identify a person as a Communist and in reply refuses to so identify “anyone,” she is guilty of only one contempt, despite a refusal to answer the same question asked 11 times with regard to other persons. See Yates v; United States (1957). Where Congress has made conspiracy to commit a felony a separate crime from the commission of the felony itself, a person may be tried for both crimes. Whether the second trial constitutes double jeopardy in cases like this depends on the nature of the evidence needed to convict. The Court in Morgan v. Devine (1915) quoted with approval from Bishop on Criminal Law: “The test is whether, if what is set out in the second indictment had been proved under the first, there could have been a conviction; when there could, the second cannot be maintained; when there could not, it can be.”
One of the obvious results of living under our federal form of government is that every person is subject to the criminal jurisdiction of two separate governments, the state and the national. It is entirely possible, therefore, for a single act to constitute an offense against the statutes of the United States and at the same time to be punishable under state law. This is true in the case of counterfeiting the national currency, corrupt practices in the conduct of congressional elections, assaults against federal officers, the larceny of goods moving in interstate commerce, violations of the former Prohibition Amendment, etc. In these cases it has long been held that a person may be tried and punished by both governments without violating the protection against double jeopardy. That guarantee is violated only by a second trial for the same offense against the same sovereignty, not by a trial /or the same act when it constitutes a separate and distinct crime against another sovereign. This doctrine had, of course, considerable practical effect in connection with the enforcement of the Prohibition Amendment, under which concurrent jurisdiction rested in the state and national governments. Note the similarity of this rule to the one applied to the self-incrimination cases.
In the present case Lanza had been convicted by the state courts of Washington for violating the state prohibition act. He was then indicted in a federal court for the same act, which also violated the Volstead Act. The district judge dismissed the indictment on the ground of double jeopardy and the government appealed. The Lanza rule, though sharply criticized, sti11 stands. Abbate v. United States (1959) held that a man convicted of a crime in Illinois could later be tried for the same act (dynamiting telephone communications) under a federal law. Lanza was specifically reaffirmed by a six-to-three decision. On the same day the Court held, five to four, that one acquitted in a federal court of robbing a federally insured bank could later be tried and convicted in a state court for the same robbery. See Bartkus v. Illinois (1959).
While the Lanza rule has a logical persuasiveness about it and the Court has done nothing to weaken it, it has not been given wide application. It is not, for example, followed in international law. As early as 1820 the Supreme Court recognized that while all states could try a person for piracy, “there can be no doubt that the plea of autrefois acquit would be good, in any civilized state, though resting on a prosecution in the courts of any other civilized state.” See United States v. Furlong. Nor has the Court felt the rule should apply in cases where two states have concurrent jurisdiction, as on the Columbia River where Washington and Oregon both have jurisdiction over the entire river so as “to avoid any nice question as to whether a criminal act sought to be prosecuted was committed on one side or the other of the exact boundary in the channel” “Where an act is . . . prohibited and punishable by the laws of both states,” the Court commented, “the one first acquiring jurisdiction of the person may prosecute the offense, and its judgment is a finality in both states, so that one convicted or acquitted in the courts of the one state cannot be prosecuted for the same offense in the courts of the other.” See Nielson v. Oregon (1909).
The manifest unfairness of the Lanza rule has been widely recognized, and following the Abbate and Bartkus decisions the Attorney General of the United States ordered that “no federal case should be tried when there has already been a state prosecution for substantially the same act or acts without the United States Attorney first submitting a recommendation to the appropriate Assistant Attorney General in the Department.” And in Petite v. United States (1960) Petite, a lawyer in deportation proceedings against the same man held in both Philadelphia and Baltimore, induced his client to swear falsely that he had been born in the United States. For this suborning of perjury he was convicted and punished in the federal district court in Pennsylvania , and later in the federal district court in Maryland . When the case came to the Supreme Court the Solicitor General moved that the second judgment be vacated and the indictment dismissed. He contended that the double jeopardy clause had not been violated, but stated that “the initiation of the second prosecution in this case was contrary to sound policy and that for that reason, and in the interests of justice, the indictment should be dismissed.” The Supreme Court, without passing on the double jeopardy question, granted the motion.”

So there Fred, is the story. Now I think this fellow I was talking about has a lot of cognitive dissonance and ego to get rid of and it just might take him more than 3 months to understand. After all, I would say he is at least 12 years behind the Informer’s knowledge. Well, once he obtains the level of competence that we have obtained then he is on to better things and won’t be so ego centered. It is nice to be eating humble pie once in awhile. I think everyone has a lot to learn from reading this and the cases if they so choose. But they need interpretation like this BOOK gives, because after all it’s what “they” interpret as ruling , not us. We are only slaves remember?

Why does the State have jurisdiction over me?

WHY DOES THE STATE HAVE JURISDICTION OVER ME?

Today all people ask why can’t I get the state off my back? Why do they say they have jurisdiction over me? Why is it that I can’t seem to shake the myth that they do have jurisdiction over me? How can I rid from me, whatever they say gives them jurisdiction? Why is it they won’t tell anyone what gives them jurisdiction, whether in the agency or court? Why do people say it’s all admiralty when I am not in any maritime contracts?

These are but a few questions of many people have had over time and 99 percent have no clue to the answers. It is a seemingly thought provoking question to say the least. Many of us have tried to tell the people the answers. For the most part they cannot comprehend the data they are given. Maybe because it’s in the court cases we have given. Maybe the people cannot comprehend the legal speak in the court decisions. Maybe it’s because people don’t want to believe what they read in those cases and cling to a myth of sovereignty. Maybe they believe the myth that the people created this monstrosity called government and they have to listen to the people. There are many reasons the people have not yet comprehended.

It is with this writing that I will attempt, again, to try and in doing so I will not bore you with court cases. I will attempt to give you the answer to all the above questions in a short but brief explanation. I will not go into residency, which is but one reason they can have jurisdiction over you. Hopefully you will understand.

Let’s start this way; everything you do in today’s world has a maritime latch. You cannot do anything without this maritime latch. What is this maritime latch you ask. Very simple, INSURANCE. Yes, insurance. You all know that this State and the United States operates as a corporation and only as a corporation. Just go to the county, parish or however the State defines the place where you live, and search the records to see when that place was incorporated. Many towns , as you enter it, will say on a big sign, entering so and so town, incorporated 1816 or some such date. Back in the 1800’s the common man had no insurance. He had no life insurance, had no car insurance, had no property insurance. So what gave that particular town jurisdiction? Residency, plain and simple. But that is not the reason for this article so forget about residency in the following and do not attempt to put residency in the mix or any other item but insurance. What about life insurance, property insurance, etc.? These all have a bearing as to why they ( government) control you. Since the State is a corporation they can allow other created corporations to exist by having them register with the Secretary of State to do their business in “this state”. You have to remember, in law words take on a different meaning and do not mean what the dictionary makes them out to be. That word, becomes a term and the law givers use term to give that dictionary word a meaning they want it to mean. Hence “ this state” is not referring to what people believe it to be. “This state” and “the state” are two separate meanings. One is corporate, the other is not corporate. This can be found on atgpress.

What about car insurance? Some people do not have a car and say that leaves me out of their jurisdiction. How about that house or land you bought? The insurance you have to get to make sure there is no hidden liens on it is all maritime. It’s called Title insurance. This state has an interest in it and is a party to ownership through that insurance contract and for the most part I would say 99.99 percent of you people have no clue that this state is a party to that policy. That is the latch, just as the life insurance policy is and that car insurance is. The fact that people today all have some type of insurance is a key latch.

Here is the simple proof that you all need to do further research to prove to yourself that what is written here is true. I take this simple answer from a book called Civil Procedure, by Professor of Law , Roy L. Brooks, who teaches Civil Procedure, Employment discrimination, corporations, corporation finance, security regulations, and other similar complex litigation.

On page 66 of his book a question is asked and an answer is given on “Examination Question on Personal Jurisdiction and Service of Process.” Now his answer is really couched in terms of law and not ordinary dictionary words that you are familiar with. This is how closely one must read any legal document or a book of this nature, because it has to use terms such as “this state” and “residency” to be understood in law. Even most patriots overlook this distinction between words and terms in what they read as you will see in reading the examination question. Everyone would read this in standard common everyday words. I will bold those misunderstood writings, because they are terms and you read them as words. Also note the capitalization in some of the key terms or phrases.

Direct quote:

Williams, a resident of State B, sued AFC Corporation (“AFC”). A State C corporation with its principle place of business in State D, and Dexter, a resident of State C who owns an office building in State A, in the state trial court of State A for damages. Williams claimed that AFC, aided in the tortious conduct of Dexter, failed to deliver goods under the terms of a contract negotiated in State A. The contract was negotiated by AFC’s president during a meeting held in Dexter’s office building. The goods were to be delivered to Williams at a storage facility located in State A. AFC has never conducted any business in State A, with the exception of operating a demolition business specializing in the use of explosives in clearing away old buildings. This business lasted for a three month period ending one year ago. Service of process was made on AFC by delivery of the complaint and summons to its president personally in State D and on Dexter by delivery of the complaint and summons to his estranged wife living in State A. The long-arm statute adopted by State A is the following:

(1) Any person , whether or not a citizen or resident of this State , who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person , and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any causes of action arising from the doing of any of said acts:

(a) The transaction of any business within this State ;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State ;
(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this State ; or
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this State at the time of contracting

END of Direct quote

I don’t believe that is very hard to digest, especially the last sentence. Just think that this State is a corporation operating strictly in Admiralty jurisdiction from way back in 1603 and even after the feigned Revolutionary war, still operated as the Crown’s colonies, now called States and United States , in all admiralty which is international law of maritime. Knowing that all insurances are maritime in nature where ever made on earth, you can see how they have jurisdiction when you obtain life insurance, health insurance, fire insurance, car insurance, and property insurance and that little known insurance when you buy property called Title insurance.

Now do you see why “this State” claims jurisdiction over you where you had no idea how?

Many, many ways do they obtain jurisdiction and none can be any plainer than what is found in my writings on atgpress. It is so subtle for instance,

http://www.atgpress.com/inform/gov046.htm
http://www.atgpress.com/inform/cs027.htm
http://www.atgpress.com/inform/cs032.htm
http://www.atgpress.com/inform/gov035.htm

It is this last subtleties in the above cases in the writings, that is shown from the North Carolina description of Counties that will help you decide as to the latches of maritime insurance and the status you hold in this quagmire of “this State”, The State, and all other terms they have used to conceal their conquest of the common people. Read this carefully all you “person”, “residents” and insurance holders of “this State” in it’s corporate chartering of insurance companies.

Source: North Carolina State Library.
COUNTY GOVERNMENT : HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Contents
Early Beginnings
The County as a Body Politic and Corporate
The Board of County Commissioners

The County as a Body Politic and Corporate

A county, as a defined geographic subdivision of the state, serves many purposes. Churches, civic clubs, and other societal institutions use counties as convenient subdivisions for their own purposes. The business world may assign sales territories and franchises to areas composed of one or more counties. The county may play a role in the psychology of people born and raised “in the country” – it serves to establish where they are from and who they are, thus becoming a part of their personal identity. But the county was created in the first instance by the state as a political unit, and this remains its primary purpose.

More than forty years ago, the North Carolina Supreme Court was called upon to define a county from a legal point of view. (In the case, Wake County was a litigant and the court spoke in terms of that county, but what the Court had to say is equally true of the other ninety-nine counties):

Wake County is a body politic and corporate, created by the General Assembly of North Carolina for certain public and political purposes. Its powers as such, both express and implied, are conferred by statutes, enacted from time to time by the General Assembly, and are exercised by its Board of Commissioners …. In the exercise of ordinary government functions, [counties] are simply agencies of the State, constituted for the convenience of local administration in certain portions of the State’s territory, and in the exercise of such functions they are subject to almost unlimited legislative control, except when the power is restricted by constitutional provisions.

