I finally get "census'd"…. sort of.

I got “census’d” today. What fun! No, I did not participate. I talked to the census taker for about 45 minutes. She was pleasant and professional. I did not answer her questions except for telling her, for purposes of a Constitutional census, the number of people is “two”. I declined my name, phone number, race (duh), whether I was married (or who the second person was), or any other information. I don’t know what she thought, but i guarantee that after my 45 minute soliloquy, she “thought”.

There had been about 3 attempts by the census by visiting my home. They left a notice with a name and number to contact them regarding submitting their form, but as I explained to the census taker, I saw no reason or obligation to reach out to them. I figured that if they showed up when I was home it would happen.

So, today, as I worked in my yard the census taker approached me by walking up the driveway to where I was working. Her name is Karen Pasterski. She showed the requisite ID and presented herself well. She was polite and pleasant. She was no different than many people I come across in my daily conversations. Most believe what they have been taught in school, told by their parents, read and see in the media, and informed of by the government. I did not seek to change here way of thinking to match mine, but rather to challenge her own way of thinking.

She asked me the basic questions like, what is your name, age, phone number, race…. I declined to answer any questions. I told her that the Constitution provides for a census to be taken every 10 years for the purposes of setting the number of representatives. For such purposes, I told her the number is two. She then told me that she needed at least 3 answers to consider the form “complete”. I replied that any other information is outside the authority extended to the government by the Constitution. She agreed, but then said that “…today, the information is also used for funding…” I asked her to quote the Constitutional provision that extended the purpose of a census to cover “funding”. She admitted that the census is used for such purposes, but could not cite any constitutional provision.

She went on to say that Collinsville relies upon the census for federal dollars to which I replied I would rather it not receive federal dollars. She said that Collinsville may choose to pay for a special census, to which I replied it would be one more census to not participate with since I did not participate in the last special census which resulted in Collinsville receiving home rule status.

I went on to comment on how government has failed and has shown to be more of a threat to liberty than a protector of it. I commented on how the people, and only those wishing to form such, were the masters of government but the tables have turned and the people are now subservient to government. I told her that I, in good conscience, cannot cooperate in supporting government in any way. I told her that I had renounced my citizenship, had no SSN, received no privileges or benefits, and possess no civil rights. She seemed very curious and allowed me to explain my statements.

She agreed on many points, but thought it more effective to remain “below the radar” than to stand up to the system. I disagreed, saying that I believed myself to possess certain talents and abilities which empowered me to stand defiant against the system.

Even though I disagreed and refused to cooperate with the census, I understood her position and hoped she therfore understood mine. I told her that if she needed a minimum of 3 answers she was welcome to to complete her form as she saw fit, using, if need-be, presumption drawn from her own inferences pursuant to our discussion. I told her I cared not what she put on “her” form, but I would not assist in providing specific details. What she put on the form… I have no idea.

In 45 minutes I told her about my run for political office, being detained by Homeland Security, my website, the difference between being an American and U.S. citizen, and my renouncing U.S. citizenship. Should I have not said anything? Why not take the opportunity? Every mind is a potential ally. Maybe exposure to the truth will give them pause and cause them to think about things. I told her, “I have nothing to hide, but I have everything to hide.” It is not what I have to hide, per se, but what I choose to disclose. She was just a pleasant woman doing what she thought was legitimate and lawful. I saw no need for confrontation, antagonism, or disrespect. I treat every one with the benefit of the doubt that they are possibly as ignorant as I once was.

I have read so many emails and posts about people in the “patriot” movement having an experience with the census taker. Many of them range from encounters which are confrontational, antagonistic, and abusive.  People are the ones who possess the natural, sovereign, and absolute power and yet we allow ourselves to act from a position of fearful and ignorant oafs when we encounter a government actor. I refuse to paint with a broad brush and discount such people as lost souls. I too, at one point, used to pledge allegiance and proudly wield my SSN.

After it was all said and done, we shook hands and she left. What she does from there is of no consequence to me.  I would give the same speech to anyone who came wielding “authority”. I don’t expect any negative consequences from our meeting. I hope she stops and reflects on what we discussed. All we can do is sow seeds.

Common Law in Illinois

Here is a Power Point presentation I used when I spoke at the Illinois Libertarian Party Convention in 2006. My speech focused on the Common Law, and how it is still operative in Illinois. Officials often portray individuals who invoke the Common Law as being fringe, patriot or militia radicals; and there is much confusion and misunderstanding of what the Common Law is. The Common Law embodies long-held judicial decisions dating back hundreds of years. It stands in distinction to statutory law, which is man-made law and often mala prohibita in nature. The application of statutes in relation to the Common Law is to modify, amend, or address shortcomings in the Common Law to address the application of the Common Law to modern-day issues where the Common Law had not previously been applied. The notes below I gleaned from the Corpus Juris Secundum which is the authoritative Legal Encyclopedia used by legal professionals and jurists. I have also included an additional analysis of the City of St. Louis, Missouri Earnings Tax, which imposes a 1% tax upon the “wages” of “taxpayers” working within the corporate limits of the City of St. Louis, Missouri. I attempt to clarify and illustrate the chicanery and confusion used in the wording of the City Code which attempts to impose a tax upon working people. You will need the ability to view Microsoft PowerPoint slide shows to view the presentation. 
Discussion of the Common Law

https://markmccoy.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/signatureii.gifwp-content/uploads/2010/05/Discussion-of-the-Common-Law.swf

 Common Law in Illinois 

Corpus Juris Secundum on the Common Law § §  11 et seq.

 The common law of England, so far as applicable and of a general nature, is in full force in Illinois until repealed by legislative authority.
 There is no national common law operative as such throughout the United States, and the adoption and application of the common law were matters left to the several states for determination.

Under the Act of March 5, 1874, which is still in effect, the General Assembly provided: “The common law of England, so far as the same is applicable and of a general nature, and all statutes or acts of the British parliament made in aid of, and to supply the defects of the common law, prior to the fourth year of James the First, excepting the second section of the sixth chapter of 43d Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of 13th Elizabeth, and ninth chapter of 37th Henry Eighth, and which are of a general nature and not local to that kingdom, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as of full force until repealed by legislative authority.” The fourth year of James the First began March 24, 1606.

This statute, without the exceptions, was passed by the general convention of the Colony of Virginia, May, 1776, and in its present form was carried into the legislature of the Indiana Territory by the Act of September 7, 1807, was in force in the territory of Illinois and was reenacted by the first state legislature by Act of February 4, 1819, and has been retained in the same form in succeeding revisions. The statute is declaratory of what was the law by which the inhabitants of the territory now constituting the State of Illinois were governed, and of the rights, privileges, and immunities to which they were entitled ever since Anglo-Saxon civilization first obtained a foothold in it.

The legislature fixed the fourth year of James the First, instead of the date of the Declaration of Independence, or of the formation of our Constitution, as the period for transplanting the common law of England because that was the period at which the first territorial government was established in America, and with it the common law of England as it then existed.

As a result of the Act, the great body of the English common law became, so far as applicable, in force in this state, and remains in force except so far as it has been modified or repealed by statute, or changed or modified by custom as found in decisions of our courts. The common law, when applicable, is as much a part of the law of the state, where it has not been expressly abrogated by statute, as the statutes themselves. In other words, Illinois is a common law state.

 
On the other hand, it has long been settled that the adoption has extended only to cases where the common law is applicable to the habits and condition of our society and in harmony with the genius, spirit, and objects of our institutions. The statute adopting the common law of England does not require the courts to enforce the local customs of England, but, on the contrary, they are excluded.  

 What the statute adopted was not just those doctrines which happened to have already been announced by English courts at the close of the Middle Ages, but rather a system of law whose outstanding characteristics are its adaptability and capacity for growth. The Supreme Court pointed out in the very early case of Penny v. Little, which was quoted in Amann v. Faidy, “That if we are to be restricted to the common law, as it was enacted at fourth James, rejecting all modifications and improvements which have since been made, by practice and statutes, except our own statutes, we will find that system entirely inapplicable to our present condition, for the simple reason that it is more than two hundred years behind the age.”

Adoption of English statutes. The Act of March 5, 1874, which is still in effect, adopted not only the common law of England, but also all statutes in aid thereof or to supply defects therein passed prior to the fourth year of James the First, except the second section of the sixth chapter of 43 Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of 13th Elizabeth, and ninth chapter of 37th Henry the Eighth, which were of a general nature and not local to that kingdom. 
 English statutes are not in force in Illinois which were passed since the fourth year of James the First, or which are inapplicable to our conditions and inconsistent with our institutions.

Corpus Juris Secundum on the Common Law § §  14, 15

Various maxims and principles of the common law which are of general application and are suited to the conditions and surroundings of our state have been adopted and are in force to the extent that they have not been superseded by statutory enactment.

Thus, the courts have applied the doctrine of Mobilia sequuntur personam and the maxim De minimis non curat lex. 
 In addition, other maxims and principles have been applied, such as ignorance of the law excuses no one, and everyone of sound and pure mind is bound at his peril to take knowledge of both the common and statute law; the law only favors the vigilant; the law abhors forfeitures and will show them no mercy or favor; persons must so use their own property and so exercise their own privileges that they do not thereby destroy or peril the rights of others; the law does not permit a person to do indirectly what he cannot do directly; and the law does not require the performance of a useless act.

Statutes

Rules for the construction of statutes are not rules of law, but are only aids which courts use to ascertain the legislative intent not clearly manifest from the language of the statute.

The purpose of all rules or maxims adopted by the courts for the construction or interpretation of statutes is to discover the true intent and meaning of the law. These rules or maxims are not rules of law, but are merely aids used by the courts in arriving at the real intention of the legislature when that intention is not clearly manifest from the language used.

These rules are useful only in cases of doubt, and are never to be used to create a doubt, but only to remove it.

Definitions.

The General Assembly has the power to make a reasonable definition of the terms used in an act, even though such definitions do not correspond with those contained in other acts. Statutory definitions control in the construction of the terms in an act, and the common-law definitions of those terms must yield to the statutory definitions.

 Words defined

The words in a statute may be defined by common usage, by previous judicial construction, as well as by statutory definition, to render the statute certain.

 § 52. Construction as including or binding sovereign

General legislative enactments do not impair the rights of the sovereign unless such an intent is expressly declared in the statute.
 The rights of the sovereign are never impaired by a general legislative enactment unless such an intent is expressly declared in the statute, and the words of a statute applying to private rights do not affect the rights of the state. The state is not bound by or included in any act of the General Assembly unless expressly named or necessarily implied to give effect to the act, although the rule that general legislative enactments are not applicable to the state is not violated when the state is made subject to the provisions thereof by reason of the expressed intention of the General Assembly to make it subject thereto.

In common usage the word “person” does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are generally construed to exclude the sovereign, although the purpose, subject matter, context, legislative history, and executive interpretation of a statute are aids to construction which may indicate an intent, by the use of the term “person,” to bring the state or nation within the scope of the statute. According to the Statute on Statutes, the words “person” or “persons,” as well as all words referring to or importing persons, may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate as well as individuals.

Mark McCoy Cover Letter for Declaration of Sovereignty

Cover letter to Declaration sent to City of Collinsville, Illinois, Illinois Secretary of State, Missouri Secretary of State, and United States State Department via Certified U.S. Mail on Jan. 2, 2008, Registration Numbers: 70070220000112930039, 70070220000112930053, 70070220000112930046 and 70070220000112930022, respectively. Certified Mail Receipts.  Return Receipts.  Recorder’s Receipt.  Postage Fees Receipt.

January 1, 2008

Know all men by these presents that I, Mark McCoy, extend greetings to all representatives, agents, and officers of the United States, and freely and voluntarily send the following message:

I am sending this letter and enclosed Declaration as a courtesy and for your information. You are receiving this because you are either a duly elected public servant, or are occupying a position created by an act of law or expediency. Please feel free to pass this letter and the enclosed Declaration along to whomever you may think would be interested in its contents. I would encourage all who read it to study it thoroughly. It comes from many years of study, research, and anguish. I have not made this decision lightly. I am fully aware of the implications, ramifications, and possible consequences. It flows from the pen of a peaceful, freedom-loving, independent man who can see the recurring pattern that has plagued mankind since man first ruled over other men. I have come to believe that I must either acquiesce to the role of a subject, or take the path others have bravely travelled, often at enormous costs to themselves. I have chosen the more difficult path of identifying and challenging that which is contrary to my liberty and conscience.

The enclosed Declaration is not a legal document. The statements made in the Declaration are not a matter of law or legality. The statements made in the Declaration exist outside law promulgated by government. My Declaration avers and attests to the Natural Law that binds all People and is the antecedent basis and justification for any other moral law. Just as ignorance of the law is no excuse, by this Declaration, ignorance of My Sovereignty, My rights, and My liberty, is no excuse.

If we are to believe in the words of those who have come before us, espousing and proclaiming the ideas of liberty, then all men have by way of their birth, possess complete and perfect title to their person, liberty, and property. Such men, seeking to form a government for their mutual benefit and binding only those who consent to its jurisdiction, cannot by right or morality bind other men to their will without the like-consent of those who they seek to bind. The Declaration of Independence makes the proclamation that, “…deriving their just power from the consent of the governed. And should any government become destructive to these ends it shall be the right of the People to alter or abolish it…” That Declaration did not ask government to accept, acknowledge, or approve of that statement because it does not need acceptance, acknowledgement, or approval. It is simply a Declaration founded in truth, morality, and nature.

 I have chosen to adopt the spirit of the Declaration of Independence in my Public Declaration of Sovereignty, Expatriation, and Dissolution of all Previous Political and National Allegiance. I believe I have taken reasonable measures to question and challenge that which has been portrayed to me as law that binds me to perform certain duties prescribed by others with whom I have not chosen to represent me or act on my behalf. I am making known my Declaration as a peaceful overture to those who have taken liberties in prescribing the limits of my liberties, defining my rights, and restricting my freedom. I have grown weary of dissemblance, fraud, deceit, threats, and silence, proliferated by supposed “servants”, elected and paid by the consenting governed, all to the detriment of those who either consent through will, or succumb through ignorance.

Please take note; I am not asking for permission; I am not seeking approval; I am not petitioning for acknowledgement, of My Declaration. It will stand as My public proclamation in clarifying or correcting who I am, in relation to what government has presumed or deemed me to be; it is my peaceful overture to all of Mankind as a reasonable, rational, and conscionable Man; and it is my firm and true belief that absent my tacit or explicit consent, I have the right and power to conscript myself to, or remove myself from, any power that acts in any manner whatsoever, in which case I consider the present federal, state, and local governments to be inconsistent with my conscience, reason, or morality. My Declaration is absolute, non-negotiable, and the supreme Law to which I morally bind myself.

Even though I subscribe to the teachings of Thoreau, King Jr., and Gandhi, I will resist peacefully, at first, by merely refusing to act in a manner prescribed by arbitrary power, but if confronted with an attempt at coercion or compulsion, through force against my person, I will resort to whatever means of self-preservation I may see fit to summon. As Thomas Jefferson said, “Resistance to Tyrants is obedience to God.” It is peaceful to refuse to act, but it is righteous to protect that which divinity has provided.

Unless a claim can be made that binds or subjects me to any presumed authority; arising from a document, contract, agreement, or oath, and which was made with my fully informed, voluntary consent, then I am subject to no governmental authority. If government requires the consent of the governed, then this Declaration contests the presumption of such consent. If I am to be subjected to arbitrary power against my will, then let the world know that this country does not represent freedom, and all living thereupon the land are not free. In either case, I will assert my independence and exercise my freedom in any manner consistent with my conscience and in opposition to any unnatural construct that would impose restrictions upon my moral exercise of liberty. If a claim is to be made, then publicly do so or let stand as truth, My Declaration.

I have made it known to the world and all mankind, my peaceful intentions, my thoughts, and my Declaration. I encourage you to visit my website at http://www.markmccoy.com

Yours in Peace and Liberty, or Conflict and War,

Mark McCoy

Collinsville Perceives Self-Defense to be a Threat of Violence

On January 3, 2008, the City of Collinsville, Illinois received my Declaration, as evidenced by the return receipt for certified mail. Below is the FOIA request I submitted to Collinsville.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST MADE TO CITY OF COLLINSVILLE

REQUEST FOR RECORDS PURSUANT TO THE ILLINOIS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 5 ILCS 140/1 ET. SEQ.
Date: March 8, 2009
Requestor’s Name: Mark McCoy
Requestor’s Address: Collinsville, Illinois
Requestor’s Phone Number: ***-***-****
Request Made to: City of Collinsville, Illinois
Request made for: Certified paper copies and CD Rom/Electronic format, if available.
Records to be: Picked up at City Hall upon fulfillment

Specific Public Records Requested:
Pursuant to the Illinois Freedom of Information Act , 5 ILCS 140/1 to 140/11, I write to request access to and a copy of the following. Any public record, as defined in 5 ILCS 140 et.seq. including but not limited to the following:

Any information, email, records, memos, letters, communications, created, received, or possessed by the City of Collinsville, its employees, officers, or agents relating to Mark McCoy.

