Monthly Archives: March 2012

My Expatriation from the United States – An Epilogue

I wanted to take this opportunity to reflect back on my Declaration of Sovereignty, Expatriation, and Dissolution of all Previous National and Political Allegiance, which I signed in December of 2007. With that Declaration, I renounced any real or implied allegiance to the government of the United States, as well as any consent to be provided any protection under its laws or obligation to obey them. I have heard nothing from anyone representing the US Government in refuting or acknowledging my Declaration, notwithstanding numerous visits from various government domains to my website, and more specifically, to my Declaration.

I have to admit, I wrote my Declaration at a time when I was having serious reservations about what I had been witnessing over some time; an ever-encroaching police state, fewer freedoms, more violence, apathetic populace, fear…. I could have retreated to my television or You Tube to disengage from the uneasiness, but instead, I chose to embrace it. Why did I feel like this? What is the reason? Was the answer “government”? No. The answer was me. For all of the things that caused me to feel uneasy, I could trace a source of conflict back to me. It was I who did not speak out. It was I who thought my obligation ended with voting someone else to correct the world’s ills. It was I who turned my head when law enforcement stepped out of bounds. It was I who had allowed myself to become de-natured in exchange for accepting a system that flourishes on fear and ignorance. I was just a man, and any tacit or explicit allegiance to a political system which brought much of the pain and suffering upon people everywhere was a voluntary approval of that system.

With that said, some have asked why pick on the ‚ United States? There are more oppressive political systems in the world; why not speak out against them? Well, because it is the United States that confronts me directly and provides the means for its petty tyrants to interject themselves into my life. I would say the same about any political society. I am an Anarchist. I do not believe in borders, governments, force. What makes the United States the object of my disdain is that it was allegedly founded on individual liberty, and in revolt to monarchy. It was founded in blood, and is maintained in blood. The patriotic platitudes still spew from the lips of politicians to perpetuate the anachronistic notions of individual liberty, but the actions of this government say otherwise. In the final discourse, it resorts to fear in garnering our consent. I do not support the Unites States, and having previously deemed to be one of its subjects, my Declaration is the catharsis for correcting that assumption. I likewise do not support other governments, but none have asked for my support, so to speak to each specifically is not required. My Declaration is my separation from all that is the United States government. From that point on, I will choose to associate myself with whatever political society I may so choose, but do so voluntarily and with fully-informed consent, reserving my right to withdraw that consent at any time.

Some have commented that since I did not follow statutory protocols in renouncing my citizenship that my renunciation therefore was not proper and I am considered to still be a citizen. What the US Government or any of its agents believe or perceive is of no consequence to me. They still deem to treat me as though I was a US citizen and for the purposes of confiscating my wealth. However, how I am treated by the US Government is no evidence as to what I say I am. It is I who determines my political status because I have to make the admission or seek a benefit or the protection of that government to fall within its jurisdiction. My presence in America is situational, where the jurisdiction of the US Government is political, and not territorial. For it to claim dominion over a plot of soil, absent a political precursor, is null and void. My political bonds have been disavowed and are no longer binding upon me with respect to them.

The reason for the lack of response from the US Government is two-fold. For them to challenge or refute my Declaration they would have to admit having read or being in receipt of it. They would have to either accept or deny its application, and more importantly, the right of people to associate or dis-associate themselves to or from political affiliations. If they accept it, then I am free from all political encumbrances, and likewise, anyone else who asserts their sovereignty; if not, then we have no choice but to succumb to the occupying forces and must therefore submit without recourse.

The United States Government, and their assorted municipal enclaves called “States”, have usurped and stolen from me over the years. I have been successful in keeping all of my earnings in some cases, and in others, been punitively withheld by so-called “employers”. I do not receive federal benefits because, in my opinion, I am not eligible due to not being a US citizen. However, I am not certain that I am willing to allow them to totally abscond with all that is rightfully mine without firing back. I have been placed at a disadvantage, having had the fruits of my labor stolen over the years. I only have a couple of options, as I see it. I can engage the government as though I were a citizen, taking benefits and filing their forms, or I can resort to more subtle and devious measures to recoup what is mine. It may come down to my having to lie, cheat, borrow, or steal to regain my property. As far as I’m concerned, there is no shame in lying or stealing from an entity which engages in lying and stealing to further its own ends. The only downside is if you are caught, and knowing how this government plays, it is wise to plan all moves accordingly.

I do not plan on staying in the US. I’ve been looking at other options abroad for some time. I won’t say where, but I’m sure they think they have it figured out since many of my trips involve Mexico, but traveling through Latin America and even out of the country is relatively easy once you are off US shores. I feel being a US citizen is in-fact more of a liability then a benefit since many countries look unkindly upon Americans and will lash out violently in response to the carnage and inhumanity left in the wake of US presence in many countries. It is not wise to travel with the blood of innocent people on your US Passport and wear the badge of imperialistic citizenship.

I am often asked, “Does the US recognize your expatriation?” I can’t say, but if so, they have erred greatly in allowing me to remain in the alleged “US”, working and living as usual. If they react in either way they are publicly on-notice and any inconsistency in their actions will be proof of their hypocrisy and arrogance. If I am not, then they are misapplying their laws to me and allowing me to remain in the “country”. If I am, then my Declaration means nothing and we have no option but to succumb to their occupation. I say I am not, and therefore will have to resort to “other means” to reclaim my property.

I harbor no love or allegiance for the US. As a country, it is a patent failure in self-determination, democracy, individual freedom, and liberty. It was never my government, as I have no need for it. There are plenty of good people, but that can be said for any spot on the globe. There is nothing special about people just because of where they may be found upon the soil. However, more-and-more “Americans” are resigned to simply obey the edicts of a corrupt, violent, and deceitful government than challenge any legitimacy on the grounds it violates natural rights or individual liberty. The people, in large part, have succumbed to materialism, immediate gratification, greed, ignorance, and fear. There is little foundation upon which to build a cohesive society which recognizes fundamental individual rights and adheres to principles of tolerance, peace, and autonomy. I welcome all peaceful people and admonish those who rally in support of the Leviathan.

What has changed, following my Declaration? In some respects, not much. There is greater peace of mind and comfort in being able to step back and see the US for what it is, and having the resolve and purpose to disassociate myself from it. I am now operating under the law of necessity, and will do all that is “necessary and proper” for me, by “any means necessary”. Let the bureaucrats and keepers of the plantation mull those words over for awhile. They love to engage in double-speak and abstractions. I will remain true to my commitment to peace and tolerance, but as for government, that abstract legal fiction of coercive control, peace rests with its demise.

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The NSA's Code Cracking Data Center Looms Large

 I am responding to an article at Wired.com http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/all/1 that talks about the NSA’s new data center for breaking encryption and listening in on ALL communication.

Dear National Security Agency, and all would-be proponents and supporters of governments everywhere who fashion themselves in the image of the paterfamilias called the United States,

They say, if you have nothing to hide you have nothing to fear. Well, I have everything to hide, but still am not afraid. The fact is, they are here, and they have the means to invade our lives. So, let’s lay it on the table. I’ll save the taxpayers a bit of coin and tell the NSA what they will probably find out anyway. I won’t bother encrypting, encoding, obfuscating, or hiding what I have to say. The United States Government is an out-of-control, imperialistic, totalitarian, exploitative, terroristic Leviathan.

Let’s put it like this; if you have nothing to fear, then you have no reason to intercept communications. Yet, you do have something to fear, don’t you Uncle Sam? Your global transgressions and immoral propensities have dyed the rivers and oceans with the blood of innocents. Your boot print is an indelible reminder of your disregard for cultures and sovereignty. Your filth infects this planet like a metastasizing cancer. You bear none of the markings of a peaceful, prosperous, and virtuous society. You were founded on blood and maintain your existence in the same fashion. You need to keep tabs on communication because it is the most dangerous weapon we have. People don’t need guns or bombs, when they can spread ideas of peace and resistance through the peaceful exchange of ideas, and it is in your nature to take offense and vex over such ideas, because they are the death knell to your need to exist.

There are many testaments to your self-aggrandizement and political narcissism. Most are benign and appeal only to the doting dolts of political megalomania, but this, the “Spy Center”, is the consummate governmental gummata. Like a yellowish mound preparing to burst through the skin and spread bacterial effluent, your spy center says to mankind, “There is no realm we cannot invade or no place sacrosanct from our jurisdiction.”

Until you acquire the technology to invade the minds of your dissenters, you have not won. People will meet in secret, and even in public. Your provocateurs will attempt to infiltrate, will be routed out, and be seen no more. The people will develop ways to avoid your traps, even if that means abandoning this sinking ship for greener pastures. What there is to fear, is your quest for glory and power, fueled by the globalists and financiers who stoke your coals. There is no plot of soil outside your ability or desire to subdue, but the spirit of peaceful people will never be within your grasp.

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Vox Populi, Methods of Manipulation

If you don’t think there’s something wrong with the world as we know it, you need to look a little deeper. If you don’t think there are powers who are not concerned with your safety and welfare, but rather with your resources and managing your physical and mental decline, you are a member of the deluded masses and should wake up.

Megan Verb’ Kargher are proud to present Vox Populi, Methods of Manipulation. It has become increasingly evident that large portions of the planet are descending with alarming speed into Orwellian police states. What is the New World Order and what are their plans for mankind? How can we stop the corruption now? Join me as I travel in search of what is really going on in the world in which we live. Featuring interviews with David Icke, Max Igan, Freeman, Jordan Maxwell, Dr. George Rhodes, Ben Stewart and Charlie Veitch.

FBI Director "Isn't Sure" Whether Americans Can Be Assassinated On U.S. Soil?

http://www.alt-market.com/articles/624-fbi-director-qisnt-sureq-whether-americans-can-be-assassinated-on-us-soil

This article does not investigate whether politicians can be assassinated by civilians for, not only constitutional transgressions, but for basic violations of human decency. Therefore, by failing to difinitely address that issue or to otherwise identify any barrier to such action, they tacitly acknowlege the justification for doing so. Funny how that works.

The Treason Clause of the U.S. Constitution specifically delineates what process should be taken when dealing with American citizens who are accused of becoming enemy combatants against their own country.  This clause does NOT allow the federal government to assassinate them under any pretense whatsoever.  What it does allow for, is due process, the requirement of at least two plausible witnesses, and a jury of their peers to hear both sides of the case.  What the Bush and Obama administrations have done over the past decade is very carefully craft a judicial “grey area” in which the law is left open to very broad interpretation, and, they have circumvented civil liberties by attempting to re-categorize certain activities and undesirables using national security and military protocols.  Ultimately, this feeds an atmosphere not of order but of lawlessness on the part of the political machine.  Legislation like the Patriot Act, the NDAA, and the executive option of assassination of American citizens, completely removes the foundational pillar of innocence until proven guilty.  Leadership must be bound by SPECIFIC legal guidelines of what it can and cannot do.  The law has to apply to government, even more so than the citizenry, otherwise, the balance of power is lost, and so is our nation.

The Obama administration has adopted the same stance. If a U.S. citizen joins al-Qaeda, “it doesn’t really change anything from the standpoint of whether we can target them,” a senior administration official said. “They are then part of the enemy.”

Both the CIA and the JSOC maintain lists of individuals, called “High Value Targets” and “High Value Individuals,” whom they seek to kill or capture. The JSOC list includes three Americans, including Aulaqi, whose name was added late last year. As of several months ago, the CIA list included three U.S. citizens, and an intelligence official said that Aulaqi’s name has now been added.

Above, FBI Director Robert Mueller tries to evade the question of whether the federal government considers Americans on American soil as viable targets for assassination.  By doing so, he actually answers quite clearly our concerns in the Liberty Movement.  By avoiding the query, he silently admits that the government is, indeed, at least considering the possibility of enemy combatant status for citizens here at home.  There is no longer any need for debate over where exactly D.C. stands on this.  Obama has tried to dance around the issue of the NDAA and indefinite detention, “promising” he will not apply it to U.S. citizens, but clearly, if he is willing to kill us without trial, then he is certainly willing to throw us in a concrete box without trial.  The bottom line; the people of this country are not going to acquiesce to this kind of totalitarian behavior from a historically unpopular Congress and President, and so, the elites have to engage in word games and semantics until they achieve an event or set of social circumstances that generate enough fear and desperation within the populace to force such abuses of power through…

You can contact Brandon Smith atbrandon@alt-market.com This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

Alt-Market is an organization designed to help you find like-minded activists and preppers in your local area so that you can network and construct communities for mutual aid and defense.  Join Alt-Market.com today and learn what it means to step away from the system and build something better.

To contribute to the growth of the Safe Haven Project, and to help us help others in relocating, or to support the creation of barter networks across the country, visit our donate page here:

http://www.alt-market.com/donate

Do you have enough Non-GMO seeds in case of economic collapse?  Seeds are the OTHER alternative currency, and if you aren’t stocked, then you aren’t prepared.  To buy top quality non-GMO seeds at a special 10% discount, visit Humble Seed, and use the code Alt10

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We Entertain the Question: Are Police Constitutional?

Seton Hall Constitutional L.J. 2001, 685

ARE COPS CONSTITUTIONAL?

‚ ‚ Roger Roots*

ABSTRACT

http://www.constitution.org/lrev/roots/cops.htm

Police work is often lionized by jurists and scholars who claim to employ “textualist” and “originalist” methods of constitutional interpretation. Yet professional police were unknown to the United States in 1789, and first appeared in America almost a half-century after the Constitution’s ratification. The Framers contemplated law enforcement as the duty of mostly private citizens, along with a few constables and sheriffs who could be called upon when necessary. This article marshals extensive historical and legal evidence to show that modern policing is in many ways inconsistent with the original intent of America’s founding documents. The author argues that the growth of modern policing has substantially empowered the state in a way the Framers would regard as abhorrent to their foremost principles.
‚ 

PART I

INTRODUCTION

THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT

PRIVATE PROSECUTORS

LAW ENFORCEMENT AS A UNIVERSAL‚ DUTY

POLICE AS SOCIAL WORKERS

THE WAR ON CRIME

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISTINCTIONS

RESISTING ARREST

THE SAFETY OF THE POLICE PROFESSION

PROFESSIONALISM?

DNA EVIDENCE ILLUSTRATES FALLIBILITY OF POLICE

COPS NOT COST-EFFECTIVE DETERRENT

PART II

POLICE AS A STANDING ARMY

THE SECOND AMENDMENT

THE THIRD AMENDMENT

THE RIGHT TO BE LEFT ALONE

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

WARRANTS A FLOOR, NOT A CEILING

PRIVATE PERSONS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

ORIGINALISTS CALL FOR CIVIL DAMAGES

DEVELOPMENT OF IMMUNITIES

THE LOSS OF PROBABLE CAUSE, AND THE ONSET OF PROBABLE SUSPICION

POLICE AND THE “AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION”

ONE EXCEPTION: THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE?

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

DUE PROCESS

ENTRAPMENT

CONCLUSION

PART I

INTRODUCTION

Uniformed police officers are the most visible element of America’s criminal justice system. Their numbers have grown exponentially over the past century and now stand at hundreds of thousands nationwide.1 Police expenses account for the largest segment of most municipal budgets and generally dwarf expenses for fire, trash, and sewer services.2 Neither casual observers nor learned authorities regard the sight of hundreds of armed, uniformed state agents on America’s roads and street corners as anything peculiar ‚” let alone invalid or unconstitutional.

Yet the dissident English colonists who framed the United States Constitution would have seen this modern ‘police state’ as alien to their foremost principles. Under the criminal justice model known to the Framers, professional police officers were unknown.3 The general public had broad law enforcement powers and only the executive functions of the law (e.g., the execution of writs, warrants and orders) were performed by constables or sheriffs (who might call upon members of the community for assistance).4 Initiation and investigation of criminal cases was the nearly exclusive province of private persons.

At the time of the Constitution’s ratification, the office of sheriff was an appointed position, and constables were either elected or drafted from the community to serve without pay.5 Most of their duties involved civil executions rather than criminal law enforcement. The courts of that period were venues for private litigation ‚” whether civil or criminal ‚” and the state was rarely a party. Professional police as we know them today originated in American cities during the second quarter of the nineteenth century, when municipal governments drafted citizens to maintain order.6 The role of these “nightly watch” officers gradually grew to encompass the catching of criminals, which had formerly been the responsibility of individual citizens.7

While this historical disconnect is widely known by criminal justice historians, rarely has it been juxtaposed against the Constitution and the Constitution’s imposed scheme of criminal justice.8 “Originalist” scholars of the Constitution have tended to be supportive, rather than critical of modern policing.9 This article will show, however, that modern policing violates the Framers’ most firmly held conceptions of criminal justice.

The modern police-driven model of law enforcement helps sustain a playing field that is fundamentally uneven for different players upon it. Modern police act as an army of assistants for state prosecutors and gather evidence solely with an eye toward the state’s interests. Police seal off crime scenes from the purview of defense investigators, act as witnesses of convenience for the state in courts of law, and instigate a substantial amount of criminal activity under the guise of crime fighting. Additionally, police enforce social class norms and act as tools of empowerment for favored interest groups to the disadvantage of others.10 Police are also a political force that constantly lobbies for increased state power and decreased constitutional liberty for American citizens.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT

The Constitution contains no explicit provisions for criminal law enforcement.11 Nor did the constitutions of any of the several states contain such provisions at the time of the Founding.12 Early constitutions enunciated the intention that law enforcement was a universal duty that each person owed to the community, rather than a power of the government.13 Founding-era constitutions addressed law enforcement from the standpoint of individual liberties and placed explicit barriers upon the state.14

PRIVATE PROSECUTORS

For decades before and after the Revolution, the adjudication of criminals in America was governed primarily by the rule of private prosecution: (1) victims of serious crimes approached a community grand jury, (2) the grand jury investigated the matter and issued an indictment only if it concluded that a crime should be charged, and (3) the victim himself or his representative (generally an attorney but sometimes a state attorney general) prosecuted the defendant before a petit jury of twelve men.15 Criminal actions were only a step away from civil actions ‚” the only material difference being that criminal claims ostensibly involved an interest of the public at large as well as the victim.16 Private prosecutors acted under authority of the people and in the name of the state ‚” but for their own vindication.17 The very term “prosecutor” meant criminal plaintiff and implied a private person.18 A government prosecutor was referred to as an attorney general and was a rare phenomenon in criminal cases at the time of the nation’s founding.19 When a private individual prosecuted an action in the name of the state, the attorney general was required to allow the prosecutor to use his name ‚” even if the attorney general himself did not approve of the action.20

Private prosecution meant that criminal cases were for the most part limited by the need of crime victims for vindication.21 Crime victims held the keys to a potential defendant’s fate and often negotiated the settlement of criminal cases.22 After a case was initiated in the name of the people, however, private prosecutors were prohibited from withdrawing the action pursuant to private agreement with the defendant.23 Court intervention was occasionally required to compel injured crime victims to appear against offenders in court and “not to make bargains to allow [defendants] to escape conviction, if they … repair the injury.”24

Grand jurors often acted as the detectives of the period. They conducted their investigations in the manner of neighborhood sleuths, dispersing throughout the community to question people about their knowledge of crimes.25 They could act on the testimony of one of their own members, or even on information known to grand jurors before the grand jury convened.26 They might never have contact with a government prosecutor or any other officer of the executive branch.27

Colonial grand juries also occasionally served an important law enforcement need by account of their sheer numbers. In the early 1700s, grand jurors were sometimes called upon to make arrests in cases where suspects were armed and in large numbers.28 A lone sheriff or deputy had reason to fear even approaching a large group “without danger of his life or having his bones broken.”29 When a sheriff was unable to execute a warrant or perform an execution, he could call upon a posse of citizens to assist him.30 The availability of the posse comitatus meant that a sheriffs resources were essentially unlimited.31

LAW ENFORCEMENT AS A UNIVERSAL DUTY

Law enforcement in the Founders’ time was a duty of every citizen.32 Citizens were expected to be armed and equipped to chase suspects on foot, on horse, or with wagon whenever summoned. And when called upon to enforce the laws of the state, citizens were to respond “not faintly and with lagging steps, but honestly and bravely and with whatever implements and facilities [were] convenient and at hand.”33 Any person could act in the capacity of a constable without being one,34 and when summoned by a law enforcement officer, a private person became a temporary member of the police department.35 The law also presumed that any person acting in his public capacity as an officer was rightfully appointed.36

Laws in virtually every state still require citizens to aid in capturing escaped prisoners, arresting criminal suspects, and executing legal process. The duty of citizens to enforce the law was and is a constitutional one. Many early state constitutions purported to bind citizens into a universal obligation to perform law enforcement functions, yet evinced no mention of any state power to carry out those same functions.37 But the law enforcement duties of the citizenry are now a long-forgotten remnant of the Framers’ era. By the 1960s, only twelve percent of the public claimed to have ever personally acted to combat crime.38

The Founders could not have envisioned ‘police’ officers as we know them today. The term “police” had a slightly different meaning at the time of the Founding.39 It was generally used as a verb and meant to watch over or monitor the public health and safety.40 In Louisiana, “police juries” were local governing bodies similar to county boards in other states.41 Only in the mid-nineteenth century did the term ‘police’ begin to take on the persona of a uniformed state law enforcer.42 The term first crept into Supreme Court jurisprudence even later.43

Prior to the 1850s, rugged individualism and self-reliance were the touchstones of American law, culture, and industry. Although a puritan cultural and legal ethic pervaded their society, Americans had great toleration for victimless misconduct.44 Traffic disputes were resolved through personal negotiation and common law tort principles, rather than driver licenses and armed police patrol.45 Agents of the state did not exist for the protection of the individual citizen. The night watch of early American cities concerned itself primarily with the danger of fire, and watchmen were often afraid to enter some of the most notorious neighborhoods of cities like Boston.46

At the time of Tocqueville’s observations (in the 1830s), “the means available to the authorities for the discovery of crimes and arrest of criminals [were] few,”47 yet Tocqueville doubted “whether in any other country crime so seldom escapes punishment.”48 Citizens handled most crimes informally, forming committees to catch criminals and hand them over to the courts.49 Private mobs in early America dealt with larger threats to public safety and welfare, such as houses of ill fame.50 Nothing struck a European traveler in America, wrote Tocqueville, more than the absence of government in the streets.51

Formal criminal justice institutions dealt only with the most severe crimes. Misdemeanor offenses had to be dealt with by the private citizen on the private citizen’s own terms. “The farther back the [crime rate] figures go,” according to historian Roger Lane, “the higher is the relative proportion of serious crimes.”52 In other words, before the advent of professional policing, fewer crimes ‚” and only the most serious crimes ‚” were brought to the attention of the courts.

After the 1850s, cities in the northeastern United States gradually acquired more uniformed patrol officers. The criminal justice model of the Framers’ era grew less recognizable. The growth of police units reflected a “change in attitude” more than worsening crime rates.53 Americans became less tolerant of violence in their streets and demanded higher standards of conduct.54 Offenses which had formerly earned two-year sentences were now punished by three to four years or more in a state penitentiary.55

POLICE AS SOCIAL WORKERS

Few of the duties of Founding-era sheriffs involved criminal law enforcement. Instead, civil executions, attachments and confinements dominated their work.56 When professional police units first arrived on the American scene, they functioned primarily as protectors of public safety, health and welfare. This role followed the “bobbie” model developed in England in the 1830s by the father of professional policing, Sir Robert Peel.57

Early police agencies provided a vast array of municipal services, including keeping traffic thoroughfares clear. Boston police made 30,681 arrests during one fiscal year in the 1880s, but in the same year reported 1,472 accidents, secured 2,461 buildings found open, reported thousands of dangerous and defective streets, sidewalks, chimneys, drains, sewers and hydrants, tended to 169 corpses, assisted 148 intoxicated persons, located 1,572 lost children, reported 228 missing (but only 151 found) persons, rescued seven persons from drowning, assisted nearly 2,000 sick, injured, and insane persons, found 311 stray horse teams, and removed more than fifty thousand street obstructions.58

Police were a “kind of catchall or residual welfare agency,”59 a lawful extension of actual state ‘police powers.’60 In the Old West, police were a sanitation and repair workforce more than a corps of crime-fighting gun-slingers. Sheriff Wyatt Earp of OK Corral fame, for example, repaired boardwalks as part of his duties.61

THE WAR ON CRIME

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, police forces took on a brave new role: crime-fighting. The goal of maintaining public order became secondary to chasing lawbreakers. The police cultivated a perception that they were public heroes who “fought crime” in the general, rather than individual sense.