The language used by the court is important as it established the definition of a county. A county, according to the court, is a “body politic and corporate.” A body politic is a civil division of the state for purposes of governmental administration. A body corporate is a legal entity. In private law, a corporation is a legal person. A county is a legal entity or corporation of a special sort and with a public function. As such, it can buy and hold property, sue and be sued, and enter into contracts – all functions necessary to make its work as a body politic effective.

In O’Berry, State Treasurer v. Mecklenburg County, [198 N.C. 357,151 S.E. 880 ( 1930)], the court stated that “the weight of authority is to effect that all the powers and functions of a county bear reference to the general policy of the State, and are in fact an integral portion of the general administration of State policy. Historically, the primary purpose for erecting a county was to serve state purposes and to perform state functions in a given area rather than to serve the purposes of a particular geographic community. (By way of contrast, a city was primarily formed at the request of the people within its jurisdiction to serve the needs of the inhabitants.)

For the Supreme Court to say that “all the powers and functions of a county bear reference to the general policy of the State and are in fact an integral portion of the general administration of State policy” is not as restrictive as might at first reading appear. “State policy” is a very broad frame of reference; it can touch any aspect of local government. Thus, the truly significant nugget in the Supreme Court’s definition of the role of counties is its statement that in the exercise of their functions, counties “are subject to almost unlimited legislative control, except when the power is restricted by constitutional provisions.” In effect, if the General Assembly can be persuaded to assign counties any given power or responsibility, and, if the Constitution does not prohibit it, that assignment becomes state policy for county administration.

The court’s phrases should not be drained of meaning, but they must be read in the light of the freedom the General Assembly has in withholding, assigning, withdrawing, and supervising the specific powers of any agency of government – state, county, municipality, or special district. The development of “state policy” with regard to the allocation of functions among governmental units and agencies is necessarily determined by successive legislatures’ changing ideas of what is best calculated to achieve desired results.

Experience plays a major role in the determination of state policy. Frequently financial emergency and stress have produced a climate favorable to reexamination of the allocation of governmental responsibilities. Until Governor McLean’s administration, the state allowed counties, cities, and other local units almost unlimited freedom in borrowing money and issuing bonds. With no one to advise or warn them in marketing their securities, many counties overextended their obligations and saw their credit ratings drop to the point where they had to pay crippling rates of interest. Eventually, some faced bankruptcy. In 1927, on the basis of this experience, and recognizing a statewide concern, the legislature established the County Government Advisory Commission and gave it the supervisory powers necessary to correct the situation. This commission effected a reversal in local government financing, and its successor, the Local Government Commission remains one of the bulwarks of North Carolina government today.

Experience with various local arrangements for road building and maintenance had a comparable effect on state policy. It is not accidental that North Carolina counties are no longer responsible for this work. Reflecting the concern of the people of the state, the legislature recognized a community of interest in roads wider than the single county and defined state policy on roads accordingly. Comparable re-definitions of the area of concern have affected governmental responsibility for operating schools, conducting elections, housing the state’s system of lower courts and their records, maintaining property ownership and mortgage records, enforcing much of the state’s criminal law, administering public health and public welfare programs, and carrying on state programs designed to promote the development of agriculture. Some of these functions are the responsibility of the boards of county commissioners, and some are assigned to other boards with varying relationships to the board of county commissioners. Thus, apart from the role played by the commissioners in any of these fields, it is the policy of the state to make extensive use of its counties in carrying out a large number of essential governmental operations.

From the beginning, the county has been used as the basic local unit in the judicial system and for law enforcement – there one finds the court, the courthouse, the sheriff, the jail, the clerk, and the court records. But the court is not a county court; it is a unit of the state’s judicial system. The judge, the solicitor, the clerk, and the magistrates are state officials who administer state law, not county law.

The General Assembly expresses and codifies its state policy decisions by enacting statutes. In assigning duties and powers to counties, the legislature sometimes speaks in terms of mandate or command and sometimes in terms of permission and discretion. Thus, for example, counties are required to provide adequate housing for public schools, while they are given discretionary authority to exercise planning and zoning powers.

The General Assembly makes two kinds of laws–it enacts general statutes that apply statewide, but it also enacts local or special laws that apply exclusively within named counties or cities. Our State Constitution contains limitations on legislative authority to enact local laws dealing with a substantial list of topics, but in the absence of constitutional restriction, the legislative is free to permit local variety and experiment, a freedom once denounced by students of government but now seen as a useful device for demonstrating new ideas and approaches to governmental problems. Given this legislative freedom, any discussion of county powers and responsibilities must always be prefaced with a caution that what is being said about counties in general may not be true for a particular county.

END of QUOTE

The Informer 11/1/2006

Jurisdiction & The First Judiciary Act

The Informer
JURISDICTION & THE FIRST JUDICIARY ACT

The following is taken from the Harvard Law Review, Vol. XXXVII, 1932-1924 with my comments in brackets if any. This is not the complete Review but only portions.

The Federal Judiciary of September 24, 1789, was Senate Bill No. 1, in the First Session of the First Congress. No adequate account of this famous legislation has ever been written; and Ellsworth’s latest able and careful biographer stated in 1905 that “no complete history of the bill, can now be written.” [The authors go on to say that the original draft and bills have been found since that statement in 1905] The disclosure of this new evidence now makes it possible, by comparison with the statute as finally enacted, to write, for the first time, an accurate history of the progress of the Act through the Congress, and of the variations of the final Act from the original Draft Bill. Such a comparison reveals certain legal and historical surprises, and makes it certain that Madison was wrong in stating, in 1836 (when he was eighty five years of age and probably of failing memory), that “it was not materially changed in its passage into a law.” William Garret Brown stated “There is enough in the Journals of the two Houses and in the debates of the House of Representatives to sustain Madison’s impression that it went through without any radical change.” The new facts disprove this statement.

Four of the great changes may be particularly mentioned at this point. First, it appears that the United States District and Circuit Courts were intended to take jurisdiction over common law crimes, instead of being confined to crimes specifically defined by Congress, as the Draft Bill when introduced provided, and as later erroneously held by the courts. Second, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts in controversies between citizens of different States was made far more restrictive than the Draft Bill intended. Third,– a surprising feature –The Draft Bill contained no such provision as was contained in the much litigated Section 34 of the Act, which provided that “the laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the Courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.” [Do you have that, they did not exist. Who and why did they put them there?] This Section 34 was inserted as a Senate Amendment. Fourth — a fact of still greater consequence — it is apparent, from the manner in which the original draft of this Senate amendment constituting Section 34 was altered by its proposer before its proposal, that the word “laws” in this Section 34 was not intended to be confined to “statute laws,” as Judge Story held in the famous case of Swift v Tyson, but was intended to include the common law of the State as well as the statute law. Had Judge Story seen this original draft of the amendment, it is almost certain that his decision would have been the reverse of what it was. All these points are discussed at greater length later on in this article.

In view of these new sources of information, it seems that a revised history of the Judiciary Act is warranted, since knowledge of the additions, subtractions, deletions and amendments relating to the original draft may possibly afford assistance to Federal Courts in future interpretations of the Act. [People, they do not want to change it for to do so would overturn every case based on the Judiciary Act including Swift v Tyson and the Erie case]

[Rather than going into all 83 pages I will point out one flaw that about which no one in the patriot community has any idea and neither do 98 percent of the lawyers, A.K.A. Judges, etc, etc.

Section 10 of the Draft Bill (Section 9 of the Act) relating to the jurisdiction of the District Courts was changed in several important features. No one of all the changes in the Draft Bill was more significant than the following. The Draft Bill gave to the District Courts, “cognizance of all crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the authority of the United States and defined by the laws of the same.” The italicized words make it clear that the framers of the Bill meant to confine criminal jurisdiction to crimes specifically defined by Congress, and to them only. In Other words, the framers clearly intended to exclude the Federal Courts from jurisdiction over common law crimes, and crimes under the law of nations. It will be recalled that, for many years after the passage of the Act, there was a heated political contest between the Federalist and the Jeffersonian parties as to whether the Federal Courts possessed such jurisdiction — a contest finally decided in the negative, as urged by the Jeffersonians, supported by the authority of the Federalist Judge, Samuel Chase. Yet many eminent Judges and lawyers maintained at the outset and continued long to maintain, that such jurisdiction over crimes at common law and under the law of nations was intended to be vested in the Federal Courts. It is a singular thing that no one appears to have investigated or cited the action of Congress on the original Draft Bill; for such action would seem to afford the strongest argument in favor of such a jurisdiction. It now appears, on comparison of the Draft Bill with the Act as passed, that by an amendment introduced in and adopted by the Senate, the restrictive clause–” and defined by the laws of the same” – was deliberately stricken out, thus leaving the District Courts with jurisdiction over crimes “cognizable under the authority of the United States,” without any limitation. The only rational meaning that can be given to this action striking out the restrictive words is, that Congress did not intend to limit criminal jurisdiction to crimes specifically defined by it. Had the Supreme Court consulted these Senate Files, it is probable that the decisions in United States v. Hudson,(55) in I812, and United States v. Coolidge,(56) in I816, might have been otherwise than they were.

55 7 Cranch (U.S.) 32 (1812).
56 1 Wheat. (U.S.) 415 (I816).

The jurisdiction of the District Courts contained in the Draft Bill was increased by the Senate by adding the words: “and shall also have jurisdiction exclusively of the Courts of the several States of all suits against consuls, or vice consuls, except for offences above the description aforesaid.” (57),

An interesting addition to the District Court jurisdiction was made by another amendment. The Draft Bill gave “exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under laws of impost, navigation or trade of the United States, where the seizures are made on waters which are navigable by the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen, within their respective districts, as well as upon the high seas.” In view of the extreme fears expressed by opponents of the Federal system lest the right of jury trial should ‘be impaired, the jurisdiction thus granted to the District Courts, in the clause beginning with the words “including all seizures,” was extraordinary. For in England, the admiralty jurisdiction did not extend to such “seizures under laws of import, navigation or trade,” which, consequently, were triable, in that country, in a common law Court by a jury. Although in some of the Colonies, trials of such cases had been had in the Colonial Admiralty Courts without jury, it seems curious that the framers of this Bill should have deliberately included such cases of seizure within the admiralty jurisdiction of the new Federal Courts and should thus have deliberately enlarged the scope of such Courts and consequently the scope of trials without jury, beyond the scope then existent in England. But such was the effect of the phraseology of this portion of the Act, as the Supreme Court later held, Judge Samuel Chase saying that “the reason for putting seizures of this kind in admiralty side of the Court was the great danger to the revenue if such cases should be left to the caprice of juries “–a rather insufficient explanation, in view of the insistence on jury trial shown by the Congress throughout other portions of the Act. [As I have always said any revenue case of any nature be it IRS, driver license etc. is all admiralty and maritime in nature. Maybe now some of the skeptics will believe me if they haven’t already read Matthew P Benders, Benedict on Admiralty and the numerous cases I have cited in the past, which again you will see in the footnotes. I have maintained that State courts had admiralty jurisdiction but many a lawyer argued against me on this so now they eat crow by reading this from The Harvard Law Review. Here is an excerpt from “Benedict on Admiralty” —

.7-22 SOURCE OF LAW AND JURISDICTION 109

…….. maritime legislation generally.(6) The Constitution, however, is a document which must be construed as a whole and it has always been interpreted(7) as investing the paramount legislative power in the Congress whether such power was sought to be derived from one or other of the express powers above mentioned, or as a necessary concomittant of and inherent in the grant of the judicial power.