Any information, email, records, memos, letters, communications created, received, or possessed by the City of Collinsville, its employees, officers, or agents concerning the website markmccoy.com

Any information, email, records, memos, letters, communications created, received, or possessed by the City of Collinsville, its employees, officers, or agents concerning a Public Declaration of Sovereignty, Expatriation, and Dissolution of all Previous National and Political Allegiance, signed by Mark McCoy, and which was filed with the St. Clair County Recorder of Deeds on Jan. 4, 2008, and which bears the Letter Number A02084317, and received by the City of Collinsville on 1/3/08.

I agree to pay any reasonable copying and postage fees. Please provide a receipt indicating the charges for each document.

As provided by The Freedom of Information Act, I will expect your response within seven (7) working days.

If you choose to deny this request, please provide a written explanation for the denial including a reference to the specific statutory exemption(s) upon which you rely. Also, please provide all portions of otherwise exempt material.

Please be advised that I am prepared to pursue whatever legal remedy necessary to obtain access to the requested records. I would note that willful violation of the open records law can result in the award of reasonable attorney’ fees.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,
Mark McCoy
Collinsville, Illinois

Today, March 24, 2009, I received my FOIA response from the City of Collinsville. The response consists of only one page. That page is a memo from then Mayor, Stan Schaeffer who refers to my Declaration at Paragraph 4 of Page 2, to wit:

“I reserve MY natural right to exercise any and all means of self-defense with any and all weapons or devices at my disposal against any and all aggressors that may result in harm or death to Myself or others who may assail me.”

In the eyes of Stan Schaeffer, that constitutes a “threat of violence”.  Mr. Schaeffer also refers to the “Kirkwood incident” where a disgruntled citizen killed several people at City Hall; associating me with a violent killer.

Here is the FOIA reply I received. In my opinion, the response is incomplete. There were three other people copied on this memo in conjunction with the City Council. I cannot believe that out of all those people this was the only document generated as a result of my Declaration and the inference of a “threat of violence”. I will need to file an appeal for an incomplete response, and quite possibly a lawsuit for violations of the Freedom of Information Act. More to come…….

So you think you're an Employee working for an Employer. A letter I wrote for one of my clients to their so-called "Employer".

XXXXX XXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX, Illinois
[62226]

Friday, March 28, 2008

Mr. XXXXX XXXXX
XXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXX
XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX
Earth City, MO 63045

Re: Demand for full compensation and release of unlawfully withheld monies under color of law.

Mr. XXXXXXX,

Ms. XXXXXXX is in receipt of payroll check (Check Number 9521) dated 12/17/2007 for the sum of $676.77 as compensation for Ms. XXXXXXX’s labor, occurring between the dates of XX/XX/2007 through XX/XX/07. I am writing to inform you that the amount reflected on the check as “Net Pay” is incorrect and deficient to the tune of $275.94, which is reflected on the stub of said check under “Taxes”, of which you had no lawful authority to withhold, and still persisted in doing so against Ms. XXXXXXX’s express permission.

I formally demand you to release the withheld monies and return them to Ms. XXXXXXX within 10 (ten) days of your receipt of this letter, to satisfy your obligation to compensate her in full, per your agreement, in her performing labor at your request in exchange for a dollar amount established by your collective bargaining agreement with the IBEW. Failure to comply with this lawful demand will result in your depriving Ms. XXXXXXX of her property by way of the tort of conversion; breaching your contract to compensate Ms. XXXXXXX in full; and intentionally causing undue stress and hardship to Ms. XXXXXXX and her family, recourse for which will be sought through the civil courts.

A number of attempts have been made to reach an agreement in this matter, among which include conversations with your attorney, Carl XXXXXX. Mr. XXXXX was provided with an 18 page fax from me which included a memorandum of law: “Requirements of Employers With Respect to Social Security Numbers”. Mr. XXXXXX never responded to the communiqué’ and refused to return a number of subsequent phone calls from me.

To date, I have not been provided with any legal authority by you or your attorney, both of you which are vocal and capricious with parroting conventional wisdom which reflects ignorant and ill-informed perceptions about the true applicability of the tax code to workers in the private sector exchanging their labor for compensation. I have made every possible attempt to inform all parties involved that there can be no withholding upon a worker without a lawful imposition of a tax (of which none has been shown to exist) or a worker’s permission to submit to withholding by tendering a signed W-4 (of which none has been tendered). Absent such lawful authority or voluntary submission, there can be no withholding.

In your letter dated Nov. 13, 2007, you presume to act under authority of 26CFR31.6011(b)–1(iv) in requiring Ms. XXXXXXX to provide a “Social Security account number”. I have reviewed the regulations and have found no such citation as you referenced within the code. I believe the text you are quoting is from 26CFR31.6011 (b) -2 (b)(iv), which contains similar verbiage as that you quoted. If you read the above referenced citation, you will see that the words “Social Security account number” appear nowhere within the text of that cite. The code only mentions “account numbers”. If you read the beginning of the citation, you will see that it pertains only to “…employment for wages subject to the taxes imposed by the Federal Insurance Contributions Act or which are subject to the withholding of income tax from wages under section 3402…”. Would you please explain under what authority or expertise you claim to define Ms. XXXXXXX’s tax liability or interpret the code as it applies to Ms. XXXXXXX’s status? Can you also provide proof that Ms. XXXXXXX’s earnings from you constitute “wages”, as defined within the code, and MPG is such an “employer” and Ms. XXXXXXX an “employee” under same code?

I also find it difficult to reconcile your apparent hypocrisy in stating that you are abiding by the law, when on Feb. 28, 2007,  Ms. XXXXXXX received a check in the amount $355.58 (number 8808) where taxes were withheld against Ms. XXXXXXX’s wishes, and in violation of the exemption documentation Ms. XXXXXXX tendered. Upon making your payroll department aware of their error, Ms. XXXXXXX was re-issued a corrected check (number 2443) in the amount of $385.04, in which no monies were withheld. It would appear that you either do not know, and apply, the law as well as you purport, as evidenced by your payroll inconsistencies, or are summarily disregarding the law in this latest instance for whatever purpose seems fit to suit your fancy. Regardless, since you issued a complete check, absent withholding, in the beginning of the year, I would expect you to likewise issue the remainder of Ms. XXXXXXX’s pay for the latest check as well.

You are making a presumptive leap to defining Ms. XXXXXXX as an employee and yourself as an employer. My whole point is that the law does not identify, nor apply to, private sector workers. The code has always applied to government workers or others performing “services” in areas under federal jurisdiction, and not to the 50 states. The law has been consistently misapplied. As long as workers continue to claim to be employees and submit to paying “the tax”, the government is more than happy to take their money.

On the other hand, Ms. XXXXXXX chose not to misidentify herself, and instead, apply the law, as written. There is no penalty for not submitting to withholding if the law never applies to Ms. XXXXXXX to begin with. The law most definitely applies to employees and employers of the United States. However, the law takes explicit measures to re-define some terms for use in the law which contradict the every day “Webster” meaning. For example:
Withholding only applies to “Wages”. “Wages” are only earned by “Employees”. The terms “Wages” and “Employee” have a special meaning for the purposes of the law, to wit:
TITLE 26 > Subtitle C > CHAPTER 24 > § 3401
§ 3401. Definitions
(a) Wages
For purposes of this chapter, the term “wages” means all remuneration (other than fees paid to a public official) for services performed by an employee for his employer, including the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any medium other than cash; except that such term shall not include remuneration paid—

So we see that “wages” are paid for services performed by an employee. An employee is defined as:

(c) Employee
For purposes of this chapter, the term “employee” includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term “employee” also includes an officer of a corporation.

Ms. XXXXXXX is not an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia. These are all federal governmental positions under federal jurisdiction. For this to apply to Ms. XXXXXXX, XXX would have to be a part of the federal government or a political extension of it. More word trickery is used to define an “Employer” as you see below:

(d) Employer
For purposes of this chapter, the term “employer” means the person for whom an individual performs or performed any service, of whatever nature, as the employee of such person, except that—
(1) if the person for whom the individual performs or performed the services does not have control of the payment of the wages for such services, the term “employer” (except for purposes of subsection (a)) means the person having control of the payment of such wages, and
(2) in the case of a person paying wages on behalf of a nonresident alien individual, foreign partnership, or foreign corporation, not engaged in trade or business within the United States, the term “employer” (except for purposes of subsection (a)) means such person.

Lawmakers use the word “Employee” as the basis for defining an “Employer”. If an “Employee” only works for a federal entity, then employers must only be federal entities. To illustrate further, the terms “United States” and “State” don’t mean what one may think. They too have a specific meaning under this chapter:

TITLE 26 > Subtitle C > CHAPTER 21 > Subchapter C > § 3121
§ 3121. Definitions
(e) State, United States, and citizen
For purposes of this chapter—
(1) State
The term “State” includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.

“States”, for the purposes of this chapter apply only to federal territories and possessions. It does not mention the “several states”. XXXX’s office is located in Missouri, not one of the above locations.

(2) United States
The term “United States” when used in a geographical sense includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.
An individual who is a citizen of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (but not otherwise a citizen of the United States) shall be considered, for purposes of this section, as a citizen of the United States.

Now we see “United States” means everything mentioned in “State” except for the District of Columbia. Again, XXXX is not located in the “United States” as it applies to this law. To illustrate further, the code even goes on to define an “American Employer”. Sounds like XXXX may be an “American Employer”. Think again. Remember the definition of “State” and “United States”:

(h) American employer
For purposes of this chapter, the term “American employer” means an employer which is—
(1) the United States or any instrumentality thereof,
(2) an individual who is a resident of the United States,
(3) a partnership, if two-thirds or more of the partners are residents of the United States,
(4) a trust, if all of the trustees are residents of the United States, or
(5) a corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of any State.

In other words, it means an employer which is the United States (The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa) or an instrumentality thereof.

An individual who is a resident of Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.

A partnership, two-thirds or more of the partners are residents of The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.

A trust, if all the trustees are residents of The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.

A corporation organized under the laws of The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa or of the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.

In case you are wondering about the use of “includes” to mean the things listed along with the 50 states or employees meaning those things listed along with you and I, one can’t assume that things not mentioned in the law are included unless they are specifically mentioned. In other words, absent a reference to the 50 states or several states, you should not assume that such are included in the terms defined. When used in law, “includes” and “including” have been held generally be terms of “limited expansion”.  The law even addresses the use of “includes” and “including:

TITLE 26 > Subtitle F > CHAPTER 79 > § 7701

(c) Includes and including
The terms “includes” and “including” when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.

It has to make you wonder why they would even have to address these words, but they use them specially when writing law. If you read the definition closely, it will read like this:

“The terms includes and including when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things that that mean the same thing as the term being defined.”

When the term “employee” is being defined as “…includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term “employee” also includes an officer of a corporation.”, the term is mentioning those working in various capacities for governmental entities. Since private sector workers are not mentioned in the definition, the word “includes” should not be deemed to embrace such workers, because they are not within the meaning of the term being defined, which is “employees” who work for governmental entities.
“Includes” can also be redefined to read, “The term “includes” shall not be deemed to imply other things not within the meaning of the term being defined.”

It is not the burden of the person to prove that the law doesn’t apply to them. The burden is upon the government to show that the law does apply to the person. When reading the actual law, as I have outlined above, there is NO tax imposed, nor duty to withhold, upon Ms. XXXXXXX’s compensation unless done by inference and applying colloquial interpretation to the law.

I would ask that you read the definitions carefully and provide me with the applicable code and regulation that requires Ms. XXXXXXX to submit to withholding or to have XXXX withhold Ms. XXXXXXX’s pay against her will. A W-4 can not be mandatory since it requires Ms. XXXXXXX/s signature. Since Ms. XXXXXXX’s signature is being requested she therefore has the prerogative to decline providing it. Ms. XXXXXXX can not be compelled to sign something against her will. And if the W-4 is necessary for withholding to occur, then absent Ms. XXXXXXX’s submission of a signed W-4, there can be no withholding.

I can respect someone acting according to the law. I can even accept someone applying the law, as they have come to read and understand it, even if that reading and understanding is misperceived. At least, in both situations, there is room for debate and communication in both sides making an argument for their interpretation of the law. However, I cannot accept, nor respect, someone who acts under color of law; who cites snippets of code out of context; and who hides behind colloquial interpretations and disjointed conventional wisdom of what they may have heard or have been told by others no more knowledgeable or informed than themselves. Since you appear to care not about what the law actually says, I have to believe you are hiding behind the law to unjustly deprive Ms. XXXXXXX of her full compensation because you are reluctant or afraid to go against the din of the ignorant cheering you on to remain ignorant like them and curry favor with the status quo.

I would appreciate, and respect, an articulate and logical application of the law, as you understand it through your own reading and research. Absent any evidence that you have applied yourself in reconciling this matter civilly, justly, and lawfully, I will remain resolute and unwavering in demanding Ms. XXXXXXX’s property be returned. Ms. XXXXXXX responded honorably in providing her labor at your request, in exchange for just compensation. I would expect you respond honorably in remitting Ms. XXXXXXX’s property to her in full.

   In closing, I will expect to see the balance of the earnings owed to Ms. XXXXXXX through unlawful confiscation returned within the time specified above. This letter constitutes final demand for payment in full of all said monies. Failure to respond with a remittance of the full amount of monies withheld will precipitate redress through the civil legal process. I await your response.

Sincerely,

Mark McCoy
Private Counsel and Representative for Ms. XXXXXXX

=============================================================================================

MISSOURI CIRCUIT COURT
TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
(City of St. Louis)

XXXXX X. XXXXX            )
XX XXXXXXX XXXXX         )
XXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXX 62226   )
                  )
         Plaintiff,           )
                  )
vs.                  )   Cause No.
                  )
XXX                  )
and Mr. XXXXXXX                        )
XXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXX XXXXX   )
Earth City, Mo 63045              )
                  )
         Defendant(s).   )

      
COMPLAINT

   COMES NOW the Plaintiff, XXXXX X. XXXXX, and for her causes of action against the defendant, XXX, hereinafter

referred to as XXXXX XXXXXXXXX, states as follows:

COUNT I
(CONVERSION AGAINST DEFENDANT, XXXXX XXXXXXXXX)

   For Count I against the Defendant, XXXXX XXXXXXXXX,

Plaintiff, XXXXX X. XXXXX, states as follows:

   1.   That the Defendant, XXXXX XXXXXXXXX, is a Missouri

   Corporation authorized to do business in the State of

   Missouri.

   2.   That the Defendant did contract with the Plaintiff for

   her labor, where she performed her duties for the Defendant

   on the following dates, and for the number of hours listed:
 
      A.   Sept. 27, 2007, for six hours.

      B.   Oct. 6, 2007, for six hours.

      C.   Oct. 11, 2007, for six hours.

      D.   Oct. 19, 2007, for six hours.
   
      E.   Nov. 2, 2007, for eight hours.

   3.   That the Defendant did contract with the Plaintiff for
   
   her labor, absent any disclosure of a social security number

   or any tendering of tax withholding forms.

   4.   That the Defendant had no lawful authority or

   permission from the Plaintiff to withhold any amount from

   the Plaintiff’s just compensation.
                     
   5.   That the agreed upon rate of pay per hour was $28.97,

   pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement with the

   International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local X.

   6.   That the Defendant was indebted to the Plaintiff for

   $952.71 as compensation for her labor.

   7.   That the Defendant did issue a payroll check in the

   amount of $676.77 on Dec. 31, 2007, to the Plaintiff,

   as compensation for her labor performed per paragraph 1.

   8.   That the Plaintiff was denied $275.94 of her just

   compensation, by the Defendant withholding said amount

   against the wishes of the Plaintiff.

   9.   That the Defendant alluded to complying with a law

   requiring him to withhold a portion of the Plaintiff’s
         
   compensation as justification, but failed to fully cite any

   lawful authority for depriving the Plaintiff of her full

   compensation when faced with a demand by the Plaintiff for

   such specific lawful duty.