The 1920s saw the rise of the profession’s second father ‚” or perhaps its wicked stepfather ‚” J. Edgar Hoover.62 Hoover’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) came to epitomize the police profession in its sleuth and intelligence-gathering role. FBI agents infiltrated mobster organizations, intercepted communications between suspected criminals, and gathered intelligence for both law enforcement and political purposes.

This new view of police as soldiers locked in combat against crime caught on quickly.63 The FBI led local police to develop integrated repositories of fingerprint, criminal, and fraudulent check records. The FBI also took over the gathering of crime statistics (theretofore gathered by a private association),64 and went to war against “Public Enemy Number One” and others on their “Ten Most Wanted” list.65 Popular culture began to see police as a “thin blue line,” that “serves and protects” civilized society from chaos and lawlessness.66

THE ABSENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIME-FIGHTING POWER

But the constitutions of the Founding Era gave no hint of any thin blue line. Nothing in their texts enunciated any governmental power to “fight crime” at all. “Crime-fighting” was intended as the domain of individuals touched by crime. The original design under the American legal order was to restore a semblance of private justice. The courts were a mere forum, or avenue, for private persons to attain justice from a malfeasor.67 The slow alteration of the criminal courts into a venue only for the government’s claims against private persons turned the very spirit of the Founders’ model on its head.

To suggest that modern policing is extraconstitutional is not to imply that every aspect of police work is constitutionally improper.68 Rather, it is to say that the totality and effect of modern policing negates the meaning and purpose of certain constitutional protections the Framers intended to protect and carry forward to future generations. Modern-style policing leaves many fundamental constitutional interests utterly unenforced.

Americans today, for example, are far more vulnerable to invasive searches and seizures by the state than were the Americans of 1791.69 The Framers lived in an era in which much less of the world was in “plain view” of the government and a “stop and frisk” would have been rare indeed.70 The totality of modern policing also places pedestrian and vehicle travel at the mercy of the state, a development the Framers would have almost certainly never sanctioned. These infringements result not from a single aspect of modern policing, but from the whole of modern policing’s control over large domains of private life that were once “policed” by private citizens.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISTINCTIONS

The treatment of law enforcement in the courts shows that the law of crime control has changed monumentally over the past two centuries. Under the common law, there was no difference whatsoever between the privileges, immunities, and powers of constables and those of private citizens. Constables were literally and figuratively clothed in the same garments as everyone else and faced the same liabilities ‚” civil and criminal ‚” as everyone else under identical circumstances. Two centuries of jurisprudence, however, have recast the power relationships of these two roles dramatically.

Perhaps the first distinction between the rights of citizen and constabulary came in the form of increased power to arrest. Early in the history of policing, courts held that an officer could arrest if he had “reasonable belief both in the commission of a felony and in the guilt of the arrestee.71 This represented a marginal yet important distinction from the rights of a “private person,” who could arrest only if a felony had actually been committed.72 It remains somewhat of a mystery, however, where this distinction was first drawn.73 Scrutiny of the distinction suggests it arose in England in 1827 ‚” more than a generation after ratification of the Bill of Rights in the United States.74

Moreover, the distinction was illegitimate from its birth, being a bastardization of an earlier rule allowing constables to arrest upon transmission of reasonably reliable information from a third person.75 The earlier rule made perfect sense when many arrests were executed by private persons. “Authority” was a narrow defense available only to those who met the highest standard of accuracy.76 But when Americans began to delegate their law enforcement duties to professionals, the law relaxed to allow police to execute warrantless felony arrests upon information received from third parties. For obvious reasons, constables could not be required to be “right” all of the time, so the rule of strict liability for false arrest was lost.77

The tradeoff has had the effect of depriving Americans of certainty in the executions of warrantless arrests. Judges now consider only the question of whether there was reasonable ground to suspect an arrestee, rather than whether the arrestee was guilty of any crime. This loss of certainty, when combined with greater deference to the state in most law enforcement matters, has essentially reversed the original intent and purpose of American law enforcement that the state act against stern limitations and at its own peril. Because arrest has become the near exclusive province of professional police, Americans have fewer assurances that they are free from unreasonable arrests.

Distinctions between the privileges of citizens and police officers grew more rapidly in the twentieth century. State and federal lawmakers enshrined police officers with expansive immunities from firearm laws78 and from laws regulating the use of equipment such as radio scanners, body armor, and infrared scopes.79 Legislatures also exempted police from toll road charges,80 granted police confidential telephone numbers and auto registration,81 and even exempted police from fireworks regulations.82 Police are also protected by other statutory immunities and protections, such as mandatory death sentences for defendants who murder them,83 reimbursement of moving expenses when officers receive threats to their lives,84 and even special protections from assailants infected with the AIDS virus.85 Officers who illegally eavesdrop, wiretap, or intrude upon privacy are protected by a statutory (as well as case law) “good faith” defense,86 while private citizens who do so face up to five years in prison. The tendency of legislatures to equip police with ever-expanding rights, privileges and powers has, if anything, been strengthened rather than limited by the courts.88

But this growing power differential contravenes the principles of equal citizenship that dominated America’s founding. The great principle of the American Revolution was, after all, the doctrine of limited government.89 Advocates of the Bill of Rights saw the chief danger of government as the inherently aristocratic and disparate power of government authority.90 Founding-era constitutions enunciated the principle that all men are “equally free” and that all government is derived from the people.91

RESISTING ARREST

Nothing illustrates the modern disparity between the rights and powers of police and citizen as much as the modern law of resisting arrest. At the time of the nation’s founding, any citizen was privileged to resist arrest if, for example, probable cause for arrest did not exist or the arresting person could not produce a valid arrest warrant where one was needed.92 As recently as one hundred years ago, but with a tone that seems as if from some other, more distant age, the United States Supreme Court held that it was permissible (or at least defensible) to shoot an officer who displays a gun with intent to commit a warrantless arrest based on insufficient cause.93 Officers who executed an arrest without proper warrant were themselves considered trespassers, and any trespassee had a right to violently resist (or even assault and batter) an officer to evade such arrest.94

Well into the twentieth century, violent resistance was considered a lawful remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.95 Even third-party intermeddlers were privileged to forcibly liberate wrongly arrested persons from unlawful custody.96 The doctrine of non-resistance against unlawful government action was harshly condemned at the constitutional conventions of the 1780s, and both the Maryland and New Hampshire constitutions contained provisions denouncing nonresistance as “absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.”97

By the 1980s, however, many if not most states had (1) eliminated the common law right of resistance,98 (2) criminalized the resistance of any officer acting in his official capacity,99 (3) eliminated the requirement that an arresting officer present his warrant at the scene,100 and (4) drastically decreased the number and types of arrests for which a warrant is required.101 Although some state courts have balked at this march toward efficiency in favor of the state,102 none require the level of protection known to the Framers.103

But the right to resist unlawful arrest can be considered a constitutional one. It stems from the right of every person to his bodily integrity and liberty of movement, among the most fundamental of all rights.104 Substantive due process principles require that the government interfere with such a right only to further a compelling state interest105 ‚” and the power to arrest the citizenry unlawfully can hardly be characterized as a compelling state interest.106 Thus, the advent of professional policing has endangered important rights of the American people.

The changing balance of power between police and private citizens is illustrated by the power of modern police to use violence against the population.107

As professional policing became more prevalent in the twentieth century, police use of deadly force went largely without clearly delineated guidelines (outside of general tort law).108 Until the 1970s, police officers shot and killed fleeing suspects (both armed and unarmed) at their own discretion or according to very general department oral policies.109 Officers in some jurisdictions made it their regular practice to shoot at speeding motorists who refused orders to halt.110 More than one officer tried for murder in such cases ‚” along with fellow police who urged dismissals ‚” argued that such killings were in the discharge of official duties.111 Departments that adopted written guidelines invariably did so in response to outcries following questionable shootings.112 Prior to 1985, police were given near total discretion to fire on the public wherever officers suspected that a fleeing person had committed a felony.113 More than 200 people were shot and killed by police in Philadelphia alone between 1970 and 1983.114

In 1985, the United States Supreme Court purported to stop this carnage by invalidating the use of deadly force to apprehend unarmed, nonviolent suspects.115 Tennessee v. Garner116 involved the police killing of an unarmed juvenile burglary suspect who, if apprehended alive, would likely have been sentenced to probation.117 The Court limited police use of deadly force to cases of self defense or defense of others.118

As a practical matter, however, the Garner rule is much less stringent. Because federal civil rights actions inevitably turn not on a strict constitutional rule (such as the Garner rule), but on the perception of a defendant officer, officers enjoy a litigation advantage over all other parties.119 In no reported case has a judge or jury held an officer liable who used deadly force where a mere “reasonable” belief that human life was in imminent danger existed.120 Some lower courts have interpreted Garner to permit deadly force even where suspects pose no immediate and direct threat of death or serious injury to others.121 The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently denied the criminal liability of an agent who shot and killed an innocent person to prevent another person from retreating to “take up a defensive position,” drawing criticism from Judge Kozinski that the court had adopted the “007 standard” for police shootings.122

Untold dozens, if not hundreds, of Americans have been shot in the back while fleeing police, even after the Garner decision. Police have shot and killed suspects who did nothing more than make a move,123 reach for their identification too quickly,124 reach into a jacket or pocket,125 “make a motion” of going for a gun,126 turn either toward or away from officers,127 ‘pull away’ from an officer as an officer opened a car door,128 rub their eyes and stumble forward after a mace attack,129 or allegedly lunge with a knife,130 a hatchet,131or a ballpoint pen.132 Cops have also been known to open fire on and kill persons who brandished or refused to drop virtually any hand-held object ‚” a Jack Daniel’s whiskey bottle,133 a metal rod,134 a wooden stick,135 a kitchen knife (even while eating dinner),136 a screwdriver,137 a rake138 ‚” or even refused an order to raise their hands.139

Cops who shoot an individual holding a shiny object that can be said to resemble a gun ‚” such as a cash box,140 a shiny silver pen,141 a TV remote control,142 or even a can opener143 ‚” are especially likely to avoid liability. In line with this defense, police officers nationwide have been caught planting weapons on their victims in order to make shootings look like self defense.144 In one of the more egregious examples ever proven in court, Houston police were found during the 1980s to have utilized an unofficial policy of planting guns on victims of police violence.145 Seventy-five to eighty percent of all Houston officers apparently carried “throw-down” weapons for such purposes.146 Only the dogged persistence of aggrieved relatives and the firsthand testimony of intrepid witnesses unraveled the police cover-up of the policy.147

Resisting arrest, defending oneself, or fleeing may also place an American in danger of being killed by police.148 Although the law clearly classifies such killings as unlawful, police are rarely made to account for such conduct in court.149 Only where the claimed imminent threat seems too contrived ‚” such as where an officer opened fire to defend himself from a pair of fingernail clippers150 ‚” or where abundant evidence of a police cover-up exists, will courts uphold damage awards against police officers who shoot civilians.151

As Professor Peter L. Davis points out, there is no good reason why police should not be liable criminally for their violations of the criminal code, just as other Americans would expect to be (and, indeed, as the constables of the Founding Era often were).152 Yet in modern criminal courts, police tend to be more bulletproof than the Kevlar vests they wear on the job. Remember that the district attorneys responsible for prosecuting police for their crimes are the same district attorneys who must defend those officers in civil cases involving the same facts.153 Under the Framers’ common law, this conflict of interest did not arise at all because a citizen grand jury ‚” independent from the state attorney general ‚” brought charges against a criminal officer, and the officer’s victim prosecuted the matter before a petit jury.154 But the modern model of law enforcement provides no real remedy, and no ready outlet for the law to work effectively against police criminals. Indeed, modern policing acts as an obstruction of justice with regard to police criminality.

The bloodstained record of shootings, beatings, tortures and mayhem by American police against the populace is too voluminous to be recounted in a single article.155 At least 2,000 Americans have been killed at the hands of law enforcement since 1990.156 Some one-fourth of these killings ‚” about fifty per year ‚” are alleged by some authorities to be in the nature of murders.157 Yet only a handful have led to indictment, conviction and incarceration.158 This is true even though most police killings involve victims who were unarmed or committed no crime.159

Killings by police seem as likely as killings by death-row murderers to demonstrate extreme brutality or depravity. Police often fire a dozen or more bullets at a victim where one or two would stop the individual.160 Such indicia of viciousness and ferocity would qualify as aggravating factors justifying the death penalty for a civilian murderer under the criminal laws of most states.161

From the earliest arrival of professional policing upon America’s shores, police severely taxed both the largess and the liberties of the citizenry.162 In early municipal police departments, cops tortured, harassed and arrested thousands of Americans for vagrancy, loitering, and similar “crimes,” or detained them on mere “suspicion.”163 Where evidence was insufficient to close a case, police tortured suspects into confessing to crimes they did not commit.164 In the name of law enforcement, police became professional lawbreakers, “constantly breaking in upon common law and … statute law.”165 In 1903 a former New York City police commissioner remarked that he had seen “a dreary procession of citizens with broken heads and bruised bodies against few of whom was violence needed to affect an arrest…. The police are practically above the law.”166

THE SAFETY OF THE POLICE PROFESSION

Defenders of police violence often cite the dangerous nature of police work, claiming the police occupation is filled with risks to life and health. Police training itself ‚” especially elite SWAT-type or paramilitary training that many officers crave ‚” reinforces the “dangerousness” of police work in the officers’ own minds.167 There is some truth to this perception, in that around one hundred officers are feloniously killed in the line of duty each year in the United States.168

But police work’s billing as a dangerous profession plummets in credibility when viewed from a broader perspective. Homicide, after all, is the second leading cause of death on the job for all American workers.169 The taxicab industry suffers homicide rates almost six times higher than the police and detective industry.170 A police officer’s death on the job is almost as likely to be from an accident as from homicide.171 When overall rates of injury and death on the job are examined, policing barely ranks at all. The highest rates of fatal workplace injuries occur in the mining and construction industries, with transportation, manufacturing and agriculture following close behind.172 Fully 98 percent of all fatal workplace injuries occur in the civilian labor force.173

Moreover, police work is generously rewarded in terms of financial, pension and other benefits, not to mention prestige. Police salaries may exceed $100,000 annually plus generous health insurance and pension plans ‚” placing police in the very highest percentiles of American workers in terms of compensation.174 The founding generation would have been utterly astonished by such a transfer of wealth to professional law enforcers.175 This reality of police safety, security and comfort is one of the best-kept secrets in American labor.

In all, it is questionable whether modern policing actually decreases the level of bloodshed on American streets. Police often bring mayhem, confusion and violence wherever they are called.176 Approximately one-third of the people killed in high-speed police car chases (which are often unnecessarily escalated by police) are innocent bystanders.177 Cops occasionally prevent rather than execute rescues.178 “Police practices” ranked as the number one cause of violent urban riots of the 1960s.179 Indeed, police actively participated in or even initiated some of the nation’s worst riots.180 During the infamous Chicago Police Riot during the Democratic National Convention in 1968, police physically attacked 63 newsmen and indiscriminately beat and clubbed numerous innocent bystanders.181

PROFESSIONALISM?

If the modern model of cop-driven criminal justice has any defense at all, it is its “professionalism.” Private law enforcement of the type intended by the Framers was supposedly more inclined toward lax and arbitrary enforcement than professional officers who are sworn to uphold the law.182 Upon scrutiny, however, the claim that professional police are more reliable, less arbitrary, and more capable of objective law enforcement than private law enforcers is drastically undermined.

The constitutional model of law enforcement (investigation by a citizen grand jury, arrest by private individuals, constables or citizens watch, and private prosecution) became seen as inefficient and ineffective as America entered its industrial age.183 Yet the grand jury in its natural and unhobbled state is more, rather than less, able to pursue investigations when compared to professional police. Grand jurors are not constrained by the Fourth, Fifth or Sixth amendments ‚” or at least the “exclusionary rule” fashioned by the courts to enforce those amendments.184

In the absence of police troops to enforce the law, the early criminal justice system was hardly as hobbled and impotent as conventional wisdom suggests. Private watch groups and broad-based advocacy groups existed to enforce laws and track criminals among jurisdictions. Thousands of local antihorsethief associations and countless ‘detecting societies’ sprang up to answer the call of crime victims in the nineteenth century.185 In Maine, the “Penobscot Temperance League” hired detectives to investigate and initiate criminal cases against illegal liquor traffickers.186 In the 1870s a private group called the Society for the Suppression of Vice became so zealous in garnering prosecutions of the immoral that it was accused in 1878 of coercing a defendant into mailing birth control information in violation of federal statutes,187 one of the earliest known instances of conduct that later became defined as entrapment.188 Although some of these private crime-fighting groups were invested with limited state law enforcement powers,189 they were not police officers in the modern sense and received no remuneration.

Such volunteer nonprofessionals continue to aid law enforcement as auxiliary officers in many American communities.190 Additionally, private organizations affiliated with regional chambers of commerce, neighborhood watch and other citizens’ groups continue to play a substantial ‚” though underappreciated ‚” role in fighting crime.191 America also has a long history of outright vigilante justice, although such vigilantism has been exaggerated both in its sordidness192 and in its scope.193

Moreover, government-operated policing is hardly a monopoly even today, neither in maintaining order nor over matters of expertise and intelligence-gathering.194 There are three times more private security guards than public police officers and even activities such as guarding government buildings (including police stations) and forensic analysis are now done by private security personnel.195

The chief selling point for professional policing seems to be the idea that sworn government agents are more competent crime solvers than grand juries, private prosecutors, and unpaid volunteers. But this claim disintegrates when the realities of police personnel are considered. In 1998, for example, forty percent of graduating recruits of the Washington, D.C. police academy failed the comprehensive exam required for employment on the force and were described as “practically illiterate” and “borderline-retarded.”196 As a practical matter, police are more dependent upon the public than the public is dependent upon police.197

Cops rely on the public for a very high percentage of their investigation clearances. As the rate of crimes committed by strangers increases, the rate of clearance by the police invariably declines.198 Roughly two-thirds of major robbery and burglary arrests occur solely because a witness can identify the offender, the offender is caught at or near the crime scene, or the offender leaves evidence at the scene.199 In contrast, where a suspect cannot be identified in such ways, odds are high that the crime will go unsolved.200

Studies show that as government policing has taken over criminal investigations, the rates of clearance for murder investigations have actually gone down. For more than three decades ‚” while police units have expanded greatly in size, power and jurisdiction ‚” the gap between the number of homicides in the United States and the number of cases solved has widened by almost twenty percent.201 Today, almost three in ten homicides go unsolved.202

DNA EVIDENCE ILLUSTRATES FALLIBILITY OF POLICE

Moreover, a surprisingly high number of police conclusions are simply wrong. Since 1963, at least 381 murder convictions have been reversed because of police or prosecutorial misconduct.203 In the 25-year period following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gregg v. Georgia204 reaffirming the use of capital punishment, one innocent person has been freed from death row for every seven who have been executed.205 In Illinois, Thirteen men have been freed from death row since 1977 after proving their innocence ‚” more than the twelve who were actually put to death over the same period. Governor George Ryan finally ordered a moratorium on executions until the death penalty system could be revamped,206 referring to the death penalty system as “fraught with error.”207

Yet death penalty cases are afforded far more due process and scrutiny of evidence than noncapital cases. If anything, the error rate of police in noncapital cases is likely substantially higher. Governor Ryan’s words would seem to apply doubly to the entire system of police-driven investigation.

The advent of DNA analysis in the courtrooms of the 1990s greatly accelerated the rate at which police errors have been proven in court, even while avenues for defendants’ appeals have been systematically cut off by Congress and state legislatures.208 DNA testing before trial has exonerated at least 5000 prime suspects who would likely have otherwise been tried on other police evidence.209 Often, exculpatory DNA revelations have come in cases where other police-generated evidence was irreconcilable, suggesting falsification of evidence or other police misconduct.210 The sheer number of wrongly accused persons freed by DNA evidence makes it beyond dispute that police investigations are far less trustworthy than the public would like to believe.211

Even more unjustified is the notion that a justice system powered by professional police possesses higher levels of integrity, trustworthiness and credibility than the criminal justice model intended by the Framers. Within the criminal justice system, cops are regarded as little more than professional witnesses of convenience, if not professional perjurers, for the prosecution.212 Almost no authority credits police with high levels of honesty. Indeed, the daily work of cops requires strategic lying as part of the job description.213 Cops lie about the strength of their evidence in order to obtain confessions,214 about giving Miranda warnings to arrestees when on the witness stand,215 and even about substantive evidence when criminal cases need more support. Cops throughout the United States have been caught fabricating, planting and manipulating evidence to obtain convictions where cases would otherwise be very weak.216 Some authorities regard police perjury as so rampant that it can be considered a “subcultural norm rather than an individual aberration” of police officers.217 Large-scale investigations of police units in virtually every major American city have documented massive evidence tampering, abuse of the arresting power, and discriminatory enforcement of laws according to race, ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic status. Recent allegations in Los Angeles charge that dozens of officers abused their authority by opening fire on unarmed suspects, planting evidence, dealing illegal drugs, or framing some 200 innocent people.218 More than a hundred prosecutions had to be dismissed in Chicago in 1997 due to similar police misconduct.219 During the infamous “French connection” case of the 1970s, New York City narcotics detectives were caught diverting 188 pounds of heroin and 31 pounds of cocaine for their own use, making the City’s Special Investigating Unit the largest heroin and cocaine dealer in the city.220

Police criminality was so acute in New Orleans during the 1980s and 1990s that people were afraid to report crimes for fear that corrupt officers would retaliate or tip off organized crime figures. One New Orleans officer was convicted of ordering the execution of a witness who reported him to the internal affairs unit for allegedly pistol-whipping a teenager.221 Thirty-six Washington, D.C. officers were indicted on charges such as drug dealing, sexual assault, murder, sodomy and kidnapping in 1992.222

In Detroit, repeated corruption allegations have seen a number of low- and high-ranking officers go to prison for drug trafficking, hiring hit men, providing drug protection, and looting informant funds.223 Police burglary rings have been uncovered in several cities.224

Patterns of police abuse tend to repeat themselves in major American cities despite endless attempts at reform.225 New York City police, for example, have been the subject of dozens of wide-ranging corruption probes over the past hundred years226 yet continue to generate corruption allegations.227 Police exhibit unique levels of occupational solidarity.228 Review boards and internal affairs commissions inevitably fail to penetrate police loyalty and find resistance from every rank.229 Cops inevitably form an isolated authoritarian subculture that is both cynical toward the rule of law and disrespectful of the rights of fellow citizens.230 The code of internal favoritism that holds police together may more aptly be described as syndicalism rather than professionalism. Historically, urban police “collected” from local businesses.231 Today, a more subtle brand of racketeering prevails, whereby police assist those businesses which provide support for police and undermine businesses which are perceived as antagonistic to police interests. This same shakedown also applies to newspaper editors and politicians.232

Even at the federal level, where national investigators presume to police corruption and oversee local departments, favoritism toward the police role is rampant. In 1992, for example, the federal government filed criminal charges in only 27 cases of police criminality.233 A federal statute criminalizing violations of the Fourth Amendment has never been enforced even a single time, although it has been a part of the U.S. Code since 1921.234 Throughout the 1980s and ’90s, the FBI Crime Laboratory actively abetted the misconduct of local police departments by misrepresenting forensic evidence to bolster police cases against defendants.235

COPS NOT COST-EFFECTIVE DETERRENT

In terms of pure economic returns, police are a surprisingly poor public investment. Typical urban police work is very expensive because police see a primary part of their role as intervention for its own sake ‚” poking, prodding and questioning the public in hope of turning up evidence of wrongdoing. Toward this end, police spin quick U-turns, drive slowly and menacingly down alleyways, reverse direction to track suspected scofflaws, and conduct sidewalk pat-down searches of potential criminals absent clear indicia of potential criminality.236 Studies indicate, however, that such tactics are essentially worthless in the war on crime. One experiment found that when police do not ‘cruise’ but simply respond to dispatched calls, crime rates are completely unaffected.237

Thus the very aspect of modern policing that the public view as most effective ‚” the creation of a ‘police presence’ ‚” is in fact a monstrous waste of public resources.238 Similarly, the history of America’s expenditures in the war on drugs provides little support for the proposition that money spent on policing yields positive returns.239 University of Chicago professor John Lott has found that while hiring police can reduce crime rates, the net benefit of hiring an additional officer is about a quarter of the benefit from arming the public with an equivalent dollar amount of concealed handguns.240

There is no doubt that modern police are a creation of lawful representative legislatures and are very popular with the general public.241 But the rights of Americans depend upon freedom from government as much as freedom of government.242 Constitutions must provide a countermajoritarian edifice to the threat posed by the will of the masses, and courts must at times pronounce even the most popular programs invalid when they contravene the fundamental liberties of a minority ‚” or even the whole people at times when they inappropriately devalue their liberties.243

PART II

POLICE AS A STANDING ARMY

It is largely forgotten that the war for American independence was initiated in large part by the British Crown’s practice of using troops to police civilians in Boston and other cities.244 Professional soldiers used in the same ways as modern police were among the primary grievances enunciated by Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence. (“[George III] has kept among us standing armies”; “He has affected to render the military independent of and superior to the civil power”; “protecting them, by a mock trial….”).245 The duties of such troops were in no way military but involved the keeping of order and the suppression of crime (especially customs and tax violations).