“Commentators took that view, Congress acted on it, and the Courts including this Court [the Supreme Court] gave effect to it. Practically, therefore, the situation is as if that view were written into the provision.”(8) This interpretation was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.(9) in these words:

“Article III, Section 2, cl. 1 (3d provision) of the Constitution and section 9 of the Act of September 24, 1789, have from the beginning been the sources of jurisdiction in litigation based upon federal maritime law. Article III impliedly contained three grants. (1) It empowered Congress to confer admiralty and maritime jurisdiction on the ‘Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court’ which were authorized by Art. I, Section 8, cl. 9. (2) It empowered the federal courts in their exercise of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction which had been conferred on them, to draw on the substantive law ‘inherent in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,’ Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 LEd. 598 (1956), and to continue the development of this law within constitutional limits. (3) It empowered Congress to revise and supplement the maritime law within the limits of the Constitution. See Crowell v. Benson, supra, at 55.

“Section 9 of the First Judiciary Act granted the District Courts maritime jurisdiction. This jurisdiction has remained unchanged in substance to the present day.”

When the Constitution was adopted, the existing maritime law became the law of the United States subject to the power in Congress to modify or supplement it as experience or changing conditions might require. Congress thus has the paramount and undisputed power to fix, determine, alter and revise the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country; and federal statutes, if constitutional, are paramount to any judicially fashioned rules of admiralty.H

Whatever may be necessary to the complete exercise of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is in the covenant of the Union, and Congress may pass all laws which are necessary and

(6) Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086 (1917), is perhaps the only case which relies solely on the combination of the granting of judicial power and the eighteenth power of Article 1, section 8 as general authority to legislate in respect of maritime law.
(7) Detroit Trust Co. v. Steamer Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 55 S. Ct. 31, 79 L. Ed. 176 (1934); Panama Railroad Co. v. Andrew Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 44 S. Ct. 391, 68 L. Ed. 718, 1924 A.M.C. 554 (1924).
(8) Panama Railroad Co. v. AndrewJohnson, N. 7, supra.
(9) Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 79 S. Ct. 468, 3 L. Ed. 2d 368, 1959 A.M.C. 832 (1959).
(10) Waring v. Clarke, 48 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 12 L. Ed. 226 (1847); The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 22 L. Ed. 654 (1875); Butler v. Boston & S.S.S.C., 130 U.S. 527, 9 S. Ct. 612, 32 L. Ed. 1017 (1889); Ex parte (jarneff, 141 U.S. 1, 11 S. Ct. 840, 35 L. Ed. 631 (1891); The Hamilton (Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Gilmore), 207 U.S. 398, 28 S. Ct. 133, 52 L. Ed. 264 (1907); Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 34 S. Ct. 733, 58 L. Ed. 1208 (1914); Southern P. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086 (1917); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 40 S. Or. 438, 64 L. Ed. 834 (1920); Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 44 S. or. 302, 68 L. Ed. 646 (1924); Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 44 S. Ct. 391, 68 L. Ed. 748 (1924); Crowell v. Bensen, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 285, 76 L. Ed. 598 (1932); U.S.v. Flores, 289 U.S. 131, 53 S. Ct. 580, 77 L. Ed. 1086, 933 A.M.C. 649 (1933); Detroit Trust Go. v. Steamer Thomas Barlure, N. 7, supra; Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1, 66 S. Ct. 869, 90 L. Ed. 1045 (1946). In Panama Ry. Co. v. Johnson, supra, the court said, “[T]here are boundaries to the maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction which inhere in those subjects and cannot be altered by legislation …” The limitation refers to Congress’ power to alter admiralty jurisdiction, not to the substantive law. Lucas v. “Brinkness” Schiffahrts (]es. Franz Lange, 387 F. Supp. 440, 1975 A.M.C. 1684 (E.D. Pa. 1974), appeal dismissed, (3d Cir. April 30, 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975). Congress may not bring under the jurisdiction of the federal admiralty court a completely land-based accident or transaction, or remove from admiralty jurisdiction those types of accidents which occur on navigable waters.
(11) Royal Netherlands Steamship Co. v. Strachan Shipping Co., 301 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1962); and see Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 75 S. Ct. 368, 99 L. Ed. 337 (1955).

[and for those that say Driver laws are not maritime read this from Benedict, it tells you something without an-in-your-face description under the chapter Maritime Crimes]

9-34 MARITIME CRIMES § 114

the recent Supreme Court decision of United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, (a) in which the majority of the Court concluded that the action of customs officials in boarding and stopping a vessel without any “reasonable suspicion of a law violation” was indeed “reasonable” and consequently not violative of the fourth amendment. The Court articulated several factors upon which it based its decision:

1.19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), which authorizes customs officers to examine the manifest and other documents and papers by hailing and stopping the vessel is a “lineal ancestor” to section 31 of the Act of August 4, 1790, ch. 35, i Stat. 145, in which the First Congress clearly authorized the suspicionless boarding of vessels. This fact naturally led the Court to conclude that such boardings do not run afoul of the fourth amendment;

2. While random stops of automobiles away from borders are not allowable under the protections of the fourth amendment, stops at fixed checkpoints or at roadblocks are allowable. However, where commerce at sea provides clear access to the open waters and is quite different from highway traffic, alternative methods of searching vessels which differ from the “stop” approach are less likely to accomplish the government’s objective of deterring criminal activity;

3. The system of marking automobiles utilized by the states is considerably less complex than the types of documentation and external marking that the federal government requires for vessels at sea. Indeed, the government has a substantial interest in making sure that the vessel documentation requirements are complied with, especially where there is a great need to frustrate and apprehend smugglers.

Therefore, the Court concluded that while the intrusion made in vessel search cases might not realistically be termed “minimal, “it is indeed “limited” when balanced against the “substantial” state interest involved.

As a practical matter, most border searches are conducted pursuant to informer’s tips and the instinct of the experienced customs official in discerning nervousness in a suspected traveller. If probable cause or proof of the reliability of an informer were a necessary pre-requisite to customs searches, protection of the national borders would be difficult if not impossible without a more sophisticated surveillance system than is now used. While the search of a person’s body is not specifically contemplated by the present statutes authorizing border [also see 19 U.S.C. 482].

Back to Harvard Law Review

But while jurisdiction over such seizures on the seas was given by the Draft Bill to the District Courts sitting in admiralty, no jurisdiction over seizures by the Federal Government made elsewhere than on the high seas was vested in any Federal Court, and hence such cases were left entirely to the State Courts. (59) The Senate, however, now added greatly to the scope of Federal jurisdiction by inserting the following words: “and shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all seizures on land, or other waters than as aforesaid, made, and of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the United States.”(6o) These cases, however, were not included within the admiralty jurisdiction of the District Court, but were left as suits at common law to be tried by a jury.

The anxiety to preserve the right of jury trial was shown by the insertion by the Senate, at the end of Section 9 of the Act: “and the trial of issues in (sic) fact in the District Court, in all causes, except civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be by jury.” (61) An amendment, drafted by Maclay, and favored by Grayson and Bassett, to provide that” no District Judge shall give a vote in any case of appeal or error from his own decision, but may assign the reason of such his decision,” was adopted by the Senate(62)
Section 10 of the Act was a new Section, introduced by the Senate in order to make special provision as to Federal Courts

(58) See The Vengeance, 3 Dall. (U.S.) 297 (1796); United States v. Schooner Sally,: Cranch (U.S.) 406 (1805); United States v. Schooner Betsy, 4 Cranch (U.S.) 443 (1808); Whelan v. United States, 7 Cranch (U.S.) 112 (1812:); Ship Octavia, I Wheat. (U.S.) 20 (I816); Woodbury, J., dissenting, Waring v. Clarke, S How. (U.S.) 441, 483 {1847); The Eagle, 8 Wall. (U.S.) I5 (1869). See I Kent, Comm, 367. See also R. W. Greene, arguing in New Jersey Steam Nav.. Co. v. Merchants’ Bank, 6 How. (U.S.) 344, 376 (I848), and see Daniel, J’., dissenting, ibid., 409, 414.
(59) See The Sarah, 8 Wheat. (U.S.) 391 (I823).
(60) This amendment, in the Senate Files, is probably in Ellsworth’s handwriting.
(61)See Senate Files.. The Draft Bill had a clause substantially the same (but which was not broad enough, after the Senate had decided to insert its Amendments to Section 9) as follows: “And the trial of facts in both cases last mentioned shall be by jury.” It is to be noted that the District Court was given no equity powers. United States v. Nourse, 6 Pet. (U.S.) 470, 496 (I832).
(62) : See MaClay July 7.

[You will love this next section for those that argue you are a non citizen. You can use the federal courts and bring up this information from Harvard.]

The chief and only real reason for this diverse citizenship jurisdiction was to afford a tribunal in which a foreigner or citizen of another State might have the law administered free from the local prejudices or passions which might prevail in a State Court against foreigners or non-citizens. The Federal Court was to secure to a non-citizen the application of the same law’ which a State Court would give to its own citizens, and to see that within a State there should be no discrimination against a-citizens in the application of justice(79) There is not a trace any other purpose than the above to be found in any of the amendments made in I787-I789 as to this jurisdiction. The idea that a Federal Court in a State was to administer any other than the law of that State or were to discriminate in favor of a non-citizen, and against a citizen, or to administer law as an :entirely free and independent tribunal, never appears to have entered the mind of any one. But to make it perfectly certain that the Federal Courts were simply to administer State law,

(79) Marshall, C. J., in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch (U.S.) 87 (i8o9): “The judicial department was introduced into the American Constitution under impressions, and with views, which are too apparent not to perceived by all. However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the States will administer justice as impartially as those of the Nation, to parties of every description, it is not less true that the Constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such indulgence the possible’ fears apprehensions of suitors, that it has established National tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different States.” Wayne, .]’., in Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. (U.S.) 33I, 354 55): “The foundation of the right of citizens of different States to sue each other in the Courts of the United States, is not an unworthy jealousy of the impartiality of the State tribunals. It was a higher aim and purpose. It is to make the people think and feel, though residing in different States of the Union, their relations to each other were protected by the strictest justice, administered in Courts independent of all local control or connection with the subject matter of the controversy between the parties to a suit.” Pitney, J’., in Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U.S. 46I, 478 (1915): it “was established for the very purpose of avoiding the influence of local opinion.” Bradley, J, in Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34 (1882): its object ,” to institute independent tribunals which it might be supposed would be unaffected by local prejudices and sectional views…. ”
See Curtis, J., dissenting in Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (U.S.) 393, 580 (1856): “Its purpose was to extend the judicial power to those controversies into which local feelings or interests might so enter as to disturb the course of justice, give rise to suspicions that they had done so, and thus possibly give occasion jealousy or ill will between different States. . .”
End footnotes.

the Senate amended the Draft Bill by adding Section 34, which in its final form read as follows: “The laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the Courts of the United States in cases where they apply.” Unquestionably the addition of this Section was intended to remove the objections of those who had opposed the Constitution and which had been expressed in 1787 by a prominent Massachusetts man as follows:

“Causes of all kinds between citizens of different States are to be tried before a Continental Court. The Court is not bound to try it according to the local laws where the controversies happen; for in that case it may as well be tried in the State Court. The rule which is to govern the new Courts must therefore be made by the Court itself, or by its employees, the Congress …. Congress, therefore, have the right to make rules for trying all kinds of questions relating to property between citizens of different States …. The right to appoint such Courts necessarily involves in it the right of defining their powers and determining the rules by which their judgment shall be regulated… It is vain to tell us that a maxim of common law required contracts to be determined by the law existing where the contract was made; for it is also a maxim that the Legislature has the right to alter the common law.” (80)

[Isn’t that nice, Congress can change the common law and you people traded one King for another that is worse because the King could not change common law like Congress can. This is why the anti-federalist was so dead set against a Congress and their con-stitution. Just think, you elect these same criminals year after year and is it any wonder they will not respond to Schultz or anyone else? They are god]

Until Judge Story, in 1842, in Swift v. Tyson,81 decided that the word “laws” in this section did not include the “common law” of the State, and that the Federal Courts in a State were free to decide questions of general commercial law for them-selves, it had never been held that there was even any doubt about the matter. The sole object for which this jurisdiction is vested in the Federal Courts, Judge Johnson had said in 1820, “is to secure to all the administration of justice upon the same principles upon which it is administered between citizens of the same State.” The object, Chief Justice Taney had said in 1838, “was to make the rules of decisions in the Courts of the United States, the same with those of ‘the States, taking care to preserve

(80) ,, Letters of Agrippa ,, (James Winthrop), Massachusetts Gazette, Dec. 11, 14, I787.
(81) 16 Pet. (U.S.) 1 (I842).

the rights of the United States by the exception contained in the same Section …. Justice to citizens of the several States required this to be done.” If this was so, then as has been said, Judge Story’s construction was “hardly possible, unless the purpose of the provision is ignored “; (82) but Story’s decision has been affirmed and extended by the Supreme Court from 1842 to the present day, with the result that, as to a large class of cases, that which was feared in 1787 has virtually taken place.(83) [ In other words, we, the men and woman in the states have been screwed if you haven’t already realized this.] The application of Story’s doctrine has resulted in the total reversal of the purposes for which Sections 11 and 34 were originally enacted. Diverse citizenship jurisdiction in the Federal Courts now, in many cases, instead of preventing a discrimination against a non-citizen, results in discrimination in their favor and against the citizen; and instead of making one law for all in a State, makes different law for citizen and non-citizen.