   10.   That the Defendant did not inform the Plaintiff, upon

   contracting for her labor, that he   would be withholding any

   amount from Plaintiff’s compensation in order to comply with

   any lawful authority.

   11.   That the Plaintiff made repeated demands to the

   Defendant for the $275.71 balance owed to her.

   12.   That the Defendant committed the tort of conversion

   when he intentionally and purposefully withheld $275.94 from

   the Plaintiff’s just compensation for her labor, and

   retained said amount for his own use.

   13.   That as a direct and proximate result of one or more of

   the aforementioned acts by the Defendant, the Plaintiff,

   XXXXX X. XXXXX, was deprived of the use and enjoyment of her

   just compensation and fruits of her labor.

   WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, XXXXX X. XXXXX, prays judgement

against the defendant, XXXXX XXXXXXXXX, for a sum of $275.94 in

compensatory damages, plus $1000 in punitive damages, plus costs

of suit.      

COUNT II
(BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST DEFENDANT, XXXXX XXXXXXXXX)

   For Count II against the Defendant, XXXXX XXXXXXXXX,

Plaintiff, XXXXX X. XXXXX, states as follows:

   1.   That the Defendant, XXXXX XXXXXXXXX, is a Missouri

   Corporation authorized to do business in the State of

   Missouri.

   2.   That the Defendant did contract with the Plaintiff for

   her labor, where she performed her duties for the Defendant

   on the following dates, and for the number of hours listed:
 
      A.   Sept. 27, 2007, for six hours.

      B.   Oct. 6, 2007, for six hours.

      C.   Oct. 11, 2007, for six hours.

      D.   Oct. 19, 2007, for six hours.
   
      E.   Nov. 2, 2007, for eight hours.

   3.   That the Defendant did contract with the Plaintiff for
   
   her labor, absent any disclosure of a social security number

   or any tendering of tax withholding forms.

   4.   That the Defendant had no lawful authority or

   permission from the Plaintiff to withhold any amount from

   the Plaintiff’s just compensation.
                     
   5.   That the agreed upon rate of pay per hour was $28.97,

   pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement with the

   International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local X.

   6.   That the Defendant was indebted to the Plaintiff for

   $952.71 as compensation for her labor.

   7.   That the Defendant did issue a payroll check in the

   amount of $676.77 on Dec. 17, 2007, to the Plaintiff,

   as compensation for her labor performed per paragraph 1.

   8.   That the Plaintiff was denied $275.94 of her just

   compensation by the Defendant withholding said amount

   against the wishes of the Plaintiff.

   9.   That the Defendant alluded to complying with a law

   requiring him to withhold a portion of the Plaintiff’s
         
   compensation as justification, but failed to fully cite any

   lawful authority for depriving the Plaintiff of her full

   compensation when faced with a demand by the Plaintiff for

   such specific lawful duty.

   10.   That the Defendant did not inform the Plaintiff, upon

   contracting for her labor, that he   would be withholding any

   amount from Plaintiff’s compensation in order to comply with

   any lawful authority.

   11.   That the Plaintiff made repeated demands to the

   Defendant for the $275.71 balance owed to her.

   12.   That the Defendant committed the tort of conversion

   when he intentionally and purposefully withheld $275.94 from

   the Plaintiff’s just compensation for her labor, and

   retained said amount for his own use.

   13.   That as a direct and proximate result of one or more of

   the aforementioned acts by the Defendant, the Plaintiff,

   XXXXX X. XXXXX, was deprived of the use and enjoyment of her

   just compensation and fruits of her labor.

   WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, XXXXX X. XXXXX, prays judgement

against the defendant, XXXXX XXXXXXXX, for a sum of $275.94 in

compensatory damages, plus $1000 in punitive damages, plus costs

of suit.      

COUNT III
(CONVERSION AGAINST DEFENDANT, XXXXX XXXXXXXX)

   For Count I against the Defendant, XXXXX XXXXXXXXX,

Plaintiff, XXXXX X. XXXXX, states as follows:

   1.   That at all relevant times herein, the Defendant, XXXXX

   XXXXXXXXX, was an agent, servant, and/or employee of

   XXX, and was acting in the course of such employment.

   2.   That the Defendant did contract with the Plaintiff for

   her labor, where she performed her duties for the Defendant

   on the following dates, and for the number of hours listed:
 
      A.   Sept. 27, 2007, for six hours.

      B.   Oct. 6, 2007, for six hours.

      C.   Oct. 11, 2007, for six hours.

      D.   Oct. 19, 2007, for six hours.
   
      E.   Nov. 2, 2007, for eight hours.

   3.   That the Defendant did contract with the Plaintiff for
   
   her labor, absent any disclosure of a social security number

   or any tendering of tax withholding forms.

   4.   That the Defendant had no lawful authority or

   permission from the Plaintiff to withhold any amount from

   the Plaintiff’s just compensation.
                     
   5.   That the agreed upon rate of pay per hour was $28.97,

   pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement with the

   International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local X.

   6.   That the Defendant was indebted to the Plaintiff for

   $952.71 as compensation for her labor.

   7.   That the Defendant did issue a payroll check in the

   amount of $676.77 on Dec. 17, 2007, to the Plaintiff,

   as compensation for her labor performed per paragraph 1.

   8.   That the Plaintiff was denied $275.94 of her just

   compensation by the Defendant withholding said amount

   against the wishes of the Plaintiff.

   9.   That the Defendant alluded to complying with a law

   requiring him to withhold a portion of the Plaintiff’s
         
   compensation as justification, but failed to fully cite any

   lawful authority for depriving the Plaintiff of her full

   compensation when faced with a demand by the Plaintiff for

   such specific lawful authority.

   10.   That the Defendant did not inform the Plaintiff, upon

   contracting for her labor, that he   would be withholding any

   amount from Plaintiff’s compensation in order to comply with

   any lawful authority.

   11.   That the Plaintiff made repeated demands to the

   Defendant for the $275.71 balance owed to her.

   12.   That the Defendant committed the tort of conversion

   when he intentionally and purposefully withheld $275.94 from

   the Plaintiff’s just compensation for her labor, and

   retained said amount for his own use.

   13.   That as a direct and proximate result of one or more of

   the aforementioned acts by the Defendant, the Plaintiff,

   XXXXX X. XXXXX, was deprived of the use and enjoyment of her

   just compensation and fruits of her labor.

   WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, XXXXX X. XXXXX, prays judgement

against the defendant, XXXXX XXXXXXXXX, for a sum of $275.94 in

compensatory damages, plus $1000 in punitive damages, plus costs

of suit.      

COUNT IV
(BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST DEFENDANT,XXXXX XXXXXXXXX)

   For Count II against the Defendant, XXXXX XXXXXXXXX, XXXXX X

XXXXX, states as follows:
            
   1.   That at all relevant times herein, the Defendant, XXXXX

        XXXXXXXXX, was an agent, servant, and/or employee of XXX, and was

        acting in the course of such employment.

   2.   That the Defendant did contract with the Plaintiff for

   her labor, where she performed her duties for the Defendant

   on the following dates, and for the number of hours listed:
 
      A.   Sept. 27, 2007, for six hours.

      B.   Oct. 6, 2007, for six hours.

      C.   Oct. 11, 2007, for six hours.

      D.   Oct. 19, 2007, for six hours.
   
      E.   Nov. 2, 2007, for eight hours.

   3.   That the Defendant did contract with the Plaintiff for
   
   her labor, absent any disclosure of a social security number

   or any tendering of tax withholding forms.

   4.   That the Defendant had no lawful authority or

   permission from the Plaintiff to withhold any amount from

   the Plaintiff’s just compensation.
                     
   5.   That the agreed upon rate of pay per hour was $28.97,

   pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement with the

   International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local X.

   6.   That the Defendant was indebted to the Plaintiff for

   $952.71 as compensation for her labor.

   7.   That the Defendant did issue a payroll check in the

   amount of $676.77 on Dec. 17, 2007, to the Plaintiff,

   as compensation for her labor performed per paragraph 1.

   8.   That the Plaintiff was denied $275.94 of her just

   compensation by the Defendant withholding said amount

   against the wishes of the Plaintiff.

   9.   That the Defendant alluded to complying with a law

   requiring him to withhold a portion of the Plaintiff’s
         
   compensation as justification, but failed to fully cite any

   lawful authority for depriving the Plaintiff of her full

   compensation when faced with a demand by the Plaintiff for

   such specific lawful duty.

   10.   That the Defendant did not inform the Plaintiff, upon

   contracting for her labor, that he   would be withholding any

   amount from Plaintiff’s compensation in order to comply with

   any lawful authority.

   11.   That the Plaintiff made repeated demands to the

   Defendant for the $275.71 balance owed to her.

   12.   That the Defendant committed the tort of conversion

   when he intentionally and purposefully withheld $275.94 from

   the Plaintiff’s just compensation for her labor, and

   retained said amount for his own use.

   13.   That as a direct and proximate result of one or more of

   the aforementioned acts by the Defendant, the Plaintiff,

   XXXXX X. XXXXX, was deprived of the use and enjoyment of her

   just compensation and fruits of her labor.

   WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, XXXXX X. XXXXX, prays judgement

against the defendant, XXXXX XXXXXXXXX, for a sum of $275.94 in

compensatory damages, plus $1000 in punitive damages, plus costs

of suit.      
      

                  Respectfully Submitted,
                                             
                  XXXXX X. XXXXX, Plaintiff

XXXXX X. XXXXX
XX XXXXXXX XXXXX         
XXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXX 62226

Illinois Gun Laws Pamphlet. Marxist Malapropisms, or How to Beat a Concealed Carry Rap.

Illinois Gun Laws Pamphlet. Marxist Malapropisms, or How to Beat a Concealed Carry Rap.

Control! The govt. oozes lies and misleading propaganda to make you believe they control you. I saw a link to the Illinois Gun Laws pamphlet, and decided to take a look at the usual pap disseminated by “Common questions and answers” publications. Let’s take a look at this:

First. we are directed to CRIMINAL OFFENSES
(720 ILCS 5/) Criminal Code of 1961.
We must look to the definitions section to understand what, and whom, we are seeking to regulate or punish:

(720 ILCS 5/Art. 2 heading)
ARTICLE 2. GENERAL DEFINITIONS

(720 ILCS 5/2‑0.5) (was 720 ILCS 5/2‑.5)
Sec. 2‑0.5. For the purposes of this Code, the words and phrases described in this Article have the meanings designated in this Article, except when a particular context clearly requires a different meaning.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑7.1)
Sec. 2‑7.1. “Firearm” and “firearm ammunition”. “Firearm” and “firearm ammunition” have the meanings ascribed to them in Section 1.1 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act.
(Source: P.A. 91‑544, eff. 1‑1‑00.)

The Firearm Owners Identification Act is limited in scope, and falls within the authority of the “Police Power” of the State. I discuss police power in one of my previous posts, but keep in mind that it is NOT constitutionally derived power, but rather assumed power for the state to regulate for the health, safety, welfare, and morals of the citizens as such may pertain to “commercial activities”. For instance, looking at the FOID act, we see that all of the objects of the regulation pertain to the commercial acts of selling or buying firearms. Look at the wording carefully. I’ll emphasize with CAPS:

(430 ILCS 65/1) (from Ch. 38, par. 83‑1)
Sec. 1. It is hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination that in order to promote and protect the health, safety and welfare of the public, it is necessary and in the public interest to provide a system of identifying persons who are not qualified to acquire or possess firearms, firearm ammunition, stun guns, and tasers within the State of Illinois by the establishment of a system of Firearm Owner’s Identification Cards, thereby establishing a practical and workable system by which law enforcement authorities will be afforded an opportunity to identify those persons who are prohibited by Section 24‑3.1 of the “Criminal Code of 1961”, as amended, from acquiring or possessing firearms and firearm ammunition and who are prohibited by this Act from acquiring stun guns and tasers.
(Source: P.A. 94‑6, eff. 1‑1‑06.) — ALL THIS DOES IS PROVIDE FOR A SYSTEM FOR IDENTIFYING, BUT DOES MAKE IMPOSE ANY REQUIREMENT FOR LICENSING OR REGISTERING.
So, who are they addressing?

“Federally licensed firearm dealer” means a person who is licensed as a federal firearms dealer under Section 923 of the federal Gun Control Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. 923). COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY

“Gun show” includes the entire premises provided for an

event or function, including parking areas for the event or function, that is sponsored to facilitate the purchase, sale, transfer, or exchange of firearms as described in this Section. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY

“Gun show vendor” means a person who exhibits, sells, offers for sale, transfers, or exchanges any firearms at a gun show, regardless of whether the person arranges with a gun show promoter for a fixed location from which to exhibit, sell, offer for sale, transfer, or exchange any firearm. AGAIN, COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY

The FOID Act does not identify or define OFFENSES commited pursuant to the act, aside from a petty offense.

So, it is clear that the FOID card is a Commercial Firearms License for use within the State of Illinois, and does not apply to private Citizens who possess their own firearms for personal use and protection. Moving on to the criminal statute.

(720 ILCS 5/1‑2) (from Ch. 38, par. 1‑2)
Sec. 1‑2. General purposes. The provisions of this Code shall be construed in accordance with the general purposes hereof, to:
(a) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses; THE FOID ACT DOES NOT LIST ANY OFFENSES OTHER THAN A PETTY OFFENSE, WHICH IS NOT CRIMINAL IN NATURE AND INAPPLICABALE TO THIS STATUTE.
(b) Define adequately the act and mental state which constitute each offense, and limit the condemnation of conduct as criminal when it is without fault;
(c) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and which permit recognition of differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders;
(d) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or convicted of offenses.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/1‑3) (from Ch. 38, par. 1‑3)
Sec. 1‑3. Applicability of common law. No conduct constitutes an offense unless it is described as an offense in this Code or in another statute of this State. However, this provision does not affect the power of a court to punish for contempt or to employ any sanction authorized by law for the enforcement of an order or civil judgment.
(Source: P.A. 79‑1360.) AGAIN, THE FOID ACT DOES NOT DEFINE ANY OFFENSES, AND THE COMMON LAW DOES NOT APPLY DUE TO THE LACK THEREOF.

Looking further to the definitions of (720 ILCS 5/Art. 2 heading)
ARTICLE 2. GENERAL DEFINITIONS

(720 ILCS 5/2‑4) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑4)
Sec. 2‑4. “Conduct”.
“Conduct” means an act or a series of acts, and the accompanying mental state.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.) SO YOU HAD A CONCEALED WEAPON. WHAT WAS YOUR MENTAL STATE AT THE TIME? TO COMMIT A CRIME, OR EXERCISE A CONSTITUTIONAL, GOD-GIVEN RIGHT? EXERCISING A RIGHT IS NOT A STATE OF MIND CONSISTENT WITH THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME.

(720 ILCS 5/2‑15) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑15)
Sec. 2‑15. “Person”.
“Person” means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated association.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.) THIS SHOULD BE INTERESTING. ARE YOU A PERSON? GENERALLY THE WORD INDIVIDUAL WOULD MEAN A REAL PERSON, OR PEOPLE, BUT USED WITH THE OTHER WORDS GIVES IT THE MEANING OF BEING AN ARTIFICIAL ENTITY, SUCH AS A CORPORATION OR OTHER GOVERNMENT-CREATED ENTITY. PERSON DOES NOT ALWAYS MEAN PEOPLE.

So, what constitutes a “crime”?

(720 ILCS 5/4‑2) (from Ch. 38, par. 4‑2)
Sec. 4‑2. Possession as voluntary act.
Possession is a voluntary act if the offender knowingly procured or received the thing possessed, or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient time to have been able to terminate his possession.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/4‑3) (from Ch. 38, par. 4‑3)
Sec. 4‑3. Mental state. THIS MUST BE PROVEN IN COURT!!!
(a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense which involves absolute liability, unless, with respect to each element described by the statute defining the offense, he acts while having one of the mental states described in Sections 4‑‑4 through 4‑‑7.
(b) If the statute defining an offense prescribed a particular mental state with respect to the offense as a whole, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the prescribed mental state applies to each such element. If the statute does not prescribe a particular mental state applicable to an element of an offense (other than an offense which involves absolute liability), any mental state defined in Sections 4‑‑4, 4‑‑5 or 4‑‑6 is applicable. WE WILL LOOK AT THESE SECTIONS.
(c) Knowledge that certain conduct constitutes an offense, or knowledge of the existence, meaning, or application of the statute defining an offense, is not an element of the offense unless the statute clearly defines it as such.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/4‑4) (from Ch. 38, par. 4‑4)
Sec. 4‑4. Intent. NOPE, INTENT IS NOT MENTIONED IN THE OFFENSE SECTION.
A person intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the statute defining the offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.) OKAY, SO YOU INTEND TO CARRY A CONCEALED WEAPPON UNDER THE EXERCISE OF YOUR CONSTITUTIONALY PROTECTED RIGHT.