Constitutional arguments quite similar to the thesis of this article were made by America’s Founders while fomenting the overthrow of their government. Thomas Jefferson proclaimed that although Parliament was supreme in its jurisdiction to make laws, “his majesty has no right to land a single armed man on our shores” to enforce unpopular laws.246 James Warren said that the troops in Boston were there on an unconstitutional mission because their role was not military but rather to enforce “obedience to Acts which, upon fair examination, appeared to be unjust and unconstitutional.”247 Colonial pamphleteer Nicholas Ray charged that Americans did not have “an Enemy worth Notice within 3000 Miles of them.”248 “[T]he troops of George the III have cross’d the wide atlantick, not to engage an enemy,” charged John Hancock, but to assist constitutional traitors “in trampling on the rights and liberties of [the King’s] most loyal subjects …”249

The use of soldiers to enforce law had a long and sullied history in England and by the mid-1700s were considered a violation of the fundamental rights of Englishmen.250 The Crown’s response to London’s Gordon Riots of 1780 ‚” roughly contemporary to the cultural backdrop of America’s Revolution ‚” brought on an immense popular backlash at the use of guards to maintain public order.251 “[D]eep, uncompromising opposition to the maintenance of a semimilitary professional force in civilian life” remained integral to Anglo-Saxon legal culture for another half century.252

Englishmen of the Founding era, both in England and its colonies, regarded professional police as an “alien, continental device for maintaining a tyrannical form of Government.”253 Professor John Phillip Reid has pointed out that few of the rights of Englishmen “were better known to the general public than the right to be free of standing armies.”254 “Standing armies,” according to one New Hampshire correspondent, “have ever proved destructive to the Liberties of a People, and where they are suffered, neither Life nor Property are secure.”255

If pressed, modern police defenders would have difficulty demonstrating a single material difference between the standing armies the Founders saw as so abhorrent and America’s modern police forces. Indeed, even the distinctions between modern police and actual military troops have blurred in the wake of America’s modern crime war.256 Ninety percent of American cities now have active special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams, using such commando-style forces to do “high risk warrant work” and even routine police duties.257 Such units are often instructed by active and retired United States military personnel.258

In Fresno, California, a SWAT unit equipped with battering rams, chemical agents, fully automatic submachine guns, and ‘flashbang’ grenades roams full-time on routine patrol.259 According to criminologist Peter Kraska, such military policing has never been seen on such a scale in American history, “where SWAT teams routinely break through a door, subdue all the occupants, and search the premises for drugs, cash and weapons.”260 In high-crime or problem areas, police paramilitary units may militarily engage an entire neighborhood, stopping “anything that moves” or surrounding suspicious homes with machine guns openly displayed.261

Much of the importance of the standing-army debates at the ratification conventions has been overlooked or misinterpreted by modern scholars. Opponents of the right to bear arms, for example, have occasionally cited the standing-army debates to support the proposition that the Framers intended the Second Amendment to protect the power of states to form militias.262 Although this argument has been greatly discredited,263 it has helped illuminate the intense distrust that the Framers manifested toward occupational standing armies. The standing army the Framers most feared was a soldiery conducting law enforcement operations in the manner of King George’s occupation troops ‚” like the armies of police officers that now patrol the American landscape.

THE SECOND AMENDMENT

The actual intent of the Second Amendment ‚” that it protect a right of people to maintain the means of violently checking the power of government ‚” has been all but lost in modern American society.264 Modern policing’s increasing monopoly on firepower tends to undermine the Framers’ intent that the whole people be armed, equipped, and empowered to resist the state. Many police organizations lobby incessantly for gun control, even though the criminological literature yields scant empirical support for general gun control as a crime-prevention measure.265

Nor is there much legitimacy to the claim that professional police are more accurate or responsible with firearms than the armed citizenry intended by the Framers. To this day, civilians shoot and kill at least twice as many criminals as police do every year,266 and their ‘error rate’ is several times lower.267 In a government study of handgun battles that lead to officer injuries, it was found that police who fired upon their killers were less than half as accurate as their civilian, nonprofessional, assailants.268

Moreover, police seem hardly less likely to misuse firearms than the general public.269 In New York City, where private possession of handguns has been virtually eliminated for most civilians, problems with off-duty police misusing firearms have repeatedly surfaced.270 Los Angeles police have been found to fire their weapons inappropriately in seventy-five percent of cases.271 Between early 1989 and late 1992, more than one out of every seven shots fired by Washington, D.C. police officers was fired accidentally.272

THE THIRD AMENDMENT

Although standing armies were not specifically barred by the final version of the Constitution’s text, some authorities have pointed to the Third Amendment273 as a likely fount for such a conceptual proposition.274 Additionally, the Amendment’s proscription of quartering troops in homes might well have been interpreted as a general anti-search and seizure principle if the Fourth Amendment had never been enacted.275 The Third Amendment was inspired by sentiments quite similar to those that led to passage of the Second and Fourth Amendments, rather than fear of military operations. Writing in the 1830s, Justice Story regarded the Third Amendment as a security that “a man’s house shall be his own castle, privileged against all civil and military intrusion.”276

The criminal procedure concerns that dominated the minds of the Framers of the Bill of Rights were created not only before the Revolution but also after it. In the five years following British surrender, the independent states vied against each other for commercial advantage, debt relief, and land claims. Conflict was especially fierce between the rival settlers of Pennsylvania and Connecticut on lands in the west claimed simultaneously by both states.277 Both states sent partisan magistrates and troops into the region, and each faction claimed authority to remove claimants of the rival state.278 Magistrates occasionally ordered arrest without warrant, turned people out of their homes, and even ordered submission to the quartering of troops in homes.279 In 1784, a Pennsylvania grand jury indicted one such magistrate and forty others for abuse of their authority.280 Many agents had to be arrested before the troubles finally ended in 1788 ‚” the very moment when the Constitution was undergoing its ratification debates.281 These troubles, and not memories of life under the Crown, were fresh in the minds of the Framers who proposed and ratified the Bill of Rights.

The Third Amendment’s proscription of soldiers quartered in private homes addressed a very real domestic concern about the abuse of state authority in 1791. This same fear of an omnipresent and all-controlling government is hardly unfounded in modern America. Indeed, the very evils the Framers sought to remedy with the entire Bill of Rights ‚” the lack of security from governmental growth, control and power ‚” have come back to haunt modem Americans like never before.282

THE RIGHT TO BE LEFT ALONE

The ‘police state’ known by modern Americans would be seen as quite tyrannical to the Framers who ratified the Constitution. If, as Justice Brandeis suggested, the right to be left alone is the most important underlying principle of the Constitution,283 the cop-driven model of criminal justice is anathemic to American constitutional principles. Today a vast and omnipotent army of insurgents patrols the American landscape in place of grand juries, private prosecutors, and the occasional constable. This immense soldiery is forever at the beck and call of whatever social forces rule the day, or even the afternoon.284

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Now to the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment reads: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”285 This protection was clearly regarded as one of the more important provisions of the Bill of Rights during debates in and out of Congress prior to ratification.286 To this day, the Amendment is probably the most cited constitutional provision in challenges to police action.

The cold, hard reality, however, is that the interest protected by the amendment ‚” security from certain types of searches and seizures ‚” has been drastically scaled back since 1791. In saying this, I am mindful that there are those among the highest echelons of the bench and academy who claim that current Fourth Amendment law is more protective than the Framers intended.287 Indeed, there are those claiming the mantles of textualism and originalism who would decrease Fourth Amendment rights even further.288 The ever-influential Akhil Amar, for example, has argued that the Fourth Amendment’s text does not really require warrants but merely lays out the evidentiary foundation required to obtain warrants.289 Amar joins other “originalist” scholars who emphasize that the only requirement of the Fourth Amendment’s first clause (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers, and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated”) is that all searches and seizures be “reasonable.”290 The warrant requirement pronounced in many Supreme Court opinions, according to Amar, places an unnecessary burden upon law enforcement and should be abandoned for a rule Amar considers more workable ‚” namely civil damages for unreasonable searches after the fact as determined by juries.

This type of “originalism” has appealed to more than one U.S. Supreme Court justice,291 at least one state high court,292 and various legal commentators.293 Indeed, it has brought a perceivable shift to the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.294 Even the U.S. Justice Department has adopted this argument as its own in briefs filed in the U.S. Supreme Court arguing for elimination of the warrant requirement.295

The problem with this line of interpretation is that it does not square with the original view of the Framers. Even the most cursory examination of history reveals that law enforcers of the Founding Era, whether private persons, sheriffs or constables, were obligated to procure warrants in many circumstances that modern courts do not require warrants.296 The general rule that warrants were required for all searches and seizures except those involving circumstances of the utmost urgency seems so well settled at the time of ratification that it is difficult to imagine a scholar arguing otherwise.297 But Professor Amar does. “Supporters of the warrant requirement,” the professor writes, “have yet to find any cases” enunciating the warrant requirement before the Civil War.298

Perhaps Amar has overlooked the 1814 case of Grumon v. Raymond, in which the Connecticut Supreme Court held both a constable, who executed an improper search warrant, and a justice of the peace who issued the warrant, civilly liable for trespass.299 The court in Grumon clearly stated that the invalidity of the search warrant left the search’s legality “on no better ground than it would be if [the search had been pursuant to] no process.”300 Or maybe Amar is unfamiliar with the 1807 case of Stoyel v. Lawrence, holding a sheriff liable for executing a civil arrest warrant after the warrant’s due date and declaring that the warrant “gave the officer no authority whatever, and, consequently, formed no defence”;301 or the 1763 Massachusetts case of Rex v. Gay, acquitting an arrestee for assaulting and beating a sheriff who arrested him pursuant to a facially invalid warrant;302 or Batchelder v. Whitcher, holding an officer liable for ordering the seizure of hay by an unsealed warrant in 1838;303 or Conner v. Commonwealth, in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded in 1810 that if the requirement of warrants based on probable cause could be waived merely to allow constables to more easily arrest criminals, “the constitution is a dead letter.”304

Even the cases Amar cites for the proposition that search warrants were not required under antebellum Fourth Amendment jurisprudence do not squarely support such a proposition.305 Most of them merely repeat the “warrant requirement” of the common law and find that their given facts fit within a common law exception.306 Similarly, the cases Amar cites that interpret various Fourth-Amendment equivalents of state constitutions by no means indicate that Founding-era law enforcers could freely search and seize without warrant wherever it was “reasonable” to do so. 307

WARRANTS A FLOOR, NOT A CEILING

Under Founding-era common law, warrants were often considered as much a constitutional floor as a ceiling. Warrants did provide a defense for constables in most trespass suits, but were not good enough to immunize officials from liability for some unreasonable searches or seizures.308 The most often-cited English case known to the Framers who drafted the Fourth Amendment involved English constabulary who had acted pursuant to a search warrant but were nonetheless found civilly liable for stiff (punitive, actually) damages.309

For more than 150 years, it was considered per se unconstitutional for law enforcers to search and seize certain categories of objects, such as personal diaries or private papers, even with perfectly valid warrants.310 Additionally, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence prohibited the government from seizing as evidence any personal property which was not directly involved in crime, even with a valid warrant.311 The rationale for this “mere evidence” rule was that the interests of property owners were superior to those of the state and could not be overridden by mere indirect evidentiary justifications.312 This rule, like many other obstacles to police search and seizure power, was discarded in the second half of the twentieth century by a Supreme Court much less respectful of property rights than its predecessors.313

PRIVATE PERSONS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Under the Founders’ Model, a private person like Josiah Butler, who lost twenty pounds of good pork under suspicious circumstances in 1787, could approach a justice of the peace and obtain a warrant to search the property of the suspected thief for the lost meat.314 Private individuals applied for many or most of the warrants in the Founders’ era and even conducted many of the arrests.315 Even where sworn constables executed warrants, private persons often assisted them.316 To avoid liability, however, searchers needed to secure a warrant before acting.317 False arrest was subject to strict liability.318

The Founders contemplated the enforcement of the common law to be a duty of private law enforcement, and assumed that private law enforcers would represent their interests with private means. However, the Founders viewed private individuals executing law enforcement duties as “public authority” and thus intended for the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to apply to such individuals when acting in their law enforcement capacities.319 Consequently, the Supreme Court’s 1921 decision in Burdeau v. McDowell320 ‚” often cited for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment applies only to government agents ‚” was almost certainly either wrongly decided or wrongly interpreted by later courts.321

Some of the earliest English interpretations of the freedom from search and seizure held the protection applicable to private citizens as much as or more so than government agents.322 Massachusetts and Vermont were apparently the first states to require that search and arrest warrants be executed by sworn officers.323 New Hampshire adopted the same rule in 1826, more than a generation after the Bill of Rights was ratified.324 It is likely that some states allowed private persons to execute search warrants well into the nineteenth century.

Because many Founding-era arrests and searches were executed by private persons, and early constables needed the assistance of private persons to do their jobs, the Fourth Amendment was almost certainly intended for application to private individuals. Burdeau cited no previous authority for its proposition in 1921, and early American cases demonstrate an original intent that the Fourth Amendment apply to every searcher acting under color of law.325 On the open seas, most enforcement of prize and piracy laws was done by “privateers” acting for their own gain but who were held accountable in court for their misconduct.326

Later courts have taken this holding to mean that “a wrongful search or seizure conducted by a private party does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” Walter v. U.S. 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1979). See also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (saying “This Court has also consistently construed this protection as proscribing only governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable to a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any government official.”).

As explained in Part I, early constables had powers no greater than those of other individuals, so they needed warrants before engaging in law enforcement activities beyond any citizen’s authority. Like you or I, a constable would be thought outside the bounds of good etiquette (and well outside the law) were he to conduct an unconsented search of another’s person, property or effects, and should ‚” very reasonably ‚” expect to be jailed, physically repulsed, or sued for such conduct.

A private person’s only defense was the absolute correctness of his allegations. A person was liable if, for example, his complaint was too vague as to the address to be searched,327 he misspelled the name of the accused in his complaint,328 or he sought the execution of a warrant naming a “John Doe” as a target.329

This was the constitutional model secured to America by the Framers. The idea of police having special powers was only a seedling, alien to the scheme of ordered liberty and limited government created by the Constitution. Eventually, police interceded between private individuals and magistrates altogether, and today it is virtually unheard of for a private person to seek a search warrant from a magistrate.

Freedom from search and seizure has been retracting in favor of police ever since the ink was dry on the Bill of Rights. The Framers lived under a common law rule that required warrantless arrests be made only for felonies where no warrant could be immediately obtained.330 By the early to mid-1800s, the rule had changed to allow warrantless arrests for all felonies regardless of whether a warrant could be obtained.331 Early American courts also apparently allowed warrantless arrests for misdemeanor breaches of peace committed in the arrestor’s presence. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, most state courts had changed to allow warrantless arrest for all crimes of any kind committed in an officer’s presence, as well as for all felonies committed either within or without an officer’s presence regardless of whether a warrant can be obtained.332

By the mid-1900s, arrest had become the almost-exclusive province of paid police, and their power to arrest opened even wider. A trend toward allowing police to arrest without warrant for all crimes committed even outside their presence has recently developed,333 with little foreseeable court-imposed impediment.334 Almost every American jurisdiction has legislated for the erosion of common law limitations with regard to domestic violence arrests and arrests for other high profile misdemeanors.335

Despite the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has imposed almost no limits on warrantless arrest at all. Only forcibly entering a residence without warrant to arrest someone inside has been found to violate the Fourth Amendment.336 Outside the home, modern police have been essentially licensed by the Court to arrest almost anyone at any time so long as probable cause exists.337 The Supreme Court effectively buried the original purpose of warrantless arrest entirely in 1985, declaring that “[r]estraining police action until after probable cause is obtained… might… enable the suspect to flee in the interim.”338

Long forgotten is the fact that common law allowance for warrantless arrest was precipitated solely on an emergency rationale and allowed only to protect the public from immediate danger.339

The rationale for the felon exception to the warrant requirement in 1791, for example, was that a felony was any crime punishable by death, generally thought to be limited to only a handful of serious crimes.340 Felons were considered “outlaws at war with society,”341 and their apprehension without warrant qualified as one of the “exceptions justified by absolute necessity.”342 By the late twentieth century, however, many crimes the Framers would have considered misdemeanors or no crime at all had been declared felonies and the rationale for immediate community action to apprehend “felons” had changed greatly.343 The courts, however, have been slow to react to this far-reaching change.344 In any case, the vast majority of arrests (seventy to eighty percent) are for misdemeanors,345 which would have been proscribed without warrant under the Framers’ law.

ORIGINALISTS CALL FOR CIVIL DAMAGES

The writings of most modern “originalist” scholars promote civil suits against police departments, instead of exclusion of evidence, as a remedy for police misconduct. Professor Amar, for example, champions a return to civil litigation, but with, somehow, a better return than such actions currently bring.346 He invents a fantastically implausible cause of action where “government should generally not prevail.”347 He bases this idea on actual cases from the nineteenth century where people prevailed against constables and sheriffs in relatively routine circumstances, often with heavy damage awards.348

These cases actually occurred ‚” but in an age before police took over American law enforcement. Civil damages really were a better remedy when many or most searches were sought ‚” and sometimes conducted ‚” by private persons who stood strictly liable in court if their allegations proved false or their conduct proved overzealous.349 American law provided recovery for every false arrest. If it was not the constable who executed the warrant, the private person, who lodged the original insufficient complaint, was liable.350

Under Founding-era common law, liability for officers was in many respects higher than for private persons. Sheriffs and deputies could be held liable for failing to arrest debtors for collection of debts351 or to serve other process,352 for allowing an imprisoned debtor to escape,353 for failing to keep entrusted goods secure354 or to deliver goods in custody at a proper time,355 or for failing to keep faithful accounting and custody of property.356 Sheriffs were also obligated to return writs within a specific time period, at pain of civil damages.357 They were liable to debtors whose property was sold at sheriffs sales if proper advertisement procedures were not followed358 and for negligently allowing other creditors to obtain priority interests on attached property.359

Law enforcers were liable for false imprisonment, even where they acted with court permission, if procedures were improper.360 A deputy was liable for damages to an arrestee whom he arrested outside his jurisdiction.361 Sheriffs were even liable if their deputies executed civil process in a rude and insolent manner.362 When executing writs, sheriffs were liable for any unnecessary violence against innocent third persons who obstructed them.363

The Founders’ law knew no “good faith” defense for law enforcers. Sheriffs and justices who executed arrests pursuant to invalid warrants were considered trespassers (as were any judges who granted invalid warrants). Any person was justified in resisting, or even battering, such officers.364 Justices of the peace could be held liable for ordering imprisonment without taking proper steps.365

Any party who sued out or issued process did so at his peril and was civilly responsible for unlawful writs (even if the executing officer acted in good faith)366

Nor did state authority provide the umbrella of indemnification that now protects public officers. Sheriffs of the nineteenth century often sought protection from liability by obtaining bonds from private sureties.367 Their bonds were used to satisfy civil judgments against them while in office.368 If the amount of their bonds was insufficient to satisfy judgments, sheriffs were liable personally.369 It was not uncommon for a sheriff to find himself in jail as a debtor for failing to satisfy judgments against him.370 Even punitive damages against officers ‚” long disfavored by modern courts with regard to municipal liability ‚” were deemed proper and normal under the law of the Framers.371

Unlike the early constables, uniformed police officers were generally introduced upon the American landscape by their oaths alone and without bonds. Their municipal employers (hence, the taxpayers) were on the hook for their civil liabilities. Although courts tended to treat police identically to bonded officials,372 their susceptibility to civil redress was much lower. This change in the law of policing had the effect of depriving Americans of remedies for Fourth Amendment (and other) violations.373 The evil that now pervades criminal justice ‚” swarms of officers unaccountable in court either criminally or civilly ‚” was the very evil that the Founders sought to remedy in the late eighteenth century.374

DEVELOPMENT OF IMMUNITIES

But immunities follow duties, and duties placed upon police by lawmakers have exploded since 1791.375 Immunities grew slowly, beginning with a slight deference to officer conduct so long as there was no bad faith, corruption, malice or “misbehavior,”376 and ending with broad qualified immunity.377 When the practice of professional policing arrived from England upon American shores (for the second time, actually, if we consider modern police to be akin to the “standing armies” of the Founders’ generation), cases began to enunciate a general deference to police conduct, permitting that the actions of officers in carrying out their duties “not to be harshly judged.”378 Appellate courts began to reverse jury verdicts against officers upon new rules of law granting privileges unknown to private individuals.379

THE LOSS OF PROBABLE CAUSE, AND THE ONSET OF PROBABLE SUSPICION

Probable cause for the issuance of warrants has also become less strict.380 The Supreme Court regarded hearsay evidence as insufficient to constitute probable cause for seventeen years in the first half of the twentieth century,381 but has since given police free reign to construct probable cause in whatever way they deem proper. Instead of probability that a crime has been committed, the courts now require only some possibility, a relaxed standard that “robs [probable cause] of virtually all operative significance.”382 This watered-down “probable cause” for the issuance of ex parte warrants would have shocked the Founders.383

At common law, one could sue and recover damages from a private person who swore out a false or misleading search warrant affidavit.384 In contrast, few modern officers will ever have to account for lies on warrant applications so long as they couch their “probable cause” in unprovables. “Anonymous citizen informants,”385 material omissions and misrepresentations,386 irrelevant or prejudicial information,387 and even outright falsities are now common fixtures of police-written search warrant applications.388 For years, Boston police simply made up imaginary informants to justify searches and seizures.389 Police themselves refer to the phenomenon as “testilying” ‚” an aspect of normal police work regarded as “an open secret” among principle players of the criminal justice systern.390

POLICE AND THE “AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION”

The courts have been particularly unkind to Fourth Amendment protections in the context of motor vehicle travel. Since the 1920s, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has allowed for a gaping and ever-widening exception to the warrant requirement with regard to the nation’s roadways.391 Today, police force untold millions of motorists off the roads each year to be searched or scrutinized without judicial warrant of any kind.392 Any police officer can generally find some pretext to justify a stop of any automobile.393 In effect, road travel itself is subject to a near total level of police control,394 a phenomenon that would have confounded the Framers, who treated seizures of wagons, horses and buggies as subject to the same constraints as seizures of other property.395

The courts have laid down such a malleable latticework of exceptions in favor of modern police that virtually any cop worth his mettle can adjust his explanations for a search to qualify under one exception or another. When no exception applies, police simply lie about the facts.396 “Judges regularly choose to accept even blatantly unbelievable police testimony.”397 The practice on the streets has long been for police to follow their hunches, seek entrance at every door, and then attempt to justify searches after the fact.398 Justice Robert Jackson observed in 1949 that many unlawful searches of homes and automobiles are never revealed to the courts or the public because the searches turn up nothing.399

ONE EXCEPTION: THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE?