It now appears from an examination of the Senate Files, however, that if Judge Story and the Court had had recourse to those Files in preparing the decision in Swift v. Tyson, it is highly probable that the decision would have been different. and that the word “laws” in Section 34 would have been construed to include the common law of a State as well as the statute law. This conclusion will probably be reached by anyone who examines the original slip of paper on which the amendment containing Section 34 was written, and which is, with little doubt, . in Ellsworth’s handwriting.

(82) J.. B. Heiske, “Conflict between Federal and State Decisions.” 16 Am. L. Rev. 743, 747. “It remained for Mr. Justice Story to construe ‘ laws ‘ as ‘ statute laws,’ and so to defeat a great part of the object contemplated by the Constitution. If the reason for the grant of jurisdiction had been kept in view, it is inconceivable that such a construction could have been adopted.” GEORGE WHARTON ‘PEPPER, THE BORDERLAND OF FEDERAL AND STATE DECISIONS. See also William Trickett, “The Non-Federal Law Administered in Federal Courts,” 40 Am. L. Rev. 819.
(83) As an example of this, see the long line of municipal bond cases, in which the Federal Courts administer the law in one way in favor of a non-citizen, and the State Courts the law in another way, in favor of a citizen. “It is to be observed that the parties were to have been put on terms of equality- a construction which favors a non-resident brings about an evil as great as that which exists when bias is exerted in favor of a resident. A construction which makes a common carrier liable to non-residents in cases where it is not liable to residents brings about a state of affairs as unjust as if the reverse of that condition were true.” GEORGE WHARTON PEPPER,supra

[Not so today people – we are discriminated to the hilt, citizen and non citizen, to satisfy the fascist government, of which it truly is when looking at the private banking cartel operating the country via its purse strings. Then there are all the other corporations like the phone companies, drug companies etc etc. that actually make and collect taxes that the government cannot legally impose. Read the Cases of Importance on the atgpress web page to see what I mean as only one example. Do pull this Harvard Law Review and read and weep as you go along as there are 83 pages to read containing so much more info that you have to rethink and redo all your beliefs in the courts, and always remember the constitution was for them and not you. They just like you to think that so you can slide right into their trap when saying “I want my constitutional rights”. Well there are no constitutional rights and never have been, so your words are what kill your arguments. Your so-called “constitutional rights are mere privileges that a subject is given and called a right. The constitution is a charter of corporate powers, nothing more, nothing less, and it tells them what they can do and what they can’t do. And for them to have power over you, you must concede to their jurisdiction and you do by mouthing those mythical words “I want my constitutional rights,” for only subjects of the Corporate board can have anything to say on “constitutional (privileges) Rights.” That United States, is only Congress assembled and does not mean the executive or judiciary departments. That they are, departments of Congress Assembled. That’s why the Judiciary did not write the 1789 Judiciary Act, Congress did and you see it in the Harvard Law Review. One final thing I have to say on Admiralty and Revenue and that is for you to pull two cases that flat out states IRS revenue matters are based on Maritime.

They are United States v. $3,976.62 in Currency, One 1960 Ford Station Wagon Serial No. 0C66W145329 347, Federal Rules Decisions 564. Head note #1 states “Although, presumably for purposes of obtaining jurisdiction for forfeiture under Internal Revenue Laws is commenced as proceeding in admiralty, after jurisdiction is obtained proceeding takes on character of civil action at law, and at least at such stage of proceedings, Rules of Civil Procedure control, 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C. 1954) § 7323 (a); 40 U.S.C.A. § 304i; Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Rules 55 and (c), 60 and (b), 81(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. Admiralty Rules 2, 10, 21, 28 U.S.C.A.; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1355”

And this case;

United States of America v ONE 1966 CHEVROLET PICKUP TRUCK et al. Civ. A. No. 526 cited at 56 Federal Rules Decision 459 where in they state the controlling laws are, 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C. 1954) §§ 7325 (3); Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, Rules A, C (4,6), 28 U.S.C.A..; Federal Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 60 (b) (1,2) Fed. Rules, Civ Proc. Rules 55 (b), (1,2), 60, 28 U.S.C.A.

Yes, Title 28 is totally based on Admiralty and is the admiralty law Title for the Congress to operate under their 1789 Judiciary Act and the process is Civil, when you are hit with a “Revenue crime”. Now how many knew that revenue crimes are a Civil Matter? You have a lot to learn dear reader.

As Always
The Informer
June 1, 2003

When was State Sovereignty Lost?

When was State Sovereignty Lost?

The Informer
Prelude

I must start out with this prelude after writing the article below on sovereignty loss. I realized that people have not understanding of sovereignty and others that still control this land and people. This is similar to the Wizard of Oz after the curtain was lifted to just who the Wizard was. The curtain has not been lifted enough for the people of America to see.

To be absolutely correct on sovereignty, the people of 1776 to the present, have never been sovereign, period. Because the United States is a controlled corporation of the Crown, the people could never have been sovereign. All the people did, after the so-called revolutionary war, was trade the Corporation of England to be controlled by the Corporation of the States. These were plantation colonies of the Crown in corporate structure before the planned war. Those agents of the Crown, the founding father lawyers, controlled by the middle and inner temples of the Crown, took control of the states (colonies) in the 1787 contract/covenant/constitution. So technically and legally, and even lawfully, the common people like yu and I have never been sovereign.

Think about it and reflect on what I say. When Governor Caswell of North Carolina immediately eliminated the quitrent tax of the Crown and laid a property tax on the people and land, after becoming the first Governor, how on earth were the people sovereign? If they were sovereign there would be no way to lay a property tax and take that property if the people did not pay this tax. This happened in every state at that time, proving people were still controlled and were not sovereign. The article below was written with the mindset that all people have an understanding that the myth of sovereignty existed in this country for the common people.

When was State Sovereignty Lost?

The real beginnings of the demise of State sovereignty was 1787 with the erection of the US Constitution. The 1791 debacle of Washington was the second attack and the third started in earnest circa 1819 with the Bank case of McCulloch v Maryland. You have to know that Justice Marshall was a major stock holder in that bank with 7700 shares and was declared a Aforeign stockholder.” Yes, he was a Federal US judge and “citizen” of the U.S., but the bank was the foreign controlled Exchequer of England. That’s why he was deemed a Aforeign stockholder.” To rule contrary to his decision would have put his stock in peril. Money rules, correct? It does today and it did then.

Eastern and Northern States almost unanimously praised the decision of McCulloch.
On the other hand, the papers of the States upholding the theories of Jefferson and the strict States’ Rights doctrines bitterly assailed it. Niles’ Register of March 13 said:

“A deadly blow has been struck at the Sovereignty of the States, and from a quarter so far removed from the people as to be hardly accessible to public opinion ….We are awfully impressed with a conviction that the welfare of the Union has received a more dangerous wound than fifty Hartford Conventions, hateful as that assemblage was, could inflict . . . and which may be wielded to destroy the whole revenues and so do away with the Sovereignties of the States.”

The Richmond Enquirer said: “If such a spirit as breathes on this opinion is forever to preside over the judiciary, then indeed it is high time for the State to tremble; that all their great rights may be swept away one by one, that those sovereign States may dwindle into paltry and contemptible corporations.”
Chief Justice Marshall wrote to Judge Story, May 27, 1819
“This opinion in the Bank case continues to be denounced by the democracy in Virginia. An effort is certainly making to induce the Legislature which will meet in December, to take up the subject and to pass resolutions very like those which were called forth by the alien and sedition laws in I799 ….If the principles which have been advanced on this occasion were to prevail, the constitution would be converted into the old Confederation.”

Please note above that the states were corporations, not that they were going to be. They were corporations of the Crown in the newly formed King’s government named the States and United States. They were absorbed under the U.S. Constitution and became members of the Motherland corporation. This goes with exactly what was stated in James Montgomery’s works on the Crown controlling. Wizard, if you so wish to see after the curtain raising.

In 1821, the great question of State Sovereignty was again the important subject before the Court; and on March 3-5 Marshall rendered his opinion in Cohens v. Virginia (6 Wheaton, 264), reaffirming the supreme power of the Court to review decisions of the State courts in criminal as well as civil proceedings. Philip P. Barbour I and Alexander Smythe appeared for the State of Virginia, and William Pinkney and David B. Ogden for the plaintiff.
The decision caused much excitement in the newspapers of the country, and was bitterly attacked by the upholders of States’ Rights in letters and speeches.

Niles’ Register said, March 17, 1821:
“The decision was exactly such as expected for we presumed that that high tribunal would act consistently and on the termination of the case about the bank of the United States, McCulloch v. Maryland, we had no manner of doubt as to the result . . . and that the State Sovereignty would be taught to bow to the judiciary-of the United States. So we go. It seems as if almost everything that occurs had for its tendency that which every reflecting man deprecates.”

On July 7, 1821, Niles’ Register said:
“The decision . . . still claims the attention Of some of our ablest writers, and the correctness of it is contested with a fine display of talents and profound reasoning by `Algeron Sidney’ in the ‘Richmond Enquirer and Hampden’ in the Washington City Gazette – – to which we refer those who are not already satisfied on the subject. For ourselves, though not exactly prepared to submit, it seems as if it were required that all who do not subscribe to their belief in the infallibility of that court are in danger of political excommunication.”

Of the criticism on the case, Marshall wrote to Story,
June 15, 1821:
“The opinion of the Supreme Court in the lottery case has been assailed with a degree of virulence transcending what has appeared on former occasions . . . I think for coarseness and malignity of invention Algernon Sidney [Spencer Roane, Judge of the Virginia Court of Errors and Appeals] surpasses all party writers who have ever made pretensions to any decency of character.”

Corruption of the courts ran rampant then as it does now, only not quite as bad as now; see the next case. You can also see that Washington was a corporation then, as it always has been via the Crown’s control. This just bears out what James has and I have, on the corporate structure, via our researched documents.