(720 ILCS 5/4‑5) (from Ch. 38, par. 4‑5)
Sec. 4‑5. Knowledge. THE CRIMINAL ACT STATES “KNOWINGLY”. LET’S LOOK AT “KNOWINGLY”.
A person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of:
(a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he is consciously aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that such fact exists.
(b) The result of his conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he is consciously aware that such result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct.
Conduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is performed wilfully, within the meaning of a statute using the latter term, unless the statute clearly requires another meaning.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/4‑ (from Ch. 38, par. 4‑8)
Sec. 4‑8. Ignorance or mistake. (a) A person’s ignorance or mistake as to a matter of either fact or law, except as provided in Section 4‑3(c) above, is a defense if it negatives the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.
(b) A person’s reasonable belief that his conduct does not constitute an offense is a defense if:
(1) The offense is defined by an administrative regulation or order which is not known to him and has not been published or otherwise made reasonably available to him, and he could not have acquired such knowledge by the exercise of due diligence pursuant to facts known to him; or
(2) He acts in reliance upon a statute which later is determined to be invalid; or
(3) He acts in reliance upon an order or opinion of an Illinois Appellate or Supreme Court, or a United States appellate court later overruled or reversed;
(4) He acts in reliance upon an official interpretation of the statute, regulation or order defining the offense, made by a public officer or agency legally authorized to interpret such statute.
(c) Although a person’s ignorance or mistake of fact or law, or reasonable belief, described in this Section 4‑‑8 is a defense to the offense charged, he may be convicted of an included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed it to be.
(d) A defense based upon this Section 4‑‑8 is an affirmative defense.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
IGNORANCE OR MISTAKE IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, BASED ON THE ABOVE CONDITIONS. HOWEVER, BELIEF THAT THE CONSTITUTION ALLOWS FOR THE CARRYING OR POSSESSING OF A FIREARM, EXCEPT WHERE THE POLICE POWER, WHICH APPLIES TO COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY RELATING TO THE HEALTH, SAFETY, WELFARE AND MORALS, APPLIES.

I would go into more detail, but this would make for a very lengthy post. All I can say is, read the law. All of the law. Definitions and intent as well. The law does not provide penalties for open carry, only concealed carry, and then under specific circumstances. I think a weapons charge under this statute, based on open carry, is able to be beaten, with the proper attorney who actually looks at the law and challenges the system based on what the law says, and uses proper case law and precedent, avoiding any mention of United States citizenship or alluding to having engaged in a commercial activity. Once you possess the FOID card, and then violate the statute, you are nailed because possessing the FOID card is the nexus that lends the presumption that you are, in fact, requred to have one and therefore engaged in a commercial activity. Once you place yourself under the autority of the police power, your constitutional rights are gone, and the U.S. citizenship priviledges apply, which do not include the second amendment. If anyone is interested in learning how U.S. citizenship means waiving your second amendment rights just let me know and I’ll show you a PowerPoint presentation detailing this fact. You can also look up 14th Amendment and Incorporation Doctrine. The Incorporation Doctrine says that courts do not consider all of the Bill of Rights to be “fundamental rights”, and have not considered the second amendment to be a right of U.S. citizenship.
Is anyone ready to take up arms yet? It’s about time!

An analysis of the so-called law (625 ILCS 5/12-212)(c) which is claimed to prohibit under-body neon lights in Illinois

An analysis of the so-called law (625 ILCS 5/12-212)(c) which is claimed to prohibit under-body neon lights in Illinois

This is an example of what many cops target as a motor vehicle violation. Of course, I can only speak to Illinois law since that is the only State I’ve researched, but I’m fairly confident that other States with similar laws on their books rely upon equally misapplied reasoning as the State of Illinois.

What is this all about, you may ask, and who really cares? I’m taking no side, specifically, as to the preference or defense of this automotive accessory inasmuch as I am illustrating the often misapplication of the law by police and the complicit fleecing if ignorant and unwitting “Defendants” who are prosecuted for such a contrived offense. This analysis looks at the letter of the law, the authority for its promulgation, the debates relating to its passing, and the intent behind its construction.

If you, or anyone you know, has been fined or threatened with prosecution for displaying similar lighting on their cars then you may want to provide them with this information so they may make an informed rebuttal the next time a revenue collector for the State or corporate municipality confronts them with ignorance and violence for violating nothing other than the regurgitated ramblings of an automaton.

Essentially, the law works like this; the Legislature proposes a Bill, there are debates and a vote, the Bill, if passed, is signed by the Governor and become law. The police then issue tickets based on what they are told the law means. People who receive citations go to court and the judge or prosecutor informs them of the alleged charge and they are asked to enter a plea. If they adopt the more-often-than-not fraudulent portrayal of the law’s application then they have just harmed themselves and plead to a non-existent or insufficient charge. The Statutes are NOT the law. They are prima facia evidence of the law, but they are not the letter of the law. Below is an image of a ticket charging this lighting offense and you’ll notice that they rely upon Section 12-212(c). Subsection (c) merely states that any lighting not authorized by this Statute is prohibited. Is that what the Legislature intended when the law was crafted? You will see, per the House Debate below, that the lights have to be “flashing”. Also, the charge on the ticket does not state an offense, since the language “Improper Use of a Lighting System” is nowhere to be found in that part of the statute.

Again, the entire system is a fraud and intentional misapplication of the law. They rely upon your ignorance and willingness to take the path of least resistance, viz., pay the ticket. I wanted to get this posted for now, and will be following up with more context on what constitutes a charge and how to successfully challenge and defeat this lie.

This is an image of an “information” wherein the “offense” of improper lighting was alleged….improperly. This “information” (ticket) fails to state an “offense”.

Sources of Authority

1. Illinois Compiled Statutes 625 ILCS 5/12-212

Illinois House of Representatives Transcripts

List of House Transcripts available which are responsive to a search for “2651”, the number of the House Bill for Public Act 86-664  http://www.ilga.gov/search/LISGSApage.asp?target=2651&submit1=Go&scope=hsetran86  When viewing any of the documents in pdf format you can perform a search for the text “2651” and go to those sections of the transcripts.

STATE OF ILLINOIS 86th GENERAL ASSEMBLY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 22nd Legislative Day April 7, 1989 for the first reading of House Bill 2651  http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans86/HT040789.pdf

STATE OF ILLINOIS 86th GENERAL ASSEMBLY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 35th Legislative Day May 4, 1989 where House Bill 2651 is passed on Short Debate  http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans86/HT050489.pdf

 STATE OF ILLINOIS 86th GENERAL ASSEMBLY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 39th Legislative Day May 11, 1989 for the second reading of House Bill 2651  http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans86/HT051189.pdf

 2. STATE OF ILLINOIS 86th GENERAL ASSEMBLY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 43rd Legislative Day May l8, 1989 (Page 232 – 238) Page 239, where more debate takes place, is missing from the transcript.http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans86/HT051889.pdf

Illinois Senate Transcripts

List of Senate Transcripts available which are responsive to a search for “2651”, the number of the House Bill for Public Act 86-664  http://www.ilga.gov/search/LISGSApage.asp?target=2651&submit1=Go&scope=sentran86  When viewing any of the documents in pdf format you can perform a search for the text “2651” and go to those sections of the transcripts.

STATE OF ILLINOIS 86th GENERAL ASSEMBLY REGULAR SESSION SENATE TRANSCRIPT 38th Legislative Day June 13 , 1989 where it is reported that House Bill 2651 is “passed”.  http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans86/ST061389.pdf

STATE OF ILLINOIS 86th GENERAL ASSEMBLY REGULAR SESSION SENATE TRANSCRIPT 38th Legislative Day May 22 , 1989 where the where the House asks for concurrence on the passage of House Bill 2651 by the Senate.  http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans86/ST052289.pdf

STATE OF ILLINOIS 86th GENERAL ASSEMBLY REGULAR SESSION SENATE TRANSCRIPT 38th Legislative Day May 30 , 1989 where the Title of House Bill 2651 is read in the Senate.  http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans86/ST053089.pdf

STATE OF ILLINOIS 86th GENERAL ASSEMBLY REGULAR SESSION SENATE TRANSCRIPT 38th Legislative Day June 1 , 1989 identifying House Bill 2651 as a Transportation Bill.  http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans86/ST060189.pdf

STATE OF ILLINOIS 86th GENERAL ASSEMBLY REGULAR SESSION SENATE TRANSCRIPT 47th Legislative Day June l5, 1989 for the third reading of House Bill 2651, at Page 53 by Senator Topinka. How can the third reading take place on June 15, 1989, and the second reading (next link below) take place a day later on June 16, 1989?  http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans86/ST061589.pdf

STATE OF ILLINOIS 86th GENERAL ASSEMBLY REGULAR SESSION SENATE TRANSCRIPT 48th Legislative Day June l6, 1989 for the second reading of House Bill 2651, even though at Page 55 Senator Lechowicz says it is the third reading. http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans86/ST061689.pdf

STATE OF ILLINOIS 86th GENERAL ASSEMBLY REGULAR SESSION SENATE TRANSCRIPT 52nd Legislative Day June 22, 1989 where House Bill 2651 is declared “passed”.  http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans86/ST062289.pdf

Criminal Procedure

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 111) et. seq. 

3. (725 ILCS 5/11-3)(a)(b)

Taking into account the information found in the statutes, as well as the debates which speak to the “intent” of the legislature, one would be pressed to find where any light is prohibited unless permitted by the legislature. Saying this another way, it is expressed by the police and courts that unless a light is spelled out in the statutes as being permitted, they are otherwise excluded. Saying it yet another way, it is as if the legislature has some Constitutional power to regulate the lighting of vehicles. Can anyone find any such power in the Illinois Constitution? Of course not.

Let’s take the approach I’m sure some courts may take and say that the legislature has expressed an intent to limit “distracting lights”, and not just “flashing lights”. The question would be, is this a reasonable interpretation of the statute? If we focus only on (625 ILCS 5/12-212)(c), it would appear that way. However, (c) cannot be interpreted on its own without considering (a) and (b) as well. As I stated earlier, the statutes are not the law, they are a reflection of the law, but reflections can be distorted. You notice Public Act (P.A. 86-664) as the source for the statute. Public Act 86-664 is the offspring of House Bill 2651. This can be seen here in the Translation Table that ties a Public Act to its originating Bill.  http://www.ilga.gov/reports/static/PA86.pdf Public Act 86-664 can be seen on page 3 in the far upper right corner and 4 lines down the list. This indicates that Public Act 86-664 is tied to all the legislation pertaining to House Bill 2651. That is the Bill we follow for the analysis of this Act.

If one were to take (625 ILCS 5/12-212)(c) literally, as a stand-alone statement, it could be interpreted to mean that if you put any light on your car, that is not already authorized by “this Code”, even if you are not driving it, it would constitute an offense since such a light was placed on a vehicle. This is why the Code must be read in its entirety and “in context”. (625 ILCS 5/12-212)(a) begins with, and is binding upon all subsequent subsections of the act….”No person shall drive or move any vehicle or equipment upon any highway……” (c) makes no statement regarding driving or moving upon any highway. It merely states that any lighting not already authorized is prohibited. Therefore, it is necessary to consider (a) and (b) into the meaning of (c) as well.

The first requirement for a violation to exist is the question of the vehicle being driven or moved upon a highway. If this is on a parking lot or other private property there is no highway. You could put a red spotlight on your car and drive around your yard or a parking lot (with permission) and there would be no violation of this Act.

Second, (a) specified a “red light”. It specifies the color, so we cannot include others that are not red. It also states the light must be “visible from directly in front of the vehicle or equipment”. This is because the legislature has already provided for red lights displayed on vehicles when viewed directly from the front and without this qualification of “as otherwise provided by this Act” the law would contradict itself. This statement reserves the use of red lights when viewed from directly in front of the vehicle for a particular purpose. If it mentions red lights viewable from directly in front, it does not include red lights when viewed from underneath. The specifying or inclusion of a qualification excludes all others.

Subsection (b) provides for “flashing” lights, which are also spelled out in the Code. Since the purpose of flashing lights is to indicate caution or signal for a turn, the use of other flashing lights is prohibited if not communicating caution or signaling for a turn.

Subsection (c), when read in the context of (a) and (b), summarizes the intent and essentially states that “any red lights viewable from directly in front of the vehicle, or flashing lights not used to indicate caution or signal for a turn, not already authorized by this Code, shall be prohibited.” It does not claim domain over ALL lighting on ALL vehicles that is not already authorized in the Code.

So, if we look then to the Debates, we can also phrase the statement this way, “Unless previously authorized, this Code  prohibits the use of multi-colored flashing lights on vehicles other than those allowed under the current law, including red lights viewable from directly in front of the vehicle or equipment.”(Emphasis courtesy the statement by Representative Parcells)

This appears, to me, to be a reasonable reading of the law, taking into account the legislative intent as found within the House Debates. There is still the issue of improperly alleged charges by the police and prosecution, but that is for another post. I would recommend anyone considering to install these lights and “drive” (you really are not driving) upon a highway to print out the PDF of the House Debates and when confronted by the police, introduce this to them and ask them to read it. Once introduced during a traffic stop it is admissible as evidence in trial where it can be presented to a jury or judge. Even though the judge claims to be able to “instruct the jury as to what the law is”, he cannot assign intent not found within the letter of the law or the legislative debates. If you choose to go to court on the first appearance date, confront the prosecuting attorney with this information and see where it goes from there. I would recommend moving for a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or insufficiency to state a charge.

1. (625 ILCS 5/12-212) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-212)
Sec. 12-212. Special restrictions on lamps. (a) No person shall drive or move any vehicle or equipment upon any highway with any lamp or device on the vehicle or equipment displaying a red light visible from directly in front of the vehicle or equipment except as otherwise provided in this Act.
(b) Subject to the restrictions of this Act, flashing lights are prohibited on motor vehicles except as a means for indicating a right or left turn as provided in Section 12-208 or the presence of a vehicular traffic hazard requiring unusual care as expressly provided in Sections 11-804 or 12-215.
(c) Unless otherwise expressly authorized by this Code, all other lighting or combination of lighting on any vehicle shall be prohibited.
(Source: P.A. 86-664.)

 

2.  This text has been slightly modified from the online version through some spelling and grammar correction, as well as some formatting. Nothing has been intentionally altered or deleted so as to portray anything different from the original version. Added emphasis is of my doing.

STATE OF ILLINOIS
86th GENERAL ASSEMBLY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE
13rd Legislative Day May 18, 1989

House Bill 2651, 
Representative Parcells. Mr. Clerk, read
the Bill.

Clerk O’Brien: House Bill 2651, A Bill for an Act to amend the Illinois Vehicle Code. Third Reading of the Bill

Speaker Cullerton: Representative Parcells on House Bill 2651

STATE OF ILLINOIS
86th GENERAL ASSEMBL Y
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE

43rd Legislative Day May18 1989

Parcells: ‘Thank you, Mr. Speaker, Ladies and Gentlemen of the House. This is an Administration Bill of the State Police, and it has two or three different things..it’s literally a
cleanup Bill. It has to do with litter control, prohibits driving vehicles on the shoulder of highways, prohibits unauthorized use of flashing lights, unless they are
flashing lights that are in the law already, and it has some provisions for the prevention of…and treatment of those who have squealing tires. There was an Amendment
presented because there was some problem with how much mud and rocks and dirt would be dropped from farm vehicles. We amended that to suit the farm community, and as of now
know of no opposition to this Bill.’

Speaker Cullerton: ‘Lady’s moved for the passage of House Bill 2651. Is there any discussion? On that question, the Lady from Lasalle, Representative Breslin.

Breslin: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Representative Parcells, one question. Does this Bill still provide that construction debris must be swept off of state highways by construction
companies?

Parcells: No. The mud, dirt, and rocks were removed.

Breslin: And that applies to everyone, that’s not just an agricultural Amendment?

Parcells: No. It applies to everything.

Breslin: ‘Thank you.

