Update: ALL CHARGES FROM ARREST ON 2/17/09 HAVE BEEN DISMISSED!
After over 5 court appearances all charges have been dismissed by order of the court. There were 4 hearings related to the challenge I made involving jurisdiction and no probable cause for the stop. I did finally get copies from the dashboard video from cars driven by Alemond and Nyman. After I received the video the cops refused to appear for the next hearing date which would have revealed the lies, misrepresentations, and fabrications in their report and how it does not match the video. I’ll arrange all this information later, but I’m providing links to the documents issued by the court as well as my motions.
Transcripts of Proceedings
Record of Proceedings 8-24-09 First Appearance
Record of Proceedings 9-30-09 Second Appearance
Record of Proceedings 10-26-09 Third Appearance
Record of Proceedings 11-30-09 Case Dismissed
Pleadings and Motions
My first pleading, a demurrer to the charges.
Associated motion to dismiss
Pretial Motion for Discovery
Motion to Reconsider
Motion to Quash Warrant
Motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction for no DL
Court orders dismissing charges
Order dismissing no DL
Order for fleeing and eluding dismissal
Order dismissing 4 remaining charges
Criminal complaints I will be filing against Alemond and Nyman
Civil Suit Filed Against Fairview Heights, Alemond and Nymann
Lawsuit, as filed, on Feb. 17, 2010
Summons for City of Fairview Heights, Aaron Nyman, and Joshua Alemond
Excessive Use of Force by Fairview Heights, Ill. Police for a traffic stop on 2/17/09 on Highway 159.
This is all courtesy of the arresting, and beating, “officer”, JOSHUAH M ALEMOND and AARON NYMAN
Statement of Marc MkKoy (To the best of my recollection at the time after being beaten, Tasered, and suffering blows to the head)
I got off work at 2a.m. CDT on 2/17/2009. I departed my place of work and proceeded north on Highway 159. I proceeded through Swansea, IL, and then through Fairview Heights, IL. The speed limit from Swansea to Fairview Hts. is 45mph. I maintained my speed within that limit. When I reached Fairview Hts. the limit reduces to 35mph. I continued at that speed until I reached the intersection of Highway 159 and Rt. 50. where I stopped at a light for less than a minute. Looking into my rear view mirror, I noticed headlights approaching from the rear’‚ Before the vehicle could reach me the light turned green and I resumed my travels northbound on Hwy. 159. I noticed in my rear view mirror that the approaching vehicle turned east on Rt. 50 where a police light-bar was visible on the vehicle. It was a police cruiser.
I continued north on Hwy. 159 through Fairview Hts. and reached the last traffic control light before heading out of the City. This light is at an intersection that leads to a gas station to the right and a shopping plaza to the left. Just past that light is a facility known as “The Fountains”. Past that point it is nothing but 4 lanes of Hwy. 159 leading to Collinsville, Il.
As I reached the last traffic control light I noticed another vehicle approaching rather quickly.‚ I thought might be just another person driving fast since a police car just turned west. I maintained my position in the left lane of northbound Hwy. 159, using my high-beams when possible and dimming when another vehicle approached. I proceeded north for about a half mile while noticing the vehicle I saw approaching quickly was now maintaining a distance behind me. I thought nothing of it in particular.
At a little more than a half-mile past the Fountains, that vehicle turned on emergency lights, flashing alternating red and blue. I‚ believed I was about to be pulled over. Looking to the right, there is a very narrow shoulder. Hwy. 159 has no lighting. I looked for a place to stop, but did not consider the shoulder viable, especially with prolific video of cars striking other cars on the side of the road; often when stopped by police. I knew of a lighted street down the road since I travel this route 4 nights a week. I intended to stop on that road.
Up to this time, I had only seen flashing lights and heard no horn or siren. I was over a three-quarters of a mile past the Fountains. I was approaching the lighted street and since seeing the flashing lights I reduced my speed by about 5 mph and activated my flashers in effort to acknowledge the signal and to avoid any misperception that I was attempting to flee or elude. At about this time I noticed a siren sound of “whoop whoop” emanating from the vehicle. It was only a short, reasonable time that I turned right onto the lighted way of Donald Bailey Drive, where I then pulled to the right and stopped.
Upon stopping, I rolled down my drivers side window. I called my wife and had her on my Bluetooth speaker during the stop. I told her that I was being stopped and to stay on the phone if possible. The officer was shouting for me to “show my hands”. I placed both my hands outside the drivers side window and shouted the question to the officer, “Am I under arrest?” The officer responded with “Exit the vehicle”. I responded again with “Am I under Arrest?” Another command, “Turn around and place your hands on your head. Walk backwards towards my voice”, I asked again, “Am I under arrest?” Another command, “On your knees and cross your ankles!” At this point I accepted the reality that I was under arrest since it now appeared that my freedom of movement was being restricted.
I complied with the last command and, with my back towards the officer, dropped to my knees and placed my hands behind my head and crossed my ankles. I sensed the officer approaching from the rear and expected to be cuffed. Instead, unexpectedly and suddenly I experienced a force driving my head forward and continuing to exert pressure upon my neck and head, causing great pain. It felt as if the weight of the officer was assigned to one knee which resided upon my neck and head. My face was directly upon the concrete road. I could feel my glasses give way and my lip split. Hoping that the worst was over I waited for the cuffs, but instead sensed what appeared to be a Taser placed against the base of my skull at the back. I could hear the “clack, clack, clack,… of the sparks and my neck experienced what felt like hundreds of bee stings. The sensation seemed to last forever, and I sensed no sign of letting up. Reflecting on stories of Taser deaths and injury I began to feel as if the officer cared not whether I died as a result.
My fear of death and injury took hold and I tried to reach back to knock his hand away in an act of self-defense and self-preservation. The officer pressed harder both on my neck with his knee and with the Taser. I resigned to accept whatever fate should this continue and after going limp I was cuffed and left to lay on the ground.
While on the ground, I could not see much and I believe other police showed up. I soon found myself in the back seat of the patrol car, but the timeframe between being Tased and moving to the car is fuzzy. I may have blacked out or become disoriented. I sat in the back seat and just bled for some time while other police arrived and went through my truck. My glasses were off and presumed broken so I could not discern much from where I was. It is all rather fuzzy at this point. The police attempted to ask me some questions, to which I replied since I was under arrest I would reserve any statements for counsel.
I was placed in the back of the cruiser and left for what seemed like about a half-hour. In that time I experienced an irregular heartbeat, shortness of breath, and difficulty swallowing. I believe possibly because of my neck muscles contracting from the shock and closing off my windpipe, but I’m not certain. The sensation subsided after about 10 or 15 mins, but reoccurred every so often for a minute or two. One of the patrolmen opened the driver-side rear door and asked me if I required medical attention. This was after about a half-hour of no inquiry. I requested medical attention. He asked if I wanted an ambulance at the scene or to wait for EMS at the station. I said I wanted an ambulance at the scene. The patrolman commented that my injuries appeared superficial and he would have EMS waiting at the station. He then slammed the door and walked away. There were two EMS personnel, at the station who did a cursory cleaning of debris from my facial wounds.