Jefferson’s views of the opinion were vigorously expressed by him two years later in a letter to Judge William Johnson, June 12, 1823:
“On the decision of Cohens v. State of Virginia in the Supreme Court of the United States in March, 1821, Judge Roane (presiding judge of the Court of Appeals of Virginia) under the signature of Algernon Sidney wrote for the Enquirer a series of papers on the law of that case. I considered these papers maturely as they came out, and confess that they appeared to me to pulverize every word that had been delivered by Judge Marshall of the extra-judicial part of his opinion, and all was extra-judicial, except the decision that the act of Congress had not purported to give to the corporation of Washington the authority claimed by their lottery of controlling the laws of the States within the States themselves.
“The practice of Judge Marshall of travelling out of his case to prescribe what the law would be in a moot case not before the court is very irregular and very censurable.”

The most alarming effect of the opposition to the strong centralizing tendency of the Supreme Court opinions was the steady increase of propositions to limit the powers of that Court by legislation or constitutional amendment. Those who favored such measures pointed to the fact that between 1809 and 1822 the Court had exercised its power to declare unconstitutional, in whole or in part, nine statutes in eight States (Georgia, New Jersey, Virginia, New Hampshire, New York, Maryland, Louisiana and Pennsylvania).

Jefferson wrote, January 19, 1821:
“I am sensible of the inroads daily making by the Federal into the jurisdiction of its co-ordinate associates, the State governments. Its legislative and executive branches may sometimes err, but elections and dependence will bring them to rights. The judiciary branch is the instrument which, working like gravity, without intermission, is to press us at last into one consolidated mass.”

On September 2, 1821, he wrote:

“To consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions, is very dangerous doctrine indeed and one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. Our judges are as honest as other men, and not more so. They have, with others, the same passions for party, for power, and the privilege of their corps. Their maxim is ‘boni judices est amplifcare jurisdictionem,’ and their power the more dangerous, as they are in office for life and not responsible as the other functionaries are to the elective control. The Constitution has erected no such single tribunal, knowing that to whatever hands confided, with the corruptions of time and party, its members would become despots.”

Well, this is a revelation for those of you that just love the Supreme Court in all it’s corruption. We researchers have known this for a long time and they have become despots as have all other bar member judges.

On December 25, 1820, Jefferson had written to Thomas Ritchie:
“The judiciary of the United States is the subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly working underground to undermine the foundations of our confederated fabric. They are construing our Constitution from a coordination of a general and special government to a general and supreme one alone …. Having found from experience that impeachment is an impracticable thing, a mere scare-crow, they consider themselves secure for life; they skulk from responsibility to public opinion, the only remaining hold on them, under a practice first introduced into England by Lord Mansfield. An opinion is huddled up in conclave, perhaps by a majority of one, delivered as if unanimous, and with the silent acquiescence of lazy or timid associates, by a crafty chief judge who sophisticates the law to his mind by the turn of his own reasoning.
A judiciary independent of a king or executive alone is a good thing; but independence of the will of the nation is a solecism, at least in a republican government.”
See Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol X, pp. 169, 184, 197, 246.

And again, on March 4, 1823, he wrote:

“There is no danger I apprehend so much as the consolidation of our government, by the noiseless and therefore unalarming instrumentality of the Supreme Court.”

Already in 1807-1809, soon after the Burr trial, attempts had been made in each branch of Congress to amend the Constitution so that all judges should hold office for a term of years and be removable by the President on address by two-thirds of both Houses. This proposition was supported by resolves of the Legislatures of Pennsylvania and Vermont, as well as by the actions of the House of Delegates in Virginia and one branch of the legislature of Tennessee..

Well there you have it, the board of directors of the corporations of Washington and States are just doing what corporate officers want. Now comes the proof as to why you all are part of these corporations that James and I have stated over and over – – that citizenship is the bane of man, whether state or United States. Go ahead and vote . But, as Lysander Spooner said, it is a vote thrown to the winds and also snares you into their corporation as you vote for the CEO of that corporation as a “stockholder.” If you don’t believe me read on and you make the decision because corporate citizenship did not start with the 14th amendment, much to your surprise.

One other decision of the United States Supreme Court during this period had immense effect on the growth of modern corporate commerce.
From 1809 to 1844, it had been held by that Court, ever since the decision of Chief Justice Marshall in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux (5 Cranch, 61), that the Federal Courts had no jurisdiction on the ground of diverse citizenship, in a case where a corporation was a party, unless all the individual stockholders of the corporation were citizens of a State other than that of the other party to the suit. Such a doctrine of course greatly restricted the rights of a corporation to sue in a Federal Court, and made such suit almost impossible.
In 1844, however, in Louisville R. R v. Letson (2 Howard, 497) Chief Justice Taney delivered an opinion, taking the broad ground that a corporation, although an artificial person, was to be deemed an inhabitant of the State of its incorporation, and to be treated as a citizen of that State for purposes of suit. Of this case, Judge Story, wrote to Ex-Chancellor Kent, August 3I, I844:
“I equally rejoice, that the Supreme Court has at last come to the conclusion, that a corporation is a citizen, an artificial citizen, I agree, but still a citizen. It gets rid of a great anomaly in our jurisprudence. This was always Judge Washington’s opinion. I have held the same opinion for very many years, and Mr. Chief Justice Marshall had, before his death, arrived at the conclusion, that our early decisions were wrong.”

Now remember people, the states and United States are corporations as stated above. An inhabitant is a resident — is a citizen of that corporation and deemed an artificial character. Just look at the case of the United States v Penelope , Fed. Case 27 no. 16024 in my book The New History of America, page 69. “Inhabitant” and “resident” mean the same thing so said the court. Now you ask how did I become an artificial? By joint venture. This is also found in my New History at pages 10, 11, 21, 31,46, 47, 56, 69, 70, 75 and 90 because it is the lynchpin to your problems. Pull the N.C. Supreme court case 207 N.C. 831; 178 S.E. 587. In here is the explanation as to why they can tax you.

In 1853, in Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. (16 Howard, 314) it was held that there was a conclusive presumption of law that all the shareholders were citizens of the State of incorporation; and this was further strengthened by a decision in 1857, in Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd (20 Howard, 227) that parties were to be held estopped from denying such citizenship.

Although talking about railroad the same principle applies to states. As stated above, irrefutably, Washington is a corporation and has citizens. States are corporations and have citizens. Are you a citizen of either? Are you then in a “joint venture”? Do you claim to be a “resident” or “inhabitant?” Are you then a “person” by association with either corporation? Is this word in the definition of 26 U.S.C. 7701 (a) (1)? Therefore, under this rinciple a “U.S. citizen” is a citizen of the incorporating United States and that is why in 26 U.S.C 7701 (a) 39 it states what it does. Are you starting to get the picture? Not quite? Well read this as printed in my book.

Under “joint-venture” principle all people who are “citizens of the State” are United States citizens, and are in contract with the State in its corporate capacity. Therefore, if and when they buy property privately from the United States it does revert back to the State. They are only holding the property of the State in a fiduciary capacity paying rent in the form of an ad valorem tax. This is where the government has conned us again. It is a vicious cycle. Therefore, the U.S. can tax the fiduciary holding State property because they are citizens, or joint-venturers, with the State in its corporate capacity. This is because the states are nothing more than “Districts” of the U.S. [as stated in my book when quoting the 1868 Inaugural address of Governor Holden of north carolina at page 10] and due to the War Powers Act they are also “agents of the federal government.” This was discovered by Dr. Eugene Schroder in the “Health and Human Service Acts” of the states. This allows the U.S. to seek out and tax its subjects, people claiming “citizenship” of the state, for they are also U.S. citizens by congress’ definition of “individual,” See 5 USC 552a A 2.

Definition of Joint venture found in N.C. Supreme court case 207 N.C. 831; 178 S.E. 587

“In order to constitute a joint venture, a joint enterprise, or common purpose there must be an agreement [your claim of citizenship and/or registering to vote for the CEO] to enter into an undertaking in respect of which the parties have a community of interest and a common purpose for its performance. [don’t all citizens have a common interest?] * * *
There is no legal distinction between the phrases `joint enterprise’ and `prosecution of a common purpose.’ The effect of the formation of a joint enterprise is to make all members responsible for the negligence of any member available who injures a third person and to make the negligence of any member available as a defense by a third person to a recovery by another member.” [does this sound like social security?]

End of quoting my book at page 10 and 11.

These decisions not only opened the door wide to interstate commerce by corporations, but they were of vast importance in breaking down the barriers sought to be erected by the political supporters of the narrow States’ Rights doctrines, and in increasing the strength of the Federal power.
In one direction, the great growth of corporations made necessary the development of a branch of corporate law to which little attention had hitherto been paid — the limits of the scope of corporate action and the doctrine of ultra vires. As stated in the preface to the first book on this subject, Brice on Ultra Vires published in 1874, it is said:
“The doctrine of ultra virus is of modern growth. Its appearance as a distinct fact and as a guiding and rather misleading principle in the legal system of this country dates from about 1845, being first prominently mentioned in the cases, in equity of Colman v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co. (10 Beavan, 1) in 1846, and at law of East Anglian Ry. Co. v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co. (11 C. B. 775) in 1851.”
In the United States Supreme Court, however, in 1858, it was referred to as “not a new principle in the jurisprudence of this Court.”

For interesting articles on this subject see A Legal Fiction with its Wings Clipped, by S. E. Baldwin, in Amer. Law Review, Vol. XLI (1907). Abrogation of Federal Jurisdiction, by Alfred Russell, Harv. Law Review, Vol. VII (1892). Corporate Citizenship a Legal Fiction, by R. M. Benjamin, Albany Law Journal, Vol. LXIX (1907).

Well that’s about enough for you to absorb and please check this out as I am not perfect.

Sincerely,
The Informer
April 10, 2002

Tagged , ,

The common man never created the U.S. Constitution.

The Informer

Settling the matter that, the common man never created the U.S. Constitution nor was the Bill of Rights for him.

Since 1990 I have been preaching that the Constitution was never mine and the People in “We the People” was not the common man on the street, but rather the aristocracy of Hamilton, Jefferson, Adams, Washington, Jay and others. Lysander Spooner is another man in the 1800’s that had the same sentiments. He too showed that the constitution was not only NOT a contract with the people, but that none of the signers signed it with any conviction and it is evident that they only signed in a witness capacity, check it out for yourself by looking at how they signed the constitution and bound no one unless they agreed to the terms in the alleged contract called a constitution that they drafted.

The following is from the Cases in Constitutional law. I had used the John Barron case to prove my point that the common man on the street had nothing to do with creating the constitution quite a few years back.. The majority of the people put the constitution even before the word of the LORD ALMIGHTY, because they revere it so much they will say they will defend it. What they do not know is that the constitution gives unlimited power to those men who assume the power and jurisdiction over them and offers them no protection whatsoever. The hoopla of the government spin doctors have led the common man to believe the common man has protections built in to protect him. Nothing could be further from the truth. The lie is so big that people, even when shown, still revert back to the constitution as if it were GOD himself. It is only because of the teachings they had that was passed down from generation to generation. Just like the little boy believes in the big lie you tell him for the fist 5 to 7 years of his life that there is a Santa, Tooth fairy and Easter bunny. Small lies but still lies. He won’t believe there is none of the above when you tell him. It is more serious in real life, the lies that have been fed your relatives all the way back to 1776, and now when we researchers tell you the truth, you still want to believe in the Big Lie, just like the 5 year old wants to believe in Santa. I want to point out that what you read is not one word of mine, except where I make comments. I will bold those words that will draw your attention and make you see the light that I saw over 10 years ago. It is a slow process, to come to the realization that in order to control the people, they must be made to believe in (government) lies. Please note how the courts, after the John Barron case, have changed the meaning so that they can start changing what the genesis of the constitution was all about. They had to do this to keep the people 10 steps behind in figuring out what Patrick Henry warned, that the constitution was a document to enslave the people of America. So I start with the book, which is the same book I used describing the 16th Amendment, Direct and Indirect taxes. Remember it is what the enemy (government State and Federal) says that counts. Sometimes they tell us things in court cases that go right over our heads. They can’t say that we were not warned.