Speaker Cullerton: Further discussion? The Gentleman from Dekalb, Representative Countryman.

Countryman: Thank you, Mr. Speaker, will the Lady yield?

Speaker Cullerton: For a question?

Countryman: Does this Bill still provide for squealing tires?

Parcells: Yes it does, but there was a provision made that the squealing tires could be done on race courses and places that squealing tires are an automatic result of
what’s going on, but not for squealing tires of young teenagers.

Countryman: ‘Is that what it says?

Parcells: No, it doesn’t say young teenagers, it just says that they…you see there’s always been something in the law that the police can handle this, but they had to take the
people down to the County Building, they weren’t able to just give them a ticket. This way they will be able to give them a ticket when they’re out there showing off and
perhaps endangering their lives and other lives.

Countryman: Well, would this apply to like when I ride with you in your Camaro down in front of the Capitol Building and you squeal your tires, would you be guilty of an offense?

Parcells: I possibly could be, yes.

Countryman: And if one of my constituents or Representative Hartke had a load of hogs going to market and they squealed would they be guilty of an offense?

Parcells: That could be, yes.

Countryman: I don’t know, this is kind of a squeaker I think. You know?

Speaker Cullerton: Further discussion? Gentleman from Logan, Representative Robert Olson.

Olson,R: Will you yield? Will the Speaker Yield?

Parcells: Yes.

Speaker Cullerton: She…for a question?

Olson R: Yes.

Speaker Cullerton: Yes, indicates she’ll yield for a question.

Olson, R: A short question. There’s a part in here about flashing lights. Does that cover…what color of flashing lights are we speaking of?

Parcells: What has happened in the past was that people could use any color light. This designates that only certain colored lights…it prohibits the use of multi-colored flashing
lights on vehicles other than those allowed under current law. They…the police have discovered that it’s very dangerous when people decide to put pink, purple, lavender
lights on their car and their flashing them. Therefore those that are by law, already in the law are fine, but they don’t want you using other colors because it is a danger.

Olson,R: The yellow flashing lights on construction equipment and farm equipment…

Parcells: I beg your pardon?

Olson, R: The yellow flashing lights that is on construction equipment, farm equipment…would still be legal?

Parcells: Yes, they would.

Olson, R: Okay

Speaker Cullerton: Representative Williams, on the purple lights question.?

Williams: Yes. What is the penalty for violation of the squeaking, squealing and…making of other noises of your vehicle?’

Parcells: It would be at the discretion of the officer, it would probably $50.00 like a regular…

Williams: At the discretion of the officer?

Parcells: I mean he is giving you a ticket instead of taking you downtown and having to tow your car. He will give you regular ticket that would then be at the discretion of the court. Right now it’s a Class A misdemeanor.

Williams: Right now squeaking and squealing your tires is Glass A misdemeanor? You mean if…

Parcells: …You see it’s under the E.P.A. regulations right now, Title 35, sub-title H, Chapter 1, section 902.0125. The only way they can handle this is that way. That’s why
we’re bringing it into this code and they would…otherwise they’d have to file a long form complaint and take you down to the County Building and maybe drag your car down. So
this way the officer could stop you and give you a ticket and it would be…(It is an interesting aside to view the above I.E.P.A. regulation involving tire noise. It should cause you to wonder why the I.E.P.A. would be the source for such violations. Mark McCoy)

Williams: What about…?

Parcells: It’s a petty offense.

Williams: Does it apply to a1l motor vehicles or is it…I mean is it…what about airplanes or any other things of that nature. Is it just for cars or is it apply to other, what about bicycles?

Parcells: This applies only to operation on the highway…of motor vehicles. I suppose if you had your airplane on the highway you could be in trouble.

Williams: Do you deal with other things besides squeaking and squealing? Do you deal with lights and decorations or other things in here? I’m just curious…I’ve been
informed that lights and other things around the tail may be illegal under this, under this Act..it says auto lighting.’

Parcells: It prohibits the use of multi-colored flashing lights on vehicles other than those allowed under the current law. And as I said this is a safety thing because it’s very
distracting to motorists when you are putting…purple, pink, yellow, orange cruise lights on your car and flashing them.

Williams: If the cab driver like they often do in Chicago were to do that, who would be responsible, the cab company or the driver?

Parcells: The driver.

Williams: …Well to the Amendment…or the Bill…or…what are we vote…the Bill. I understand what we’re trying to do…we’re…I’ve often been awakened by squealing,
screeching light flashing, automobiles riding at extreme speeds emanating all types of nasty noises and things. But, the thought of allowing someone to take and to have a
ticket and to be placed in…I don’t know…the police will maybe take them under custody and lock some guy up for this stuff and half the cabs in Chicago and who knows, low
riders and other people may be a real dangerous species here, which may be a violation of certain people…cultural things. So I would think at this time, that this Bill is
not quite in the perfect form. I think that even though it is not, is an annoying habit, don’t know if it should be a punishable habit and I think that this may not be the
right Bill at the right time.

Speaker Cullerton: Gentleman from Vermilion, Representative Black.

Black: ‘Well, thank you very much, Mr. Speaker, will the Sponsor yield?’ 

Speaker Cullerton: For a question?

Black: Yes, thank you.

Speaker Cullerton: She indicates she will.

Black: I…Representative just have one question to ask you. Is this Bill on Short Debate? Oh, thank you very much; that’s all I wanted to know.

Speaker Cullerton: ‘Representative Homer.

Homer: Question for the Sponsor, please.

Speaker Cullerton: She indicates she’ll yield for a question.

Homer: Representative Parcells, your Bill would prohibit squealing and screeching noises from vehicles tires. think I’ve heard and understand what those are, but it also
says, ‘or such other noise from the vehicles tires.’ Could you either specify and/or emulate what other noise you’re talking about?

Parcells: don’t know how to describe what other noise they might make, but I would like to answer, that answer to previous question, this is already punishable under the E.P.A. Act but there it is a Class A misdemeanor and we’re bringing it into this Act to make it a petty offense, so that a policeman can just write a ticket. But it is already punishable…I mean it is already an offense but a
much more serious one than we would have it in this Act.

Homer: Well, is this a moving violation for which you could lose your license?

Parcells: …if you’ll wait just a moment we’ll look that up.

Homer: While you’re looking notice that you’ve got it follows in sequence of these offenses, you’ve got:…DUI, illegal transportation of alcohol, reckless driving, draq racing and then screeking would be the next one. Are those in order of severity, or what was your thought?

Parcells: is called a reportable violation.

Homer: ‘It’s a what?

Parcells: Reportable violation.

Homer: ‘Reportable violation?

Parcells: Under 6201, and it’s the Secretary of State’s discretion….whether or not to assess points…

Homer: I see. So, if somebody…if somebody accelerated and squealed, screeched or made some other indescribable noise from the vehicle’s tires then that person could be fined up
to five hundred dollars and would receive points against the possible suspension of a drivers license by the Secretary of State.

Parcells: It is a traffic offense, but remember it always could have been punished as a Class A misdemeanor. So, this is a lessor…punishment, if you will, or a lessor offense to
make a petty offense in the Class A misdemeanor.

Homer: Well, what’s the thrust? I mean are you…do you feel that…the current penalties are too strong and your trying to make for lighter penalties for squealers?

Parcells: That’s part of it and the other part is, if the police

(This is the end of Page 238. Page 239.which is supposed to follow, was not included in the online PDF version)

3. (725 ILCS 5/111-3)    
Form of charge. 
    (a) A charge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by: 
        (1) Stating the name of the offense; 
        (2) Citing the statutory provision alleged to have

been violated;

(3) Setting forth the nature and elements of the

offense charged;

        (4) Stating the date and county of the offense as

definitely as can be done; and

        (5) Stating the name of the accused, if known, and

if not known, designate the accused by any name or description by which he can be identified with reasonable certainty.

    (b) An indictment shall be signed by the foreman of the Grand Jury and an information shall be signed by the State’s Attorney and sworn to by him or another.
A complaint shall be sworn to and signed by the complainant; Provided, however, that when a citation is issued on a Uniform Traffic Ticket or Uniform Conservation
Ticket (in a form prescribed by the Conference of Chief Circuit Judges and filed with the Supreme Court), the copy of such Uniform Ticket which is filed with the circuit court
constitutes a complaint to which the defendant may plead, unless he specifically requests that a verified complaint be filed.

4. (625 ILCS 5/4-103.2)

(7) a person:
(A) who is the driver or operator of a vehicle and is not entitled to the possession of that vehicle and who knows the vehicle is stolen or converted, or
(B) who is the driver or operator of a vehicle being used to transport or haul a vehicle or essential part of a vehicle and is not entitled to the possession of that vehicle or essential part being transported or hauled and who knows the transported or hauled vehicle or essential part is stolen or converted, who has been given a signal by a peace officer directing
him to bring the vehicle to a stop, to willfully fail or refuse to obey such direction, increase his speed, extinguish his lights or otherwise flee or attempt to elude the officer. The signal given by the peace officer may be by hand, voice, siren, or red or blue light. The officer giving the signal, if driving a vehicle, shall display the vehicle’s illuminated, oscillating, rotating or flashing red or blue lights, which when used in conjunction with an audible horn or siren would indicate that the vehicle is an official police vehicle. Such requirement shall not preclude the use of amber or white oscillating, rotating or flashing lights in conjunction with red or blue oscillating, rotating or flashing lights as required in Section 12-215 of this Code; or

(625 ILCS 5/11-1301) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-1301)
Sec. 11-1301. Stopping, standing or parking outside of business or residence district. 

(d) Any second division vehicle used exclusively for the collection of garbage, refuse, or recyclable material may stop or stand on the road in a business, rural, or residential district for the sole purpose of collecting garbage, refuse, or recyclable material. The vehicle, in addition to having its hazard lights lighted at all times that it is engaged in stopping or standing, shall also use its amber oscillating, rotating, or flashing light or lights as authorized under paragraph 12 of subsection (b) of Section 12-215, if so equipped.
(Source: P.A. 91-869, eff. 1-1-01.)

(625 ILCS 5/11-1421) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-1421)
Sec. 11-1421. Conditions for operating ambulances and rescue vehicles. 

2. The ambulance or rescue vehicle shall be equipped with a siren producing an audible signal of an intensity of 100 decibels at a distance of 50 feet from the siren, and with a lamp or lamps emitting an oscillating, rotating or flashing red beam directed in part toward the front of the vehicle, and these lamps shall have sufficient intensity to be visible at 500 feet in normal sunlight, and in addition to other lighting requirements, excluding those vehicles operated in counties with a population in excess of 2,000,000, may also operate with a lamp or lamps emitting an oscillating, rotating, or flashing green light;

(625 ILCS 5/12-215) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-215)
Sec. 12-215. Oscillating, rotating or flashing lights on motor vehicles. Except as otherwise provided in this Code: 

(a) The use of red or white oscillating, rotating or flashing lights, whether lighted or unlighted, is prohibited except on:
1. Law enforcement vehicles of State, Federal or local authorities;
2. A vehicle operated by a police officer or county coroner and designated or authorized by local authorities, in writing, as a law enforcement vehicle; however, such designation or authorization must be carried in the vehicle;
2.1. A vehicle operated by a fire chief who has completed an emergency vehicle operation training course approved by the Office of the State Fire Marshal and designated or authorized by local authorities, in writing, as a fire department, fire protection district, or township fire department vehicle; however, the designation or authorization must be carried in the vehicle, and the lights may be visible or activated only when responding to a bona fide emergency;
3. Vehicles of local fire departments and State or federal firefighting vehicles;
4. Vehicles which are designed and used exclusively as ambulances or rescue vehicles; furthermore, such lights shall not be lighted except when responding to an emergency call for and while actually conveying the sick or injured;
5. Tow trucks licensed in a state that requires such lights; furthermore, such lights shall not be lighted on any such tow truck while the tow truck is operating in the State of Illinois;
6. Vehicles of the Illinois Emergency Management Agency, vehicles of the Illinois Department of Public Health, and vehicles of the Department of Nuclear Safety;
7. Vehicles operated by a local or county emergency management services agency as defined in the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act;
8. School buses operating alternately flashing head lamps as permitted under Section 12-805 of this Code; and
9. Vehicles that are equipped and used exclusively as organ transplant vehicles when used in combination with blue oscillating, rotating, or flashing lights; furthermore, these lights shall be lighted only when the transportation is declared an emergency by a member of the transplant team or a representative of the organ procurement organization.
(b) The use of amber oscillating, rotating or flashing lights, whether lighted or unlighted, is prohibited except on:
1. Second division vehicles designed and used for towing or hoisting vehicles; furthermore, such lights shall not be lighted except as required in this paragraph 1; such lights shall be lighted when such vehicles are actually being used at the scene of an accident or disablement; if the towing vehicle is equipped with a flat bed that supports all wheels of the vehicle being transported, the lights shall not be lighted while the vehicle is engaged in towing on a highway; if the towing vehicle is not equipped with a flat bed that supports all wheels of a vehicle being transported, the lights shall be lighted while the towing vehicle is engaged in towing on a highway during all times when the use of headlights is required under Section 12-201 of this Code;
2. Motor vehicles or equipment of the State of Illinois, local authorities and contractors; furthermore, such lights shall not be lighted except while such vehicles are engaged in maintenance or construction operations within the limits of construction projects;
3. Vehicles or equipment used by engineering or survey crews; furthermore, such lights shall not be lighted except while such vehicles are actually engaged in work on a highway;
4. Vehicles of public utilities, municipalities, or other construction, maintenance or automotive service vehicles except that such lights shall be lighted only as a means for indicating the presence of a vehicular traffic hazard requiring unusual care in approaching, overtaking or passing while such vehicles are engaged in maintenance, service or construction on a highway;
5. Oversized vehicle or load; however, such lights shall only be lighted when moving under permit issued by the Department under Section 15-301 of this Code;
6. The front and rear of motorized equipment owned and operated by the State of Illinois or any political subdivision thereof, which is designed and used for removal of snow and ice from highways;
(6.1) The front and rear of motorized equipment or vehicles that (i) are not owned by the State of Illinois or any political subdivision of the State, (ii) are designed and used for removal of snow and ice from highways and parking lots, and (iii) are equipped with a snow plow that is 12 feet in width; these lights may not be lighted except when the motorized equipment or vehicle is actually being used for those purposes on behalf of a unit of government;
7. Fleet safety vehicles registered in another state, furthermore, such lights shall not be lighted except as provided for in Section 12-212 of this Code;
8. Such other vehicles as may be authorized by local authorities;
9. Law enforcement vehicles of State or local authorities when used in combination with red oscillating, rotating or flashing lights;
9.5. Propane delivery trucks;
10. Vehicles used for collecting or delivering mail for the United States Postal Service provided that such lights shall not be lighted except when such vehicles are actually being used for such purposes;
11. Any vehicle displaying a slow-moving vehicle emblem as provided in Section 12-205.1;
12. All trucks equipped with self-compactors or roll-off hoists and roll-on containers for garbage or refuse hauling. Such lights shall not be lighted except when such vehicles are actually being used for such purposes;
13. Vehicles used by a security company, alarm responder, or control agency;
14. Security vehicles of the Department of Human Services; however, the lights shall not be lighted except when being used for security related purposes under the direction of the superintendent of the facility where the vehicle is located; and
15. Vehicles of union representatives, except that the lights shall be lighted only while the vehicle is within the limits of a construction project.
(c) The use of blue oscillating, rotating or flashing lights, whether lighted or unlighted, is prohibited except on:
1. Rescue squad vehicles not owned by a fire department and vehicles owned or operated by a:voluntary firefighter; paid firefighter; part-paid firefighter; call firefighter; member of the board of trustees of a fire protection district; paid or unpaid member of a rescue squad; paid or unpaid member of a voluntary ambulance unit; or paid or unpaid members of a local or county
emergency management services agency as defined in the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act, designated or authorized by local authorities, in writing, and carrying that designation or authorization in the vehicle. However, such lights are not to be lighted except when responding to a bona fide emergency.
Any person using these lights in accordance with this subdivision (c)1 must carry on his or her person an identification card or letter identifying the bona fide member of a fire department, fire protection district, rescue squad, ambulance unit, or emergency management services agency that owns or operates that vehicle. The card or letter must include:
(A) the name of the fire department, fire protection district, rescue squad, ambulance unit, or emergency management services agency;
(B) the member’s position within the fire department, fire protection district, rescue squad, ambulance unit, or emergency management services agency;
(C) the member’s term of service; and
(D) the name of a person within the fire department, fire protection district, rescue squad, ambulance unit, or emergency management services agency to contact to verify the information provided.
2. Police department vehicles in cities having a population of 500,000 or more inhabitants.
3. Law enforcement vehicles of State or local authorities when used in combination with red oscillating, rotating or flashing lights.
4. Vehicles of local fire departments and State or federal firefighting vehicles when used in combination with red oscillating, rotating or flashing lights.
5. Vehicles which are designed and used exclusively as ambulances or rescue vehicles when used in combination with red oscillating, rotating or flashing lights; furthermore, such lights shall not be lighted except when responding to an emergency call.
6. Vehicles that are equipped and used exclusively as organ transport vehicles when used in combination with red oscillating, rotating, or flashing lights; furthermore, these lights shall only be lighted when the transportation is declared an emergency by a member of the transplant team or a representative of the organ procurement organization.
7. Vehicles of the Illinois Emergency Management Agency, vehicles of the Illinois Department of Public Health, and vehicles of the Department of Nuclear Safety, when used in combination with red oscillating, rotating, or flashing lights.
8. Vehicles operated by a local or county emergency management services agency as defined in the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act, when used in combination with red oscillating, rotating, or flashing lights.
(c-1) In addition to the blue oscillating, rotating, or flashing lights permitted under subsection (c), and notwithstanding subsection (a), a vehicle operated by a voluntary firefighter, a voluntary member of a rescue squad, or a member of a voluntary ambulance unit may be equipped with flashing white headlights and blue grill lights, which may be used only in responding to an emergency call.
(c-2) In addition to the blue oscillating, rotating, or flashing lights permitted under subsection (c), and notwithstanding subsection (a), a vehicle operated by a paid or unpaid member of a local or county emergency management services agency as defined in the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act, may be equipped with white oscillating, rotating, or flashing lights to be used in combination with blue oscillating, rotating, or flashing lights, if authorization by local authorities is in writing and carried in the vehicle.
(d) The use of a combination of amber and white oscillating, rotating or flashing lights, whether lighted or unlighted, is prohibited except motor vehicles or equipment of the State of Illinois, local authorities, contractors, and union representatives may be so equipped; furthermore, such lights shall not be lighted on vehicles of the State of Illinois, local authorities, and contractors except while such vehicles are engaged in highway maintenance or construction operations within the limits of highway construction projects, and shall not be lighted on the vehicles of union representatives except when those vehicles are within the limits of a construction project.
(e) All oscillating, rotating or flashing lights referred to in this Section shall be of sufficient intensity, when illuminated, to be visible at 500 feet in normal sunlight.
(f) Nothing in this Section shall prohibit a manufacturer of oscillating, rotating or flashing lights or his representative from temporarily mounting such lights on a vehicle for demonstration purposes only.
(g) Any person violating the provisions of subsections (a), (b), (c) or (d) of this Section who without lawful authority stops or detains or attempts to stop or detain another person shall be guilty of a Class 2 felony.
(h) Except as provided in subsection (g) above, any person violating the provisions of subsections (a) or (c) of this Section shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
(Source: P.A. 93-181, eff. 1-1-04; 93-725, eff. 1-1-05; 93-794, eff. 7-22-04; 93-829, eff. 7-28-04; 94-143, eff. 1-1-06; 94-270, eff. 1-1-06; 94-331, eff. 1-1-06; 94-730, eff. 4-17-06.)