My wife arrived and sat on Hwy. 159 to observe from the side of Hwy. 159. I was eventually transported to Fairview Heights Police Station and processed.
The salient points of this store are;
1. I never identified myself or showed any identification. Who did this brigand believe he was beating and why would he feel this level of force is necessary? It appears to me that he preemptively ran my plates and discovered an outstanding “bench warrant”. I believe he was running plates with NO reasonable suspicion and looking for a warrant hit. There are SO many of these things out there that you can throw a rock at someone who has one for merely missing a court date, not completing the payment of a fine…… and most aren’t even seen or signed by a judge. After this brigand got a hit on a warrant he contrived “swerving” as reasonable suspicion.
2. I am essentially under arrest immediately for a traffic infraction, if there is no warrant component. Why, if the brigand was so afraid of me, did he not maintain a safe distance with his weapon and me in my truck while he called for backup?
3. Why did they pry a lock off my rear passenger-side storage compartment? The keys were on the ring with my ignition key.
4. Why kick a man to the ground from behind while he is on his knees and defenseless, as well as exhibiting no overt threat?
5. Why, when I asked if I am “under arrest”, did the brigand not answer? A simple “yes” would have sufficed.
6. The brigand’s statement to me, “If you would have pulled over when I lit you up this never would have happened.” This essentially says that “If you would have read my mind and pulled over when I thought you should you would not have suffered under punishment determined by me for transgressing my arbitrary and unannounced sensibilities.”
7. I was denied medical attention when requested. I was left alone, injured, with no inquiry as to my condition; especially after being Tased in the back of the neck.
8. After receiving a copy of the report, I know there were two patrolmen on the scene when I was beaten and Tased. Why such force when a man on his knees and hands on his head? 8. I was not informed of my rights at any time, nor was I afforded an opportunity to speak with counsel while in custody.
So, what do we have? Perjury for falsifying an “information” (ticket) in fabricating reasonable suspicion for the stop. Unlawful imprisonment for detaining me under color of law and with the threat of deadly force when the impetus for the stop was never lawful (fruit of the poison tree). Assault, battery, and cruel and unusual punishment for the injuries inflicted upon me for violating “his” law. Unlawful search and seizure. The tape from my recorder as well as the broken lock in my rear passenger compartment constitute a violation of the 4th Amendment protection from search without a warrant or probable cause. Nowhere in the stop for a bench warrant or improper lane usage did any probable cause of a “crime” arise. I was not apprised of my rights or afforded counsel. I was denied medical treatment.
I transcribed Alemond’s report for easier reading and for making notations. You are free to compare it with the PDF version to check for inaccuracies.
Transcription of Joshua Alemond’s Crime/Incident Report
On 02/17/09 at approximately 0211 hrs, I was traveling northbound on Hwy 159 in my marked patrol vehicle, when I observed a red Chevrolet pickup truck, bearing Illinois registration 96128M, traveling northbound in the innermost traffic lane, crossing over I-64. While behind the vehicle, I conducted a computer check of the vehicle’s registration, at which time it revealed it was registered to MARC MKKOY, and MS. MKKOY, of 317 Vandalia., Collinsville, Illinois, 62234. The vehicle was clear and valid, with an expiration of 03/3009. As I continued to follow the vehicle,‚ I observed it begin to weave within its own traffic lane, going from the outer far line to the inner far dash line on several occasions. Believing the driver of the vehicle to be intoxicated, I activated my overhead lights in an attempt to conduct a vehicle stop. This was conducted on northbound Hwy 159, just north of the Fountains Parkway. The vehicle refused to stop and continued to travel northbound in the innermost traffic lane, keeping to the 45 mph speed limit. After the vehicle failed to stop for my overhead lights, I activated my siren and air horn on several occasions, in an effort to stop the vehicle, however; ignoring this, the vehicle continued to travel northbound. At one point the driver activated his bright headlights and applied his hazards as he changed from the innermost traffic lane to the outermost traffic lane. It should be noted that I could not see into the cab of the pickup truck due to the heavy window tint on the rear window. I informed FHPD dispatch of the vehicle’s license plate and that he was refusing to stop. I continued to follow the vehicle past Milburn School Road, and the entrance to the Stonewolf subdivision.‚ The vehicle then made a sudden and aggressive right turn from Hwy 159 onto Donald Bailey Drive, a dead end private roadway to the Pipefitters Union Hall.
It should be noted that while following the vehicle for a mile and a half, I conducted a further computer check of the vehicle’s registration, discovering that one of the registered owners, that being MARC L. MKKOY, M/W, DOB: 08/01/64, was wanted through St. Clair County Sherriff’s department, per warrant number 06TR0058724.
As the vehicle made this sudden turn onto Donald Bailey Drive, it continued traveling forward for several feet coming to a sudden and abrupt stop. After the vehicle came to a stop, still not being able to see the interior or what the occupant or occupants were doing, and for my safety I initiated a felony vehicle stop. I drew my department issued weapon and ordered the driver of the vehicle to show me his hands. I repeated this command several times receiving the response from the driver after which he showed me his hands “Am I arrested?” I ordered the driver to exit the vehicle, keeping his hands raised, to which he eventually complied. I then had the driver walk, with his hands raised, backwards towards my vehicle. I then ordered the driver down on his knees. The driver continued to ask, “Am I under arrest?” I ordered the driver down on his knees, to cross his legs, to cross his ankles, and place his hands on top of his head. The driver initially refused every order I had given him forcing me to repeat my command. It should be noted that during the stop my commands were clear, concise, and in a loud voice. I observed the driver to be a middle aged male white.
Officer Aaron Nyman, DSN 171, responded to the scene to provide cover. I asked the driver if there was anyone else in the vehicle, to which he responded “No”. With Officer Nyman providing cover, I holstered my weapon and approached the subject. I began to lay the subject on the ground for the purpose of handcuffing, at which time he refused to give me his right hand. As he lay face down on the ground with his left hand behind his back, his right hand was lying under him near his waistband. The subject began to resist by pulling his right hand away from me; I ordered him on several occasions to place his hands behind his back, to which he ignored.
Seeing this resistance, Officer Nyman left his cover position and assisted while I struggled with the subject to place him in handcuffs. While attempting to place his hands behind his back and due to his uncooperative behavior, I struck the subject in the right side of his torso in an attempt to gain pain compliance. At this point, I was aware that Officer Nyman had initiated a dry stun to the subject with his department issued taser. The struggle continued for several seconds until Officer Nyman and I pinned the subject to the ground using our legs and body weight and successfully placed him in handcuffs. After being placed in handcuffs, the resistance ceased and the struggle stopped.
While Officer Nyman was securing the driver, I then cleared the interior of the pickup truck, finding no other occupants.
A search incident to arrest revealed no weapons or items of contraband. After picking him off the ground I observed that his face was bleeding. The subject had sustained minor abrasions and lacerations to his face and lip during the struggle. I also observed that the eyeglasses the subject had been wearing were broken and lying on the ground, along with a cell phone and Bluetooth earpiece. During the search incident to arrest, I was unable to find a driver’s license for the subject. Knowing that the vehicle’s registered owner, Marc L. MkLoy, to be wanted I asked if he was this subject. The driver refused to answer, stating “I want counsel”. During this time he did ask what he was being arrested for, at which time Officer Nyman informed him Fleeing and Eluding as well as Resisting Arrest.