Conventional wisdom suggests there is one important exception to the long decline of Fourth Amendment protections: the exclusionary rule. Since 1914, the Supreme Court has required the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment from being used against a defendant in federal court.400 In 1961, this rule was applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio.401 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court expanded the exclusionary rule to other protections such as the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in cases such as Miranda v. Arizona.402

Textualists and originalists have lobbed a steady stream of vitriol against the exclusionary rule for decades. No enunciation of such a rule, say these critics, can be found in the writings or statements of the Framers.403 Moreover, say such critics, the rule places a heavy burden on the efficiency of police (but simultaneously, somehow, fails to deter them in any way), and unfairly frees a small but not insignificant percentage of “guilty” offenders.404 So-called “conservative” legal scholars remember the Warren Court’s imposition of the exclusionary rule upon the states in the 1960s as a bare-knuckled act of judicial activism405 and argue that the Court “[took] it upon itself, without constitutional authorization, to police the police.”406

The Miranda and Mapp decisions provoked an onslaught of hostility by police organizations and their sympathizers that has not subsided decades later. High-ranking authorities (not the least of which were Justices Harlan and White, who dissented in Miranda) wrote that such decisions put society at risk from criminals.407 The Miranda rule, according to Justice White, would force “those who rely on the public authority for protection” to “engage in violent self-help with guns, knives and the help of their neighbors similarly inclined.”408 Even more outraged was the chief of police of Garland, Texas, who responded, “We might as well close up shop.”409

Yet the dire predictions that followed the Miranda and Mapp decisions were ultimately proved false.410 Rather than returning to what Justice White decried as “violent self-help” (as the Constitution’s framers truly intended), America continued its slide into increased dependence upon police for the most mundane aspects of law enforcement. If anything, reliance upon police for personal protection has increased since the 1960s.

I propose an altogether different interpretation of Mapp, Miranda, and some of the Warren Court’s other criminal procedure decisions. While I concede that this jurisprudence grossly violated certain constitutional principles (most importantly, principles of federalism), I submit that such rulings were attempts to bring constitutional law into accord with the alien threat posed by modern policing. Professional policing’s arrival upon the American scene required that the Court’s Bill of Rights jurisprudence splinter a dozen ways to accommodate it. Thus, Mapp and Miranda were an application of brakes to a foreign element (modern policing) that is itself without constitutional authorization.

In many ways, the Warren Court was the first U.S. Supreme Court to face criminal procedural questions squarely in light of the advent of professional policing. The Miranda and Mapp decisions, according to noted criminal law expert David Rudovsky, “at least implicitly acknowledged widespread police and prosecutorial abuse,”411 a phenomenon that would have bedeviled the Framers. Mapp’s holding was brought on more by the need to make the criminal justice system work fairly than by any other consideration.412 The same realities gave way to the rule of Bivens v. Six Narcotics Agents, in 1971, in which the Court conceded that an agent acting illegally in the name of the government possesses a far greater capacity for harm than any individual trespasser exercising his own authority (as prevailed as the common form of law enforcement in 1791).413

Furthermore, the notion that exclusion cannot be justified under an originalist approach is not nearly as well-founded as its harshest critics suggest.414 Critics of the rule point to the 1914 case of Weeks v. United States415 as the rule’s debut in Supreme Court jurisprudence.416 However, the rule actually debuted in dicta in the 1886 case of Boyd v. United States.417 Even this seemingly late date of the rule’s debut can be attributed to the Court’s lack of criminal appellate jurisdiction until the end of the nineteenth century.418 The reality is that Boyd, the Court’s first suggestion of the rule, represents, for practical purposes, the very first Fourth Amendment case decided by the Supreme Court. The exclusionary rule thus has a better pedigree than it is credited with.419

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

In a previous article, I described the limitation of common law grand jury powers by Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as an unconstitutional infringement of the Fifth Amendment Grand Jury Clause.420 The fact that most criminal charges are now initiated not by crime victims but by armed state agents who serve the state’s interests represents a drastic alteration of Founding-era criminal procedure.421 The suppression of grand jurors’ lawful powers belies the intent of the Constitution that law enforcement officials be subject to stringent oversight by the citizenry through grand juries. Modern policing, in effect, acts as a middleman between the people and the judicial branch of government that was never contemplated by the Framers.

The Fifth Amendment also prohibits the compulsion of self-incriminating testimony.422 Various competing interpretations ebbed and flowed from this provision until 1966, when the Supreme Court held that police are required to actually tell suspects about the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ protections before interrogating them.423 The sheer volume of criticism by police organizations of the Miranda ruling over the next three decades indicates the strong state interest in keeping the Constitution’s protections concealed from the American public.

Modem police interrogation could scarcely have been imagined by the Framers who met in Philadelphia in the late eighteenth century. Police tactics such as falsifying physical evidence, faking identification lineups, administering fake lie detector tests and falsifying laboratory reports to obtain confessions are methods developed by the professionals of the twentieth century. 424 Against such methods a modern suspect stands little chance of keeping his tongue. Like the exclusionary rule and the entrapment defense, the Miranda rule operates as an awkward leveling device between the rights of American citizens and their now-leviathanic government.

In 2000, the Supreme Court upheld (indeed, “constitutionalized”) the Miranda rule in the face of widespread predictions that the police-favoring Rehnquist majority would abandon the rule.425 The Court delivered an opinion recognizing that “the routine practices of [police] interrogation [is] itself a relatively new development.”426 The Miranda requirement, according to Justice Rehnquist, was therefore justified as an extension of due process ‚” a far more sustainable course than one extending from the wording of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.427

The Dickerson decision illustrates the increasingly awkward peace between the Bill of Rights and the phenomenon of modern policing. Because the Framers did not contemplate wide-scale execution of government power through paid, full-time agents, modern jurisprudence reconciling the Bill of Rights with today’s police practices seems increasingly farfetched. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented from the Dickerson majority with well-founded textualist objections, arguing that the majority was writing a “prophylactic, extraconstitutional Constitution” to protect the public from police.428 Yet in light of the extraconstitutional nature of modern police, the Dickerson majority opinion is no less consistent with the Framers’ constitutional intent.

DUE PROCESS

Due process of law depends upon assurances that a level playing field exists between rival adversaries pitted against each other.429 The constitutional design pitted a citizen defendant against his citizen accuser before a jury of his (the defendant’s) peers. The state provided only the venue, the process, and assurances that the rule of law would govern the outcome. By comparison, a modern defendant is hardly pitted in a fair fight, facing the vast treasury and human resources of the state. While the criminal justice system of the Founding era was victim-driven, and thus self-limiting, today’s system is fueled by a professional army of police who measure their success in numbers of arrests and convictions.430

Police themselves often ignore standard concepts of fairness, official regulations, and statutes in their war on crime.431 Police agencies have even been known to develop institutional means to circumvent court attempts to equalize the playing field.432 In the face of unwanted publicity or controversy surrounding police brutality cases, police departments have been known to release arrest records to the media to vilify victims of police misconduct.433

The police model of law enforcement tilts the entire system of criminal justice in favor of the state. The police, though supposedly neutral investigators, are in reality an arm of the prosecutor’s office.434 Where police secure a crime scene for investigation, they in fact secure it for the prosecution alone and deny access to anyone other than the prosecution. A suspect or his defense attorneys often must obtain court permission to view the scene or search for evidence. Only such exculpatory evidence as by accident falls into the hands of the prosecution need be revealed to the suspect or defendant.435 In cases where police misconduct is an issue, police use their monopoly over the crime scene to prepare the evidence to suit their version of events.436

Mapp, Miranda and Dickerson notwithstanding, the tendency of modern courts to work around police practices, rather than nullify or restrain them, poses the very threat to due process of law the Framers saw as most dangerous to liberty. Instead of viewing the system as a true adversarial contest with neutral rules, judges and lawmakers have decided that catching (nonpolice) lawbreakers is more important than maintaining a code of integrity.437 The “sporting theory of criminal justice,” wrote Justice Warren Burger, “has been experiencing a decline in our jurisprudence.”438 In its place is a system where the government views the nonpolice lawbreaker as a threat to its authority and places top priority on defeating him in court.439

ENTRAPMENT

Abandonment of victim-driven, mostly private prosecution has led to consequences the Framers could never have predicted and would likely never have sanctioned. Even in the most horrific examples of colonial criminal justice (and there were many), defendants were rarely if ever entrapped into criminal activity. The development of modern policing as an omnipotent power of the state, however, has necessitated the simultaneous development of complicated doctrines such as entrapment and “outrageous government conduct” as counterweights.

It was not until the late nineteenth century that any English or American case dealt with entrapment as a true defense to a criminal charge.440 (The case law until then had been virtually devoid of police conduct issues altogether).441 Beginning in 1880, English case law slowly became involved with phenomena such as state agents inducing suspects to sell without proper certificates,442 persuading defendants to supply drugs to terminate pregnancy,443 and enticing people to commit other victimless crimes. Dicta in some English cases expressed outrage that police might someday “be told to commit an offense themselves for the purpose of getting evidence against someone.”444 Police who commit such offenses, said one English court, “ought also to be convicted and punished, for the order of their superior would afford no defense.”445

Entrapment did not arise as a defense in the United States until 1915, when the conduct of government officers for the first time brought the issue before the federal courts. In Woo Wai v. United States, the Ninth Circuit overturned a conviction of a defendant for illegally bringing Chinese persons into the United States upon evidence that government officers had induced the crime.446 Growth in police numbers and “anti-crime” warfare was so rapid that in 1993, the Wyoming Supreme Court wrote that entrapment had “probably replaced ineffectiveness of defense counsel and challenged conduct of prosecutors as the most prevalent issues in current appeals.”447

The growth of the use of entrapment by the state raises troubling questions about the nature and purposes of American government. Rather than “serving and protecting” the public, modern police often serve and protect the interests of the state against the liberties and interests of the people. A significant amount of police brutality, for example, seems aimed at mere philosophical, rather than physical, opposition. Police dominance over the civilian (rather than service to or protection of him) is the “only truly iron and inflexible rule” followed by police officers.448 Thus, any person who defies police faces virtually certain negative repercussions, whether a ticket, a legal summons, an arrest, or a bullet.449 One study found nearly half of all illegal force by police occurred in response to mere defiance of an officer rather than a physical threat.450

In the political sphere, police serve the interests of those in power against the rights of the public. New York police of the late nineteenth century were found by the New York legislature to have committed “almost every conceivable crime against the elective franchise,” including arresting and brutalizing opposition-party voters, stuffing ballot boxes, and using “oppression, fraud, trickery [and] crime” to ensure the dominant party held the city.451 In the twentieth century, J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI agents burglarized hundreds of offices of law-abiding, left-wing political parties and organizations, “often with the active cooperation or tacit consent of local police.”452 The FBI has also spent thousands of man-hours surveiling and investigating writers, playwrights, directors and artists whose political views were deemed a threat to the interests of the ruling political establishment.453

Police today are a constant agent on behalf of governmental power. Both in the halls of legislatures and before the courts, police act as lobbyists against individual liberties.454 Police organizations, funded by monies funneled directly from police wages, lobby incessantly against legislative constraints on police conduct.455 Police organizations also file amicus curie briefs in virtually every police procedure case that goes before the Supreme Court, often predicting dire consequences if the Court rules against them. In 2000, for example, the police lobby filed amicus briefs in favor of allowing police to stop and frisk persons upon anonymous tips, warning that if the Court ruled against them, “the consequence for law enforcement and the public could be increased assaults and perhaps even murders.”456

CONCLUSION

The United States of America was founded without professional police. Its earliest traditions and founding documents evidenced no contemplation that the power of the state would be implemented by omnipresent police forces. On the contrary, America’s constitutional Framers expressed hostility and contempt for the standing armies of the late eighteenth century, which functioned as law enforcement units in American cities. The advent of modern policing has greatly altered the balance of power between the citizen and the state in a way that would have been seen as constitutionally invalid by the Framers. The implications of this altered balance of power are far-reaching, and should invite consideration by judges and legislators who concern themselves with constitutional questions.


* Roger Isaac Roots, J.D., M.C.J., graduated from Roger Williams University School of Law in 1999, Roger Williams University School of Justice Studies in 2001, and Montana State University-Billings (B.S., Sociology) in 1995. He is a former federal prisoner and founder of the Prison Crisis Project, a not-for-profit law and policy think tank based in Providence, Rhode Island. He is grateful to Duane Horton of Portsmouth, Rhode Island for his scrupulous proof-reading efforts and thoughtful insights.

1‚ As of June, 1996, there were more than 700,000 full- and part-time professional state-sworn police in the United States.‚ See‚ BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 1996 (1998)‚ available at‚ <http://virlib.ncjrs.org/Statistics.asp>. Figures for earlier decades and centuries are difficult to obtain, but a few indicators suggest that the ratio of police per citizen has grown by at least four thousand percent. In 1816, the British Parliament reported that there was at that time one constable for every 18,187 persons in Great Britain.‚ See‚ Jerome Hall,Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARVARD L. REV. 566, 582 (1936). Conventional wisdom would suggest that American ratios were, if anything, lower. Today there is approximately one officer for every 386 Americans.

2‚ The City of Los Angeles, for example, spends almost half (49.1%) of its annual discretionary budget on police but only 17.7% on fire and 14.8% on public works.‚ See City of Los Angeles 1999-2000 Budget Summary‚ (visited Dec. 2000) <http://www.cityofla.org/cao/bud9900.pdf>. The City of Chicago spends over forty percent of its annual budget on police.‚ See Chicago Budget 1999‚ (visited Dec. 2000) <http://www.ci.chi.il.us/mayor/Budgetl999/sld011.htm> (pie chart). Seattle spends more than $150 million, or 41 percent of its annual budget, on police and police pensions.‚ See‚ City of Seattle 2000 Proposed Budget (visited Dec. 2000) <http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/budget>. The City of New York is one exception, due primarily to New York State’s unique system for funding education. Police and the administration of justice constitute the third largest segment, or twelve percent, of the City’s budget, after education and human resources.‚ See‚ THE CITY OF NEW YORK, EXECUTIVE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2000 1 (2000) (pie chart).

3‚ See‚ Carol S. Steiker,‚ Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 830 (1994) (saying twentieth century police and “our contemporary sense of ‘policing’ would be utterly foreign to our colonial forebears”).

4‚ See id.

5‚ See id. at 831 (saying the sole monetary reward for such officers was occasional compensation by private individuals for returning stolen property).

6‚ See‚ CHARLES SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 314 (1978). The City of Boston, for example, enacted an ordinance requiring drafted citizens to walk the streets “to prevent any danger by fire, and to see that good order is kept.”‚ Id.

7‚ C.f. id. (mentioning that cops’ role of maintaining order predates their role of crime control).

8‚ But see, e.g., Steiker,‚ supra‚ note 3, at 824 (saying the “invention … of armed quasi-military, professional police forces, whose form, function, and daily presence differ dramatically from that of the colonial constabulary, requires that modern-day judges and scholars rethink” Fourth Amendment remedies).

9‚ See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 104 (1996) (criticizing Supreme Court rulings that have “steadily expanded” the rights of criminals and placed limitations upon police conduct).

10‚ Cf. E.X. BOOZHIE, THE OUTLAW’S BIBLE 15 (1988) (stating the true mission of police is to protect the status quo for the benefit of the ruling class).

11‚ As a textual matter, the Constitution grants authority to the federal government to define and punish criminal activity in only five instances. Article I grants Congress power (1) “[t]o provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States,” art. I, ƒ¯‚¿‚½ 8, cl. 6; (2) “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations,”‚ id, cl. 10; (3) “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,”‚ id. at cl. 14; (4) “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over” the District of Columbia and federal reservations.‚ id. at cl. 17;‚ see also‚ Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 426 (1821) (“Congress has a right to punish murder in a fort, or other place within its exclusive jurisdiction; but no general right to punish murder committed within any of the states”). Likewise, (5) Article III defines the crime of “Treason against the United States” and grants to Congress the “Power to declare [its] Punishment….” U.S. CONST. art. III, ƒ¯‚¿‚½ 3.

12‚ Several early constitutions expressed a right of citizens “to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property,” and therefore purported to bind citizens to contribute their proportion toward expenses of such protection.‚ See‚ DELAWARE DEC. OF RIGHTS of Sept. 11, 1776, ƒ¯‚¿‚½ 10; PA. CONST. of Sept. 28, 1776, Dec. of Rights, ƒ¯‚¿‚½ VIII; VT. CONST. of July 8, 1777, Chap. 1, ƒ¯‚¿‚½ IX. Other typical provisions required that the powers of government be exercised only by the consent of the people,‚ see, e.g., N.C. CONST. of Dec. 18, 1776, ƒ¯‚¿‚½ V, and that all persons invested with government power be accountable for their conduct.‚ See‚ MD. CONST. of Nov. 11, 1776, ƒ¯‚¿‚½ IV.

13‚ The constitutions of several early states expressed the intent that citizens were obligated to carry out law enforcement duties.‚ See, e.g., DELAWARE DEC. OF RIGHTS of Sept. 11, 1776, ƒ¯‚¿‚½ 10 (providing every citizen shall yield his personal service when necessary, or an equivalent); N.H. CONST. of June 2, 1784, Part I, art. I, ƒ¯‚¿‚½ XII (providing that every member of the community is bound to “yield his personal service when necessary, or an equivalent”); VT. CONST. of July 8, 1777, Chap. 1, ƒ¯‚¿‚½ IX (providing every member of society is bound to contribute his proportion towards the expenses of his protection, “and to yield his personal service, when necessary”).

14‚ C.f. JAMES BOVARD, LOST RIGHTS: THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN LIBERTY 51 (1st‚ ed. 1994) (discussing Revolution-era perception that the law was a means to restrain government and to secure rights of citizens).

15‚ Originally, all criminal procedure fell under the rule of private vengeance. A victim or aggrieved party made a direct appeal to county authorities to force a defendant to face him.

See‚ ARTHUR TRAIN, THE PRISONER AT THE BAR 120 n. (1926). From these very early times, “grand” or “accusing” juries were formed to examine the accusations of private individuals.‚ Id. at 121 n. Although the accusing jury frequently acted as a trial jury as well, it eventually evolved into a separate body that took on the role of accuser on behalf of aggrieved parties. It deliberated secretly, acting on its members’ own personal information and upon the application of injured parties.‚ Id. at 124 n.

16‚ In the early decades of American criminal justice, criminal cases were hardly different from civil actions, and could easily be confused for one another if “the public not being joined in it.” Clark v. Turner, 1 Root 200 (Conn. 1790) (holding action for assault and battery was no more than a civil case because the public was not joined). It was apparently not unusual for trial judges themselves to be confused about whether a case was criminal or civil, and to make judicial errors regarding procedural differences between the two types of cases.‚ See‚ Meacham v. Austin, 5 Day 233 (Conn. 1811) (upholding lower court’s dismissal of criminal verdict because the case’s process had been consistent with civil procedure rather than criminal procedure).

17‚ See‚ Respublica v. Griffiths, 2 Dall. 112 (Pa. 1790) (involving action by private individual seeking public sanction for his prosecution).

18‚ See, e.g., Smith v. State, 7 Tenn. 43 (1846) (using the term prosecutor to describe a private person); Plumer v. Smith, 5 N.H. 553 (1832) (same); Commonwealth v. Harkness, 4 Binn. 193 (Pa. 1811) (same).

19‚ See‚ Harold J. Krent,‚ Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons From History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 281-90 (1989) (saying that any claim that criminal law enforcement is a ‘core’ or exclusive executive power is historically inaccurate and therefore the Attorney General need not be vested with authority to oversee or trigger investigations by the independent counsel).

20‚ See‚ Respublica v. Griffiths, 2 Dall. 112 (Pa. 1790) (holding the Attorney General must allow his name to be used by the prosecutor).

21‚ Private prosecutors generally had to pay the costs of their prosecutions, even though the state also had an interest.‚ See‚ Dickinson v. Potter, 4 Day 340 (Conn. 1810). Government attorneys general took over the prosecutions of only especially worthy cases and pursued such cases at public expense.‚ SeeWaldron v. Turtle, 4 N.H. 149, 151 (1827) (stating if a prosecution is not adopted and pursued by the attorney general, “it will not be pursued at the public expense, although in the name of the state”).

22‚ See‚ State v. Bruce, 24 Me. 71, 73 (1844) (stating a threat by crime victim to prosecute a supposed thief is proper but extortion for pecuniary advantage is criminal).

23‚ See‚ Plumer v. Smith, 5 N.H. 553 (1832) (holding promissory note invalid when tendered by a criminal defendant to his private prosecutor in exchange for promise not to prosecute).

24‚ Shaw v. Reed, 30 Me. 105, 109 (1849).

25‚ See‚ In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1956).

26‚ See‚ Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1939).

27‚ See‚ Krent,‚ supra‚ note 19, at 293.

28‚ C.f. Ellen D. Larned, 1 History of Windham County, Connecticut 272-73 (1874) (recounting attempts by Windham County authorities in 1730 to arrest a large group of rioters who broke open the Hartford Jail and released a prisoner).

29‚ Id. at 273.

30‚ See‚ Buckminster v. Applebee, 8 N.H. 546 (1837) (stating the sheriff has a duty to raise the posse to aid him when necessary).

31‚ See‚ Waterbury v. Lockwood, 4 Day 257, 259-60 (Conn. 1810) (citing English cases).

32‚ See‚ Jerome Hall,‚ Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without A Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REV. 566, 579 (1936).

33‚ Barrington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 164 N.E. 726, 727 (N.Y. 1928).

34‚ See‚ Eustis v. Kidder, 26 Me. 97, 99 (1846).

35‚ By the early 1900s, courts held that civilians called into posse service who were killed in the line of duty were entitled to full death benefits.‚ See‚ Monterey County v. Rader, 248 P. 912 (Cal. 1926); Village of West Salem v. Industrial Commission, 155 N.W. 929 (Wis. 1916).

36‚ United States v. Rice, 27 Fed. Cas. 795 (W.D.N.C. 1875).

37‚ The Constitution is not without provisions for criminal procedure. Indeed, much of the Bill of Rights is an outline of basic criminal procedure.‚ See‚ LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 118 (2d ed. 1985). But these provisions represent enshrinements of individual liberties rather than government power. The only constitutional provisions with regard to criminal justice represent‚ barriers‚ to governmental power, rather than provisions for that power. Indeed, the Founders’ intent to protect individual liberties was made clear by the language of the Ninth Amendment and its equivalent in state constitutions of the founding era. The Ninth Amendment, which declares that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people,” provides a clear indication that the Framers assumed that persons may do whatever is not justly prohibited by the Constitution rather than that the government may do whatever is not justly prohibited to it.‚ See‚ Randy E. Barnett,‚ Introduction: James Madison’s Ninth Amendment, in‚ THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 43 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989).

38‚ See‚ JAMES S. CAMPBELL ET AL., LAW AND ORDER RECONSIDERED: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW AND LAW ENFORCEMENT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 450 (1970) (discussing survey by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice).

39‚ The term “policing” originally meant promoting the public good or the community life rather than preserving security.‚ See‚ Rogan Kersh et al.,‚ “More a Distinction of Words than Things”: The Evolution of Separated Powers in the American States, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 5, 21 (1998).

40‚ See, e.g., N.C. CONST. of Dec. 18, 1776, Dec. of Rights, ƒ¯‚¿‚½ II (providing that people of the state have a right to regulate the internal government and “police thereof); PA. CONST. of Sept. 28, 1776, Dec. of Rights, art. III (stating that the people have a right of “governing and regulating the internal police of [the people]”).

41‚ See‚ Police Jury v. Britton, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 566 (1872). The purpose of such juries was 1) to police slaves and runaways, (2) to repair roads, bridges, and other infrastructure, and (3) to lay taxes as necessary for such acts.‚ Id. at 568.‚ See also‚ BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 801 (abridged 6th‚ ed. 1991).

42‚ When Blackstone wrote of offenses against “the public police and economy” in 1769, he meant offenses against the “due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom” such as clandestine marriage, bigamy, rendering bridges inconvenient to pass, vagrancy, and operating gambling houses. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 924-27 (George Chase ed., Baker, Voorhis& Co. 1938) (1769).

43‚ See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,27-28 (1948) (proclaiming that “security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police” is at the core of the Fourth Amendment (clearly a slight misstatement of the Founders’ original perception)).

44‚ See‚ Roger Lane,‚ Urbanization and Criminal Violence in the 19th‚ Century: Massachusetts as a Test Case, in‚ NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 445, 451 (Graham & Gurr dir., 1969) (saying citizens were traditionally supposed to take care of themselves, with help of family, friends, or servants “when available”).

45‚ See, e.g., Kennard v. Burton, 25 Me. 39 (1845) (involving collision between two wagons).

46‚ Lane,‚ supra‚ note 44, at 451.

47‚ ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 96 (J.P. Mayer ed., Harper Perennial Books 1988) (1848).

48‚ Id.

49‚ See id. at 96.

50‚ See‚ Pauline Maier,‚ Popular Uprisings and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century America, 27 WM. & MARY Q. 3-35 (1970).