(625 ILCS 5/12-216) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-216)
Sec. 12-216. Operation of oscillating, rotating or flashing lights. Oscillating, rotating or flashing lights located on or within police vehicles in this State shall be lighted whenever a police officer is in pursuit of a violator of a traffic law or regulation.
(Source: P.A. 85-830.)

An analysis of the proposed Occupancy Code for Collinsville, Illinois

Collinsville_Proposed_Occupancy_Codes –

Detailed Analysis of the Code Here

Related Story Here

So, what is it about a city council that makes them believe they have the right to pass an ordinance requireing anyone to procure a permit to live in their own home? Well, for one, if one claims “residency” within the corporate municipality then are then deemed to be considered to be regulated by the rules (by-laws) and ordinances which pertain only to that corporate body. Likewise, for U.S. citizens, there are no Constitutional protections since much of what regulates their behavior is codes, and regulations.

Most people do not understand what a municipality is. Here is an excerpt from a page I have which explains Municipal Law:

B. [1.2] General Concepts and Definitions

A “municipal corporation” has been defined as a public corporation created by government for political purposes and having subordinate and local powers of legislation. People ex rel.Mortell v. Bergman, 253 Ill. 469, 97 N.E. 695 (1912); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, p. 1042 (8th ed. 2004). As they exist today, these public corporations can be compared with private corporations. Just as private corporations have a charter under which they are organized, so, too, municipalities have a “charter” in the sense that they are organized under the general law as it exists in the Illinois Municipal Code (Code), 65 ILCS 5/1-1-1, et seq. Just as shareholders control the operations of a private corporation by ratifying a charter and electing a board of directors, the citizens comprising the electorate control the workings of the public corporation by opting to form either a city or a village under one of the forms provided in the Code and by electing officials (city council or village board), who in turn carry on the business (government) and affairs of the city or village by passing and adopting ordinances (akin to bylaws passed by the board of directors of a private corporation).

[My Commentary] So, if we look at it in these terms, we could say that Ford is a corporation (municipality) that is owned by the shareholders (Citizens/electors) who in turn elect the Officers, or Board (City Council, Mayor…) to perform the duties set forth in the Charter which were written to control the function of the “body” in achieving the ends of the shareholder/citizen. This body, in turn, passes ordinances (By-laws) that regulate the functions of that body in meeting the objectives of the shareholder/citizen. The shareholders believe that their dividends (benefits) are being wasted on providing health care coverage to workers (City employees) who smoke, and therefore want to make Ford a non-smoking company (municipality). The Board of Ford (City council) passes an ordinance (By-law) that prohibits smoking for employees of Ford (City employees). Now, does that mean that Ford can force the smoking shareholders to quit smoking as well? No. The shareholders are not subject to the regulations governing the operation of the corporate body of Ford, the same way that Citizens are not subject to the regulations (ordinances) of the corporate body (Collinsville).

So, how do we, the People, create a government that is laid out with a charter and by-laws for the purpose of securing our freedoms and liberty, as well as performing in a collective capacity that which would be otherwise inefficient or cumbersome for us to perform individually? Why, you take up “residency”, of course. Normally, Citizens retain all of their natural rights that are protected by the Constitution. However, if you want to derive any of the “corporate benefits” of the “corporation”, you must become a resident of that corporation and therefore subject to the governing by-laws of that corporation. You do not need to be a resident to walk into a public library and read a book. However, in order to take that book out of the library’s control and have it entrusted to you for safe-keeping and return, you must be a resident of that corporate body which subjects you to the ascribed penalties for violating your agreement with the library for the use and safe return of that book. That library card, that you have to sign (give your permission and therein claim the status of resident) your name and claim residency. That contract is then enforceable with fines and punishment for your violating any provision of that agreement.

Residents derive benefits or exercise privileges that Citizens do not. If your tax dollars are going to fund a function of government then you have paid your way and are asking for nothing more than a Citizen is entitled to. However. if you are deriving a benefit that cannot be traced to a service provided through your payment of taxes, then you are acting as a resident. Most of the things provided by government in its proper capacity are paid by our taxes, i.e.., water, sewer, trash, roads…etc. The City gets you to claim the status of resident in order to receive these services, which is a trap, but you are not automatically conscripted to the ordinances unless they specifically apply to a particular benefit derived.

Word trickery

If you read the proposed ordinance you will see a section called Definitions. What happens is, the drafters of the legislation use words which have common meanings, but used in a particular way which possess a “special” or “legal” meaning. They are terms, not words. The legislation imposes a duty, and penalties, upon persons. Are you a person? Look at the definition:

“Person means any natural person; firm; joint venture, including all participants; partnership, including all partners; association, social club, or fraternal organization, including all officers and directors; corporation, including all officers, directors and significant stockholders; estate; trust; business trust; receiver; or any other group or combination acting as a unit.”

Of course, most of you will see the term “natural person” and believe you are natural and therefore a natural person. A natural person is a flesh-and-blood human being, but one which is charged with a fiducary obligation or acting as a representative for an incorporeal entity. All natural persons are flesh-and-blood but not all flesh-and-blood are natural persons.

There is a canon of statutory construction called ejusdem generis which reads:

Ejusdem generis (Of the same kinds, class, or nature)
When a list of two or more specific descriptors is followed by more general descriptors, the otherwise wide meaning of the general descriptors must be restricted to the same class, if any, of the specific words that precede them. For example, where “cars, motor bikes, motor powered vehicles” are mentioned, the word “vehicles” would be interpreted in a limited sense (therefore vehicles cannot be interpreted as including airplanes).

Look at the definition of the word person above. What follows? Firm, joint venture, partnership, association… these are  not “natural” things. These are organizations of individuals, many of which are formed pursuant to an act found in statutes. Nowhere does an individual human being come into play unless they are part of a legal structure. A natural person is a flesh-and-blood human being who has taken a position or joined as a member of some other incorporeal or fictional body.

So, what does this mean? People have natural, unalienable rights. Corporations, as well as other legal fictions, do not. Constitutions are created by People to create another legal fiction called the State for the purpose of protecting their natural, unalienable rights. The State is nothing more than the People acting in a collective capacity and forming a political body. The State is not some natural manifestation which possesses some supernatural control or authority over the People. The People, being the creators of the Constitution have the power to permit artificial, incorporeal entities like corporations, partnerships, associations… to be created and therefore, make conditional their existence to the will of the people. People cannot make anybody else’s existence or exercise of rights conditional.

Looking at the definition of person in the ordinance, what is being regulated are things owing their existence to a legal construct. If there is a legal nexus between the entity and the State where a registration or permit has been issued or recognized then it is a legal fiction and thereby subject to regulation. In the case of this legislation, a landlord who is a private individual owning and renting property has an obligation to provide a safe abode for his tenants and is subject to any harm caused by his neglect. He has a duty. However, as a tenant, people have the right to rent accommodations which may appear less than desirable to outside observers. Provided the landlord honors his duty to ensure there are no hazards which endanger the health or life of a tenant he has fulfilled his obligation.

I would recommend the following approach should the ordinance pass, and I believe it will because most of the people serving on the Council are ignorant, arrogant, self-serving, Oligarchs. Most of them have probably not even read the Constitution of Illinois or of the United States. What needs to happen is massive civil disobedience. If people do not possess the temerity to assert their liberty then I say they deserve whatever they get. Otherwise, I would take a property owned by a private individual, not one acting in a corporate capacity such as an LLC or other entity, and through a Quit Claim Deed take “ownership” for valuable consideration of $1 with a promise to release the property back after 30 days for the same valuable consideration. What this would do is create a nexus where I would take ownership and thereby be “required” to procure an occupancy permit to occupy the premises. I would then take up “occupancy” and wait for the ensuing litigation. In the mean-time, I would expect an information campaign relating to this matter to be disseminated to the public, as well as promoting the people’s right to exercise jury nullification as their right. Hopefully, a jury would not convict or I would just refuse to comply, relying on legal arguments I have previously confronted various governmental bodies with. In-short, I would not comply.

I will not make myself available for such a tactic without the explicit commitment of others desiring to challenge and confront this ordinance. I will also not put myself in harm’s way for people who prefer their chains, but prefer them under their terms. I favor NO chains. That said, I will await contact……

Mark McCoy

UPDATE:

Since the last post it seemed as though the City was going to mothball the issue. Recently it has come to light that there is another push to pass this ordinance. Not much has changed in the wording. The intent is the same, viz., to deceive the “residents” by claiming an interest in health, safety, welfare, and morals of the people (the so-called Police Power).

I will be updating this post with information as I do more research. I would first like to address the Police Power, it’s limitations, interpretations, and applications.

When a municipality has the power to tax, it may raise revenue through a license fee payable in connection with the taxable subject matter. See, e.g., Rozner v. Korshak, 55 Ill.2d 430, 303 N.E.2d 389 (1973) (sustaining Cook County’s vehicle licensing ordinance as home rule revenue measure). When authorized by statute, a municipality may also charge license fees in connection with the exercise of its regulatory police powers, but it may not use the fees to raise revenue substantially in excess of the cost of regulation. In short, a municipality may license for revenue purposes only when it has the power to tax the subject matter of the license. Under a regulatory ordinance, the license fees must bear some reasonable relationship to the costs of regulation. Quad Canteen Service Corp. v. Ruzak, 85 Ill.App.3d 256, 406 N.E.2d 616, 40 Ill.Dec. 610 (2d Dist. 1980). The mere probability that the license fees may in some degree exceed the cost of administration and inspection under a regulatory ordinance will not render the ordinance invalid. Village of Roxana v. Costanzo, 41 Ill.2d 423, 243 N.E.2d 242 (1968). The costs of printing and issuing the license tags, collecting the license fees, keeping records of the licenses issued and fees collected, and inspecting and testing the subject of regulation have been recognized as elements of the cost of administration and inspection. Larson v. City of Rockford, 371 Ill. 441, 21 N.E.2d 396 (1939).

A licensing ordinance that contains genuine regulatory provisions cannot, on its face, be condemned as a revenue device. Id. However, license fees may be so grossly excessive as to be deemed arbitrary and unreasonable as a matter of law. City of Chicago Heights v. Public Service Company of Northern Illinois, 408 Ill. 604, 97 N.E.2d 807 (1951). Generally, in the absence of proof to the contrary, it must be presumed that a reasonable relationship exists between the license fees and the costs of administration and inspection. Gibbons v. City of Chicago, 34 Ill.2d 102, 214 N.E.2d 740 (1966). The presumptive validity of a licensing ordinance must be rebutted by clear and affirmative evidence. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc. v. Village of North Riverside, 66 Ill.App.3d 542, 383 N.E.2d 1316, 23 Ill.Dec. 289 (1st Dist. 1978). When it is found that the license fees greatly exceed the costs of administration and inspection so as to render the licensing ordinance a revenue measure rather than a regulatory device, enforcement of the ordinance may be enjoined and the license fees paid under protest ordered refunded. Quad Canteen Service, supra.

Compare Quad Canteen Service, supra, with A & H Vending Service, Inc. v. Village of Schaumburg, 168 Ill.App.3d 61, 522 N.E.2d 188, 118 Ill.Dec. 733 (1st Dist. 1988), in which the court held that licensing fees imposed by home rule municipalities have a valid regulatory, as opposed to revenue-generating, purpose even though revenue generated by the fee exceeded by a five-to-one margin the municipality’s cost of inspection. See also Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 181 Ill.App.3d 10, 536 N.E.2d 763, 129 Ill.Dec. 713 (1st Dist. 1989), in which the court held that a landlord-tenant ordinance contained genuine regulatory provisions and the license fee assessed pursuant to the ordinance was not an improper revenue raising measure since the purpose of the licensing provision was to ensure that multiunit dwellings in the village met the requirements, rules, and regulations of the village code. Moreover, the license fees were reasonably related to costs of regulation when evidence was presented to indicate that the fees charged were insufficient to cover all necessary costs of regulation.

In Alnoa G. Corp. v. City of Houston, Texas, 563 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1977), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that special assessments are taxes for which no federal court relief may be had if the state provides a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy. However, in Bung’s Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Township Council of Township of Florence, 206 N.J.Super. 432, 502 A.2d 1198 (1985), the Superior Court of New Jersey held that if an assessment exceeds the value of the benefit, is arbitrary, exceeds the limits of the police power, and deprives a person of property without due process of law, it constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, the plaintiffs could claim attorneys’ fees in defending the action under 42 U.S.C. §1988. In addition, see Bowman v. City of Franklin, 980 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1992), relative to an attack on a special assessment proceeding in federal court.

[A] municipality’s right to regulate its streets “must find basis in the doctrine of overruling necessity, or bear some substantial relation to the public good.” . . . [A] municipality’s regulatory and police powers over its public streets are subject to a reasonableness limitation. . . . A determination of reasonableness must be made in each case by weighing the particular circumstances in light of the aim of the restriction. . . . Further, one who challenges an ordinance as failing this test of minimum rationality bears the burden of proving “by clear and affirmative evidence that the ordinance constitutes arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable municipal action, that there is no permissible interpretation which justifies its adoption, or that it will not promote the safety and general welfare of the public.” [Citations omitted.] 664 N.E.2d at 299.