The driver was secured in the rear of my marked patrol vehicle. Sgt. Krummrich, DSN 141, was notified and responded to supervise the scene.
Officer Nyman and I conducted a search incident to arrest of the interior of the vehicle, finding no weapons or contraband. We did locate a laptop computer, two cell phones, an audio voice recorder, as well as three digital cameras, and a video recorder.‚ Nyman also located several‚ anti-government and anti-police pamphlets and reading material.
When asked why he had refused to stop for my marked patrol vehicle, the subject stated that he was looking for a safe place to stop. It should be noted that this section of State Highway 159 is a four lane highway with a center turn lane and wide shoulder for both north and southbound traffic.
The subject requested medical attention, at which time he was informed that MedStar EMS ALS had been contacted and would respond to FHPD for treatment and evaluation.
While conducting a search of the interior of the vehicle, I located a US Passport, belonging to the registered owner and driver of the vehicle, that being MARC L. MKKOY, M/W, DOB: 08/01/64. FHPD dispatch confirmed the warrant through computer hit conformation as being active per warrant number 06TR0058724, bond amount $1,000, 10% applying.
MkKoy was transported to the FHPD after being placed under arrest for his outstanding warrant, as well as Resisting a Peace Officer. He was issued Non-Traffic Complaint 1115419 for this charge. He was also issued Illinois Traffic Citations 1159154 for Improper Lane Usage, 1159155 for Fleeing/Attempting to Elude Police, 1159156 for No Valid Driver’s License and 1159157 for Operating an Uninsured Vehicle. Copies of the Citations are attached to this report. Upon arrival at the FHPD, MkKoy was properly booked for the aforementioned charge.
Prior to his booking, MedStar EMS had arrived to treat MkKoy’s minor injuries.
While still on the scene with MkKoy’s vehicle, Officer Nyman prepared FHPD 112, this department’s Towed Vehicle Report. A copy of which was provided to MkKoy. Walter’s Towing responded and towed the vehicle to their facility.
A check of MkKoy’s criminal history indicated a total of two arrests with two convictions, including one charge with one conviction for Larceny, one charge with zero convictions for Forgery. MkKoy’s last arrest was by the FHPD on 04/16/80.
Upon completion of all booking procedures of MkKoy was released from FHPD custody after posting the required cash only bond. At this time, he was provided all his appropriate copies of the Towed Vehicle Report, Non-Traffic Complaint, as well as his Illinois Traffic Citations.
Improper Lane Usage
Attempting to Flee or Elude
Resisting A Peace Officer
No Valid Drivers License
Operating uninsured vehicle
COPY OF THE CRIMINAL/INCIDENT REPORT.
Items Discovered During Search Subsequent To Arrest
Pursuant to the warrantless search incident to arrest, the inventory of my vehicle contained:
Healing Our World, The other piece of the puzzle by Dr. Mary J. Ruwart
Asset Protection Secrets, by Arnold Goldstein J.D., LLM, Ph.D DSC Power 832 Security System
Pioneer DEH-P7700MP Stereo
Under The Hood by TechOnline
Owners Manual – 1998 Chevy S-10
Civil Liberties and the Bill of Rights, by Professor John E. Finn Mother Earth News, Issue No. 228
American Juror, Newsletter of the Fully Informed Jury Association and the American Jury Institute, Volume 20, Issue 1 Spring 2008
The Philosopher’s Handbook, by Stanley Rosen “Essential Readings from Plato to Kant”
Philosophy for Dummies by Tom Morris, Ph.D.
The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States of America,‚ autographed by 2004 Libertarian Presidential Candidate, Michael Badnarik
That’s it as far as “printed material” aside from some cell phone plan tri-folds and business cards.
Apparently, Alemon and Nyman have a distorted view of what constitutes “anti-government” and “anti-police”. Notwithstanding their hyperbolic and exaggerated interpretation of my reading material genre, it was in-fact police working for government who violated my rights, beat, and shocked me. Of course, to be accurate, it was ignorant, violent, oppressive, and lying men in costumes who used their delusional belief in being morally or lawfully superior to others by virtue of the color of their clothes, or possession of weapons which harmed me. Police and government are fictions, and possess no conscience. Alemon and Nyman, concordantly, are flesh who choose not to embrace their conscience, or have instead adopted despots as their external conscience.
Analysis of charges, in the order of they allegedly occurred.
The report states that, “As I continued to follow the vehicle, I observed it to begin to weave within its own traffic lane, going from the outer far line to the inner far dash line on several occasions. Believing the driver of the vehicle to be intoxicated, I activated my overhead lights in an attempt to conduct a vehicle stop.” The statute below at (a) states “…within a single lane…” which is what the report confirms, “…within its own traffic lane…”
(625 ILCS 5/11-709) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-709)
Sec. 11-709. Driving on roadways laned for traffic. Whenever any roadway has been divided into 2 or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others consistent herewith shall apply. (a)‚ A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety. (b) Upon a roadway which is divided into 3 lanes and provides for two-way movement of traffic, a vehicle shall not be driven in the center lane except when overtaking and passing another vehicle traveling in the same direction when such center lane is clear of traffic within a safe distance, or in preparation for making a left turn or where such center lane is at the time allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the same direction that the vehicle is proceeding and such allocation is designated by official traffic control devices. (c) Official traffic control devices may be erected directing specific traffic to use a designated lane or designating those lanes to be used by traffic moving in a particular direction regardless of the center of the roadway and drivers of vehicles shall obey the directions of every such device. On multi-lane controlled access highways with 3 or more lanes in one direction or on any multi-laned highway with 2 or more lanes in one direction, the Department may designate lanes of traffic to be used by different types of motor vehicles. Drivers must obey lane designation signing except when it is necessary to use a different lane to make a turning maneuver.
(d) Official traffic control devices may be installed prohibiting the changing of lanes on sections of roadway and drivers of vehicles shall obey the directions of every such device. (Source: P.A. 84-1311.)
(625 ILCS 5/11-204) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-204)
Sec. 11-204. Fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer.
(a) Any driver or operator of a motor vehicle who, having been given a visual or audible signal by a peace officer directing such driver or operator to bring his vehicle to a stop,‚ willfully fails or refuses to obey such direction,increases his speed, extinguishes his lights, or otherwise flees or attempts to elude the officer, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. The signal given by the peace officer may be by hand, voice, siren, red or blue light. Provided, the officer giving such signal shall be in police uniform, and,‚ Such requirement shall not preclude the use of amber or white oscillating, rotating or flashing lights in conjunction with red or blue oscillating, rotating or flashing lights as required in Section 12-215 of Chapter 12. (b) Upon receiving notice of such conviction the Secretary of State shall suspend the drivers license of the person so convicted for a period of not more than 6 months for a first conviction and not more than 12 months for a second conviction. (c) A third or subsequent violation of this Section is a Class 4 felony. (Source: P.A. 93-120, eff. 1-1-04.)