51‚ DE TOCQUEVILLE,‚ supra‚ note 47, at 72.

52‚ Lane,‚ supra‚ note 44, at 450.

53‚ See id.

54‚ Id.

55‚ See id. at 451.

56‚ See, e.g., Lamb v. Day, 8 Vt. 407 (1836) (involving suit against constable for improper execution of civil writ); Tomlinson v. Wheeler, 1 Aik. 194 (Vt. 1826) (involving sheriff’s neglect to execute civil judgment); Stoyel v. Edwards, 3 Day 1 (1807) (involving sheriffs execution of civil judgment).

57‚ If the modern police profession has a father, it is Sir Robert Peel, who founded the Metropolitan Police of London in 1829.‚ See‚ SUE TITUS REID, CRIMINAL JUSTICE: BLUEPRINTS 58 (5th‚ ed. 1999) (attributing the founding of the first modern police force to Peel). Peel’s uniformed officers ‚” nicknamed ‘Bobbies’ after the first name of their founder ‚” operated under the direction of a central headquarters (Scotland Yard, named for the site once used by the Kings of Scotland as a residence), walking beats on a full-time basis to prevent crime.‚ See id. Less than three decades later, Parliament enacted a statute requiring every borough and county to have a London-type police force.‚ See id.

The ‘Bobbie’ model of policing caught on more slowly in the United States, but by the 1880s most major American cities had adopted some type of full-time paid police force.‚ See id. at 59 (noting that the county sheriff system continued in rural areas).

58‚ See‚ LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 151-52 (1993) (citation omitted).

59‚ Id. at 151.

60‚ See id. at 152 (describing early police use of station houses as homeless shelters for the poor). This same type of public problem-solving still remains a large part of police work. Police are called upon to settle landlord-tenant disputes, deliver emergency care, manage traffic, regulate parking, and even to respond to alleged haunted houses.‚ See id. at 151 (recounting 1894 alleged ghost incident in Oakland, California). Police continue to provide essential services to communities, especially at night and on weekends when they are the only social service agency.‚ See‚ SILBERMAN,‚ supra‚ note 6, at 321.

61‚ See‚ GARRY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT 248 (1999) (citation omitted).

62‚ See‚ REID,‚ supra‚ note 57, 65 (5th‚ ed. 1999).

63‚ See‚ JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 129 (1993).

64‚ See id.

65‚ See id. at 130.

66‚ See‚ E.X. BOOZHIE, THE OUTLAW’S BIBLE 15 (1988).

67‚ Private prosecution was not without costs to taxpayers. The availability of free courtrooms to air grievances tended to promote litigation. In 1804, the Pennsylvania legislature acted to allow juries to make private prosecutors pay the costs of prosecution in especially trifling cases. Act of Dec. 8, 1804 PL3, 4 Sm L 204 (repealed 1860). Private persons were thereafter liable for court costs if they omitted material exculpatory information from a grand jury, thereby causing a grand jury to indict without knowledge of potential defenses.‚ See‚ Commonwealth v. Harkness, 4 Binn. 194 (Pa. 1811). This protection, like many others, was lost when police and public prosecutors took over the criminal justice system in the twentieth century.‚ See‚ United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (holding prosecutor has no duty to present exculpatory evidence to grand jury).

68‚ In the American constitutional scheme, the states have ‘general jurisdiction,’ meaning they may regulate for public health and welfare and enact whatever means to enforce such regulation as is necessary and constitutionally proper.‚ See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (both standing for the general proposition that states have constitutional power to provide for protection, health, safety, and quality of life for their citizens).‚ See also‚ Lawrence Tribe, American Constitutional Law, ƒ¯‚¿‚½ƒ¯‚¿‚½ 6-3, 7-3 (2d ed. 1988). State and municipal police forces can therefore be viewed as constitutional to the extent they actually carry out the lawful enactments of the state.

69‚ See infra‚ notes 285-398 and their accompanying text.

70‚ See‚ Silas J. Wasserstrom,‚ The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 347 (1984).

71‚ See‚ Jerome Hall,‚ Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without A Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REV. 566, 567 (1936).

72‚ See id.

73‚ See id. at 567-71 (discussing earliest scholarly references to the distinction). A 1936 Harvard Law Review article suggested the distinction is a false one owed to improper marshalling of scholarship.‚ See id. (writing of “the general misinterpretation” resulting from a 1780 case in England).

74‚ See id. at 575 n.44 (citing the case of‚ Beckwith v. Philby, 6 B. & C. 635 (K. B. 1827)).

75‚ See id. at 571-72. Although official right was apparently considered somewhat greater than that of private citizens during much of the 1700s, the case law enunciates no support for any such distinction until‚ Rohan‚ v.‚ Sawin, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 281 (1850). It was apparently already the common practice of English constables to arrest upon information from the public in the 1780’s.‚ See id. at 572. The “earlier requirement of a charge of a felony had already been entirely forgotten” in England by the early nineteenth century.‚ Id. at 573. According to Hall, the only real distinction in practice in the early nineteenth century was that officers were privileged to draw their suspicions from statements of others, whereas private arrestors had to base their cause for arrest on‚ their own‚ reasonable beliefs.‚ See id. at 569.

76‚ See‚ Rohan v. Sawin, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 281, 285 (1850).

77‚ See id.

78‚ See‚ 18 U.S.C. ƒ¯‚¿‚½ 925 (a)(l) (2000) (exempting government officers from federal firearm disabilities).

79‚ See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ƒ¯‚¿‚½ 468 (West 1985) (releasing police from liability for possession of sniper scopes and infrared scopes).

80‚ See, e.g., FLA. STAT. CH. 338. 155 (1990).

81‚ See, e.g., FLA. STAT. CH. 320.025 (1990) (allowing confidential auto registration for police).

82‚ See‚ ARK. CODE ANN. ƒ¯‚¿‚½ 20-22-703 (Michie 2000).

83‚ See‚ 18 U.S.C. ƒ¯‚¿‚½ 1114 (amended 1994) (providing whoever murders a federal officer in first degree shall suffer death).

84‚ See‚ CAL. PENAL CODE ƒ¯‚¿‚½ 832.9 (West 1995).

85‚ See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ƒ¯‚¿‚½ƒ¯‚¿‚½ 199.95-199.99 (West 1990) (mandating HIV testing for persons charged with interfering with police officers whenever officers request).

86‚ See‚ Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2511 (2000); United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).

87‚ See‚ Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271 (lst‚ Cir. 1993).

88‚ See, e.g., People v. Curtis, 450 P.2d 33, 35 (Cal. 1969) (speaking of the “[g]eneral acceptance” by courts of the elimination of the right to resist unlawful arrest).

89‚ See‚ HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE OPPONENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 53 (1981). The statements of James Madison when introducing the proposed amendments to the Constitution before the House of Representatives, June 8, 1789, also support such a reading of the Bill of Rights. House of Representatives, June 8, 1789 Debates,‚ reprinted in‚ THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1787-1792 647, 657 (David E. Young, ed.) (2d ed. 1995) (stating “the great object in view is to limit and qualify the powers of Government”).

90‚ See‚ STORING,‚ supra‚ note 89, at 48.

91‚ See, e.g., MD. CONST. of 1776, art. I (declaring that “all government of right originates from the people, is founded in compact only, and instituted solely for the good of the whole”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. I (“All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. I (“All men are born equally free and independent”).

92‚ See‚ Coyle v. Hurtin, 10 Johns. 85 (N.Y. 1813).

93‚ See‚ Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529 (1900).

94‚ See‚ Rex v. Gay, Quincy Mass. Rep. 1761-1772 91 (Mass. 1763) (acquitting assault defendant who beat a sheriff when sheriff attempted to arrest him pursuant to invalid warrant).

95‚ See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30 n. 1, 31 n. 2 (1948) (citing cases upholding right to resist unlawful search and seizure).

96‚ See‚ Adams v. State, 48 S.E. 910 (Ga. 1904).

97‚ See‚ MD. CONST. of 1776, art. IV; N.H. Const. of 1784, art. X.

98‚ See, e.g., State v. Kutchara, 350 N.W.2d 924, 927 (Minn. 1984) (saying Minnesota law does not recognize right to resist unlawful arrest or search); People v. Curtis, 450 P.2d 33, 36 (Cal. 1969) (holding California law prohibits forceful resistance to unlawful arrest).

99‚ See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ƒ¯‚¿‚½ 243 (criminalizing the resistance, delay or obstruction of an officer in the discharge of “any duty of his office”). CAL. PENAL CODE ƒ¯‚¿‚½ 834(a) (1957) (“If a person has knowledge … that he is being arrested by a peace officer, it is the duty of such person to refrain from using force or any weapon to resist such arrest”).

100‚ See, e.g., United States v. Charles, 883 F.2d 355 (5th‚ Cir. 1989) (excusing as harmless error the failure of officers executing warrant to have the warrant in hand during raid); United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 499 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding failure to deliver copy of warrant to the party being searched or seized does not invalidate search or seizure in the absence of prejudice); Willeford v. State, 625 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. App. 1981) (upholding validity of search and seizure before arrival of warrant). Not only has the requirement that officers show their warrant before executing it been eliminated, but the requirement that officers announce their authority and purpose before executing search warrants has been all but eliminated.‚ See‚ Richards v. Wisconsin, 570 U.S. 385 (1997) (eliminating requirement that officers be refused admittance before using force to enter the place to be searched in many cases).

101‚ See‚ William A. Schroeder,‚ Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth Amendment, 58 MO. L. REV. 771 (1993) (discussing the erosion of requirements for arrest warrants in many jurisdictions).

102‚ See, e.g., Polk v. State, 142 So. 480, 481 (Miss. 1932) (striking down statute allowing warrantless arrest for misdemeanors committed outside an officer’s presence); Ex Parte Rhodes, 79 So. 462, 462-63 (Ala. 1918) (holding statute unconstitutional which allowed for warrantless arrest for out-of-presence misdemeanors).

103‚ See‚ Schroeder,‚ supra‚ note 101, at 793.

104‚ See‚ Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 380 (Cal. 1993) (saying the developing consensus “uniformly recognizes” a patient’s right to control his own body, stemming from the “long-standing importance in our Anglo-American legal tradition of personal autonomy and the right of self-determination.”) (citations omitted). “For self-determination to have any meaning, it cannot be subject to the scrutiny of anyone else’s conscience or sensibilities.”‚ Id. at 385.

105‚ See‚ Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1145 (Wyo. 1995) (stating if a statute reaches a fundamental interest, courts are to employ strict scrutiny in making determination as to whether enactment is essential to achieve compelling state interest).

106‚ “[Only] the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). A “compelling state interest” is defined as “[o]ne which the state is forced or obliged to protect.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 282 (6th‚ ed. 1990) (citing Coleman v. Coleman, 291 N.E.2d 530, 534 (1972)).

107‚ The American constitutional order grants to every individual a privilege to stand his ground in the face of a violent challenger and meet violence with violence. A “duty to retreat” evolved in some jurisdictions, however, where a defender contemplates the use of‚ deadly force. See‚ WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 461 (2d ed. 1986). But with police, the courts have never imposed a duty to retreat.‚ See id. This, combined with the recurring police claim that an attacker might get close enough to grasp the officer’s sidearm, has meant, in practical terms, that an officer may repel even a minor physical threat with deadly force.

The effect of this exception for law enforcement officers has been to grant an almost absurd advantage to police in ‘self-defense’ incidents. Not only do cops have no duty to retreat, but they seem privileged to kill whenever a plausible threat of any injury manifests itself.‚ See infra, notes 115-147, and accompanying text. Cops ‚” unlike the general public ‚” appear excused whenever they open fire on an individual who threatens‚ any‚ harm ‚” even utterly nonlethal ‚” against them, such as a verbal threat to punch the officer combined with a step forward.‚ See infra, notes 123-147, and accompanying text.

108‚ See‚ James J. Fyfe,‚ Police Use of Deadly Force: Research and Reform, in‚ THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: POLITICS AND POLICIES 134-40 (George F. Cole & Mare G. Gertz eds., 7th‚ ed. 1998).

109‚ Id. at 135 (quoting Chapman and Crocket).

110‚ See‚ People v. Klein, 137 N.E. 145, 149 (Ill. 1922) (reporting that “numerous” peace officers testified that shooting was the customary method of arresting speeders during trial of peace officer accused of murder).

111‚ See id.; Miller v. People, 74 N.E. 743 (Ill. 1905) (involving village marshal who shot and killed speeding carriage driver).

112‚ See‚ Fyfe,‚ supra‚ note 108, at 137.

113‚ See id. at‚ 140.

114‚ See id. at 141 (table showing fatal shootings per 1,000 police officers, Philadelphia). A study of Philadelphia P.D. firearm discharges from 1970 through 1978 found only two cases that resulted in departmental discipline against officers on duty.‚ See id. at 147 n.2. One case involved an officer firing unnecessary shots into the air; the other involved an officer who shot and killed his wife in a police station during an argument over his paycheck.‚ See id.

115‚ See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).

116‚ 471 U.S. 1 (1985).

117‚ See‚ Fyfe,‚ supra‚ 108, at 136.

118‚ The Garner‚ decision has been interpreted in different ways by different courts and law-making bodies.‚ See‚ Michael R. Smith,‚ Police Use of Deadly Force: How Courts and Policy-Makers Have Misapplied Tennessee v. Garner, 1 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 100, 100-01 (1998). Smith argues that many of these interpretations stem from inaccurate readings of‚ Garner‚ and that lower courts have failed to hold police officers liable according to the standard required by the Supreme Court.‚ See id.

119‚ On behalf of modern police, courts have adopted a qualified immunity defense to police misconduct claims. Essentially, where cops can justify by plausible explanation that their conduct was within the bounds of their occupational duties, there is a “good faith” defense.‚ See‚ Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). But as David Rudovsky points out, the “good faith” defense is an artificial ingredient to normal tort liability. “The standard rule,” notes Rudovsky, “is that a violation of another’s rights or the failure to adhere to prescribed standards of conduct constitutes grounds for liability.” David Rudovsky,‚ The Criminal Justice System and the Role of the Police, in‚ THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, 242, 248 (David Kairys ed., 1982). The “good faith” defense for police is thus an artificial layer of tort immunity protection not normally available to other types of litigants. Under the standard rules of tort law, after all, a defendant’s good faith, intent, or knowledge of the law are irrelevant.‚ See id. at 248.

120‚ See‚ Smith,‚ supra‚ note 118, at 117.

121‚ See id. at 106.

122‚ Idaho v. Horiuchi, 215 F.3d 986 (9th‚ Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).

123‚ OCTOBER 22 COALITION TO STOP POLICE BRUTALITY ET AL., STOLEN LIVES: KILLED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT 307 (2d. ed. 1999) (hereinafter “STOLEN LIVES”) (saying officer shot and killed victim after victim ‘made a move’ following a foot chase).

124‚ See id. at 207 (listing a 1993 Michigan case).

125‚ See id. at 262 (reporting 1990 Brooklyn case in which cop had shot unarmed teenage suspect in back of head for allegedly reaching into jacket).

126‚ See id. at 250 (reporting 1996 New York case in which man was shot 24 times by police while sitting in car with his hands in the air);‚ id. at 252 (reporting shooting of alleged car thief after motion as if they were going for a gun’).

127‚ See id. at 262 (reporting 1990 Bronx shooting precipitated by the decedent turning toward an officer as officer opened door of decedent’s cab).

128‚ See id. at 263 (reporting 1988 New York case initiated when a driver made illegal turn and ending with police pumping 16 bullets into her).

129‚ See id. at 262 (reporting 1990 Brooklyn case in which decedent was shot nine times while standing and twice in back while lying on ground).

130‚ See id. at 240 (reporting a 1998 New York case).

131‚ See id. at 232 (reporting 1991 New Mexico case).

132‚ See id. at 220 (reporting 1998 Nevada case).

133‚ See id. at 29.

134‚ Id. at 44.

135‚ Id. at 46. The possession of a wooden stick has cost more than one person his life at the hands of police.‚ See also id. at 68.

136‚ Id. at 53.

137‚ Id. at 53.

138‚ See Detroit Police Kill Mentally Ill Deaf Man, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 31, 2000 at A8.

139‚ See‚ STOLEN LIVES,‚ supra‚ note 123, at 57.‚ 140‚ See id. at 60.

141‚ See id. at 62.

142‚ See id. at 206 (listing a 1993 Michigan case). In another Michigan case, a cop shot someone who merely had a VCR remote control in his pocket, claiming he mistook it for a gun.‚ See id. at 205.

143‚ See id. at 305 (saying Houston police surrounded truck and fired 59 times at victim as he sat in truck holding can opener). No civilian witnesses saw the “shiny object” (can opener) police claimed they saw.‚ See id.

144‚ Police use of throwdown guns has been alleged across the country. Guns which are introduced without a suspect’s fingerprints when they should have fingerprints, and guns that are found by police officers after an initial, supposedly complete, search of a crime scene by other detectives, can be said to raise questions about police use of throw-down guns.‚ C.f. Joe Cantlupe & David Hasemyer,‚ Pursuit of Justice: How San Diego Police Officers Handled the Killing of One of Their Own. It Is a Case Flawed by Erratic Testimony and Questionable Conduct, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Sept. 11, 1994, at A1 (raising the issue in a San Diego case).

145‚ See‚ Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 1220, 1227 (5th Cir. 1982).

146‚ Id. at 1222.

147‚ See id. at 1221-23 (describing “damning” evidence of official cover-up and police vindication as a matter of policy).

148‚ See‚ STOLEN LIVES,‚ supra‚ note 123, at 72. In one 1987 Los Angeles case, a man was shot four times and killed when he picked up a discarded pushbroom to deflect police baton blows.‚ See id. 72.

149‚ See id. at iv. In one particularly egregious case, a police killing was upheld as beyond liability where officers shot a speeding trucker who refused to stop.‚ See‚ Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328 (8th‚ Cir. 1993).‚ But see, e.g., Gutierrez-Rodriquez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553 (1st‚ Cir. 1989) (affirming verdict against plainclothes officers who shot driver who drove away); Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195 (7th‚ Cir. 1987) (affirming verdict against officers who shot driver as driver reached into jacket pocket during questioning); Moody v. Ferguson, 732 F. Supp. 176 (D.S.L. 1989) (rendering judgment against officers who shot driver fleeing in vehicle from traffic stop).

150‚ See‚ Zuchel v. City and County of Denver, Colorado, 997 F.2d 730 (10th‚ Cir. 1993).

151‚ See‚ Alison L. Patton,‚ The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. ƒ¯‚¿‚½ 1983 Is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L. J. 753, 754 (1993) (saying plaintiffs rarely win absent independent witnesses or physical evidence).

152‚ See‚ Peter L. Davis,‚ Rodney King and the Decriminalization of Police Brutality in America, 53 MD. L. REV. 271, 288 (1994). Prior to the 1900s, it was not uncommon for law enforcers who killed suspects during confrontations to be placed on trial for their lives even when they reacted to violent resisters.See‚ United States v. Rice, 27 F. Cas. 795 (C.C.N.C. 1875) (No. 16,153) (involving deputy United States Marshall on trial for murder of tax evasion suspect); State v. Brown, 5 Del. (5 Harr.) 505 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1853) (fining peace officers for assault and false imprisonment); Conner v. Commonwealth, 3 Bin. 38 (Pa. 1810) (involving a constable indicted for refusing to execute arrest warrant). Even justices of the peace could be criminally indicted for dereliction of duties.‚ See‚ Respublica v. Montgomery, Dall. 419 (1795) (upholding validity of a criminal charge against a justice of the peace who failed to suppress a riot).

153‚ See‚ Davis,‚ supra‚ note 152, at 290 (noting the hopeless conflict of interest in handling police violence complaints).

154‚ For an overview of the powers of early grand juries to accuse government officials, see Roger Roots,‚ If It’s Not a Runaway, It’s Not a Real Grand Jury, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 821 (2000).

155‚ See‚ Steiker,‚ supra‚ note 3, at 836 (saying police excesses such as beatings, torture, false arrests and the third degree arc well documented).

156‚ See‚ STOLEN LIVES,‚ supra‚ note 123, at vii.

157‚ See‚ International Secretariat of Amnesty International, News Release,‚ From Alabama to Wyoming: 50 Counts of Double Standards ‚” The Missing Entries in the US Report on Human Rights, Feb. 25, 1999.

158‚ See‚ STOLEN LIVES,‚ supra‚ note 123, at iv.

159‚ See id. at v.

160‚ Certain examples demonstrate. FBI agents in Elizabeth, New Jersey shot 38 times inside an apartment to kill an unarmed man who they first tried to say had fired first.‚ See id. at 226. In February 1999, Bronx police fired 41 bullets at an unarmed African immigrant in his apartment doorway.‚ See id. at 234. After this unlawful killing, cops unlawfully searched the decedent’s apartment to justify shooting, failing to find any evidence of drugs.‚ See id. In August 1999, Manhattan cops fired a total of 35 shots at alleged robber (who probably did not fire), injuring bystander and sending crowds fleeing.‚ See id.

161‚ Most states that allow the death penalty require that aggravating factors exist before imposition of capital punishment.‚ See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ƒ¯‚¿‚½ 19-2515 (1997) (allowing death penalty for crimes involving “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, [or] manifesting exceptional depravity” or showing “utter disregard for human life”); TEX. CRIM. P. ANN. ƒ¯‚¿‚½ 37.071 (West 1981) (listing factors such as whether the crime was “unreasonable in response to the provocation”); WYO. STAT. ANN. ƒ¯‚¿‚½ 6-2-102 (Michie 1999) (allowing death penalty only upon a finding of aggravating factors such as a creation of great risk of death to two or more persons or for “especially atrocious or cruel” conduct).

162‚ The earliest attempts at professionalization of constables failed in the United States due to insufficiency of public funds.‚ See‚ Steiker,‚ supra‚ note 3, at 831. Some of the earliest U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding police forces involve disputes over municipal police spending.‚ See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. New Orleans, 215 U.S. 170 (1909) (resolving dispute over debts run up by municipal police district); New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 U.S. 411 (1894) (involving dispute over unbudgeted debts run up by New Orleans police board); District of Columbia v. Hutton, 143 U.S. 18 (1891) (dealing with salary dispute involving District of Columbia police force).

163‚ See‚ FRIEDMAN,‚ supra‚ note 58, at 362 (1993). Dallas police, for example, arrested 8,526 people in 1929 “on suspicion” but charged less than five percent of them with a crime.‚ See id.

164‚ The infamous case of‚ Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), provides a grim reminder of the torture techniques that have been employed upon suspects during the past century. In‚ Brown, officers placed nooses around the necks of suspects, temporarily hanged them, and cut their backs to pieces with a leather strap to gain confessions.‚ Id. at 281-82.

165‚ FRIEDMAN,‚ supra‚ note 58, at 151 n.20 (quoting George S. McWatters, who studied New York detectives in the 1870s).

166‚ See‚ TITUS REID, supra note 57, at 122 (citations omitted).

167‚ See‚ Peter B. Kraska & Victor E. Kappeler,‚ Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units, 44 SOC. PROBS. 1, 11 (1997).

168‚ One-hundred-seventeen federal, state, and local officers were killed feloniously in 1996 ‚” the lowest number since 1960.‚ See‚ Sue TITUS REID,‚ supra‚ note 57, at 123.

169‚ See‚ National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,‚ Violence in the Work Place, June 1997.

170‚ See id.

171‚ Approximately 40 percent of police deaths are due to accidents.‚ See‚ TITUS REID,‚ supra‚ note 57, at 123.

172‚ See‚ National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,‚ Fatal Injuries to Workers in the United States, 1980-1989: A Decade of Surveillance‚ 14 (April 15, 1999); Robert Rockwell,‚ Police Brutality: More than Just a Few Bad Apples, REFUSE & RESIST, Aug. 14, 1997 (describing the “cultivation of the myth of policing as the most dangerous occupation”).

173‚ See id. at 13.

174‚ See‚ SKOLNICK & FYFE,‚ supra‚ note 63, at 93.

175‚ See‚ Hall,‚ supra‚ note 71, at 582-83 (describing early constables as “[a]bominably paid”).

176‚ C.f. STOLEN LIVES,‚ supra‚ note 123, at v (saying when police arrive on the scene, they often escalate the situation rather than defuse it).

177‚ See‚ STOLEN LIVES,‚ supra‚ note 123, at vi.