Chapter 16
The Nationalization of the Bill of Rights
Early Efforts To Extend the Bill of Rights to the States

BARRON v. BALTIMORE
7 Peters 243; 8 L. Ed. 672 (1833)

One of the bitter criticisms urged against our federal Constitution as it came from the hands of the Convention was that it contained no bill of rights. It was feared that without specific guarantees the civil rights and liberties of the people and the states would be at the mercy of the proposed national government. Ratification was secured, but with a tacit understanding that a bill of rights should promptly be added which should restrict the national government in behalf of individual liberty. That the early statesmen thought of a federal bill of rights only in terms of restrictions on national power is emphasized by Hamilton’s ingenious argument in The Federalist (No. 84) that since the proposed central government was one which possessed only the powers delegated to it, it would be not only unnecessary but unwise to prohibit it from doing things which were clearly outside the scope of its delegated authority.
When the First Congress convened, the House of Representatives proposed seventeen amendments in the nature of a bill of rights. One of these, the fourteenth, provided that “no state should infringe the right of trial by jury in criminal cases, nor the rights of conscience, nor the freedom of speech or of the press. This amendment, which was the only one restricting the powers of the states, was rejected by the Senate. The substance of the others was consolidated into twelve amendments, ten of which were finally ratified by the states.
The First Amendment indicates by its own language that it is directed only against the federal government, for it begins, “Congress shall make no law …. ” The other amendments are couched in terms of general prohibition; and in spite of the perfectly clear historical evidence as to the intention of those who framed them, it came to be argued that these guarantees of civil liberty ought to be construed as restrictions upon state and federal governments alike. Whether this view is correct is the issue involved in Barron v. Baltimore, the last constitutional decision in which Mr. Chief Justice Marshall participated.
While paving its streets, the city of Baltimore had diverted from their natural courses certain streams, with the result that sand and gravel were deposited near Barron’s wharf. The wharf, which had previously enjoyed the deepest water in the harbor, was rendered practically useless, for the deposits prevented the approach of vessels. A verdict of $4500 for Barron had been reversed by the state court of appeals, and a writ of error was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States. It was alleged by Barron that this action upon the part of the city constituted a violation of that clause of the Fifth Amendment which forbids taking private property for public use without just compensation. He insisted that this amendment, being a guarantee in behalf of individual liberty, ought to be construed to restrain the states as well as the national government.
The decision in Barron v. Baltimore has left an indelible impression on the development of civil rights in this country. While today Barron would have brought his case under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (which does restrict the states), the process of change by which parts of the Bill of Rights have come to be applicable to the states has been slow, uncertain, and confusing. While most rights in the Bill of Rights now do apply to the states, they do so only because they are essential to due process of law. The ruling in the present case that the Bill of Rights does not apply directly to the states has never been overruled.

Mr. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the court:

The judgment brought up by this writ of error having been rendered by the court of a State, this tribunal can exercise no jurisdiction over it unless it be shown to come within the provisions of the twenty-fifth section of the Judicial Act.
The plaintiff in error contends that it comes within that clause in the fifth amendment to the Constitution which inhibits the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. He insists that this amendment, being in favor of the liberty of the citizen, ought to be so construed as to restrain the legislative power of a State, as well as that of the United States. If this proposition be untrue, the court can take no jurisdiction of the cause.
The question thus presented is, we think, of great importance, but not of much difficulty.
The Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the of the individual States. Each State established a constitution for itself, and in that constitution provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government as its judgment dictated. . . . .
But it is universally understood, it is a part of the history of the day, that the great revolution which established the Constitution of the United States was not effected without immense opposition. Serious fears were extensively entertained that those powers which the patriot statesmen who then watched over the interests of our country, deemed essential to union, and to the attainment of those invaluable objects for which union was sought, might be exercised in a manner dangerous to liberty. In almost every convention by which the Constitution was adopted, amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recommended. These amendments demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the general government–not against those of the local governments.
In compliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed, to quiet fears thus extensively entertained, amendments were proposed by the required majority in Congress, and adopted by the States. These amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the State governments. This court cannot so apply them.
We are of opinion that the provision in the fifth amendment to the Constitution, declaring that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the States. We are therefore of opinion that there is no repugnancy between the several acts of the General Assembly of Maryland, given in evidence by the defendants at the trial of this cause in the court of that State, and the Constitution of the United States.
This court, therefore, has no jurisdiction of the cause, and [it] is dismissed.

Informer’s Comment: Ever wonder why the federal judges say, “don’t bring the constitution in my court?” Now you know why. So now we see the progression to hide this fact from the people in the states, who had no say whatsoever in drafting and creating the U.S. Constitution, by the courts dictating change by their decisions. Remember also, that the constitution of each of the states was never created or ratified by the common man either, for the same reasons the U. S. Constitution was never drafted nor ratified by the common man. So why do you all claim it is your constitution and Bill of Rights when it clearly is stated by the court that it is not?

In the next case please see if you can see RIGHTS mentioned. First the government granted “privileges” and after they were granted, they became rights under statute, only at the whim of the Congress. Today that is called “statutory rights” and NOT God given rights. That is why it was always a “privilege” to vote, because of the original restrictions, having property and money was the only criteria allowing those to vote. History has shown this to be so. That left the common man, who had no property or money in excess of 100 dollars silver, who you believe to have drafted both the Constitution and Bill of Rights, could not vote.

THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES 16 Wallace 36; 21 L. Ed. 394 (1873)

In the years prior to the Civil War the individual relied almost entirely on the constitution of his state for the protection of his rights and liberties. The Supreme Court had ruled in Barron v. Baltimore (1833) that the Bill of Rights limited only the national government, and with the exception of the Alien and Sedition Acts, Congress had passed no law which anyone seriously believed had violated these limitations. The ordinary citizen looked to the state legislature to protect his person and property from private interference, and to the state bill of rights for protection against injury by his state government. Certainly he did not, and could not, expect the national government to step in and protect him either from his neighbor or from his state government.
At the close of the Civil War it seemed clear that without the intervention of the federal government the Southern states would by legislative restrictions strip the newly freed Negro of most of the ordinary rights and immunities of free citizens. To place the civil rights of the Negro upon a firm basis Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment authorizing the national government to step in and protect the Negro against actions by his own state government. The states were forbidden to take life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or to deny anyone the equal protection of the laws. The amendment defined United States citizenship in terms which included the Negro, and the states were forbidden to make laws abridging the privileges and immunities of that citizenship.
Exactly what the framers of the amendment intended to include in the phrase “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States” is not altogether clear, and there is evidence to indicate that it was not clear even to the framers. Some apparently believed that the clause would include within its protection those basic rights enjoyed by all persons–such as the right to marry, to own property, to do business, and to move about freely. Others thought that it would include all or part of the protections listed in the federal Bill of Rights. In the Slaughter-House Cases the Court held that the privileges and immunities clause protected none of these rights, and from this decision the Court has never retreated.
The Slaughter-House Cases were the first cases brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, and they had nothing whatever to do with the rights of freedmen. The case arose on the following facts: the Reconstruction or “carpetbag,’ government in Louisiana, unquestionably under corrupt influence, had granted a monopoly of the slaughterhouse business to a single concern, thus preventing over one thousand other persons and firms from continuing in that business. The validity of the law was attacked under the Fourteenth Amendment. The case was argued before the Supreme Court twice and was decided by a majority of five to four.
The importance of the case can hardly be overestimated. By distinguishing between state citizenship and national citizenship, and by emphasizing that the rights and privileges of federal citizenship do not include the protection of ordinary civil liberties such as freedom of speech and press, religion, etc., but only the privileges which one enjoys by virtue of his federal citizenship, the Court averted, for the time being at least, the revolution in our constitutional system apparently intended by the framers of the amendment and reserved to the states the responsibility for protecting civil rights generally. Nor has the Court been willing to expand the scope of the privileges and immunities clause beyond this early, limited interpretation. Five years before the Slaughter-House Cases the Supreme Court had held void, in Crandall v. Nevada (1868), a state tax on transporting persons out of the state, on the ground that such a tax would obstruct the citizen in his inherent federal right to come to the seat of his government. Two members of the Court, while concurring in the judgment, held the tax to be a violation of the commerce clause. In his opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases, Mr. Justice Miller cites this freedom of movement as an example of the privileges and immunities of United States citizens, and in 1941 in Edwards v. California, four members of the Court strongly urged that the California “anti-Okie” law should be held invalid on this ground. The majority had rested their decision, as had the minority in the Crandall case, upon the commerce power.
Had the Slaughter-House Cases been decided 25 years later, the Louisiana statute would in all probability have been invalidated as a deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. But the majority of the Court disposed rather summarily of these clauses by holding in substance that the due process of law clause was not a limitation on the state’s police power and that the equal protection of the laws clause, equally inapplicable, would probably never be invoked except for the protection of the Negro. It is important to bear in mind that Mr. Justice Miller’s comments about the due process and equal protection clauses no longer state the law. The Court has long since given those clauses the broadest possible applicability. There have, in fact, been more cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment than on any other phase of constitutional law.
It looked for a time (1935-1940) as though the Court might also broaden the scope and applicability of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Colgate v. Harvey (1935) the Court held void a provision of a Vermont income tax law which taxed income from money loaned outside the state at a higher rate than that loaned inside the state. Besides denying the equal protection of the laws, this act was held to abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. The right to carry on business freely across state lines was declared to be a privilege or immunity of federal citizenship, a doctrine sharply differing from the rule of Slaughter-House Cases. In 1939, in Hague v. CIO, involving the validity under the Fourteenth Amendment of various repressions of free speech, assembly, etc., in Jersey City, two justices of the Supreme Court from the majority held that the right of citizens to assemble and discuss their rights under the National Labor Relations Act was a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. There was also speculation as to whether protection against unreasonable searches and seizures was also a privilege and immunity of federal citizenship, but no decision was made on that point. There was sharp dissent in both cases against this tendency to enlarge the scope of the privileges and immunities clause; and in Madden v. Kentucky (1940), in a case similar to Colgate v. Harvey, the Court specifically overruled that case and returned to the timeworn narrow construction of the privileges and immunities clause embodied in the Slaughter-House Cases.

Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the Court, saying in part:

The plaintiffs in error accepting this issue, allege that the statute is a violation of the Constitution of the United States in these several particulars:

Informer’s comment: The Plaintiffs lost because the constitution of the United States did not apply to them and the amendments did not apply to the states. The part of the decision of Miller states, “But with the exception of these and a few other restrictions, the entire domain of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the states, as above defined, lay within the constitutional and legislative power of the states, AND WITHOUT that of the federal government.” Emphasis mine.

Now I hope all you understand that the Bill of Rights, as originally adopted, DID NOT belong to the people that lived in the states and they did not, contrary to the big lie they are led to believe, create the Bill of Rights, just like they did not create the Constitutions of the United States, much less the state constitution where they live. The common man never ratified any constitution.

Now in Nebbia v New York 291 U.S. 502, Justice Roberts stated, “So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other constitution restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adopted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. . . .

Informer’s Comment: People, “public welfare” means government welfare, NOT your welfare. How many believe when they say “public,” that it means you and me? Probably 95 percent of you think this way. Not so, the government is termed public. Ever hear the term “public office?” That is easy to understand it means government office. Why is it so difficult to understand the “public welfare clause “means government welfare and not your welfare? Therefore, as stated by the Nebbia court, the federal courts are without authority to override the state’s domain.