(720 ILCS 5/31-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 31-1) Sec. 31-1. Resisting or obstructing a peace officer, firefighter, or correctional institution employee. (a) A person who knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer, firefighter, or correctional institution employee of any authorized act within his official capacity commits a Class A misdemeanor. (a-5) In addition to any other sentence that may be imposed, a court shall order any person convicted of resisting or obstructing a peace officer, firefighter, or correctional institution employee to be sentenced to a minimum of 48 consecutive hours of imprisonment or ordered to perform community service for not less than 100 hours as may be determined by the court. The person shall not be eligible for probation in order to reduce the sentence of imprisonment or community service. (a-7) A person convicted for a violation of this Section whose violation was the proximate cause of an injury to a peace officer, firefighter, or correctional institution employee is guilty of a Class 4 felony. (b) For purposes of this Section, “correctional institution employee” means any person employed to supervise and control inmates incarcerated in a penitentiary, State farm, reformatory, prison, jail, house of correction, police detention area, half-way house, or other institution or place for the incarceration or custody of persons under sentence for offenses or awaiting trial or sentence for offenses, under arrest for an offense, a violation of probation, a violation of parole, or a violation of mandatory supervised release, or awaiting a bail setting hearing or preliminary hearing, or who are sexually dangerous persons or who are sexually violent persons; and “firefighter” means any individual, either as an employee or volunteer, of a regularly constituted fire department of a municipality or fire protection district who performs fire fighting duties, including, but not limited to, the fire chief, assistant fire chief, captain, engineer, driver, ladder person, hose person, pipe person, and any other member of a regularly constituted fire department. “Firefighter” also means a person employed by the Office of the State Fire Marshal to conduct arson investigations. (c) It is an affirmative defense to a violation of this Section if a person resists or obstructs the performance of one known by the person to be a firefighter by returning to or remaining in a dwelling, residence, building, or other structure to rescue or to attempt to rescue any person. (Source: P.A. 95-801, eff. 1-1-09.)
(720 ILCS 5/7-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 7-5)
Sec. 7-5. Peace officer’s use of force in making arrest. (a) A peace officer, or any person whom he has summoned or directed to assist him, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. He is justified in the use of any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the arrest and of any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest. However, he is justified in using force likely to cause death or great bodily harm only when he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or such other person, or when he reasonably believes both that: (1) Such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by resistance or escape; and
(2) The person to be arrested has committed or attempted a forcible felony which involves the infliction or threatened infliction of great bodily harm or is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise indicates that he will endanger human life or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested without delay. (b) A peace officer making an arrest pursuant to an invalid warrant is justified in the use of any force which he would be justified in using if the warrant were valid, unless he knows that the warrant is invalid. (Source: P.A. 84-1426.)
(720 ILCS 5/7-7) (from Ch. 38, par. 7-7)
Sec. 7-7. Private person’s use of force in resisting arrest. A person is not authorized to use force to resist an arrest which he knows is being made either by a peace officer or by a private person summoned and directed by a peace officer to make the arrest, even if he believes that the arrest is unlawful and the arrest in fact is unlawful. (Source: P.A. 86-1475.)
(720 ILCS 5/7-8) (from Ch. 38, par. 7-8) Sec. 7-8. Force likely to cause death or great bodily harm. (a) Force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm, within the meaning of Sections 7-5 and 7-6 includes:
(1) The firing of a firearm in the direction of the person to be arrested, even though no intent exists to kill or inflict great bodily harm; and (2) The firing of a firearm at a vehicle in which the person to be arrested is riding.
(b) A peace officer’s discharge of a firearm using ammunition designed to disable or control an individual without creating the likelihood of death or great bodily harm shall not be considered force likely to cause death or great bodily harm within the meaning of Sections 7-5 and 7-6. (Source: P.A. 90-138, eff. 1-1-98.)
(720 ILCS 5/7-13) (from Ch. 38, par. 7-13) Sec. 7-13. Necessity.
Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity if the accused was without blame in occasioning or developing the situation and reasonably believed such conduct was necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater than the injury which might reasonably result from his own conduct. (Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/7-14) (from Ch. 38, par. 7-14)
Sec. 7-14. Affirmative defense. A defense of justifiable use of force, or of exoneration, based on the provisions of this Article is an affirmative defense. (Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(625 ILCS 5/6-101) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-101) Sec. 6-101. Drivers must have licenses or permits. (a) No person, except those expressly exempted by Section 6-102, shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in‚ this State unless such person has a valid license or permit, or a restricted driving permit, issued under the provisions of this Act. (b) No‚ person shall drive a motor vehicle unless he holds a valid license or permit, or a restricted driving permit issued under the provisions of‚ Section 6-205,‚ 6-206, or‚ 6-113 of this Act. Any person to whom a license is issued under the provisions of this Act must surrender to the Secretary of State all valid licenses or permits. No drivers license shall be issued to any person who holds a valid Foreign State license, identification card, or permit unless such person first surrenders to the Secretary of State any such valid Foreign State license, identification card, or permit. (b-5) Any person who commits a violation of subsection (a) or (b) of this Section is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor, if at the time of the violation the person’s driver’s license or permit was cancelled under clause (a)9 of Section 6-201 of this Code.
(c) Any person licensed as a driver hereunder shall not be required by any city, village, incorporated town or other municipal corporation to obtain any other license to exercise the privilege thereby granted. (d) In addition to other penalties imposed under this Section, any person in violation of this Section who is also in violation of Section 7-601 of this Code relating to mandatory insurance requirements shall have his or her motor vehicle immediately impounded by the arresting law enforcement officer. The motor vehicle may be released to any licensed driver upon a showing of proof of insurance for the motor vehicle that was impounded and the notarized written consent for the release by the vehicle owner. (e) In addition to other penalties imposed under this Section, the vehicle of any person in violation of this Section who is also in violation of Section 7-601 of this Code relating to mandatory insurance requirements and who, in violating this Section, has caused death or personal injury to another person is subject to forfeiture under Sections 36-1 and 36-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961. For the purposes of this Section, a personal injury shall include any type A injury as indicated on the traffic accident report completed by a law enforcement officer that requires immediate professional attention in either a doctor’s office or a medical facility. A type A injury shall include severely bleeding wounds, distorted extremities, and injuries that require the injured party to be carried from the scene. (Source: P.A. 94-993, eff. 1-1-07; 95-578, eff. 6-1-08.)