The “police power” of government is its authority to enact laws, including zoning ordinances, in furtherance of the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. County of Cook v. Priester, 62 Ill.2d 357, 342 N.E.2d 41 (1976); Sternaman v. County of McHenry, 454 F.Supp. 240 (N.D.Ill. 1978). The police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty: it is the power necessary to conduct and maintain government. Although the police power defies precise definition, it was described as follows by the court in State Public Utilities Commission ex rel. Quincy Ry. v. City of Quincy, 290 Ill. 360, 125 N.E. 374, 375 – 376 (1919): The police power of the state has never been exactly defined or circumscribed by fixed limits. It is considered as being capable of development and modification within certain limits, so that the powers of governmental control may be adequate to meet changing social, economic and political conditions. In a general way it may be defined “as comprehending the making and enforcement of all such laws, ordinances and regulations as pertain to the comfort, safety, health, convenience, good order and welfare of the public.” Wice v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co., 193 Ill. 351; 6 R. C. L. 189. Since the police power is reserved to the states by the Constitution (Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 64 L.Ed. 194, 40 S.Ct. 106 (1919)), local government has no inherent police power. It has only those powers delegated to it by the state constitution or statute. Tuftee v. County of Kane, 76 Ill.App.3d 128, 394 N.E.2d 896, 31 Ill.Dec. 694 (2d Dist. 1979); Cederberg v. City of Rockford, 8 Ill.App.3d 984, 291 N.E.2d 249 (2d Dist. 1972); Park Ridge Fuel & Material Co. v. City of Park Ridge, 335 Ill. 509, 167 N.E. 119 (1929).

In Illinois, the statutory provisions described in §§2.6, 2.8, and 2.9 below constitute the state delegation of zoning powers to non-home rule units of local government (municipalities, counties, and townships respectively). The Illinois Constitution vests home rule units of local government with police power. The Supreme Court in Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Ill.2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 240, 243 (1972), explained: The concept of home rule adopted under the provisions of the 1970 constitution was designed to drastically alter the relationship which previously existed between local and State government. Formerly, the actions of local governmental units were limited to those powers which were expressly authorized, implied or essential in carrying out the legislature’s grant of authority. Under the home-rule provisions of the 1970 constitution, however, the power of the General Assembly to limit the actions of home-rule units has been circumscribed and home-rule units have been constitutionally delegated greater autonomy in the determination of their government and affairs. To accomplish this independence the constitution conferred substantial powers upon home-rule units subject only to those restrictions imposed or authorized therein.

“. . . An ordinance will be presumed to be valid, and the one attacking [it] bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. The challenging party must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the ordinance, as applied, is arbitrary and unreasonable and bears no substantial relation to the public health, safety or welfare. [Citations.]” Tomasek v. City of Des Plaines (1976), 64 Ill.2d 172, 179 – 80. In City of Carbondale v. Brewster, 78 Ill.2d 111, 398 N.E.2d 829, 831, 34 Ill.Dec. 838 (1979), the court similarly stated: To be a valid exercise of police power, the legislation must bear a reasonable relationship to one of the . . . interests which is sought to be protected, and the means adopted must constitute a reasonable method to accomplish such objective. . . . Although the determination of reasonableness is a matter for the court, the legislature has broad discretion to determine not only what the interests of the public welfare require but what measures are necessary to secure such interest. . . . The court will not disturb a police regulation merely where there is room for a difference of opinion as to its wisdom, necessity and expediency. [Emphasis added.] [Citations omitted.]

See also Hewette v. Carbondale Zoning Board of Appeals, 261 Ill.App.3d 803, 634 N.E.2d 1223, 199 Ill.Dec. 869 (5th Dist. 1994). Accordingly, the plaintiff must do more than establish that its proposed use is reasonable in order to prevail in a challenge to the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance. Quoting Buhrinaster v. County of DuPage, 16 Ill.App.3d 212, 305 N.E.2d 722, 725 (2d Dist. 1973), the court in Coney v. County of DuPage, 51 Ill.App.3d 980, 367 N.E.2d 152, 153, 9 Ill.Dec. 718 (2d Dist. 1977), wrote: Faced with this presumptive validity of the zoning ordinance, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to establish that the legislative decision as to the subject property is clearly unreasonable, rather than that the property could reasonably be classified as plaintiffs wished. Kambich v. Village of Riverwoods, 308 Ill.App.3d 772, 721 N.E.2d 709, 242 Ill.Dec. 430 (2d Dist. 1999).

See also Zeitz, supra; American National Bank & Trust Company of Rockford v. City of Rockford, 55 Ill.App.3d 806, 371 N.E.2d 337, 13 Ill.Dec. 620 (2d Dist. 1977). Even if a municipality admits the invalidity of its zoning restriction, the plaintiff carries the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that prohibition of the proposed use is unreasonable. National Boulevard Bank of Chicago v. Village of Schaumburg, 83 Ill.2d 228, 415 N.E.2d 333, 47 Ill.Dec. 328 (1980).In Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. County of McHenry, 41 Ill.2d 77, 241 N.E.2d 454, 459 (1968), the court stated that if the gain to the public is small when compared with the hardship imposed upon the individual property owner by the restriction . . . no valid basis for an exercise of the police power exists.

The Wes Ward court relied on People ex rel. Barrett v. Thillens, 400 Ill. 224, 79 N.E.2d 609, 613 (1948): It is a fundamental and well-established rule, both in the United States courts and in the courts of this State, as a firmly settled constitutional principle, that every citizen is guaranteed the right to engage in any lawful, useful and harmless business or trade, and it is not within the constitutional authority of the State legislature, in the exercise of police power, to interfere with the rights of the individual to carry on a legitimate business, where no interest of the public safety, welfare or morals is damaged or threatened. 355 N.E.2d at 136.
The Wes Ward court went on to reason that if an ordinance tends, in some degree, to prevent an offense or preserve the public health, morals, safety, or welfare, then the ordinance is within the police power of the state. The Peoria ordinance met this low level of scrutiny. The court also found no violation of equal protection even though the ordinance contained exemptions for state licensed professions like hospital and nursing home employees, healing arts practitioners, barbers, and cosmetologists.

As noted in §5.4 above, the power of a municipality to license is strictly construed against the municipality. The principle of ejusdem generis — which holds that when general words follow an enumeration of specific things such general words are interpreted as applying only to things of the same general kind as those specifically mentioned — is implicit in any strict construction of the law. However, the courts have not always agreed on when to apply that principle. The courts have, in several instances, applied the principle in interpreting licensing powers under Illinois Municipal Code §11-42-3, which authorizes the corporate authorities of each municipality to license, tax, locate, and regulate all places of business of dealers in junk, dismantled or wrecked motor vehicles or parts thereof, rags, and any secondhand article whatsoever. 65 ILCS 5/11-42-3. In City of Chicago v. Moore, 351 Ill. 510, 184 N.E. 621 (1933), a secondhand store license ordinance was declared invalid as applied to a store selling secondhand books. The court held that this power to license extended only to those secondhand stores that carried on a business similar to junk shops. Identical reasoning in Bullman v. City of Chicago, 367 Ill. 217, 10 N.E.2d 961 (1937), removed various automobile-related businesses from municipal regulation under this section (note that Bullman was decided under a previous version of the statute, and the current statute does allow dismantled or wrecked motor vehicle dealers as a licensable subject), as did City of Chicago v. Stone, 328 Ill.App. 345, 66 N.E.2d 100 (1st Dist. 1946), regarding used musical instruments, and City of Kewanee v. Riverside Industrial Materials Co., 21 Ill.App.2d 416, 158 N.E.2d 86 (2d Dist. 1959), regarding industrial scrap.
On the other hand, Code §11-42-5 reads: The corporate authorities of each municipality may license, tax, regulate, or prohibit hawkers, peddlers, pawnbrokers, itinerant merchants, transient vendors of
merchandise, theatricals and other exhibitions, shows, and amusements and may license, tax, and regulate all places for eating or amusement.

The court in Stiska v. City of Chicago, 405 Ill. 374, 90 N.E.2d 742 (1950), refused to apply the principle of ejusdem generis. The plaintiffs argued that the term “amusements” was within the class of theatricals and other exhibitions, thereby not applying to bowling, billiards, and pool halls. The city, on the other hand, argued that the term “amusements” was not within the class of “theatricals and other exhibitions” since it was not strictly an item of that series in point of syntax. The court held that if the statute was limited to exhibitive entertainment, such an interpretation would render the term “shows, and amusements” superfluous and devoid of meaning, which the court was not willing to do. “The rule of ejusdem generis is only a rule of construction to aid in ascertaining and giving effect to the legislative intent. . . . It cannot be applied to defeat the evident purpose of the statute or to restrict the scope of subjects the legislature intended to include.” [Citation omitted.] 90 N.E.2d at 747. See also Lamere v. City of Chicago, 391 Ill. 552, 63 N.E.2d 863 (1945).

Although statutes authorizing licensing are to be strictly construed against the municipality, it should also be noted that ordinances are presumptively valid. In Aladdin’s Castle, Inc. v. Village of North Riverside, 66 Ill.App.3d 542, 383 N.E.2d 1316, 23 Ill.Dec. 289 (1st Dist. 1978), the court upheld the validity of an ordinance licensing and regulating coin-operated amusement devices. The village relied on Code §§11-42-2 (“The corporate authorities of each municipality may license, tax, regulate, or prohibit pinball, or bowling alleys, billiard, bagatelle, pigeon-hole, pool, or any other tables or implements kept for a similar purpose in any place of public resort.”) and 11-42-5 (quoted above) in passing the ordinance. Among other things, the ordinance contained an age restriction, a space restriction, and a maximum limit on the number of machines per establishment.

One of the plaintiff’s contentions was that its property and liberty rights in the premises and its business were violated. The court acknowledged the existence of the plaintiff’s private rights but stated that a valid exercise of the police power superseded those rights. In determining that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the police power, the court stated: [T]he provisions of Ordinance No. 75-0-16 in issue are clothed with presumptive validity which must be rebutted by clear and affirmative evidence that their adoption constitutes arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable municipal action; that there is no permissible interpretation which justifies their adoption; or that they will not promote the safety or general welfare of the people of the village. 383 N.E.2d at 1319.

Grants of power to corporate authorities may come from separate sources: “The authority of a municipality to adopt an ordinance may be derived from a single grant or a combination of enumerated powers.” City of Chicago v. R. & X. Restaurant, Inc., 369 Ill. 65, 15 N.E.2d 725, 726 (1938). The power to license may be inferred from several sources of statutory power, even though none of them grants explicit authority to license. The leading case for this proposition is Father Basil’s Lodge, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 393 Ill. 246, 65 N.E.2d 805 (1946). The court sustained a Chicago ordinance regulating nursing homes although it was based on no explicit grant of
authority.

In so doing, the court relied on several sections of the Code, including §§11-30-4 and 11-8-2 dealing with the construction of buildings and prevention of fire hazards (65 ILCS 5/11- 30-4, 5/11-8-2) and §11-20-5 (65 ILCS 5/11-20-5) dealing with the general maintenance of health and suppression of disease. The court ruled that under these delegations of police power from the state, a city may regulate any occupation or business that the unrestricted pursuit of might either injuriously affect the health of the citizens or subject them to danger from fire. The court went on to state: If the regulation of certain conditions affecting the public safety has been delegated to a city and the efficient regulation of such conditions requires the conduct of a business peculiarly affected by them to be controlled by the limitations of a licensing ordinance, the power of the city to adopt such an ordinance will be necessarily implied. 65 N.E.2d at 812.

On the other hand, an attempt to license an occupation unnamed in the statutes by pooling authority from a combination of powers to license related businesses was invalidated in Ives v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill.2d 582, 198 N.E.2d 518 (1964). In Ives, the city attempted to sustain an authority to license general contractors by referring to the power to license particular kinds of contractors under numerous sections of the Code, including air conditioning and refrigeration contractors (§11-32-1), electrical contractors (§11-33-1), persons in charge of steam boilers (§11- 34-1), plumbers (§11-35-1), and masonry contractors (§11-36-1). The court ruled that the existence of the enumerated statutory powers had just the opposite effect by precluding the imposition of regulation and licensing on contractors in fields other than those to which cities have expressly been given regulatory power.

If the city has the power by implication to fill the gaps between contractors enumerated by statutes for regulation and all other contractors, there was little purpose in the legislature’s selectivity in choosing certain contractors for regulation. . . . The authorization to regulate certain classes of contractors other than building contractors neither authorizes nor permits licensing of the latter. 198 N.E.2d at 520.
NOTE: Like many of the cases cited in this chapter, this case was decided prior to the enactment of the 1970 Constitution, which granted home rule authority. See §§5.21 – 5.25 below for a discussion of home rule licensing powers. The authors further note that despite the court’s holding in Ives a number of non-home rule municipalities have adopted or are considering the adoption of ordinances licensing and regulating general contractors. While passage of such an ordinance is without lawful authority, there seems to be little objection in the construction industry to date. The careful practitioner should, however, advise any municipal client of the risks involved with such action.

The grant that “[t]he corporate authorities of each municipality may pass and enforce all necessary police ordinances” (65 ILCS 5/11-1-1) may be used to effect other statutory provisions granting the power to license, but it cannot stand alone as authority for a licensing ordinance. The court has held in City of Chicago v. M. & M. Hotel Co., 248 Ill. 264, 93 N.E. 753 (1910), that Illinois Municipal Code §11-1-1 is intended to give cities and villages the power to pass and enforce all necessary police ordinances with respect to those subjects and occupations the regulation and control of which are expressly delegated to such municipalities by other specific clauses. Code §11-1-1 is not a general delegation of all police power of the state, which if given to them, would authorize cities and villages to pass and enforce all police ordinances on any and all subjects without regard to any other specific delegation of power.

Similarly, in Lowenthal v. City of Chicago, 313 Ill. 190, 144 N.E. 829 (1924), the city argued that its police powers authorized an ordinance licensing and regulating the sale of drugs and such articles as are commonly sold in drug stores. The court stated that “[i]f the business sought to be regulated has no tendency to injure the public health or public morals or interfere with the general welfare it is not a subject for the exercise of the police power.” 144 N.E. at 831. The court struck down the ordinance, noting that there was no statutory authority granting the city the right to regulate or license drug stores and that drugs and medicine were already subject to direct state regulation. The other aspects of operating a drug store were no different from other retail stores, which presented no public health hazards; therefore, the licensing ordinance could not be imposed on the plaintiff. As discussed in §5.9 below, the power to regulate also means the power to license. Conversely, the courts have held that the power to license not only implies the power to regulate,
but mandates it. In R. & X. Restaurant, supra, 15 N.E.2d at 727, the court stated: “An ordinance providing for a license, without regulatory provisions of any kind, is solely a revenue measure and not within the police power.” See also City of Chicago Heights v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 406 Ill. 428, 94 N.E.2d 306, 310 (1950) (“A licensing ordinance which does not regulate in any degree must be considered to be a revenue measure, and, unless the power to tax has been expressly conferred by the legislature, the ordinance is void.”); Lamere v. City of Chicago, 391 Ill. 552, 63 N.E.2d 863 (1945); Ward Baking Co. v. City of Chicago, 340 Ill. 212, 172 N.E. 171 (1930).

Since licensing for revenue only is not permitted, municipalities do not have unfettered discretion in fixing the amount of license fees. City of Bloomington v. Ramey, 393 Ill. 467, 66 N.E.2d 385 (1946); Ward Baking, supra. However, a license fee for regulatory purposes will be sustained as long as the license fee bears some reasonable relation to the cost of regulation. In R. & X. Restaurant, supra, the court upheld a licensing ordinance that based the annual license fees for food-dispensing establishments on seating capacity. In response to the defendant’s contention that the license fee did not bear a reasonable relation to the burdens placed on the city because of the regulatory provisions, the court stated:

When the legislative department of a city has exercised its power of regulation upon a subject within the police power, unless there is a palpably arbitrary exercise of
such power, the courts will not declare the regulatory provisions void. . . . [A] license fee which will legitimately assist in the regulation of the business may be exacted, and it is not essential that it be confined to the exact expense of issuing a license and regulating and inspecting the business. 15 N.E.2d at 728. In A & H Vending Service, Inc. v. Village of Schaumburg, 168 Ill.App.3d 61, 522 N.E.2d 188, 118 Ill.Dec. 733 (1st Dist. 1988), the court upheld a regulatory ordinance resulting in a five-to one ratio of revenue to cost of enforcement; the enforcement scheme involved administration of records and physical inspection of vending machines by licensing and health inspectors. In reaching its decision, the court stated: [I]t is clear that a license fee for regulatory purposes can be sustained as long as the license fee bears some reasonable relation to the cost of regulation. (Arends v. Police Pension Fund (1955), 7 Ill.2d 250, 253, 130 N.E.2d 517, 519.)