BUT, the problem has completely gone away and with the advent of the War Powers the Congress and the President now control all states and actually throws out all these court arguments because “Public Policy” (Government AKA Congress’s Policy) over rules all law except what they drafted after the Reconstruction Acts. The enemy, that is the common man, has no rights, State or otherwise under emergency power control. And, even if we were to revert back to peace time and be under no emergency rule, the Constitution would still not protect you nor the Bill of Rights against State control. Now that blows the 2nd Amendment right out of the water because it only applies to the People of the United States and NOT to the people of the States. Go an Pull the entire John Barron case to see where they addressed every item in the Bill of Rights and how they do not pertain to the people in the states, with the exception of one.

Have a nice day.

Sincerely, The Informer

Fiction of Law

The Informer

FICTION OF LAW

Well People, It’s about time to wake up and smell the coffee. What I am about to give you is nothing but the truth from the courts and laws of the United States. When you know what to look for you will find it in the oddest places. Places that the ordinary man would not expect to find it. Every one talks about government being a corporation as cited in 28 USC 3002 (15). Every one complains when taken to court where is the contract. All people argue these contracts, whether implied, adhesion or what ever. So there is a lot in common with all the arguments. Of course when you go into court you most always lose even when bringing in the law, regulations and court cases that you feel supports your position.

For years now I have been trying to make people understand that citizenship, of what ever government nature, is what sucks you into being a taxpayer, or requiring you to get whatever license is needed to survive and being controlled by government (corporation). How the government operates is by Fiction of Law. A fiction of law is stated from Lectric Law Library on the net as follows:

The assumption that a certain thing is true, and which gives to a person or thing a quality which is not natural to it, and consequently establishes, a certain disposition, which, without the fiction, would be repugnant to reason and to truth. It is an order of things which does not exist, but which the law prescribes or authorizes. It differs from presumption because it establishes as true, something which is false; whereas presumption supplies the proof of something true.

The law never feigns what is impossible. Fiction is like art; it imitates nature, but never disfigures it. It aids truth, but it ought never to destroy it. It may well suppose that what was possible, but which does not exist; but it will never feign that what was impossible actually is.

Fictions were invented by the Roman praetors who, not possessing the power to abrogate the law, were nevertheless willing to derogate from it under the pretense of doing equity. Fiction is the resource of weakness which, in order to obtain its object, assumes as a fact what is known to be contrary to truth: when the legislator desires to accomplish his object, he need not feign, he commands. Fictions of law owe their origin to the legislative usurpations of the bench.

It is said that every fiction must be framed according to the rules of law, and that every legal fiction must have equity for its object. To prevent their evil effects, they are not allowed to be carried further than the reasons which introduced them necessarily require.

The law abounds in fictions. That an estate is in abeyance; the doctrine of remitter, by which a party who has been disseised of his freehold and afterwards acquires a defective title, is remitted to his former good title; that one thing done today, is considered as done at a preceding time by the doctrine of relation; that because one thing is proved, another shall be presumed to be true, which is the case in all presumptions; that the heir, executor, and administrator stand by representation in the place of the deceased are all fictions of law. “Our various introduction of John Doe and Richard Roe; our solemn process upon disseisin by Hugh Hunt; our casually losing and finding a ship (which never was in Europe) in the parish of St. Mary Le Bow, in the ward of Cheap; our trying the validity of a will by an imaginary wager of five pounds; our imagining and compassing the king’s death, by giving information which may defeat an attack upon an enemy’s settlement in the antipodes; our charge of picking a pocket or forging a bill with force and arms; of neglecting to repair a bridge, against the peace of the king, his crown and dignity are circumstances, which, looked at by themselves, would convey an impression of no very favorable nature, with respect to the wisdom of our jurisprudence.”

Now notice that Assumption is the word used to describe how fiction operates. The word presumption is the opposite, see opening paragraph for this sentence “It differs from presumption because it establishes as true, something which is false; whereas presumption supplies the proof of something true.”
Now lets use this material from Black’s 3rd Edition Law book and a case to wit:

Fiction. Derived from Fictio in Roman Law, a fiction is defined as a false averment on the part of the Plaintiff which the defendant is not allowed to traverse, the object being to give the court jurisdiction. Black’s Law Dictionary 3rd Ed. (1969) Pg. 468; In the case of “Willful failure to File,” the Plaintiff and court invents the “fiction” that defendant is a “taxpayer”, A.K.A. “Person.” Motions and briefs which rely on precepts of law will thereafter be denied or found frivolous. This point was made clear in Roberts v. Commissioner, 176 F 2d 221, 225 (9 C.A., 1949)

Now you know why all your arguments are frivolous. You are a fiction and fictions have no constitutional protection from encroachment on your unalienable rights. What is this fiction that you are? This is a list of words or phrases that describe a fiction, remembering “fiction” is artificial in character, PERSON, RESIDENT, U.S. CITIZEN, STATE CITIZEN, and INDIVIDUAL.

I am using the full case as it is so important, not only for the fact that I am writing on Fiction of Law, but other parameters that I have written long ago and that people pooh-poohed it as ridiculous as it dealt with admiralty. I had showed where both revenue and driving was maritime in nature and almost everyone said I was way off base even though I had shown, through Benedict on Admiralty, that licensing and registering your car was in the nature of maritime. So all revenue situations, Income tax and Driving are in the admiralty jurisdiction because of the maritime nature. That is why the courts will not tell you the nature is maritime and the cause is that you have violated your promise to perform under fiction of law. Now you are going to say, oh no the Informer is going off the deep end again. Well hear these cases out and the Fiction of Law premise. Take off the blinders you have had on so long and use the brain that the Lord gave you. The Lord did say that not all that have eyes to see will see and, therefore, if you do not see you will forever be doomed to the existence you have. I am going to bold, in the case, to show how maritime is used whenever you carry passengers for hire, be it boat, plane, wagon, scooter, rickshaw or car. Do not lose sight of the fact that you are a fiction and have contracted with government when reading this case. Oh by the way go to Find Law and search for Fiction of Law and have a good time reading.

U.S. Supreme Court
ARCHAWSKI v. HANIOTI, 350 U.S. 532 (1956)
350 U.S. 532
ARCHAWSKI ET AL. v. HANIOTI.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT.
No. 351.
Argued March 5, 1956.
Decided April 9, 1956.

A libel in admiralty alleged that petitioners paid moneys to respondent for transportation to Europe on respondent’s vessel, and that respondent breached the contract by abandonment of the voyage. The libel further alleged that respondent wrongfully appropriated the passage money to his own use and committed other fraudulent acts. Held: The cause of action alleged
was within the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal District Court. Pp. 532-536.

(a) The essential character of the libel as a claim for breach of a maritime contract was not altered by the allegations of wrongfulness and fraud. Pp. 534-535.

(b) So long as the claim asserted arises out of a maritime contract, the admiralty court has jurisdiction over it. P. 535.

(c)Admiralty has jurisdiction even where a libel reads like indebitatus assumpsit at common law, provided that the unjust enrichment arose out of the breach of a maritime contract. Pp. 535-536.

223 F.2d 406, reversed and remanded.

Harry D. Graham argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.

Israel Convisser argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The sole question in the case is whether the cause of action alleged comes within the admiralty jurisdiction of the District Court. The District Court held that this was an action on a maritime contract, within the admiralty jurisdiction, 129 F. Supp. 410. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the suit was in the nature of the [350 U.S. 532, 533] old common law indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received, based upon the wrongful withholding of money. 223

F.2d 406. The case is here on a petition for certiorari which we granted, 350 U.S. 872, because of the seeming conflict of that ruling with Krauss Bros. Co. v. Dimon S. S. Corp., 290 U.S. 117, 124.1

The libel alleges that respondent, doing business in his own and in various trade names, owned and controlled a passenger vessel, known as the City of Athens, and held out that vessel as a common carrier of passengers for hire, and that petitioners paid moneys for passage upon the vessel, scheduled for July 15, 1947, to Europe. A contract for the transportation of passengers is a maritime contract within admiralty jurisdiction.2 The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411. The allegations so far mentioned are plainly sufficient to establish such a contract. The libel goes on to allege a breach of that contract through an abandonment of the voyage. If this were all, it would be plain that petitioners stated a claim for breach of a maritime contract. But the libel further alleges that the sums paid by petitioners as passage money were “wrongfully and
deliberately” applied by respondent to his own use and benefit “in reckless disregard of his obligations to refund [350 U.S. 532, 534] the same” and that respondent “has secreted himself away and manipulated his assets . . . for the purpose of defrauding” petitioners. Then follow allegations of certain fraudulent acts and transactions.

The allegations of wrongfulness and fraud do not alter the essential character of the libel. For the ancient admiralty teaching is that, “The rules of pleading in the admiralty are exceedingly simple and free from technical requirements.” Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Vance, 19 How. 162, 171-172. And see 2 Benedict, American Admiralty (6th ed. 1940), 223, 237. Though these particular allegations of the libel sound in fraud or in the wrongful withholding of moneys, it is plain in the context that the obligation to pay the moneys arose because of a breach of the contract to transport passengers. Lawyers speak of the obligation in terms of indebitatus assumpsit, a concept whose tortuous development gave expression to “the ethical character of the law.” See Ames. The History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 53, 58 (1888). As Mr. Justice Holmes once put it, “An obligation to pay money generally is enforced by an action of assumpsit and to that extent is referred to a contract even though it be one existing only by fiction of law.” Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221, 235.

I HAVE INCLUDED A PORTION OF THIS CASE AFTER THIS ONE,
THE INFORMER.

The fiction sometimes distorted the law. A line of authorities emerged to the effect that admiralty had no jurisdiction to grant relief in such cases “because the implied promise to repay the moneys which cannot in good conscience be retained – necessary to support the action for money had and received – is not a maritime contract.”3 United Transp. & L. Co. v. New York
& B. T. Line, 185 F. 386, 391. Yet that duty to pay is often referable, [350 U.S. 532, 535] as here, to the breach of a maritime contract. As Mr. Justice Stone said in Krauss Bros. Co. v. Dimon S. S. Corp., supra, at 124:

“. . . Even under the common law form of action for money had and received there could be no recovery without proof of the breach of the contract involved in demanding the payment, and the basis of recovery there, as in admiralty, is the violation of some term of the contract of affreightment, whether by failure to carry or by exaction of freight which the contract did not authorize.”

The truth is that in a case such as the present one there is neither an actual promise to repay the passage moneys nor a second contract. The problem is to prevent unjust enrichment from a maritime contract. See Morrison, The Remedial Powers of the Admiralty, 43 Yale L. J. 1. 27 (1933). A court that prevents a maritime contract from being exploited in that way does not
reach beyond the domain of maritime affairs. We conclude that, so long as the claim asserted arises out of a maritime contract, the admiralty court has jurisdiction over it.

The philosophy of indebitatus assumpsit is, indeed, not wholly foreign to admiralty. Analogous conceptions of rights based on quasi-contract are found in admiralty. One who saves property at sea has the right to an award of salvage, regardless of any agreement between him and the owner. See Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 2 Cranch 240, 266; The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 390; 1 Benedict, supra, 117 et seq. Likewise, where cargo is jettisoned, the owner becomes entitled to a contribution in general average from the owners of other cargo which was saved without the aid of any agreement. See Barnard v. Adams, 10 How. 270, 303-304; Star of Hope, 9 Wall. 203, 228-230; 1 Benedict, supra, 98. Other examples could be given. See Chandler, Quasi Contractual Relief [350 U.S. 532, 536] in Admiralty, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 23 (1928). Rights which admiralty recognizes as serving the ends of justice are often indistinguishable from ordinary quasi-contractual rights created to prevent unjust enrichment. How far the concept of quasi-contracts may be applied in admiralty it is unnecessary to decide. It is sufficient this day to hold that admiralty has jurisdiction, even where the libel reads like indebitatus assumpsit at common law, provided that the unjust enrichment arose as a result of the breach of a maritime contract. Such is the case here.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Footnotes

[Footnote 1] There is also an apparent conflict with Sword Line v. United States, 228 F.2d 344, 346, decided, after we granted certiorari, by a different panel of the Second Circuit from the one which sat in the instant case.