(625 ILCS 5/6-102) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-102)
Sec. 6-102. What persons are exempt. The following persons are exempt from the requirements of Section 6-101 and are not required to have an Illinois drivers license or permit if one or more of the following qualifying exemptions are met and apply: 1. Any employee of the United States Government or any member of the Armed Forces of the United States, while operating a motor vehicle owned by or leased to the United States Government and being operated on official business need not be licensed; 2. A nonresident who has in his immediate possession a valid license issued to him in his home state or country may operate a motor vehicle for which he is licensed for the period during which he is in this State; 3. A nonresident and his spouse and children living with him who is a student at a college or university in Illinois who have a valid license issued by their home State. 4. A person operating a road machine temporarily upon a highway or operating a farm tractor between the home farm buildings and any adjacent or nearby farm land for the exclusive purpose of conducting farm operations need not be licensed as a driver. 5. A‚ resident of‚ this State who has been serving as a member of the Armed Forces of the United States outside the Continental limits of the United States, for a period of 45 days following his return to the continental limits of the United States. 6. A nonresident on active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States who has a valid license issued by his home state and such nonresident’s spouse, and dependent children and living with parents, who have a valid license issued by their home state. 7. A nonresident who becomes a resident of this State, may for a period of the first 90 days of residence in Illinois operate any motor vehicle which he was qualified or licensed to drive by his home state or country so long as he has in his possession, a valid and current license issued to him by his home state or country. Upon expiration of such 90 day period, such new resident must comply with the provisions of this Act and apply for an Illinois license or permit. 8. An engineer, conductor, brakeman, or any other member of the crew of a locomotive or train being operated upon rails, including operation on a railroad crossing over a public street, road or highway. Such person is not required to display a driver’s license to any law enforcement officer in connection with the operation of a locomotive or train within this State. The provisions of this Section granting exemption to any nonresident shall be operative to the same extent that the laws of the State or country of such nonresident grant like exemption to residents of this State. The Secretary of State may implement the exemption provisions of this Section by inclusion thereof in a reciprocity agreement, arrangement or declaration issued pursuant to this Act. (Source: P.A. 86-1258.)
(625 ILCS 5/6-112) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-112) Sec. 6-112. License and Permits to be carried and exhibited on demand. Every licensee or permittee shall have his drivers license or permit in his immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle and, for the purpose of indicating compliance with this requirement, shall display such license or permit if it is in his possession upon demand made, when in uniform or displaying a badge or other sign of authority, by a member of the State Police, a sheriff or other police officer or designated agent of the Secretary of State. However, no person charged with violating this Section shall be convicted if he produces in court satisfactory evidence that a drivers license was theretofor issued to him and was valid at the time of his arrest. For the purposes of this Section, “display” means the manual surrender of his license certificate into the hands of the demanding officer for his inspection thereof. (Source: P.A. 76-1749.)
(625 ILCS 5/6-601) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-601) Sec. 6-601. Penalties.
(a) It is a petty offense for any person to violate any of the provisions of this Chapter unless such violation is by this Code or other law of this State declared to be a misdemeanor or a felony. (b) General penalties. Unless another penalty is in this Code or other laws of this State, every person convicted of a petty offense for the violation of any provision of this Chapter shall be punished by a fine of not more than $500. (c) Unlicensed driving. Except as hereinafter provided a violation of Section 6-101 shall be:
1. A Class A misdemeanor if the person failed to obtain a driver’s license or permit after expiration of a period of revocation. 2. A Class B misdemeanor if the person has been issued a driver’s license or permit, which has expired, and if the period of expiration is greater than one year; or if the person has never been issued a driver’s license or permit, or is not qualified to obtain a driver’s license or permit because of his age. If a licensee under this Code is convicted of violating Section 6-101 for operating a motor vehicle during a time when such licensee’s driver’s license was invalid under the provisions of Section 6-110, then conviction under such circumstances shall be punishable by a fine of not more than $25. If a licensee under this Code is convicted of violating Section 6-303 for operating a motor vehicle during a time when such licensee’s driver’s license was suspended under the provisions of Section 6-306.3, then such act shall be a petty offense (provided the licensee has answered the charge which was the basis of the suspension under Section 6-306.3), and there shall be imposed no additional like period of suspension as provided in paragraph (b) of Section 6-303. (Source: P.A. 92-622, eff. 1-1-03; 92-647, eff. 1-1-03; 92-883, eff. 1-13-03.)
(625 ILCS 5/1-159) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-159) Every natural person, firm, copartnership, association or corporation. (Source: P.A. 76-1586.)
(625 ILCS 5/1-173) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-173) (a) Every‚ who resides in this state shall be deemed a resident of this State.
(b) In the case of a firm, copartnership or association, if the principal place of business of such firm, copartnership or association is located in the State of Illinois, then such firm, copartnership or association shall be deemed a resident of the State of Illinois. (c) In the case of a corporation, if the corporation was incorporated under the laws of the State of Illinois or if the principal place of business of such corporation is in the State of Illinois, then such corporation shall be deemed a resident of the State of Illinois. (Source: P.A. 76-1586.)
(625 ILCS 5/1-195) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-195)
A state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or a province of the Dominion of Canada. (Source: P.A. 76-1586.)
Sec. 1-138.1. Licensee. A person licensed or required to be licensed under Sections 5-101, 5-102, 5-201 and 5-301 of this Code. (Source: P.A. 83-1473.)
ARTICLE I. DEALERS (625 ILCS 5/5-101) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 5-101) Sec. 5-101. New vehicle dealers must be licensed.
Sec. 5-102. Used vehicle dealers must be licensed.
ARTICLE II. TRANSPORTERS (625 ILCS 5/5-201) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 5-201) Sec. 5-201. Transporters must apply for in-transit plates.
ARTICLE III. USED PARTS DEALERS, SCRAP PROCESSORS, AUTOMOTIVE PARTS RECYCLERS AND REBUILDERS (625 ILCS 5/5-301) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 5-301) Sec. 5-301. Automotive parts recyclers, scrap processors, repairers and rebuilders must be licensed.
(625 ILCS 5/3-707) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 3-707) Sec. 3-707. Operation of uninsured motor vehicle – penalty.
(a) No person shall operate a motor vehicle unless the motor vehicle is covered by a liability insurance policy in accordance with Section 7-601 of this Code. (b) Any person who fails to comply with a request by a law enforcement officer for display of evidence of insurance, as required under Section 7-602 of this Code, shall be deemed to be operating an uninsured motor vehicle.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (c-5), any operator of a motor vehicle subject to registration under this Code who is convicted of violating this Section is guilty of a business offense and shall be required to pay a fine in excess of $500, but not more than $1,000. However, no person charged with violating this Section shall be convicted if such person produces in court satisfactory evidence that at the time of the arrest the motor vehicle was covered by a liability insurance policy in accordance with Section 7-601 of this Code. The chief judge of each circuit may designate an officer of the court to review the documentation demonstrating that at the time of arrest the motor vehicle was covered by a liability insurance policy in accordance with Section 7-601 of this Code. (c-1) A person convicted of violating this Section shall also have his or her driver’s license, permit, or privileges suspended for 3 months. After the expiration of the 3 months, the person’s driver’s license, permit, or privileges shall not be reinstated until he or she has paid a reinstatement fee of $100. If a person violates this Section while his or her driver’s license, permit, or privileges are suspended under this subsection (c-1), his or her driver’s license, permit, or privileges shall be suspended for an additional 6 months and until he or she pays the reinstatement fee. (c-5) A person who (i) has not previously been convicted of or received a disposition of court supervision for violating this Section and (ii) produces at his or her court appearance satisfactory evidence that the motor vehicle is covered, as of the date of the court appearance, by a liability insurance policy in accordance with Section 7-601 of this Code shall, for a violation of this Section, pay a fine of $100 and receive a disposition of court supervision. The person must, on the date that the period of court supervision is scheduled to terminate, produce satisfactory evidence that the vehicle was covered by the required liability insurance policy during the entire period of court supervision. An officer of the court designated under subsection (c) may also review liability insurance documentation under this subsection (c-5) to determine if the motor vehicle is, as of the date of the court appearance, covered by a liability insurance policy in accordance with Section 7-601 of this Code. The officer of the court shall also determine, on the date the period of court supervision is scheduled to terminate, whether the vehicle was covered by the required policy during the entire period of court supervision. (d) A person convicted a third or subsequent time of violating this Section or a similar provision of a local ordinance must give proof to the Secretary of State of the person’s financial responsibility as defined in Section 7-315. The person must maintain the proof in a manner satisfactory to the Secretary for a minimum period of 3 years after the date the proof is first filed. The Secretary must suspend the driver’s license of any person determined by the Secretary not to have provided adequate proof of financial responsibility as required by this subsection. (Source: P.A. 94-1035, eff. 7-1-07; 95-211, eff. 1-1-08; 95-686, eff. 6-1-08; 95-876, eff. 8-21-08.)