178‚ See, e.g., Brandon v. City of Providence, 708 A.2d 893 (R.I. 1998) (finding municipality immune from liability when cops prevented relatives of injured shooting victim from taking victim to the hospital before victim died).‚ See also‚ Stolen Lives,‚ supra‚ note 157, at 305 (saying Tennessee police prevented fire fighters from saving victim of fire in 1997 case). Other notorious examples can be cited, including the 1993 Waco fire (in which fire trucks were held back by federal agents) and the 1985 MOVE debacle in Philadelphia in which police dropped a bomb on a building occupied by women and children and then held back fire fighters from rescuing bum victims.‚ See‚ WILLIE L. WILLIAMS, TAKING BACK OUR STREETS: FIGHTING CRIME IN AMERICA 16 (1996) (saying investigative hearings revealed cops had held back rescuers as a ‘tactical decision’).

179‚ See‚ SKOLNICK & FYFE,‚ supra‚ note 63, at 75 (citing U.S. Civil Disorder Commission study).

180‚ See‚ SKOLNICK & FYFE,‚ supra‚ note 63, at 83 (describing police riots at Columbia University and Los Angeles).

181‚ See‚ RIGHTS IN CONFLICT: THE OFFICIAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE xxiii, xxvi (1968).

182‚ See‚ John D. Bessler,‚ The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511 (1994) (attacking private prosecution as unfair, arbitrary, and not in the public interest).

183‚ See‚ Hall,‚ supra‚ note 71, at 580-85 (detailing inadequacies of private law enforcement).

184‚ See‚ United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977) (holding Miranda requirements do not apply to a witness testifying before a grand jury); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (holding grand jury witness may not refuse to answer questions on ground that they are based on evidence obtained from unlawful search); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding seizure of a person by subpoena for grand jury appearance is generally not within Fourth Amendment’s protection).

185‚ See‚ Richard M. Brown,‚ Historical Patterns of Violence in America, in‚ NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 57 (Graham & Gurr, ed. 1969).

186‚ See‚ State v. Walker, 32 Me. 195 (1850) (upholding actions of the private group).

187‚ See United States v. Whittier, 28 F. Cas. 591 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1878).

188‚ See supra‚ notes 438-445 and accompanying text for a discussion of the evolution of entrapment as a law enforcement practice.

189‚ See‚ Richard Maxwell Brown,‚ The American Vigilante Tradition, in‚ NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 57 (Graham & Gurr, dir. 1969).

190‚ See‚ JAMES S. CAMPBELL, ET AL., LAW AND ORDER RECONSIDERED: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 441 (1970) (discussing successes of citizen auxiliary units in Queens, New York and other areas).

191‚ See id. 437-54 (1970) (discussing successes of citizen involvement in law enforcement).

192‚ American frontier vigilantism generally targeted serious criminals such as murderers, coach robbers and rapists as well as horse thieves, counterfeiters, outlaws, and ‘bad men.’‚ See‚ NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 97 (Graham & Gurr, dir. 1969). Arguably, such offenders qualified as felons and would have faced the death penalty under the common law even if more conventional court processes were followed. That such vigilante movements often followed rudimentary due process of law is attested by historians such as Richard Maxwell Brown, who recounts that “vigilantes’ attention to the spirit of law and order caused them to provide, by their lights, a fair but speedy trial.” Richard Maxwell Brown,‚ supra‚ note 189, at 164. The northern Illinois Regulator movement of 1841, for example, provided accused horse thieves and murderers with a lawyer, an opportunity to challenge jurors, and an arraignment.‚ See id. at 163. At least one accused murderer was‚ acquitted‚ by a vigilante court on the Wyoming frontier.‚ See‚ Joe B. Frantz,‚ The Frontier Tradition: An Invitation to Violence, in‚ NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 129-30 (Graham & Gurr, dir. 1969). Many accused were let off with whipping and expulsion rather than execution in the early decades of vigilante justice.‚ See‚ Brown,‚ supra‚ note 189, at 164. Less than half of all vigilante groups ever killed anyone.‚ See id. Ironically, the move by vigilante groups toward killing convicted suspects began in the 1850s, ‚” corresponding closely with the meteoric rise of professional policing.‚ See id.

Vigilante movements occasionally developed to‚ rescue‚ the law from corrupt public officials who were violating the law. The case of the vigilantes who arrested and hanged Sheriff Henry Plummer of Virginia City, Montana in 1864 is such an example.‚ See‚ LEW L. CALLAWAY, MONTANA’S RIGHTEOUS HANGMEN (1997) (arguing the vigilantes had no choice but to take the law into their own hands).

193‚ “[T]he Western frontier developed too swiftly for the courts of justice to keep up with the progression of the people.” Joe B. Frantz,‚ supra‚ note 192, at 128. Vigilante movements did little more than play catch-up to what can only be described as rampant frontier lawlessness. Five-thousand wanted men roamed Texas in 1877.‚ See id. at 128. Major crimes often went totally unprosecuted and countless offenders whose crimes were well known lived openly without fear of arrest on the western frontier.‚ See id. Vigilantes filled in only the most gaping holes in court jurisdiction, generally (but not always) intervening to arrest only the perpetrators of serious crimes.‚ See id. and at 130 (saying “improvised group action” was the only resort for many on the far frontier).

194‚ David H. Bayley & Clifford D. Shearing,‚ The Future of Policing, in‚ THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: POLITICS AND POLICIES 150, 150 (George F. Cole & Marc G. Gertz, eds., 7th‚ ed. 1998).

195‚ See id. at 151, 154.

196‚ Tucker Carlson,‚ Washington’s Inept Police Force,‚ WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1993, at A19.

197‚ See‚ SILBERMAN,‚ supra‚ note 6, at 297. Silberman points out that New York City police solved only two percent of robbery cases in which a witness could not identify an offender or the offender was not captured at the scene.‚ See id.

198‚ See id. at 296 (saying clearance rate dropped precipitously between 1960 and 1976 as proportion of crimes committed by strangers increased).

199‚ See id. (citing figures registered between 1960 and 1976).

200‚ See id. at 296.

201‚ See‚ Laura Parker & Gary Fields,‚ Unsolved Killings on Rise: Percent of Cases Closed Drops From 86% to 69%, USA TODAY, Feb. 22, 2000, at A1.

202‚ See id.

203‚ See‚ BARRY SCHECK, ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 175 (2000).

204‚ 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (finding death penalty constitutional so long as adequate procedures are provided to a defendant).

205‚ See‚ SCHECK,‚ supra‚ note 203, at 218.

206‚ See Illinois Governor Orders Execution Moratorium,‚ USA TODAY, Feb. 1, 2000, at 3A.

207‚ See id.

208‚ See‚ SCHECK,‚ supra‚ note 203, at 218 (noting an average of 4.6 condemned people per year have been set free after 1996, while only 2.5 death row inmates per year were freed between 1973 and 1993).

209‚ See id. at xv (noting these 5,000 exonerations came from only the first 18 thousand results of DNA testing at crime laboratories ‚” a rate of almost 30% exonerated).

210‚ C.f. id. at 180 (detailing indictment of four officers for perjury and obstruction of justice in the wake of one DNA exoneration).

211‚ DNA testing has proven that at least 67 people were sent to prison or death row for crimes they did not commit.‚ See id. at xiv. This number grows each month.‚ See id.

212‚ C.f. Morgan Cloud,‚ The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L. J. 1311, 1311 (1994) (saying “[p]olice perjury is the dirty little secret of our criminal justice system”).

213‚ See‚ BURTON S. KATZ, JUSTICE OVERRULED: UNMASKING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 77-86 (1999).

214‚ See‚ SILBERMAN,‚ supra‚ note 6, at 308 (describing interrogation techniques of police as “an art form in its own right.”). Lying or bluffing can often persuade a suspect to admit crimes to the police which would not otherwise be proven.‚ See id.

215‚ C.f. id. (recounting that an officer under observation would simply lie on the stand if challenged in court about whether Miranda warnings were given before questioning a suspect).

216‚ See‚ Joe Cantlupe & David Hasemyer,‚ Pursuit of Justice: How San Diego Police Officers Handled the Killing of One of Their Own. It Is a Case Flawed by Erratic Testimony and Questionable Conduct, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Sept. 11, 1994, at A1 (exposing that some officers gave false testimony in case of suspected cop-killers).

217‚ Andrew Horwitz,‚ Taking the Cop Out of Copping a Plea: Eradicating Police Prosecution of Criminal Cases, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1305, 1321 (1998) (quoting Jerome H. Skolnick).

218‚ See‚ Daniel B. Wood,‚ One precinct stirs a criminal-justice crisis, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 18, 2000, at 1.

219‚ See‚ TITUS REID,‚ supra‚ note 57, at 120.

220‚ See‚ SILBERMAN,‚ supra‚ note 6, at 231.

221‚ See‚ Gary Fields,‚ New Orleans’ Crime Fight Started With Police, USA TODAY, Feb. 1, 2000, at 6A.

222‚ See‚ Tucker Carlson,‚ Washington’s Inept Police Force, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1993, at A19.

223‚ See Abuse of Power, DETROIT NEWS, May 3, 1996.

224‚ See‚ Lawrence W. Sherman,‚ Becoming Bent: Moral Careers of Corrupt Policemen, IN‚ “ORDER UNDER LAW”: READINGS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 96, 104-06 (1981) (discussing police burglary scandals of the 1960s).

225‚ See‚ Wood,‚ supra‚ note 218, at 5 (citing critics).

226‚ See‚ FRIEDMAN,‚ supra‚ note 58, at 154. The Lexow Committee of 1894 was perhaps the first to probe police misconduct in New York City. The Committee found that the police had formed a “separate and highly privileged class, armed with the authority and the machinery of oppression.”‚ See id.. Witnesses before the Committee testified to brutal beatings, extortion and perjury by New York police.‚ See id. at 154-55.

227‚ In April 1994, for example, thirty-three New York officers were indicted and ultimately convicted of perjury, drug dealing and robbery.‚ See‚ James Lardner,‚ Better Cops. Fewer Robbers, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 9, 1997, pp. 44-52. The following year, sixteen Bronx police officers were indicted for robbing drug dealers, beating people, and abusing the public.‚ See id.

228‚ See‚ Jerome H. Skolnick,‚ A Sketch of the Policeman’s “Working Personality,” in‚ THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: POLITICS AND POLICIES 116, 123 (George F. Cole & Marc G. Gertz 7th‚ ed. 1998).

229‚ See‚ Wood,‚ supra‚ note 218, at 5 (quoting critics).

230‚ C.f. TITUS REID,‚ supra‚ note 57, at 117-119 (describing police subculture).

231‚ See‚ FRIEDMAN,‚ supra‚ note 58, at 154 (saying New York police of the 1890s engaged in routine extortion of businesses, collecting kickbacks from push-cart vendors, corner groceries, and businessmen whose flag poles extended too far into the street). In Chicago, police historically sought “contributions” from saloonkeepers.‚ See id.‚ at 155.

232‚ See, e.g., PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, RIGHT FROM THE BEGINNING 283-84 (1990) (detailing police favoritism toward one St. Louis newspaper and antagonism toward its competitor); Jonathan D. Rockoff,‚ Comment Costs Kennedy Police Backing, PROVIDENCE J., April 21, 2000, at 1B (describing police unions’ threats to drop their support for Rep. Kennedy due to Kennedy’s public remarks).

233‚ See‚ Davis,‚ supra‚ note 152, at 355.

234‚ See‚ Wasserstrom,‚ supra‚ note 70, at 293-94 n.188 (1984) (stating no one has ever been convicted under the statute, 18 U.S.C. ƒ¯‚¿‚½ 2236).

235‚ See‚ U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Inspector General,‚ The FBI Laboratory: An Investigation into Laboratory Practices and Alleged Misconduct in Explosives-Related and Other Cases‚ (April 1997) (detailing Justice Department’s findings of impropriety at the FBI Crime Lab).

236‚ Cf. SlLBERMAN,‚ supra‚ note 6, at 211-14 (observing the behavior of cops on patrol).

237‚ See id. at 215-16 (citing study conducted in Kansas City in the 1970s).

238‚ C.f. id. at 215 (pointing to mounting criticism of traditional approach). Studies of police pull-overs and sidewalk stops invariably demonstrate patterns of economic, racial, and social discrimination as well.‚ See, e.g., Bruce Landis,‚ State Police Records Support Charges of Bias in Traffic Stops, PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 5, 1999 at 1A (reporting Rhode Island traffic stop statistics demonstrate racial bias by state police).

239‚ The United States’ ‘war on drugs’ is a perfect illustration of the difficulties of implementing broad-ranging social policy through police enforcement mechanisms. “Not since Vietnam ha[s] a national mission failed so miserably.” JIM MCGEE & BRIAN DUFFY, MAIN JUSTICE: THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO ENFORCE THE NATION’S CRIMINAL LAWS AND GUARD ITS LIBERTIES 43 (1996). The federal drug control budget increased from $4.3 billion in 1988 to $11.9 billion in 1992, yet national drug supply increased greatly and prices dropped during the same period.‚ See id. at 42. The costs of enforcement in 1994 ranged from $79,376 per arrestee by the DEA to $260,000 per arrestee by the FBI, with no progress made at all toward decreasing the drug trade.‚ See id.

240‚ See‚ JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN CONTROL LAWS 213 n.3 (1998) (citing forthcoming paper).

241‚ Some two-thirds of the public say they have a great deal of respect for the police. See SHMUEL LOCK, CRIME, PUBLIC OPINION, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE TOLERANT PUBLIC 69 (1999). Interestingly, however, lawyers are more than 20 percentage points lower in their general assessment of police.‚ See id.

242‚ Public opinion polls repeatedly show that a majority of the public favor decreasing constitutional protections.‚ See, e.g., id. at 6. It must be noted, however, that the general public is‚ more‚ inclined than lawyers and the Supreme Court to favor protecting some civil liberties. For example, 49 percent of the public disapproves of police searching private property by air without warrant, while only 37 percent of lawyers disapprove and the Supreme Court upheld the practice in‚ United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).‚ See id. at 39. A majority of the public (51%) would prohibit police from searching one’s garbage without a warrant, while only 36 percent of lawyers disapprove and the Supreme Court upheld the practice in‚ California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).‚ See id. The public is also less inclined than lawyers to approve of using illegally obtained evidence to impeach a witness.‚ See id. at 45.

243‚ C.f. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (stating Fourth Amendment rights have at times proved unpopular and the Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment in fear that future majorities might compromise Fourth Amendment values).

244‚ See‚ JOHN PHILLIP REID, IN DEFIANCE OF THE LAW: THE STANDING-ARMY CONTROVERSY, THE Two CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1981) (recounting the history and constitutional background of the standing-army controversy that preceded the Revolution).

245‚ THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 12, 13, 14 (U.S. 1776).

246‚ See‚ JOHN P. REID,‚ supra‚ note 244, at 79.

247‚ See id. at 79.

248‚ See id. at 50 (citation omitted).

249‚ See id. at 29 (quoting the orations of Hancock).

250‚ In Edinburgh in 1736, a unit of town guards maintaining order during the execution of a convicted smuggler was pelted with stones and mud until some soldiers began firing weapons at the populace.‚ See‚ JOHN P. REID,‚ supra‚ note 244, at 114-15 (recounting the history and constitutional background of the standing-army controversy which preceded the Revolution). After nine citizens were found dead, the captain of the guard was tried for murder, convicted, and himself condemned to be hanged.‚ See id.

When officers of the crown indicated a willingness to pardon the captain, a mob of civilians “rescued” the captain from prison and hanged him.‚ See id.

251‚ See‚ Hall,‚ supra‚ note 71, at 587-88.

252‚ Id. at 587.

253‚ Ben C. Roberts,‚ On the Origins and Resolution of English Working-Class Protest, in‚ NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 238, 252 (Graham & Gurr, dir. 1969).

254‚ JOHN P. REID,‚ supra‚ note 244, at 80.

255‚ See id. at 95 (quoting from a 1770 issue of the New Hampshire Gazette).

256‚ See‚ Kraska & Kappeler,‚ supra‚ note 167, at 2-3 (citing National Institute of Justice report detailing “partnership” between Defense and Justice Departments in equipping personnel to “engage the crime war”).

257‚ See‚ William Booth,‚ The Militarization of ‘Mayberry,’‚ WASH. POST, June 17, 1997, at A1.

258‚ See id.

259‚ See id.

260‚ See id. (quoting Kraska).

261‚ See‚ Kraska & Kappeler,‚ supra‚ note 167, at 10.

262‚ See‚ Roger Roots,‚ The Approaching Death of the Collective Right Theory of the Second Amendment, 39 DUQUESNE L. REV. 71 (2000).

263‚ See id.

264‚ C.f. id.

265‚ See‚ JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN CONTROL LAWS (1998) (supporting a proposition consistent with the title); GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1991).

266‚ KLECK,‚ supra‚ note 265, at 111-116, 148.

267‚ See‚ George F. Will,‚ Are We a Nation of Cowards?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 15, 1993, at 93. The error rate is defined as the rate of shootings involving an innocent person mistakenly identified as a criminal. See id.

268‚ See‚ ANTHONY J. PINIZZOTTO, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, IN THE LINE OF FIRE: A STUDY OF SELECTED FELONIOUS ASSAULTS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 8 (1997) (table showing 41 percent accuracy by police as opposed to 91 percent accuracy by their assailants with handguns).

269‚ See, e.g., Morgan v. California, 743 F.2d 728 (9th‚ Cir. 1984) (involving drunk officers who backed their car into innocent civilian couple and then brandished guns to threaten them).

270‚ See‚ Shapiro v. New York City Police Dept., 595 N.Y.S.2d 864 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (upholding revocation of pistol license of cop who threatened drivers with gun during two traffic disputes); Matter of Beninson v. Police Dept., 574 N.Y.S.2d 307 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (involving revocation of pistol permit of cop based on two displays of firearms in traffic situations).

271‚ See‚ JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 255 n. 34 (2d ed. 1995) (citing review of nearly 700 shootings).

272‚ See‚ Tucker Carlson,‚ Washington’s Inept Police Force, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1993, at A19.

273‚ U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law”).

274‚ See‚ Morton J. Horwitz,‚ Is the Third Amendment Obsolete?, 26 VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 209, 214 (1991) (stating the Third Amendment might have produced a constitutional bar to standing armies in peacetime if public antipathy toward standing armies had remained intense over time).

275‚ See id.

276‚ 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 747-48 (1833) (emphasis added).

277‚ For a well-written local history of this conflict, see HENRY BLACKMAN PLUMB, HISTORY OF HANOVER TOWNSHIP 121-140 (1885).

278‚ See id.

279‚ See id. at 125-26.

280‚ See id. at 130.

281‚ See id. at 138 (adding that those convicted “were allowed easily to escape, and no fines were ever attempted to be collected”).

282‚ See, e.g., JAMES BOVARD, FREEDOM IN CHAINS: THE RISE OF THE STATE AND THE DEMISE OF THE CITIZEN (1999) (presenting a thesis in line with the title); JAMES BOVARD, LOST RIGHTS: THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN LIBERTY (1994) (detailing America’s loss of freedom).

283‚ See‚ Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (saying the right to be let alone is “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man.”).

284‚ C.f. Stephen D. Mastrofski, et al.,‚ The Helping Hand of the Law: Police Control of Citizens on Request, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 307 (2000) (detailing study finding officers are likely to use their power to control citizens at mere request of other citizens).

285‚ U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

286‚ See, e.g., Maryland Minority,‚ Address to the People of Maryland, Maryland Gazette, May 6, 1788,‚ reprinted in‚ THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT,‚ supra‚ note 89, at 356, 358 (stating that an amendment protecting people from unreasonable search and seizure was considered indispensable by many who opposed the Constitution).

287‚ See, e.g., AKHIL R. AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 1-45 (1997). Amar argues that the Amendment lays down only a few “first principles” ‚” namely “that all searches and seizures must be reasonable, that warrants (and only warrants) always require probable cause, and that the officialdom should be held liable for unreasonable searches and seizures.”‚ Id. at 1.

288‚ See, e.g., Richard A. Posner,‚ Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment should not provide a guilty criminal with any right to avoid punishment).

289‚ See‚ AMAR,‚ supra‚ note 287, at 3-17 (arguing the Framers intended no warrant requirement).

290‚ See id.

291‚ See‚ California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referencing Amar’s claims for support). Ten years earlier, in‚ Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), Justice Rehnquist cited a 1969 book by Professor Telfred Taylor ‚” Amar’s predecessor in the argument that the Fourth Amendment’s text requires only an ad hoc test of reasonableness ‚” for the same proposition.‚ Id. at 437 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

292‚ See, e.g., Hulit v. State, 982 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (citing Amar for proposition that Fourth Amendment requires no warrants).

293‚ See, e.g., Max Boot, Out of Order: Arrogance, Corruption, and Incompetence on the Bench 66 (1998) (reciting the Amar/Taylor thesis without reservation).

294‚ Since the addition of Justice Rehnquist to the Supreme Court, the Court has traveled far down the road toward ejecting the warrant requirement.‚ See generally‚ Wasserstrom,‚ supra‚ note 70. The Court has increasingly tended to adopt a mere balancing test, pitting the citizen’s “Fourth Amendment interests” (rather than his “rights”) against “legitimate governmental interests.”‚ See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).

295‚ In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 6 (1977), the United States Justice Department mounted a “frontal attack” on the warrant requirement and argued that the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment protected only “interests traditionally identified with the home.” Accordingly, the Justice Department would have eliminated warrants in every other setting.

296‚ Compare‚ Howard v. Lyon, 1 Root 107 (Conn. 1787) (involving constable who obtained “escape warrant” to recapture an escaped prisoner and even had the warrant “renewed” in Rhode Island where prisoner fled),‚ and‚ Bromley v. Hutchins, 8 Vt. 68 (1836) (upholding damages against a deputy sheriff who arrested an escapee without warrant outside the deputy’s jurisdiction),‚ with‚ United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (allowing warrantless arrest of most suspects in public so long as probable cause exists).

297‚ See‚ Morgan Cloud,‚ Searching through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1713 (1996) (citing the exhaustive research of William Cuddihy for the proposition that specific warrants were required at Founding).

298‚ AMAR,‚ supra‚ note 287, at 5.

299‚ 1 Conn. 40 (1814).

300‚ See id. at 44.

301‚ 3 Day 1, 3 (Conn. 1807).

302‚ 1761-1772 Quincy Mass. Reports (1763). Perhaps Amar’s statement can be read as a commentary on the dearth of originalist scholarship among those who support strong protections for criminal suspects and defendants. “Originalism” as a means of constitutional interpretation is not always definable in a single way, and “originalists” may often contradict each other as to their interpretation of given cases.‚ See‚ Richard S. Kay,‚ “Originalist” Values and Constitutional Interpretation, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 335 (1995). Professor Kay has identified four distinct interpretive methods as being “originalist” ‚” any two of which might produce differing conclusions: 1) original text, 2) original intentions, 3) original understanding, and 4) original values.‚ See id. at 336. This being conceded, originalism has generally been the domain of “conservative” jurists for the past generation, fueled by reactions to the methods of adjudication employed by the Warren Court.‚ See id. at 335.

303‚ 9 N.H. 239 (1838).

304‚ 3 Bin. 38, 43 (Pa. 1810).

305‚ Admittedly, two of Amar’s cited cases present troubling statements of the law. The rule of Amar’s first case,‚ Jones v. Root, 72 Mass. 435 (1856), is somewhat difficult to discern. Although the case may be read as a total rejection of required warrants (as Amar contends,‚ supra note 287, at 4-5 n.10), it may also be read as an adoption of the “in the presence” exception to the warrant requirement known to the common law. The court’s opinion is no more than a paragraph long and merely upholds the instruction of a lower court that a statute allowing warrantless seizure of liquors was constitutional.‚ Jones, 72 Mass. at 439. The opinion also upheld the use of an illustration by the trial judge that suggested the seizure was similar to a seizure of stolen goods observed in the presence‚ of an officer.‚ See id. at 437.

A second case may also be read to mean that the government may search and seize without warrant, but might also be read as enunciating the “breach of peace” exception to the warrant requirement.‚ Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 53 (1817) involved a town tythingman who seized a wagon and horses of an apparent teamster engaged in commercial delivery on the Sabbath, in violation of a New Hampshire statute. Amar quotes‚ Mayo’s‚ pronouncement that the New Hampshire Fourth-Amendment equivalent “does not seem intended to restrain the legislature …” But elsewhere in the opinion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that an arrest‚ required‚ a “warrant in law” ‚” either a magistrate’s warrant, or excusal by the commission of a felony or breach of peace.‚ Mayo, 1 N.H. at 56. “[B]ut if the affray be over, there must be an express warrant.” Id. (emphasis added). Not much support for Amar’s thesis there.