[Footnote 2] The Court in New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v. Merchants’ Bank, 6 How. 344, 392, stated that in determining admiralty jurisdiction the inquiry is “into the nature and subject-matter of the contract, – whether it was a maritime contract, and the service a maritime service, to be performed upon the sea, or upon waters within the ebb and flow of the
tide. And, again, whether the service was to be substantially performed upon the sea, or tide-waters, although it had commenced and had terminated beyond the reach of the tide; if it was, then jurisdiction has always been maintained.”

[Footnote 3] And see Israel v. Moore & McCormack Co., 295 F. 919; Home Ins. Co. v. Merchants’ Transp. Co., 16 F.2d 372; Silva v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 163 F.2d 602. [350 U.S. 532, 537]

The following is the case cited above that bears importance on the fiction and how you are compelled to pay an income tax for your contract with the government. It is based on a level of a dollar amount which is the possession and use of a federal Reserve Note which is a debt you had and received in a transfer to which you are to pay back a portion for the use of the notes. This is based on the promise to follow all the rules and regs as a citizen of, resident therein of the contract, by implied consent for accepting the artificial character of individual, which is a word definition defining person in statute that is the subject of liability. When reading the following replace “stockholder”/”members” with citizen/person/ resident and “corporation” with State or United States.

Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221, 235.
There remains only the question whether the liability is of a kind that will be enforced outside of the California courts. Analysis on this point often is blurred by the vague statement that the liability is ‘contractual.’ An obligation to pay money generally is enforced by an action of assumpsit, and to that extent is referred to a contract, even though it be one existing only by fiction of law. But such obligations when imposed upon the members of a corporation may very very largely. The incorporation may create a chartered partnership the members of which are primary contractors, or it may go no farther than to impose a penalty; or again, it may create a secondary remedy for a debt treated as that of the corporation alone, like the right to attach the corporation’s real estate; or the liability may be inseparable from the local procedure; or the law may be so ambiguous as to leave it doubtful whether the liability is matter of remedy, and local, or creates a contract on the part of the members that will go with them wherever they are found McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 161 49 L. ed. 702, 705, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410, 3 Ann. Cas. 500; Christopher v. Norvell, 201 U.S. 216, 225, 226 S., 50 L. ed. 732, 736, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, 5 Ann. Cas. 740. In the present case we think that there can be no doubt of the meaning of the California statute. It reads: ‘Each stockholder of a corporation is individually and personally liable for such proportion of its debts and liabilities,’ etc., as we have stated, and supposes the action against him to be brought ‘upon such debt.’ Civil Code, 322. This means that by force of the statute, if the corporation incurs a debt within the juris- [232 U.S. 221, 236] diction, the stockholder is a party to it, and joins in the contract in the proportion of his shares.

Now, I hope you are ready to understand what you have read. All statutes are written for persons, residents, individuals and are premised on one thing, citizenship. Citizenship means you are a member of the corporate body politic of the state or federal government. So go ahead and call yourself a citizen of so and so state and you immediately become a “stockholder” of that State and assume all its debts. Plus the fact that the State you claim citizenship in is a “political subdivision” of the United States. Since all States are corporations and have joined the parent corporation, The United States, you are bound to a contract as stated in the cases above. Now you have ASSUMED the character of a FICTION OF LAW, namely that of a person, to which all statutes apply. Now in the definition of person the word INDIVIDUAL describes person in 26 USC 7701 (a) (1). In my books, The New History of America and Which One Are You. I used two cases wherein the Judges stated that the defendants did not dispute that they were NOT United States citizens so they were taxpayers. Why people did not pick up on this is because there is very little logical thinking minds anymore to deduce the obvious.

Here is how you become part of a contract, that all talk about existing, but no one can figure out where this contract is, to promise to pay the debt of the State and United States. As the above cases states, it is where ever the person (stockholder/member) is that the jurisdiction follows. That is why the IRS can go into a State contrary to what you all believe that they can not. Oh yes they can, and you did it to yourself when using a fiction of law and they came right back on that fiction of law and nailed you with your own actions which you cannot shake no matter how hard you try. They even went to Mexico to get the person, and when you now read Cook v Tate, it will become so clear that you will wonder why you did not see it before. You did not see it before because you did not have this information before you to digest.

Here is how they did it and looking back to the cases above it should be evident to you.

You are born a MAN, not a person, or individual. God created MAN. Did God create person, individual or citizen? No statutes are written with Man in them, only person. For only artificial entities can go after other artificial entities, they cannot attack MAN. Read “PERSON” article written on http://www.atgpress.com/ for further clarification. The constitution is for members only, the States, not people. People cannot join the Union. To prove it try to join the Union. States are corporations. People, MAN, can become a member of a State by registering to vote or taking an oath to support that contract called a constitution. Once doing that you are a stockholder and therefore a citizen of that state. Citizen is an artificial character and a Fiction of Law. The statutes of contract are geared toward person which is artificial in character. Now that you have claimed citizenship of a State, you are deemed by the Courts as a person of artificial character. Artificial characters have no constitutional protections and are in the same class as other artificial entities (corporations). To prove this look at the words that define person in 26 U.S.C. 7701 (a) (1) which are individual, corporation, association, partnership, trust, estate, and company, all being artificial entities. Being this is so,your part of the debt of the government is predicated on the membership (read in the case above), wherever you might be. The debt the State has to the United States, as a Union member, is transferred to all its members to pay a federal income tax. So it matters not where you are the IRS can go into the state, any state, and has jurisdiction because you are a “person” described in the statutes who is resident in their political subdivision, the state.

So you are taken into court and claim that you are a sovereign citizen. Remember “citizen” is an artificial entity, a Fiction of Law. “Citizen” is not natural. So the court notes you, by your own admission, are a “member” of the body politic and proceeds on that Fiction of Law. You argue you are not the person liable because the statutes do not define the activity that makes you liable. The fact of the matter is, is that you are the “person” in the statute and the taxpayer in 7701 (a) (14). The person is what makes you liable, not so much the activity. So as was posted in the Cooper case on the internet, that everyone wants to believe that the use of the post office makes for dual citizenship is totally wrong. Dual citizenship is predicated on the fact you are a “member” of a political subdivision (State)of the United States, ergo have dual citizenship for taxation as you are responsible for the debts of both corporations, the State and the United States. So you are an “individual” required to file an individual income tax form. I include an excerpt from The New History of America that proves the point.

U.S. v Slater, 82-2 USTC 9571
“There is a tax imposed, in 26 U.S.C. Sec. 1, on the income of `every individual.’ No provision exists in the tax code exempting from taxation persons who, like Slater, characterize themselves as somehow standing apart from the American polity, and the defendant cites no authority supporting his position. Slater’s protestations to the effect that he derives no benefit from the United States government have no bearing on his legal obligation to pay income taxes. (cites omitted) Unless the defendant can establish that he is NOT a citizen of the United States, the IRS possesses authority to attempt to determine his federal tax liability.”
Notice the last sentence, and also, they can only attempt on a U.S. citizen. Now to the other case which is an Appeal in the Seventh Circuit and she lost;

Rachel Templeton v Internal Revenue Service, 86-1363 on appeal from 85 C 457.
“Finally, we address Templeton’s second argument in which she claims that she is not a ‘person liable’ or a ‘taxpayer’, as those terms are defined by the Internal Revenue Code and the relevant case law, and as a result that the provisions of section 6103 do not apply in her case. We agree with the district court that this claim is patently frivolous. As Templeton does NOT dispute that she is a citizen of the United States, and because the Code imposes an income tax on `every individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States,’ 26 C.F.R. Sec. 1.1-(1) (a) (1985), it would clearly contradict the ‘plain meaning’ of the term to conclude that Congress did not intend that Templeton be considered a ‘taxpayer’ as the term is used throughout the Code.”
In both cases the people claimed to be citizens of (belonging to) the United States, so the tribunals were absolutely right in their determinations because they fell under 26 Sec. 1 in USC and CFR. Most certainly they consented to the jurisdiction in question. Argue against their codes as mightily as you want, it matters not. They joined the insurance club as Spooner stated, didn’t they?

END OF EXCERPT.

I don’t know how much plainer it can get. That is why I published the fact that “in law” person, resident, and individual are all artificial entities. They are working a fiction of law because you fell right into legal terminology while NOT, in your mind, thinking the “legal” definitions applied to these terms. You helped put the nail in your own coffin so to speak, by helping the fiction of law prevail against you. So all the law that you use as a defense is for naught. As evidenced from the Slater and Templeton case, this is exactly what has happened all across this country in every court case before that time, (look at the Cook v Tate Case) and every case after that. Now you can appreciate why you lose by this definition statement to wit;

” a fiction is defined as a false averment on the part of the Plaintiff which the defendant is not allowed to traverse, the object being to give the court jurisdiction. Black’s Law Dictionary 3rd Ed. (1969) Pg. 468; In the case of “Willful failure to File,” the Plaintiff and court invents the “fiction” that defendant is a “taxpayer”, A.K.A. “Person.” Motions and briefs which rely on precepts of law will thereafter be denied or found frivolous.”

Now, this is not a false averment on the Plaintiff because YOU created the fiction of law either by your actions, or inactions in denying that, you are a registered voter; a resident of a State; a person, a individual; a member of a State; a citizen of a State; a United States citizen; that your constitution is designed to protect you, OR, claiming that you are a sovereign citizen. Use any of these and you, not them, are operating a fiction of law. Do you think they are going to tell you all these things? NO!

So let me play devil’s advocate. If you are a “Sovereign citizen” and claim they are your servants, you are supposed to know all the law that your servants are to use and you would not use any of the terms listed in the above paragraph. So why do you use those terms? Using these terms proves that sovereign citizen is truly an oxymoron as I have always stated. The reason is, sovereign is the opposite of citizen. This is what the masses and the most educated so called “patriot” cannot fathom because of the fraud and deceit placed upon you since childhood. You carry the fraud with you to your grave and in doing so pass it on to your children so everyone believes there is this thing called sovereign citizen. Why people cannot think for themselves is beyond me. All one has to do is research the word citizen to see he is under a legal disability, while Sovereign is not under any legal disability. The equivalent, respectively, are prose/pro per and sui juris. Legal terms are not common terms and are drafted to deceive.

So who is working a fiction of law that will never allow you to prevail? It is not the government. It is you. The government courts are only following the law and what you say. Place yourself as the judge and you know the “legal terms” that apply in court. You are bound by oath to give justice. A man comes before you and claims he is a “person”, only not one liable to pay a income tax. He also claims he is a sovereign citizen of the State of So & So. He brings in the argument that there is no statute stating he is required to file an income tax form or pay a tax. Knowing he has just stated Fictions of law, you have to rule by the law. The law says person liable. He stated he was a person. Since this “person” has received a transfer over a certain sum of debt obligations, he, is made liable for the use and transfer of these debt obligations, see ‘Use and Transfer’ and ‘Is this what makes you liable’, on atgpress.com. This man did all the work for you in presenting all the fictions of Law to convict him. You, as a judge cannot rule against the law. See my point? Well this concludes another facet of our problem. Not one single argument will win, but this is as close as you are going to get. All the articles on http://www.atgpress.com/ dovetail to make a neat package. I give this freely so that YOU, and no one else, can make the decision that I am lying or telling the truth. As I say, check my information out and everyone that states it is wrong. Leave no stone unturned, as you are the one that suffers, not us.

Sincerely,

The Informer