Sec. 7-602. Insurance card. Every operator of a motor vehicle subject to Section 7-601 of this Code shall carry within the vehicle evidence of insurance. The evidence shall be legible and sufficient to demonstrate that the motor vehicle currently is covered by a liability insurance policy as required under Section 7-601 of this Code and may include, but is not limited to, the following: (a) an insurance card provided by the insurer under this Section;
(b) the combination of proof of purchase of the motor vehicle within the previous 60 days and a current insurance card issued for the motor vehicle replaced by such purchase; (c) the current declarations page of a liability insurance policy;
(d) a liability insurance binder, certificate of liability insurance or receipt for payment to an insurer or its authorized representative for a liability insurance premium, provided such document contains all information the Secretary of State by rule and regulation may require; (e) a current rental agreement;
(f) registration plates, registration sticker or other evidence of registration issued by the Secretary only upon submission of proof of liability insurance pursuant to this Code; (g) a certificate, decal, or other document or device issued by a governmental agency for a motor vehicle indicating the vehicle is insured for liability pursuant to law. An insurance card shall be provided for each motor vehicle insured by the insurer issuing the liability insurance policy.
The form, contents and manner of issuance of the insurance card shall be prescribed by rules and regulations of the Secretary of State. The Secretary shall adopt rules requiring that reasonable measures be taken to prevent the fraudulent production of insurance cards. The insurance card shall display an effective date and an expiration date covering a period of time not to exceed 12 months. The insurance card shall contain the following disclaimer: “Examine policy exclusions carefully. This form does not constitute any part of your insurance policy.” If the insurance policy represented by the insurance card does not cover any driver operating the motor vehicle with the owner’s permission, or the owner when operating a motor vehicle other than the vehicle for which the policy is issued, the insurance card shall contain a warning of such limitations in the coverage provided by the policy. No insurer shall issue a card, similar in appearance, form and content to the insurance card required under this Section, in connection with an insurance policy that does not provide the liability insurance coverage required under Section 7-601 of this Code. The evidence of insurance shall be displayed upon request made by any law enforcement officer wearing a uniform or displaying a badge or other sign of authority. Any person who fails or refuses to comply with such request is in violation of Section 3-707 of this Code. Any person who displays evidence of insurance, knowing there is no valid liability insurance in effect on the motor vehicle as required under Section 7-601 of this Code or knowing the evidence of insurance is illegally altered, counterfeit or otherwise invalid, is in violation of Section 3-710 of this Code.
“Display” means the manual surrender of the evidence of insurance into the hands of the law enforcement officer, court, or officer of the court making the request for the officer’s, court’s, or officer of the court’s inspection thereof. (Source: P.A. 93-719, eff. 1-1-05.)
Form of Charge
(725 ILCS 5/111-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 111-3) Sec. 111-3. Form of charge. (a) A charge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by: (1) Stating the name of the offense; (2) Citing the statutory provision alleged to have been violated; (3) Setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged; (4) Stating the date and county of the offense as definitely as can be done; and
(5) Stating the name of the accused, if known, and if not known, designate the accused by any name or description by which he can be identified with reasonable certainty. (b) An indictment shall be signed by the foreman of the Grand Jury and an information shall be signed by the State’s Attorney and sworn to by him or another. A complaint shall be sworn to and signed by the complainant; Provided, however, that when a citation is issued on a Uniform Traffic Ticket or Uniform Conservation Ticket (in a form prescribed by the Conference of Chief Circuit Judges and filed with the Supreme Court), the copy of such Uniform Ticket which is filed with the circuit court constitutes a complaint to which the defendant may plead, unless he specifically requests that a verified complaint be filed.
(c) When the State seeks an enhanced sentence because of a prior conviction, the charge shall also state the intention to seek an enhanced sentence and shall state such prior conviction so as to give notice to the defendant. However, the fact of such prior conviction and the State’s intention to seek an enhanced sentence are not elements of the offense and may not be disclosed to the jury during trial unless otherwise permitted by issues properly raised during such trial. For the purposes of this Section, “enhanced sentence” means a sentence which is increased by a prior conviction from one classification of offense to another higher level classification of offense set forth in Section 5-5-1 of the “Unified Code of Corrections”, approved July 26, 1972, as amended; it does not include an increase in the sentence applied within the same level of classification of offense. (c-5) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in all cases in which the imposition of the death penalty is not a possibility, if an alleged fact (other than the fact of a prior conviction) is not an element of an offense but is sought to be used to increase the range of penalties for the offense beyond the statutory maximum that could otherwise be imposed for the offense, the alleged fact must be included in the charging instrument or otherwise provided to the defendant through a written notification before trial, submitted to a trier of fact as an aggravating factor, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Failure to prove the fact beyond a reasonable doubt is not a bar to a conviction for commission of the offense, but is a bar to increasing, based on that fact, the range of penalties for the offense beyond the statutory maximum that could otherwise be imposed for that offense. Nothing in this subsection (c-5) requires the imposition of a sentence that increases the range of penalties for the offense beyond the statutory maximum that could otherwise be imposed for the offense if the imposition of that sentence is not required by law. (d) At any time prior to trial, the State on motion shall be permitted to amend the charge, whether brought by indictment, information or complaint, to make the charge comply with subsection (c) or (c-5) of this Section. Nothing in Section 103-5 of this Code precludes such an amendment or a written notification made in accordance with subsection (c-5) of this Section. (e) The provisions of Article 33B of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended, shall not be affected by this Section. (Source: P.A. 91-953, eff. 2-23-01.)
Relating to Search and Seizure
(725 ILCS 5/Art. 108 heading) ARTICLE 108. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
(725 ILCS 5/108-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 108-1) Sec. 108-1. Search without warrant.