Mayo‚ was decided only fourteen years after the dawn of judicial review in‚ Marbury v. Madison, 5‚ U.S. 137 (1803), during an era when the constitutional interpretations of legislatures were thought to have equal weight to the interpretations of the judiciary.‚ Cf. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 335-40 (7th‚ ed. 1998) (describing the slow advent of the concept of judicial review). Indeed, the first act of a state legislature to be declared unconstitutional came only seven years earlier,‚ see‚ Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810), and the first state court decision invalidated by the Supreme Court had come only one year earlier.‚ See‚ Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816). The very heart of the Mayo‚ decision that Amar relies on (the proposition that state legislatures have concurrent power of constitutional review with the judiciary) was so thoroughly discredited soon afterward that Amar’s extrapolation that Founding era courts did not require warrants seems exceedingly far-fetched.

As judicial review gathered sanction, the doctrine apparently enunciated in‚ Mayo‚ became increasingly discredited.‚ See‚ Ex Parte Rhodes, 79 So. 462 (Ala. 1918) (saying “[t]here is not to be found a single authority, decision, or textbook, in the library of this court, that sanctions the doctrine that the legislature, a municipality, or Congress can determine what is a ‘reasonable’ arrest”).

306‚ Amar cites six cases (all referred to in‚ United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)), as standing for the proposition that state Fourth Amendment equivalents did not presume a warrant requirement. AMAR,‚ supra‚ note 287, at 5 n. l1. The first case,‚ State v. Brown, 5 Del. (5 Harr.) 505 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1853), is difficult to reconcile with Amar’s thesis that antebellum courts recognized no warrant requirement.‚ Brown‚ upheld a criminal‚ verdict against a night watchman who entered a residence in pursuit of a fleeing chicken thief and instead falsely arrested ‚” without warrant ‚” the proprietor. The second case cited by Amar,‚ Johnson v. State, 30 Ga. 426 (1860), simply upheld a guilty verdict against a man who shot a policeman during a warrantless arrest for being an accomplice to a felony. The Georgia Supreme Court repeated the common law exception allowing that an officer may arrest felons without warrant. The third case,‚ Baltimore & O. R.R. Co. v. Cain, 81 Md. 87, 31 A. 801 (1895), merely reversed a civil jury verdict for an arrestee on grounds that the appellant railroad company was entitled to a jury instruction allowing for a breach-of-peace exception to the warrant requirement. The fourth case,‚ Reuck v. McGregor, 32 N.J.L. 70 (Sup. Ct. 1866), reversed a civil verdict on grounds of excessive damages ‚” while upholding civil liability‚ for causing warrantless arrest of an apparently wrongly-accused thief.‚ Holley v. Mix, 3 Wend. 350 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829), Amar’s fifth case, offers little support for Amar’s thesis.‚ Holleyupheld a civil judgment against a private person and an officer who arrested a suspect pursuant to an invalid warrant. Finally,‚ Wade v. Chaffee, 8 R.I. 224 (1865), simply held that a constable was not bound to procure a warrant where he had probable cause to believe an arrestee was guilty of a felony, even though no fear of escape was present.

307‚ Amar cites four cases as standing for the proposition that state courts interpreted their state constitutional predecessors of the Fourth Amendment’s text as requiring no warrants for searches or seizures. AMAR, supra note 287, at 5 n.10.‚ Jones v. Root, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 435 (1856), upheld a Massachusetts “no-warrant” statute in a one-paragraph opinion explained supra‚ note 306. In‚ Rohan v. Sawin, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 281 (1850), Massachusetts’ highest court found that a warrantless arrest qualified under the “felon” exception to the warrant requirement.‚ Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 53 (1817), is described supranote 306.

Finally, the 1814 Pennsylvania case of‚ Wakely v. Hart, 6‚ Binn. 316 (Pa. 1814), resolved a civil suit brought by an accused thief (Wakely) against his arresters upon grounds that the arrest had been warrantless and Wakely had been guilty only of a misdemeanor. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a jury’s verdict for the arresters, upon the rather-fudged finding that Wakely had fled from the charges against him and had been guilty of at least “an offence which approaches very near to a felony,” if not an actual felony.‚ Wakely, 6 Binn. at 319-20.

308‚ See‚ Eric Schnapper,‚ Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REV. 869, 874 (1985) (saying the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment “embodies requirements independent of the warrant clause” but which were more strict at Founding than warrant requirement).

309‚ See‚ Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1153, 1167 (c.p. 1763) (stating “a jury have it in their power to give damages for more than the injury received”).

310‚ See‚ Schnapper,‚ supra‚ note 308, at 917 (referring to‚ Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).‚ Boyd’s‚ proposition was slowly watered down and distinguished until the case of‚ Andresen v. Maryland‚ finished it off. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (holding that business documents evidencing fraudulent real estate dealings could be constitutionally seized by warrant).

311‚ See‚ Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (pronouncing “mere evidence” rule, which stood for more than 45 years).

312‚ See‚ Schnapper,‚ supra‚ note 308, at 923-29.

313‚ See‚ Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (holding that police can obtain even indirect evidence by use of search warrants).‚ Hayden‚ overturned at least five previous Supreme Court decisions by declaring that “privacy” rather than property was the “principle object of the Fourth Amendment.”‚ Id. at 296 n.l, 304.

314‚ See‚ Frisbie v. Butler, 1 Kirby 213 (Conn. 1787).

315‚ See, e.g., Stevens v. Fassett, 27 Me. 266 (1847) (involving defendant who had obtained two arrest warrants against plaintiff without officer assistance); State v. McAllister, 25 Me. 490 (1845) (involving crime victim who swore out warrant affidavit against alleged assailant); State v. J.H., 1 Tyl. 444 (Vt. 1802) (quashing criminal charge gained by unsworn complaint of private individual).

316‚ See‚ Humes v. Taber, 1 RI. 464 (1850) (involving search by sheriff accompanied by private persons).

317‚ See‚ Kimball v. Munson, 2 Kirby (Conn.) 3 (1786) (upholding civil damages against two men who arrested suspect without warrant to obtain reward).

318‚ See‚ Wasserstrom,‚ supra‚ note 70, at 289.

319‚ The Framers regarded private persons acting under color of “public authority” to be subject to constitutional constraints like the proscription against double jeopardy..See‚ Stevens v. Fassett, 27 Me. 266 (1847) (holding private prosecutors were prohibited from twice putting a defendant in jeopardy for the same offense).

320‚ 256 U.S. 465 (1921).

321‚ Burdeau v. McDowell‚ involved a corporate official (McDowell) who was fired by his employer for financial malfeasance at work. After McDowell’s termination, company representatives raided his office, opened his safe, and rifled through his papers.‚ See id. at 473. Upon finding incriminating evidence against McDowell, company representatives alerted the United States Justice Department and turned over certain papers to the government. A district judge ordered the stolen papers returned to McDowell before they could be seen by a grand jury. The Supreme Court reversed, stating the Fourth Amendment “was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies.”‚ Id. at 475.

322‚ See‚ Cloud,‚ supra‚ note 297, at 1716 (discussing transition during early 1700s from concept that ‘a man’s house is his castle (except against the government)’ to the legal adage that ‘a man’s house is his castle (especially against the government)’).

323‚ Massachusetts and Vermont apparently required that only public officers execute search warrants in the early nineteenth century.‚ See Commonwealth v. Foster, 1 Mass. 488 (1805) (holding justice of peace had no authority to issue a warrant to a private person to arrest a criminal suspect); State v. J.H., 1 Tyl. 444 (Vt. 1802).

324‚ See‚ Bissell v. Bissell, 3 N.H. 520 (1826).

325‚ See Kimball v. Munson, which upheld civil damages against two men who arrested an alleged horse thief without warrant in response to a constable’s reward offer. 2 Kirby 3 (Conn. 1786). Kimball suggested the two private persons would have been protected from liability had they secured a warrant soon after their arrest of the suspect.‚ See also‚ Frisbie v. Butler, 1 Kirby 213 (Conn. 1787) (applying specificity requirement to search warrant issued to private person).

326‚ See‚ Del Col v. Arnold, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 333 (1796) (holding that “privateers” on the open seas who capture illegal vessels under the auspices of government authority act at their own peril and may be held liable for all damages to the captured vessels ‚” even where the captured vessels are engaged in crimes on the high seas).

327‚ See‚ Humes v. Taber, 1 R.I. 464 (1850)

328‚ See‚ Melvin v. Fisher, 8 N.H. 406, 407 (1836) (saying “he who causes another to be arrested by a wrong name is a trespasser, even if the process was intended to be against the person actually arrested).

329‚ See‚ Holley v. Mix, 3 Wend. 350 (N.Y. 1829).

330‚ See‚ Kimball v. Munson, 2 Kirby 3 (Conn. 1786) (faulting two arrestors for failing to obtain a proper warrant immediately after their warrantless arrest of a suspected felon); Knot v. Gay, 1 Root 66, 67 (Conn. 1774) (stating warrantless arrest is permitted “where an highhanded offense had been committed, and an immediate arrest became necessary, to prevent an escape”).

331‚ See‚ Wade v. Chaffee, 8 R.I. 224 (R.I. 1865) (holding a constable is not bound to procure a warrant before arresting a felon even though there may be no reason to fear the escape of the felon).

332‚ See, e.g., Oleson v. Pincock, 251 P. 23, 25 (Utah 1926); Burroughs v. Eastman, 59 N.W. 817 (Mich. 1894); Minnesota v. Cantieny, 24 N.W. 458 (Minn. 1885); William A. Schroeder,‚ Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth Amendment, 58 Mo. L. REV. 790-91 (1993).

333‚ See‚ Schroeder,‚ supra‚ note 101, at 784 n.14-16 (listing eight jurisdictions allowing such arrests).

334‚ But see id. at 791 n.39 (listing four cases that have held warrantless arrests for crimes committed outside an officer’s presence unconstitutional).

335‚ See id. at 779-81 n.13 (providing two pages of statutory provisions allowing warrantless arrest for domestic violence and other specific misdemeanors).

336‚ See‚ Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (requiring warrant to forcibly enter a home to arrest someone inside for a misdemeanor traffic offense); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (requiring warrant to forcibly enter a home to arrest a suspected felon unless exigent circumstances prevail).

337‚ See‚ United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 412 (1976).‚ Watson‚ represents one of the starkest redrawings of search and seizure law ever pronounced by the Supreme Court. Essentially, the Court declared that officers may arrest without warrant wherever they have probable cause. Justice Thurgood Marshall released a blistering dissent accusing the majority of betraying the “the only clear lesson of history” that the common law “considered the arrest warrant far more important than today’s decision leaves it.”‚ Id. at 442 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

338‚ United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985).

339‚ See‚ Conner v. Commonwealth, 3 Bin. 38, 42-43 (Pa. 1810) (insisting that public safety alone justifies exceptions to the warrant requirement).

340‚ See‚ Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985). The number of crimes considered felonies varied greatly according to location and period. Plymouth Colony knew only seven in 1636: treason, willful murder, willful arson, conversing with the devil, rape, adultery, and sodomy.‚ See Julius Goebel, Jr.,‚ King’s Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New England, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 416, n.43 (1931). In general, the American colonists considered far fewer crimes to be felonies than did the people of England.‚ C.f. Thorp L. Wolford,‚ The Laws and Liberties of 1648, reprinted in‚ ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 147, 182 (David H. Flaherty, ed. 1969) (saying there were far more felonies in English than in Massachusetts law).

341‚ JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 253 (2d ed. 1995).

342‚ United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).

343‚ See‚ United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 439-440 (1976).

344‚ But see id. at 438 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact is that a felony at common law and a felony today bear only slight resemblance, with the result that the relevance of the common-law rule of arrest to the modern interpretation of our Constitution is minimal”).

345‚ See‚ WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 20 (2d ed. 1992).

346‚ See‚ AMAR,‚ supra‚ note 287, at 44. The remedial suggestions proposed by Amar (strict liability tort remedies, class actions, attorneys’ fees, statutorily-generated punitive damages, and injunctive relief) are, if anything, less loyal to originalist ideals than the warrant requirement he criticizes.‚ See‚ Carol S. Steiker,Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 828 (1994) (suggesting Amar’s departures from the Framer’s intent regarding remedies belie his proclaimed adherence to the Framers’ “vision” regarding warrants, probable cause and the exclusionary rule).

347‚ See‚ AMAR,‚ supra‚ note 287, at 44 n. 226 (saying the “government should generally not prevail” in Amar’s type of ideal tort actions).

348‚ See‚ AMAR‚ supra‚ note 287, at 12.

349‚ See‚ Wasserstrom,‚ supra‚ note 70, at 289 (saying false arrest was subject to strict liability in colonial times).

350‚ See‚ Holley v. Mix, 3 Wend. 350, 354 (N.Y. 1829) (stating if any person charge another with felony, the charge will justify an officer taking the suspect in custody, but the person making the charge will be liable for false arrest if no felony was committed).

351‚ See‚ Clarke v. Little, 1 Smith 100, 101 (N.H. 1805) (addressing liabilities of deputy to debtor’s creditors).

352‚ Hall v. Brooks 8 Vt. 485 (1836) (holding constable liable for refusing to serve court process).

353‚ See‚ Shewel v. Fell, 3 Yeates 17, 22 (Pa. 1800) (holding sheriff liable to prisoner’s creditor for entire debt of prison escapee).

354‚ See‚ Chapman v. Bellows, 1 Smith 127 (N.H. 1805).

355‚ See‚ Morse v. Betton, 2 N.H. 184, 185 (1820).

356‚ See‚ Lamb v. Day, 8 Vt. 407 (1836) (holding constable liable for allowing mare in his custody to be used); Bissell v. Huntington, 2 N.H. 142. 146-47 (1819).

357‚ See‚ Webster v. Quimby, 8 N.H. 382, 386 (1836).

358‚ See‚ Administrator of Janes v. Martin, 7 Vt. 92 (Vt. 1835).

359‚ See‚ Kittredge v. Bellows, 7 N.H. 399 (1835).

360‚ See‚ Herrick v. Manly, 1 Cai. R. 253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803).

361‚ See‚ Bromley v. Hutchins, 8 Vt. 194, 196 (Vt. 1836).

362‚ See‚ Hazard v. Israel, 1 Binn. 240 (Pa. 1808).

363‚ See‚ Fullerton v. Mack, 2 Aik. 415 (1828).

364‚ See‚ Rex v. Gay, Quincy, Mass. Rep. 1761-1772 (1763) (acquitting defendant who battered sheriff when sheriff attempted arrest with warrant irregular on its face).

365‚ See‚ Percival v. Jones, 2 Johns. Cas. 49, 51 (N.Y. 1800) (holding justice of peace liable for issuing arrest execution against person privileged from imprisonment).

366‚ See id.

367‚ See‚ Preston v. Yates, 24 N.Y. 534 (1881) (involving sheriff who obtained indemnity bond from private party).

368‚ See‚ Grinnell v. Phillips, 1 Mass. 530, 537 (1805) (involving Massachusetts statute requiring officers to be bonded).

369‚ See‚ Tilley v. Cottrell, 43 A. 369 (R.I. 1899) (holding constable liable for damages against him for which his indemnity bond did not cover).

370‚ C.f. White v. French, 81 Mass. 339 (1860) (involving officer arrested when his obligor failed to pay for officer’s liability); Treasurer of the State v. Holmes, 2 Aik. 48 (Vt. 1826) (involving sheriff jailed for debt in Franklin County, Vermont).

371‚ At the time of Founding, juries remedied improper searches and seizures by levying heavy damages from officers who conducted them.‚ See‚ AMAR,‚ supra‚ note 287, at 12. The ratification debates made it clear that no method of curbing “the insolence of office” worked as well as juries giving “ruinous damages whenever an officer has deviated from the rigid letter of the law, or been guilty of any unnecessary act of insolence or oppression.” Maryland Farmer,‚ Essays by a Farmer‚ (1),‚ reprinted in‚ THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 5, 14 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). Punitive damages were apparently common in search and seizure trespass cases, and provided “an invaluable maxim” for securing proper and reasonable conduct by public officers. Today, however, municipalities never have to pay out punitive damages.‚ See‚ Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).

372‚ See‚ Johnson v. Georgia, 30 Ga. 426 (1860) (holding that a policeman is as much under protection of the law as any public officer).

373‚ Many Founding-Era constitutions contained statements declaring a right of remedy for every person.‚ See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, ƒ¯‚¿‚½ 12 (providing that “every freeman for every injury done him in his goods, lands or person, by any other person, ought to have remedy by the course of the law of the land”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. I, ƒ¯‚¿‚½ XI (providing “Every subject of the commonwealth ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, part I, ƒ¯‚¿‚½ XIV (stating “Every subject of this state is entitled to a certain remedy”). Some early proposals for the national Bill of Rights also included such remedy provisions.‚ See, e.g., Proposed Amended Federal Constitution, April 30, 1788,‚ reprinted in‚ THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1787-1792 790, 791 (David E. Young, ed.) (2d ed. 1995) (providing that “every individual… ought to find a certain remedy against all injuries, or wrongs”).

374‚ C.f. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776) (“He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance”).

375‚ A small history lesson regarding the early development of officer immunity is provided in‚ Seaman v. Patten, 2 Cai. R. 312 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). Early tax and custom enforcement agents were unsworn volunteers, having “generally received a portion of the spoil.”‚ Id. at 315. Corresponding to this system, such agents acted at their own peril and were civilly liable for their every impropriety. This “hard rule” of high officer liability was still in force a generation after the Constitution was ratified, although courts began to hold officers less accountable for their mistakes when officers became sworn to perform certain ever-more-difficult duties.‚ See id.

376‚ See Seaman, 2 Cai. R. at 317; Bissell v. Huntington, 2 N.H. 142, 147 (1819) (declaring that sheriffs good faith acts should receive “most favourable construction.”). “[N]either the court, the bar, nor the public should favor prosecutions against them for petty mistakes.”‚ Id. at 147.

377‚ See‚ Diana Hassel,‚ Living a Lie; The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 Mo. L. REV. 123, 151 n. 122.

378‚ State v. Dunning, 98 S.E. 530, 531 (N.C. 1919).

379‚ See, e.g., Stinnett v. Commonwealth, 55 F.2d 644, 647 (4th‚ Cir. 1932) (reversing jury verdict against officer on grounds that “courts should not lay down rules which will make it so dangerous for officers to perform their duties that they will shrink and hesitate from action”); State v. Dunning, 98 S.E. 530 (N.C. 1919) (reversing criminal verdict against officer who shot approaching man on grounds that the officer enjoyed a privilege to use deadly force instead of retreating).

380‚ The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence has offered a more relaxed definition of “probable cause” as a “fluid concept” of “suspicion” rather than a fixed standard of probability.‚ See‚ Wasserstrom,‚ supra note 70, at 337 (analyzing Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in‚ Illinois v. Gates).

381‚ See‚ Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124, 128 (1932),‚ overturned by‚ Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).

382‚ Wasserstrom,‚ supra‚ note 70, at 274.

383‚ See‚ AMAR,‚ supra‚ note 287, at 20. Judges of the Founding era appear to have been somewhat more reluctant than modern judges to issue search and seizure warrants. For an early example of judicial scrutiny of warrant applications, see United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. 42 (1795) (upholding refusal of district judge to issue warrant for arrest of French deserter in the face of what government claimed was probable cause). Today, search warrant applications are rarely denied. The “secret wiretap court” established by Congress to process wiretap applications in 1978, has rejected only one wiretap request in its 22-year life.‚ See‚ Richard Willing,‚ Wiretaps sought in record numbers, USA TODAY, June 5, 2000, at A1 (saying the court approved 13,600 wiretap requests in the same period).

384‚ Private persons were liable if, for example, their complaint was too vague as to the address to be searched,‚ see‚ Humes v. Taber, 1 R.I. 464 (1850); misspelled the name of the accused,‚ see‚ Melvin v. Fisher, 8 N.H. 406, 407 (1836) (saying “he who causes another to be arrested by a wrong name is a trespasser, even if the process was intended to be against the person actually arrested); or called for the execution of a warrant naming a “John Doe” as a target,‚ see‚ Holley v. Mix, 3 Wend. 350 (N.Y. 1829).

385‚ See‚ Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784 (9th‚ Cir. 1995) (involving challenge to search warrant wrongfully obtained through false references to anonymous sources).

386‚ See‚ Hummel-Jones v. Strope, 25 F.3d 647 (8th‚ Cir. 1994) (involving police officer’s failure to disclose to judge that an undercover deputy sheriff was the “confidential informant” referred to in a search warrant application).

387‚ See‚ David B. Kopel & Paul H. Blackman,‚ The Unwarranted Warrant: The Waco Search Warrant and the Decline of the Fourth Amendment, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L & POL’Y 1, 13 (saying Waco warrant was filled with statements irrelevant to Koresh’s alleged firearm violations).

388‚ See id. at 21 (noting ATF agent’s false claims that various spare parts were machine gun conversion kits).

389‚ See‚ ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 235 (1994).

390‚ Id. at 233.

391‚ The 1920’s saw an explosion of police privilege to oversee two separate ‚” but often interrelated ‚” elements of American life: Prohibition and the automobile.‚ See‚ FRIEDMAN,‚ supra‚ note58, at 300 (saying search and seizure became a particularly salient issue during Prohibition). In 1925, the Supreme Court, by split decision, released an opinion that would grow within the next 75 years into an immense expansion of police prerogatives while at the same time representing an enormous loss of personal security for American automobile travelers.‚ Carroll v. United States‚ upheld a warrantless search of an automobile for liquor as valid under the infamous Volstad Act, enacted to breathe life into the Eighteenth Amendment. 267 U.S. 137 (1925). The Carroll opinion led lower courts to more than one interpretation,‚ see‚ Francis H. Bohlen & Harry Shulman,‚ Arrest With and Without a Warrant, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485, 488-89 (1927) , but slowly became recognized as a pronouncement of an “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement.‚ See‚ United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982).

Two decades after‚ Carroll, Justice Robert H. Jackson tried in earnest to force the genie back into the bottle by narrowing the automobile exception to cases of serious crimes, but a 7-2 majority outnumbered him.‚ See‚ Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). SinceBrinegar, the “automobile exception” has been a fixture of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and has greatly expanded. The automobile exception now accounts for the broadest umbrella of warrant exceptions.‚ See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (allowing warrantless search of containers in automobiles even without probable cause to search the vehicle as a whole). Indeed, the automobile exception has expanded so far that it has made a mockery of Fourth Amendment doctrine. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his‚ Acevedo‚ concurrence, an anomaly now exists protecting a briefcase carried on the sidewalk from warrantless search but allowing the same briefcase to be searched without warrant if taken into a car.‚ Acevedo‚ at 581 (Scalia, J., concurring).

392‚ Police surveillance of American roadways has brought the bar of justice far closer to most Americans than ever before. Few accounts of the sheer scale of traffic stops are available, but anecdotal evidence suggests traffic encounters with police number in the hundreds of millions annually. In North Carolina alone, more than 1.2 million traffic infractions were recorded in a single year.‚ See‚ FRIEDMAN,‚ supra‚ note 58, at 279. Of actual traffic stops, no reliable estimate can be made.

393‚ See‚ SKOLNICK & FYFE,‚ supra‚ note 63, at 99.

394‚ In‚ Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the Supreme Court actually considered, but stopped short of, allowing cops to randomly stop any traveler without any particularized reason ‚” with one justice (Rehnquist) arguing that cops may do so.‚ Prouse, 440 U.S. at 664 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

395‚ See‚ Flanders v. Herbert, 1 Smith (N.H.) 205 (1808) (finding constable who stopped a driver and horse team pursuant to an invalid writ of attachment liable for trespass). Private tort principles rather than state licensing programs governed highway travel at the time of the Framers.‚ See‚ Kennard v. Burton, 25 Me. 39 (1845).

396‚ See‚ David Rudovsky,‚ The Criminal Justice System and the Role of the Police, in‚ THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, 242, 247 (David Kairys, ed. 1982).

397‚ Id.