The burden of proof is upon those seeking to invalidate the fees to show the lack of any reasonable relation between the fee and the cost of enforcement. (Village of Roxana v. Costanzo (1968), 41 Ill.2d 423, 425, 243 N.E.2d 242, 243.) Unless that fee is arbitrary or in great excess of the cost of enforcement and as long as the ordinances contain genuine regulatory provisions, the courts have been generous in sustaining a licensing fee for regulatory purposes. See Larson v. City of Rockford (1939), 371 Ill. 441, 444, 21 N.E.2d 396. See also Village of Roxana v. Costanzo (1968), 41 Ill.2d 423, 243 N.E.2d 242; City of Chicago v. Schall (1954), 2 Ill.2d 90, 116 N.E.2d 872. 522 N.E.2d at 190. See also Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 181 Ill.App.3d 10, 536 N.E.2d 763, 129 Ill.Dec. 713 (1st Dist. 1989). For a case that found no reasonable relation between the fee and the cost of regulation, see Quad Canteen Service Corp. v. Ruzak, 85 Ill.App.3d 256, 406 N.E.2d 616, 40 Ill.Dec. 610 (2d Dist. 1980), in which the court found a revenue versus cost ratio of ten to one unconstitutional when no inspections were done until after the lawsuit was filed and the inspections were minimal.

Thus, although many municipalities have a licensing ordinance that merely lists business categories and respective fees, the legally proper ordinance should contain some regulatory provisions regarding health, safety, or registration for each business that the municipality desires to license. However, it is not a valid attack on such an ordinance that the actual personnel available may not be able to carry out the full regulatory scheme contained in the ordinance. In American Banking Co. v. City of Wilmington, 370 Ill. 400, 19 N.E.2d 172 (1938), the court upheld an ordinance licensing vehicles used for the storage or delivering of food. The ordinance provided for inspections to determine compliance with its provision, but the plaintiffs argued that there was only one police officer to make such inspections and that the provisions for inspection were not being enforced. The court rejected this argument and stated: “This is wholly irrelevant as to the validity of the ordinance. It relates only to its enforcement. An ordinance is not rendered void by failure of the city to enforce it.” 19 N.E.2d at 174. See §5.11 below for a discussion of how the power to tax affects the validity of the amount of license fees.

As with the power to license, the power to regulate can be implied from various sources. Father Basil’s Lodge, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 393 Ill. 246, 65 N.E.2d 805 (1946). See also Alarm Detection Systems, Inc. v. Village of Hinsdale, 326 Ill.App.3d 372, 761 N.E.2d 782, 788, 260 Ill.Dec. 599 (2d Dist. 2001). In addition, the power to regulate includes the power to license. Therefore, a licensing ordinance can be authorized by either the implied or express authority to regulate. Some examples of cases applying this rule include the following: The power to regulate the storage of flammable liquids was held to authorize the licensing of dry cleaners in Klever Shampay Karpet Kleaners v. City of Chicago, 323 Ill. 368, 154 N.E. 131 (1926). The power to prevent fire hazards and to protect the public health was construed to permit the licensing of cosmetic manufacturers using alcohol and toxic materials in Chicago Cosmetic Co. v. City of Chicago, 374 Ill. 384, 29 N.E.2d 495 (1940).

The power to regulate the storage of lumber justified an ordinance licensing furniture manufacturers who maintain over 5,000 board feet of lumber in connection with their business in City of Chicago v. Churchill Cabinet Co., 379 Ill. 351, 40 N.E.2d 518 (1942). The power to establish and improve streets and sidewalks, to regulate the use of streets, and to prescribe the strength and manner of constructing all buildings allowed building contractors and those engaged in laying streets and sidewalks to be licensed in Concrete Contractors’ Association of Greater Chicago v. Village of La Grange Park, 14 Ill.2d 65, 150 N.E.2d 783 (1958). The power to prescribe the strength and manner of constructing buildings and to prevent fire hazards, among other powers, authorized a licensing ordinance regarding carpenter contractors in Village of Maywood v. Weglarz, 24 Ill.App.2d 495, 165 N.E.2d 362 (1st Dist. 1960). However, in Chicago Coin Meter Co. v. City of Rolling Meadows, 6 Ill.App.3d 418, 286 N.E.2d 22 (1st Dist. 1972), the court held that the statutory power to locate and regulate the use and construction of laundries was insufficient to authorize a license requirement for companies that leased coin-operated washing machines and dryers to owners of apartment complexes. See §5.8 above for a discussion of other cases in which various grants of statutory authority were held insufficient to authorize licensing. As with licensing ordinances authorized by the express or implied power to license, licensing ordinances authorized by the express or implied power  to regulate must actually contain regulatory provisions. In Aberdeen-Franklin Coal Co. v. City of Chicago, 315 Ill. 99, 145 N.E.  613 (1924), the court struck down an ordinance requiring coal dealers to be licensed, noting that the ordinance contained no regulatory provisions. In doing so, the court stated: “While the power to license is an incident of the power to regulate, and a regulatory ordinance may require a license and the payment of a license fee as an incident to regulation, to sustain the power to license as an incident to regulation the ordinance must be a regulatory ordinance.” 145 N.E. at 615. Again, however, the fact that the regulatory provisions are not actually enforced will not necessarily invalidate the ordinance. See discussion in §5.8 above.

A discussion on the Common Law as it applies to Illinois

Here is a Power Point presentation I used when I spoke at the Illinois Libertarian Party Convention in 2006. My speech focused on the Common Law, and how it is still operative in Illinois. Officials often portray individuals who invoke the Common Law as being fringe, patriot or militia radicals; and there is much confusion and misunderstanding of what the Common Law is. The Common Law embodies long-held judicial decisions dating back hundreds of years. It stands in distinction to statutory law, which is man-made law and often mala prohibita in nature. The application of statutes in relation to the Common Law is to modify, amend, or address shortcomings in the Common Law to address the application of the Common Law to modern-day issues where the Common Law had not previously been applied. The notes below I gleaned from the Corpus Juris Secundum which is the authoritative Legal Encyclopedia used by legal professionals and jurists. I have also included an additional analysis of the City of St. Louis, Missouri Earnings Tax, which imposes a 1% tax upon the “wages” of “taxpayers” working within the corporate limits of the City of St. Louis, Missouri. I attempt to clarify and illustrate the chicanery and confusion used in the wording of the City Code which attempts to impose a tax upon working people. You will need the ability to view Microsoft PowerPoint slide shows to view the presentation. 
Click here to view the Slide Show Presentation.

Common Law in Illinois 

Corpus Juris Secundum on the Common Law § §  11 et seq.

 The common law of England, so far as applicable and of a general nature, is in full force in Illinois until repealed by legislative authority.
 There is no national common law operative as such throughout the United States, and the adoption and application of the common law were matters left to the several states for determination.

Under the Act of March 5, 1874, which is still in effect, the General Assembly provided: “The common law of England, so far as the same is applicable and of a general nature, and all statutes or acts of the British parliament made in aid of, and to supply the defects of the common law, prior to the fourth year of James the First, excepting the second section of the sixth chapter of 43d Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of 13th Elizabeth, and ninth chapter of 37th Henry Eighth, and which are of a general nature and not local to that kingdom, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as of full force until repealed by legislative authority.” The fourth year of James the First began March 24, 1606.

This statute, without the exceptions, was passed by the general convention of the Colony of Virginia, May, 1776, and in its present form was carried into the legislature of the Indiana Territory by the Act of September 7, 1807, was in force in the territory of Illinois and was reenacted by the first state legislature by Act of February 4, 1819, and has been retained in the same form in succeeding revisions. The statute is declaratory of what was the law by which the inhabitants of the territory now constituting the State of Illinois were governed, and of the rights, privileges, and immunities to which they were entitled ever since Anglo-Saxon civilization first obtained a foothold in it.
    The legislature fixed the fourth year of James the First, instead of the date of the Declaration of Independence, or of the formation of our Constitution, as the period for transplanting the common law of England because that was the period at which the first territorial government was established in America, and with it the common law of England as it then existed.

As a result of the Act, the great body of the English common law became, so far as applicable, in force in this state, and remains in force except so far as it has been modified or repealed by statute, or changed or modified by custom as found in decisions of our courts. The common law, when applicable, is as much a part of the law of the state, where it has not been expressly abrogated by statute, as the statutes themselves. In other words, Illinois is a common law state. 
 On the other hand, it has long been settled that the adoption has extended only to cases where the common law is applicable to the habits and condition of our society and in harmony with the genius, spirit, and objects of our institutions. The statute adopting the common law of England does not require the courts to enforce the local customs of England, but, on the contrary, they are excluded.  

 What the statute adopted was not just those doctrines which happened to have already been announced by English courts at the close of the Middle Ages, but rather a system of law whose outstanding characteristics are its adaptability and capacity for growth. The Supreme Court pointed out in the very early case of Penny v. Little, which was quoted in Amann v. Faidy, “That if we are to be restricted to the common law, as it was enacted at fourth James, rejecting all modifications and improvements which have since been made, by practice and statutes, except our own statutes, we will find that system entirely inapplicable to our present condition, for the simple reason that it is more than two hundred years behind the age.”

Adoption of English statutes. The Act of March 5, 1874, which is still in effect, adopted not only the common law of England, but also all statutes in aid thereof or to supply defects therein passed prior to the fourth year of James the First, except the second section of the sixth chapter of 43 Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of 13th Elizabeth, and ninth chapter of 37th Henry the Eighth, which were of a general nature and not local to that kingdom. 
 English statutes are not in force in Illinois which were passed since the fourth year of James the First, or which are inapplicable to our conditions and inconsistent with our institutions.

Corpus Juris Secundum on the Common Law § §  14, 15

Various maxims and principles of the common law which are of general application and are suited to the conditions and surroundings of our state have been adopted and are in force to the extent that they have not been superseded by statutory enactment.

Thus, the courts have applied the doctrine of Mobilia sequuntur personam and the maxim De minimis non curat lex. 
 In addition, other maxims and principles have been applied, such as ignorance of the law excuses no one, and everyone of sound and pure mind is bound at his peril to take knowledge of both the common and statute law; the law only favors the vigilant; the law abhors forfeitures and will show them no mercy or favor; persons must so use their own property and so exercise their own privileges that they do not thereby destroy or peril the rights of others; the law does not permit a person to do indirectly what he cannot do directly; and the law does not require the performance of a useless act.

Statutes

Rules for the construction of statutes are not rules of law, but are only aids which courts use to ascertain the legislative intent not clearly manifest from the language of the statute.

The purpose of all rules or maxims adopted by the courts for the construction or interpretation of statutes is to discover the true intent and meaning of the law. These rules or maxims are not rules of law, but are merely aids used by the courts in arriving at the real intention of the legislature when that intention is not clearly manifest from the language used.

These rules are useful only in cases of doubt, and are never to be used to create a doubt, but only to remove it.

Definitions.

The General Assembly has the power to make a reasonable definition of the terms used in an act, even though such definitions do not correspond with those contained in other acts. Statutory definitions control in the construction of the terms in an act, and the common-law definitions of those terms must yield to the statutory definitions.

 Words defined

The words in a statute may be defined by common usage, by previous judicial construction, as well as by statutory definition, to render the statute certain.

 § 52. Construction as including or binding sovereign

General legislative enactments do not impair the rights of the sovereign unless such an intent is expressly declared in the statute.
 The rights of the sovereign are never impaired by a general legislative enactment unless such an intent is expressly declared in the statute, and the words of a statute applying to private rights do not affect the rights of the state. The state is not bound by or included in any act of the General Assembly unless expressly named or necessarily implied to give effect to the act, although the rule that general legislative enactments are not applicable to the state is not violated when the state is made subject to the provisions thereof by reason of the expressed intention of the General Assembly to make it subject thereto.

In common usage the word “person” does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are generally construed to exclude the sovereign, although the purpose, subject matter, context, legislative history, and executive interpretation of a statute are aids to construction which may indicate an intent, by the use of the term “person,” to bring the state or nation within the scope of the statute. According to the Statute on Statutes, the words “person” or “persons,” as well as all words referring to or importing persons, may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate as well as individuals.

Showdown at St. Louis County Circuit Court. Oct. 10, 2006

Patrick Clifford Associate Circuit Judge

I attended traffic court with my wife in St. Louis County Circuit Court, where a motion hearing was to take place. My wife was called by the judge to approach the bench. She approached with me in tow. The prosecuting attorney took his position at the left corner of the table facing the judge and my wife took her place at the far right corner with me to her right.

Discussion on one of the motions began with the prosecutor for the City of Olivette, Steven Fluhr, arguing for the plaintiff. I was listening, whispering to my wife what was taking place and what to say in rebuttal. Judge Clifford then barked at my wife to keep quiet, that he was listening to the prosecutor, and he would tell her when she could speak. Now remember, my wife is pro se, and not versed in the ways of appearing at the bar.

Clifford then asked me who I was, and I said that he needed to address my wife, since I was not a party to the case. My wife told him that I was her counsel. He asked me if I was an attorney, to which I replied, no. He then told me that I could not be my wife’s counsel since I was not an attorney. My wife said that she had the right to choose her counsel and I was her choice.

Clifford proceeded to tell me that “this area” was reserved for members of the bar, and since I was not an attorney I had to sit down. I told him that I was not going to sit down, and that I was going to honor my wife’s request to assist her. He then said that he would have me jailed for contempt if I did not sit down. I told him to do what he felt he had to do, I was not sitting down. He then said that he had never been shown such disrespect in his courtroom, and he didn’t want to have to jail me for contempt, but he was prepared to do so if I did not sit down. I said to do it. There was a bailiff in the courtroom who approached me from behind as this was taking place and I just turned to look at him and I shook my head as in not to lay a hand on me. He stopped about six feet behind me.

Clifford ordered the clerks to get the sherriff. One of them asked, “Really?” and Clifford responded with, “Yes!”. Everyone just stood there. The clerks got on the phone and called the Sherriff, the prosecutor, Steven Fluhr, just looked down at his shoes, and my wife asked me what she should do if they arrest me and should she stay there for the hearing. I told her that if I am taken away that she should walk out of the courtroom since she had been deprived of her right to assistance of counsel.

At about this time two deputies came into the courtroom and Clifford held his hand up as to have them halt and told them that I was not under arrest yet, but rather to just wait there. So, there stood the deputies at the back of the courtroom, a bailiff behind me, my wife to my left and the prosecutor opposite her. There was not a sound for what seemed like about two minutes as Clifford leaned back in his chair and looked at the ceiling. I stood there prepared to be escorted to a cell.

Clifford finally leaned forward and said, “You can assist your wife, but you can’t stand at the bar. That is reserved for attorneys. If you wanted to assist her then you will have to sit in your seat and she could go to you to consult.” I’m thinking to myself, almost aloud, “Where is the contempt of court you threatened me with? I proceeded back to my seat, which was about six rows back. There stood the two deputies behind my seat and before I sat down I thought about sitting with them standing guard over me. I thought, “To hell with that.”, and I walked back up to the front of the courtroom and sat in the front section usually reserved for attorneys. This was a better place to hear what was taking place at the bench.

As my wife argued the motion which I had written for her she turned a few times as if to ask me a question. Clifford paused and asked, “Mrs. McCoy, it appears you have some questions for your husband. Do you wish to consult?” She said yes and was allowed to come sit by me while I briefed her on what was happening and how to argue the motion. This happened a total of three times and was allowed to consult with me uninterrupted.

After the proceeding was concluded, Clifford said, “Mr. McCoy, will you approach the bench?” I walked to the bench and leaned over close to Clifford when he said, “In all my years on the bench I have never had anyone show such disrespect. When I give an order I expect it to be followed. If you ever disobey another order in my court I will hold you in contempt, do you understand?” I looked Clifford in the eye and said, “It think we understand each other.” I then turned and walked out of the courtroom.

The moral of the story is that people have a right to assistance of their choosing. I do not represent people in legal proceedings. I do not speak to the court on their behalf. I speak with them privately. No judge has a right to tell someone they are not entitled to assistance of any kind. Clifford knew this and also knew he would be breaking the law by denying my wife assistance. He would have opened a can of worms by having me held in contempt. I was prepared for this possibility. When you have nothing to fear you will realize the only people like Clifford have on their side is intimidation and fear.