(1) When a lawful arrest is effected a peace officer may reasonably search the person arrested and the area within such person’s immediate presence for the purpose of: (a) protecting the officer from attack; or (b) preventing the person from escaping; or (c) discovering the fruits of the crime; or
(d) discovering any instruments, articles, or things which may have been used in the commission of, or which may constitute evidence of, an offense. (2) (Blank). (3) A law enforcement officer may not search or inspect a motor vehicle, its contents, the driver, or a passenger solely because of a violation of Section 12-603.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. (Source: P.A. 93-99, eff. 7-3-03.)
(725 ILCS 5/108-1.01) (from Ch. 38, par. 108-1.01) Sec. 108-1.01. Search during temporary questioning.
When a peace officer has stopped a person for temporary questioning pursuant to Section 107-14 of this Code and reasonably suspects that he or another is in danger of attack, he may search the person for weapons. If the officer discovers a weapon, he may take it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return the weapon, if lawfully possessed, or arrest the person so questioned. (Source: Laws 1968, p. 218.)
(725 ILCS 5/108-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 108-2) Sec. 108-2. Custody and disposition of things seized.
An inventory of all instruments, articles or things seized on a search without warrant shall be given to the person arrested and a copy thereof delivered to the judge before whom the person arrested is taken, and thereafter, such instruments, articles or things shall be handled and disposed of in accordance with Sections 108–11 and 108–12 of this Code. If the person arrested is released without a charge being preferred against him all instruments, articles or things seized, other than contraband, shall be returned to him upon release. (Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)
(725 ILCS 5/Art. 103 heading) ARTICLE 103. RIGHTS OF ACCUSED
(725 ILCS 5/103-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-1)
Sec. 103-1. Rights on arrest. (a) After an arrest on a warrant the person making the arrest shall inform the person arrested that a warrant has been issued for his arrest and the nature of the offense specified in the warrant. (b) After an arrest without a warrant the person making the arrest shall inform the person arrested of the nature of the offense on which the arrest is based. (c) No person arrested for a traffic, regulatory or misdemeanor offense, except in cases involving weapons or a controlled substance, shall be strip searched unless there is reasonable belief that the individual is concealing a weapon or controlled substance. (d) “Strip search” means having an arrested person remove or arrange some or all of his or her clothing so as to permit a visual inspection of the genitals, buttocks, anus, female breasts or undergarments of such person. (e) All strip searches conducted under this Section shall be performed by persons of the same sex as the arrested person and on premises where the search cannot be observed by persons not physically conducting the search. (f) Every peace officer or employee of a police department conducting a strip search shall:
(1) Obtain the written permission of the police commander or an agent thereof designated for the purposes of authorizing a strip search in accordance with this Section. (2) Prepare a report of the strip search. The report shall include the written authorization required by paragraph (1) of this subsection (f), the name of the person subjected to the search, the names of the persons conducting the search, and the time, date and place of the search. A copy of the report shall be provided to the person subject to the search. (g) No search of any body cavity other than the mouth shall be conducted without a duly executed search warrant; any warrant authorizing a body cavity search shall specify that the search must be performed under sanitary conditions and conducted either by or under the supervision of a physician licensed to practice medicine in all of its branches in this State. (h) Any peace officer or employee who knowingly or intentionally fails to comply with any provision of this Section is guilty of official misconduct as provided in Section 103-8; provided however, that nothing contained in this Section shall preclude prosecution of a peace officer or employee under another section of this Code. (i) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as limiting any statutory or common law rights of any person for purposes of any civil action or injunctive relief. (j) The provisions of subsections (c) through (h) of this Section shall not apply when the person is taken into custody by or remanded to the sheriff or correctional institution pursuant to a court order. (Source: P.A. 81-1509.)
(725 ILCS 5/103-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-2) Sec. 103-2. Treatment while in custody. (a) On being taken into custody every person shall have the right to remain silent. (b) No unlawful means of any kind shall be used to obtain a statement, admission or confession from any person in custody. (c) Persons in custody shall be treated humanely and provided with proper food, shelter and, if required, medical treatment. (Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)
(725 ILCS 5/103-2.1) Sec. 103-2.1. When statements by accused may be used.
(a) In this Section, “custodial interrogation” means any interrogation during which (i) a reasonable person in the subject’s position would consider himself or herself to be in custody and (ii) during which a question is asked that is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. In this Section, “place of detention” means a building or a police station that is a place of operation for a municipal police department or county sheriff department or other law enforcement agency, not a courthouse, that is owned or operated by a law enforcement agency at which persons are or may be held in detention in connection with criminal charges against those persons. In this Section, “electronic recording” includes motion picture, audiotape, or videotape, or digital recording.
(b) An oral, written, or sign language statement of an accused made as a result of a custodial interrogation at a police station or other place of detention shall be presumed to be inadmissible as evidence against the accused in any criminal proceeding brought under Section 9-1, 9-1.2, 9-2, 9-2.1, 9-3, 9-3.2, or 9-3.3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or under clause (d)(1)(F) of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code unless: (1) an electronic recording is made of the custodial interrogation; and (2) the recording is substantially accurate and not intentionally altered.
(c) Every electronic recording required under this Section must be preserved until such time as the defendant’s conviction for any offense relating to the statement is final and all direct and habeas corpus appeals are exhausted, or the prosecution of such offenses is barred by law. (d) If the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation in violation of this Section, then any statements made by the defendant during or following that non-recorded custodial interrogation, even if otherwise in compliance with this Section, are presumed to be inadmissible in any criminal proceeding against the defendant except for the purposes of impeachment. (e) Nothing in this Section precludes the admission (i) of a statement made by the accused in open court at his or her trial, before a grand jury, or at a preliminary hearing, (ii) of a statement made during a custodial interrogation that was not recorded as required by this Section, because electronic recording was not feasible, (iii) of a voluntary statement, whether or not the result of a custodial interrogation, that has a bearing on the credibility of the accused as a witness, (iv) of a spontaneous statement that is not made in response to a question, (v) of a statement made after questioning that is routinely asked during the processing of the arrest of the suspect, (vi) of a statement made during a custodial interrogation by a suspect who requests, prior to making the statement, to respond to the interrogator’s questions only if an electronic recording is not made of the statement, provided that an electronic recording is made of the statement of agreeing to respond to the interrogator’s question, only if a recording is not made of the statement, (vii) of a statement made during a custodial interrogation that is conducted out-of-state, (viii) of a statement given at a time when the interrogators are unaware that a death has in fact occurred, or (ix) of any other statement that may be admissible under law. The State shall bear the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that one of the exceptions described in this subsection (e) is applicable. Nothing in this Section precludes the admission of a statement, otherwise inadmissible under this Section, that is used only for impeachment and not as substantive evidence. (f) The presumption of inadmissibility of a statement made by a suspect at a custodial interrogation at a police station or other place of detention may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was voluntarily given and is reliable, based on the totality of the circumstances. (g) Any electronic recording of any statement made by an accused during a custodial interrogation that is compiled by any law enforcement agency as required by this Section for the purposes of fulfilling the requirements of this Section shall be confidential and exempt from public inspection and copying, as provided under Section 7 of the Freedom of Information Act, and the information shall not be transmitted to anyone except as needed to comply with this Section. (Source: P.A. 93-206, eff. 7-18-05; 93-517, eff. 8-6-05; 94-117, eff. 7-5-05.)
(725 ILCS 5/103-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-3) Sec. 103-3. Right to communicate with attorney and family; transfers.
(a) Persons who are arrested shall have the right to communicate with an attorney of their choice and a member of their family by making a reasonable number of telephone calls or in any other reasonable manner. Such communication shall be permitted within a reasonable time after arrival at the first place of custody. (b) In the event the accused is transferred to a new place of custody his right to communicate with an attorney and a member of his family is renewed. (Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)
(725 ILCS 5/103-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-4) Sec. 103-4. Right to consult with attorney.
Any person committed, imprisoned or restrained of his liberty for any cause whatever and whether or not such person is charged with an offense shall, except in cases of imminent danger of escape, be allowed to consult with any licensed attorney at law of this State whom such person may desire to see or consult, alone and in private at the place of custody, as many times and for such period each time as is reasonable. When any such person is about to be moved beyond the limits of this State under any pretense whatever the person to be moved shall be entitled to a reasonable delay for the purpose of obtaining counsel and of availing himself of the laws of this State for the security of personal liberty. (Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)
(725 ILCS 5/103-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-5) Sec. 103-5. Speedy trial.)
(a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by a continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court’s determination of the defendant’s physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal. Delay shall be considered to be agreed to by the defendant unless he or she objects to the delay by making a written demand for trial or an oral demand for trial on the record. The provisions of this subsection (a) do not apply to a person on bail or recognizance for an offense but who is in custody for a violation of his or her parole or mandatory supervised release for another offense. The 120-day term must be one continuous period of incarceration. In computing the 120-day term, separate periods of incarceration may not be combined. If a defendant is taken into custody a second (or subsequent) time for the same offense, the term will begin again at day zero. (b) Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by a continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court’s determination of the defendant’s physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal. The defendant’s failure to appear for any court date set by the court operates to waive the defendant’s demand for trial made under this subsection. For purposes of computing the 160 day period under this subsection (b), every person who was in custody for an alleged offense and demanded trial and is subsequently released on bail or recognizance and demands trial, shall be given credit for time spent in custody following the making of the demand while in custody. Any demand for trial made under this subsection (b) shall be in writing; and in the case of a defendant not in custody, the demand for trial shall include the date of any prior demand made under this provision while the defendant was in custody. (c) If the court determines that the State has exercised without success due diligence to obtain evidence material to the case and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may be obtained at a later day the court may continue the cause on application of the State for not more than an additional 60 days. If the court determines that the State has exercised without success due diligence to obtain results of DNA testing that is material to the case and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such results may be obtained at a later day, the court may continue the cause on application of the State for not more than an additional 120 days. (d) Every person not tried in accordance with subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this Section shall be discharged from custody or released from the obligations of his bail or recognizance. (e) If a person is simultaneously in custody upon more than one charge pending against him in the same county, or simultaneously demands trial upon more than one charge pending against him in the same county, he shall be tried, or adjudged guilty after waiver of trial, upon at least one such charge before expiration relative to any of such pending charges of the period prescribed by subsections (a) and (b) of this Section. Such person shall be tried upon all of the remaining charges thus pending within 160 days from the date on which judgment relative to the first charge thus prosecuted is rendered pursuant to the Unified Code of Corrections or, if such trial upon such first charge is terminated without judgment and there is no subsequent trial of, or adjudication of guilt after waiver of trial of, such first charge within a reasonable time, the person shall be tried upon all of the remaining charges thus pending within 160 days from the date on which such trial is terminated; if either such period of 160 days expires without the commencement of trial of, or adjudication of guilt after waiver of trial of, any of such remaining charges thus pending, such charge or charges shall be dismissed and barred for want of prosecution unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness for trial, by a continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court’s determination of the defendant’s physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal; provided, however, that if the court determines that the State has exercised without success due diligence to obtain evidence material to the case and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may be obtained at a later day the court may continue the cause on application of the State for not more than an additional 60 days. (f) Delay occasioned by the defendant shall temporarily suspend for the time of the delay the period within which a person shall be tried as prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e) of this Section and on the day of expiration of the delay the said period shall continue at the point at which it was suspended. Where such delay occurs within 21 days of the end of the period within which a person shall be tried as prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e) of this Section, the court may continue the cause on application of the State for not more than an additional 21 days beyond the period prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e). This subsection (f) shall become effective on, and apply to persons charged with alleged offenses committed on or after, March 1, 1977. (Source: P.A. 94-1094, eff. 1-26-07.) (725 ILCS 5/103-6) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-6)
Sec. 103-6. Waiver of jury trial. Every person accused of an offense shall have the right to a trial by jury unless (i) understandingly waived by defendant in open court or (ii) the offense is an ordinance violation punishable by fine only and the defendant either fails to file a demand for a trial by jury at the time of entering his or her plea of not guilty or fails to pay to the clerk of the circuit court at the time of entering his or her plea of not guilty any jury fee required to be paid to the clerk. (Source: P.A. 86-1386.)
(725 ILCS 5/103-7) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-7) Sec. 103-7. Posting notice of rights.
Every sheriff, chief of police or other person who is in charge of any jail, police station or other building where persons under arrest are held in custody pending investigation, bail or other criminal proceedings, shall post in every room, other than cells, of such buildings where persons are held in custody, in conspicuous places where it may be seen and read by persons in custody and others, a poster, printed in large type, containing a verbatim copy in the English language of the provisions of Sections 103-2, 103-3, 103-4, 109-1, 110-2, 110-4, and sub-parts (a) and (b) of Sections 110-7 and 113-3 of this Code. Each person who is in charge of any courthouse or other building in which any trial of an offense is conducted shall post in each room primarily used for such trials and in each room in which defendants are confined or wait, pending trial, in conspicuous places where it may be seen and read by persons in custody and others, a poster, printed in large type, containing a verbatim copy in the English language of the provisions of Sections 103-6, 113-1, 113-4 and 115-1 and of subparts (a) and (b) of Section 113-3 of this Code. (Source: Laws 1965, p. 2622.)
(725 ILCS 5/103-8) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-8) Sec. 103-8. Mandatory duty of officers.
Any peace officer who intentionally prevents the exercise by an accused of any right conferred by this Article or who intentionally fails to perform any act required of him by this Article shall be guilty of official misconduct and may be punished in accordance with Section 33-3 of the “Criminal Code of 1961” approved July 28, 1961, as heretofore and hereafter amended. (Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)
(725 ILCS 5/103-9) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-9)
Sec. 103-9. Bail bondsmen. No bail bondsman from any state may seize or transport unwillingly any person found in this State who is allegedly in violation of a bail bond posted in some other state. The return of any such person to another state may be accomplished only as provided by the laws of this State. Any bail bondsman who violates this Section is fully subject to the criminal and civil penalties provided by the laws of this State for his actions. (Source: P.A. 84-694.)
Per Aldemon’s report, page 5 of 6, he states, “Nyman also located several anti-government and anti-police pamphlets and reading material.