398‚ Prior to the imposition of the exclusionary rule in‚ Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Cincinnati police force rarely applied for search warrants. In 1958, the police obtained three warrants. In 1959 the police obtained none.‚ See‚ Bradley C. Canon,‚ Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?: Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62‚ KENTUCKY L. J. 681, 709 (1974). Similarly, the use of search warrants by the New York City Police Department prior to‚ Mapp‚ was negligible, but afterward, over 5000 warrants were issued.‚ See Wasserstrom,‚ supra‚ note 70, at 297 n. 203.

399‚ Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (expressing belief that many unlawful searches are never revealed because no evidence is recovered).

400‚ See‚ Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

401‚ 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

402‚ 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

403‚ See‚ AMAR,‚ supra‚ note 287, at 21 (claiming “[s]upporters of the exclusionary rule cannot point to a single major statement from the Founding ‚” or even the antebellum or Reconstruction eras ‚” supporting Fourth Amendment exclusion of evidence in a criminal trial”).

404‚ See‚ BURTON S. KATZ, JUSTICE OVERRULED: UNMASKING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 43 (1997) (saying in two consecutive sentences that “[t]he exclusionary rule has failed in its only goal” but that “[t]he cost… is almost unbelievably high”).

405‚ See, e.g., id. at 43 (saying‚ Mapp‚ was the “culmination of an activist judicial trend”).

406‚ Fred E. Inbau,‚ Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor’s Stand, 53 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & P. S. 85 (1962),‚ reprinted in‚ 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1413, 1413 (1999) (emphasis added).

407‚ Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 516 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (saying “the Court is taking a real risk with society’s welfare in imposing its new regime on the country. The social costs of crime are too great to call the new rules anything but a hazardous experimentation.”).

408‚ Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting).

409‚ See‚ J. Richard Johnston,‚ Plea Bargaining in Exchange for Testimony: Has‚ Singleton‚ Really Resolved the Issues?, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Fall 1999, at 32 (quoting from Ed Cray’s biography of Earl Warren,‚ Chief Justice).

410‚ See id.

411‚ David Rudovsky,‚ The Criminal Justice System and the Role of the Police, in‚ THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 246 (David Kairys, ed. 1982).

412‚ Six years prior to the Mapp‚ decision, the influential California Supreme Court justice Roger Traynor concluded that exclusion was necessary to level the playing field between state and citizen. “It is morally incongruous,” wrote Traynor, “for the state to flout constitutional rights and at the same time demand that its citizens observe the law.” People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (Cal. 1955).

413‚ See‚ Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971).

414‚ See‚ Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 362 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (saying the exclusionary rule is much more soundly based in history than is popularly thought).

415‚ 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

416‚ See, e.g., Katz,‚ supra‚ note 214, at 43 (saying there was no exclusionary rule for 123 years and “[t]here is a good reason for that.”).

417‚ 116 U.S. 616 (1886).

418‚ See‚ AMAR,‚ supra‚ note 287, at 146 (explaining that the Supreme Court reported very few criminal cases of any kind until the end of the 1800’s).

419‚ In the course of researching other matters for this article, I stumbled across a small number of‚ pre-Boyd‚ cases appearing to stand for variations of the exclusionary rule.‚ See‚ In re May, 1 N.W. 1021 (Mich. 1879) (ordering release of prostitute arrested without warrant); People v. Crocker, 1 Mich. 31 (1869) (ordering discharge of defendant arrested by unsigned warrant); Commonwealth v. Foster, 1 Mass. 488 (1805) (overturning jury’s guilty verdict where defendants were arrested pursuant to faulty arrest warrant); State v. J.H., 1 Tyl. 444 (Vt. 1802) (ordering discharge of person arrested upon warrant where no clear evidence of complainant’s oath appeared).

The earliest case I discovered to mention the question of exclusion was‚ Frisbie v. Butler, 1 Kirby 213 (Conn. 1787), a case that preceded the Bill of Rights by four years.‚ Frisbie‚ found a warrant plainly illegal, but stated “yet, how far this vitiates the proceedings upon the arraignment, may be a question, which is not necessary now to determine.”‚ Id. at 215. While this case by no means applied the rule of exclusion, it quite clearly establishes that exclusion was a consideration in the minds of Founding-era judges.

And while the rules of the above cases are subject to interpretation, they at least stand for the proposition that an unlawful seizure, by itself, has an impact on a subsequent criminal prosecution. This rule is actually far more favorable to criminal defendants than modern Supreme Court allows. See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990) (holding that police may detain a suspect even though they improperly arrested him); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (holding an invalid arrest is not a defense to the offense charged).

I cannot believe that my list of cases is in any way exhaustive. While I have not undertaken any systematic study of this matter, the cases I cite suggest to me that the exclusionary rule (or some remedial rule quite similar to the exclusionary rule) may have far stronger historical roots than it is credited with.

420‚ See‚ Roger Roots,‚ If It’s Not a Runaway, It’s Not a Real Grand Jury, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 821 (2000).

421‚ See id.

422‚ See‚ U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself).

423‚ See‚ Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

424‚ See‚ SKOLNICK & FYFE,‚ supra‚ note 63, at 61.

425‚ See‚ Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).

426‚ Id. at 435 n. l.

427‚ See id. at 435.

428‚ Id. at 434 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

429‚ C.f. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887) (recognizing that impartiality in criminal cases requires that “[b]etween [the accused] and the state the scales are to be evenly held”); Unites States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1314 (10th‚ Cir. 1999) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (speaking of “the policy of ensuring a level playing field between the government and defendant in a criminal case”).

430‚ See‚ BOOZHIE,‚ supra‚ note 10, at 238.

431‚ See id.

432‚ G. Gordon Liddy points out in his 1980 autobiography‚ Will‚ that when the courts began requiring that the FBI provide defense attorneys with FBI reports on defendants, the FBI circumvented such orders by recording investigation notes on unofficial attachments which were never provided to the defense.‚ SeeG. GORDON LIDDY, WILL 354 (1980).

433‚ See, e.g., id. at 216 (reporting 1996 St. Louis case in which police released arrest record of dead person whom police had killed to damage his reputation);‚ id. at 238 (reporting 1998 New York case in which police released rap sheet of their victim but withheld identity of involved officers);‚ id. at 240 (reporting case in which police revealed dead suspect was on parole and used his case to call for abolishing parole).

434‚ Perhaps the most extreme example of lopsided investigative resources occurred in the Oklahoma City bombing case in 1995. Defense attorneys complained that “the resources of every federal, state, and local agency in the United States” were at the government’s disposal ‚” including a 24-hour FBI command center with 400 telephones to coordinate evidence-gathering for the prosecution.‚ See‚ Petition For Writ of Mandamus of Petitioner-Defendant, Timothy James McVeigh at 13, McVeigh v. Matsch (No. 96-CR-68-M) (10th‚ Cir. Mar. 25, 1997). In contrast, the defense complained that “without subpoena power, without the right to take depositions, and without access to national intelligence information, the McVeigh defense can go no further.”‚ Id. at 4.

435‚ See‚ Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (finding that suppression of evidence favorable to defense violates due process). Prosecutors are required by the Brady‚ doctrine to reveal exculpatory evidence in their possession or in the possession of the investigating agency.‚ See‚ United States v. Zuno-Arce, 44 F3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1995). Only one federal court of appeals has held that prosecutors are imputed to hold knowledge of information “readily available” to them and require such knowledge to be transferred to the defense.‚ See‚ Williams v. Whitley, 940 F2d 132 (5th Cir. 1991). However, nothing in the law mandates that police look for exculpatory evidence.

436‚ See, e.g., STOLEN LIVES,‚ supra‚ note 123, at 248 (reporting 1997 New York City case in which officers closed off scene of shooting by police for a half an hour after the shooting). Upon being allowed to enter the shooting scene, observers noticed that police had moved large kitchen table to the side of room to make police claim that victim (who had apparently been on other side of the table from officers) had lunged at them more plausible.‚ See id.

437‚ See‚ BOOZHIE,‚ supra‚ note 10, at 238.

438‚ Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 417 (1977) ( Burger, J., dissenting).

439‚ BOOZHIE,‚ supra‚ note 10, at 238.

440‚ See‚ PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 3 (2d ed. 1995).

441‚ See id. at 3-4.

442‚ See‚ Blaikie v. Linton, 18 Scot. Law Rep. 583 (1880).

443‚ See‚ Regina v. Bickley, 2 Crim. App. R. 53, 73 J.P.R. 239 (C.A. 1909).

444‚ Brannan v. Peek, 2 All E.R. 572, 574 (Q.B. 1947).

445‚ Id.

446‚ 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).

447‚ Rivera v. State, 846 P.2d 1, 11 (Wyo. 1993).

448‚ SKOLNICK & FYFE,‚ supra‚ note 63, at 102 (quoting Paul Chevigny).

449‚ See id. See also‚ STOLEN LIVES,‚ supra‚ note 123, at 302. Kevin McCoullough, who was suing the City of Chattanooga for unjust imprisonment, was shot dead by police at his workplace after he allegedly threw or ran at police with a metal object. McCoullough had predicted his own murder by police in statements to co-workers.‚ See id.

450‚ See id. (citing President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice study).

451‚ See‚ FRIEDMAN,‚ supra‚ note 58, at 154 (citations omitted).

452‚ JEFFREY REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON: IDEOLOGY, CLASS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 166 (5th‚ ed. 1997).

453‚ See‚ HERBERT MITGANG, DANGEROUS DOSSIERS (1988). The FBI kept a 207-page file on cartoonist Bill Mauldin, a 153-page file on book publisher Alfred A. Knopf, and a 23-page file on Lincoln biographer Carl Sandburg, for example.‚ See id. at 249, 195, and 81.

454‚ The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), the largest police organization in the United States, has over 270,000 members and has been named one of the most powerful lobbying groups in Washington.‚ See‚ National Fraternal Order of Police,‚ Press Release, Sept. 17, 1997,‚ available at<http://www.mofop.org/power>.

455‚ An example of the police lobby’s power is its ability to scuttle asset forfeiture reform. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) managed to keep congressional leaders from attaching forfeiture reform to budget legislation in 1999.‚ See‚ IACP,‚ End of Session Report for the 1st‚ Session of 106thCongress: FY 2000 Funding Issues, Jan. 17, 2000.‚ See also‚ Peter L. Davis,‚ Rodney King and the Decriminalization of Police Brutality in America, 53 MD. L. REV. 271, 281 n.40 (1994). Police unions in many jurisdictions successfully thwart efforts to establish civilian review boards.‚ See id. at 282.

456‚ See‚ Richard Willing,‚ High Court Restricts Police Power to Frisk, USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 2000, 4A.

Minor Traffic Issue Allegedly Ends With Cop Pointing Gun At Head

Well, Fairview Heights Police have again illustrated their propensity for aggressiona and violence when they chase down a family in their vehicle before dragging them out and putting guns to their heads. This is not so far removed from what happened to me on Feb. 17th, 2009 when I too was pulled over and had a gun drawn on me. The difference is, I was beaten‚ and Tasered as well. That story can be found here.

Here is the story as reported by Fox2Now.com in St. Louis, Mo. Visit their site to also see a video of their interview with the Sims’.

http://fox2now.com/2012/03/12/minor-traffic-issue-allegedly-ends-with-cop-pointing-gun-at-head/

BELLEVILLE, IL (KTVI)- A Belleville family wants answers‚  after they say an undercover police officer crossed the line during a traffic stop.

The family says undercover officer pointed a gun at their heads while a four year old watched in the back seat.

The Sims family says they were headed from Fairview Heights to Belleville last Wednesday evening when their four year old accidentally tossed an ash tray out of the window.

Moments later, they say a man in a Cadillac Escalade tried to run them off the road.
They thought it was road rage, but it was an undercover officer who they say was out of control.

Adriana Sims, 18, said, ‚“When he was chasing us I was thinking it`s road rage and I tried to get somewhere in the light where there are people.‚

Adriana Sims was behind the wheel driving her parents GMC Envoy.
Her sister, older brother and his four year‚ old daughter are in the car. They are scared.

Arthur Sims Jr. said, ‚“Being the older brother I said it`s road rage don`t stop until we get to a lighted area.. We rode for while and finally when we saw some other cars he turned on the lights.‚

But even then. they say they had no idea the man behind the wheel was an undercover officer.

‚“My main concern is my baby was sitting right next to me he would get behind us and rev the engine,‚ said Arthur.

The intersection at Lebonnon Ave in Belleville is where the situation allegedly escalated.
The Sims say the officer jumped out of his car, put a gun to their heads and slammed them on the ground while the four year old watched.

‚“First the gun was to my head and then to my back as we were walking. All I‚  could think about was if he would slip that bullet was going through me,‚ said Arthur.

As other Fairview Heights police officers started to show up the Sims thought the situation would improve.

‚“When I saw them I was thinking maybe they are going to help but they helped him and everything he was doing,‚ said Adriana.

Fairview Heights police say the undercover officer is assigned to the narcotics task force.
In a written statement, they say the officer pursued the Sims after they yelled curse words and threw something out the window that hit his unmarked car.

‚“I felt helpless it was all because an ash tray fell out if anything give me a littering ticket,‚ said Arthur.

Arthur says his four year old now has nightmares. He says the officer could have handled the situation differently.

‚“It was embarrassing. My daughter was right there,‚ said Arthur.

‚“He didn`t jump out with a badge. He just jumped out with a gun,‚ said Adriana.

Adriana Sims was ticketed for not having her insurance card and drivers license and failing to stop for an emergency vehicle.

Arthur Sims was taken‚ to Fairview Heights jail for disorderly conduct and was released when his parents arrived.

The Sims say the are filing a complaint.

Fairview Heights police say they have initiated an internal review.

Below is the statement from police:

Fairview Press Release on Sims Incident

I will quote from the Press Release, and address disparities between what Fairview Heights Police say should be done in trying to bring criminal charges against police, and driving to a well-lit area if pulled over by an unmarked vehicle.

“On Thursday, March 8, 2012, Arthur Sims Jr., and Adriana Sims came to the Fairview Heights Police Department to file a complaint against the Fairview Heights Police officer. After briefly explaining their version of the events, theey‚ were informed that state law requires they provide a sworn affidavit as to their complaint. They were provided the necessary paperwork, but they refused to provide a sworn affidavit. As of Monday, March 12, 2012, they have not returned and no formal complaint has been filed.

The Fairview Heights Police Department holds all its officers to high ethical and professional standards. Although the formal investigation process legally requires the signed affidavit, we recognoze and are aware of the incident and complaint. We have initiated our internal review process and await further information and a sworn affidavit from the Sims.

We recognize the presence of emergency lights in an unmarked vehicle does not provide complete assurance the vehicle is actually an authorized police vehicle. Drivers are reminded when they have doubt, they should continue driving to a well-lit populated location before stopping. In addition, they should call 911 whenever possible while driving to determine the validity of the stop.”

‚ Now, as for the first paragraph regarding sworn affidavits; I have provided the same to officials in St. Clair County, only to have them mis-handled and filed as a civil complaint by the then Circuit Clerk, Brendan Kelly.

http://marcmkkoy.com/2010/08/20/corruption-in-st-clair-county-illinois-officials-refuse-to-prosecute-police-for-misconduct/

Mr. Kelly had the case assigned to his judicial lackey, Brian Babka, who very adroitly disposed of the case upon being met with my motion proving that associate judges had a duty under the Illinois Constitution to hear criminal complaints.

http://marcmkkoy.com/mark/FHPD/Criminal%20Complaints%20against%20Alemond%20and%20Nyman.pdf

http://marcmkkoy.com/2011/06/26/judge-brian-babka-dodges-the-issue-of-issuing-arrest-warrants-against-police-case-10-mr-212-is-dismissed/

With regard to the last paragraph regarding driving when you can’t identify the vehicle as being an official police vehicle, I did the same thing when pulled over at 2am and could not tell if the car was marked or the driver in uniform. I proceeded to drive to a lit area and was beaten, as well as charged with fleeing and eluding. Even though I could not identify the vehicle with lights on as a police vehicle due to it being dark and lights shining in my eyes, I drove to a lighted street, was ordered from my vehicle at gunpoint, beaten and Tasered.

I hope to speak with the Sims’ soon and get more information on their case.

4 USC CHAPTER 4 – THE STATES

http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/04C4.txt
-CITE-
    4 USC CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES                                01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
                          CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-MISC1-
    Sec.
    101.        Oath by members of legislatures and officers.
    102.        Same; by whom administered.
    103.        Assent to purchase of lands for forts.
    104.        Tax on motor fuel sold on military or other
                 reservation; reports to State taxing authority.
    105.        State, etc., taxation affecting Federal areas; sales
                 or use tax.(!1)
    106.        Same; income tax.
    107.        Same; exception of United States, its
                 instrumentalities, and authorized purchasers
                 therefrom.
    108.        Same; jurisdiction of United States over Federal areas
                 unaffected.
    109.        Same; exception of Indians.
    110.        Same; definitions.
    111.        Same; taxation affecting Federal employees; income
                 tax.
    112.        Compacts between States for cooperation in prevention
                 of crime; consent of Congress.
    113.        Residence of Members of Congress for State income tax
                 laws.
    114.        Limitation on State income taxation of certain pension
                 income (!2)
    115.        Limitation on State authority to tax compensation paid
                 to individuals performing services at Fort Campbell,
                 Kentucky.
    116.        Rules for determining State and local government
                 treatment of charges related to mobile
                 telecommunications services.
    117.        Sourcing rules.
    118.        Limitations.
    119.        Electronic databases for nationwide standard numeric
                 jurisdictional codes.
    120.        Procedure if no electronic database provided.
    121.        Correction of erroneous data for place of primary use.
    122.        Determination of place of primary use.
    123.        Scope; special rules.
    124.        Definitions.
    125.        Nonseverability.
    126.        No inference.

                                AMENDMENTS
      2000 - Pub. L. 106-252, Sec. 2(b), July 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 633,
    added items 116 to 126.
      1998 - Pub. L. 105-261, div. A, title X, Sec. 1075(a)(2), Oct.
    17, 1998, 112 Stat. 2138, added item 115.
      1996 - Pub. L. 104-95, Sec. 1(b), Jan. 10, 1996, 109 Stat. 980,
    added item 114.
      1977 - Pub. L. 95-67, Sec. 1(b), July 19, 1977, 91 Stat. 271,
    added item 113.
      1966 - Pub. L. 89-554, Sec. 2(b), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 608,
    added item 111 and redesignated former item 111 as 112.
      1949 - Act May 24, 1949, ch. 139, Sec. 129(a), 63 Stat. 107,
    added item 111.

               CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER INDIANS
      Amendment of State Constitutions to remove legal impediment to
    the assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction in accordance
    with the provisions of section 1162 of Title 18 and section 1360 of
    Title 28, see act Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, Sec. 6, 67 Stat. 590, set
    out as a note under section 1360 of Title 28, Judiciary and
    Judicial Procedure.
      Consent of United States to other States to assume jurisdiction
    with respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or
    with respect to both, as provided for in section 1162 of Title 18
    and section 1360 of Title 28, see act Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, Sec.
    7, 67 Stat. 590, set out as a note under section 1360 of Title 28.

-FOOTNOTE-
    (!1) So in original. Does not conform to section catchline.

    (!2) So in original. Probably should be followed by a period.

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 101                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 101. Oath by members of legislatures and officers

-STATUTE-
      Every member of a State legislature, and every executive and
    judicial officer of a State, shall, before he proceeds to execute
    the duties of his office, take an oath in the following form, to
    wit: "I, A B, do solemnly swear that I will support the
    Constitution of the United States."

-SOURCE-
    (July 30, 1947, ch. 389, 61 Stat. 643.)

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 102                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 102. Same; by whom administered

-STATUTE-
      Such oath may be administered by any person who, by the law of
    the State, is authorized to administer the oath of office; and the
    person so administering such oath shall cause a record or
    certificate thereof to be made in the same manner, as by the law of
    the State, he is directed to record or certify the oath of office.

-SOURCE-
    (July 30, 1947, ch. 389, 61 Stat. 644.)

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 103                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 103. Assent to purchase of lands for forts

-STATUTE-
      The President of the United States is authorized to procure the
    assent of the legislature of any State, within which any purchase
    of land has been made for the erection of forts, magazines,
    arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings, without such
    consent having been obtained.

-SOURCE-
    (July 30, 1947, ch. 389, 61 Stat. 644.)

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 104                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 104. Tax on motor fuel sold on military or other reservation
      (!1) reports to State taxing authority

-STATUTE-

-STATUTE-
      (a) All taxes levied by any State, Territory, or the District of
    Columbia upon, with respect to, or measured by, sales, purchases,
    storage, or use of gasoline or other motor vehicle fuels may be
    levied, in the same manner and to the same extent, with respect to
    such fuels when sold by or through post exchanges, ship stores,
    ship service stores, commissaries, filling stations, licensed
    traders, and other similar agencies, located on United States
    military or other reservations, when such fuels are not for the
    exclusive use of the United States. Such taxes, so levied, shall be
    paid to the proper taxing authorities of the State, Territory, or
    the District of Columbia, within whose borders the reservation
    affected may be located.
      (b) The officer in charge of such reservation shall, on or before
    the fifteenth day of each month, submit a written statement to the
    proper taxing authorities of the State, Territory, or the District
    of Columbia within whose borders the reservation is located,
    showing the amount of such motor fuel with respect to which taxes
    are payable under subsection (a) for the preceding month.
      (c) As used in this section, the term "Territory" shall include
    Guam.

-SOURCE-
    (July 30, 1947, ch. 389, 61 Stat. 644; Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 827, 70
    Stat. 799.)

-MISC1-
                                AMENDMENTS
      1956 - Subsec. (c) added by act Aug. 1, 1956.

     CIVIL AIRPORTS OWNED BY UNITED STATES SUBJECT TO SECTIONS 104 TO
     110; SALES OR USE TAXES: FUELS FOR AIRCRAFT OR OTHER SERVICING OF
              AIRCRAFT; LANDING OR TAKING OFF CHARGES; LEASES
      Section 210 of Pub. L. 91-258, title II, May 21, 1970, 84 Stat.
    253, provided that:
      "(a) Nothing in this title or in any other law of the United
    States shall prevent the application of sections 104 through 110 of
    title 4 of the United States Code to civil airports owned by the
    United States.
      "(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to -
        "(1) sales or use taxes in respect of fuels for aircraft or in
      respect of other servicing of aircraft, or
        "(2) taxes, fees, head charges, or other charges in respect of
      the landing or taking off of aircraft or aircraft passengers or
      freight.
      "(c) In the case of any lease in effect on September 28, 1969,
    subsection (a) shall not authorize the levy or collection of any
    tax in respect of any transaction occurring, or any service
    performed, pursuant to such lease before the expiration of such
    lease (determined without regard to any renewal or extension of
    such lease made after September 28, 1969). For purposes of the
    preceding sentence, the term 'lease' includes a contract."

-FOOTNOTE-
    (!1) So in original. Probably should be followed by a semicolon.

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 105                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 105. State, and so forth, taxation affecting Federal areas;
      sales or use tax

-STATUTE-
      (a) No person shall be relieved from liability for payment of,
    collection of, or accounting for any sales or use tax levied by any
    State, or by any duly constituted taxing authority therein, having
    jurisdiction to levy such a tax, on the ground that the sale or
    use, with respect to which such tax is levied, occurred in whole or
    in part within a Federal area; and such State or taxing authority
    shall have full jurisdiction and power to levy and collect any such
    tax in any Federal area within such State to the same extent and
    with the same effect as though such area was not a Federal area.
      (b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall be applicable only
    with respect to sales or purchases made, receipts from sales
    received, or storage or use occurring, after December 31, 1940.

-SOURCE-
    (July 30, 1947, ch. 389, 61 Stat. 644.)

-MISC1-
    TAXATION WITH RESPECT TO ESSENTIAL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES OR FUNCTIONS
    OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL PERSONS IN CONGRESSIONALLY-CONTROLLED LOCATIONS
                          IN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
      Pub. L. 100-202, Sec. 101(i) [title III, Sec. 307], Dec. 22,
    1987, 101 Stat. 1329-290, 1329-309, as amended by Pub. L. 104-186,
    title II, Sec. 214, Aug. 20, 1996, 110 Stat. 1745, provided that:
      "(a) Notwithstanding section 105 of title 4, United States Code,
    or any other provision of law, no person shall be required to pay,
    collect, or account for any sales, use, or similar excise tax, or
    any personal property tax, with respect to an essential support
    activity or function conducted by a nongovernmental person in the
    Capitol, the House Office Buildings, the Senate Office Buildings,
    the Capitol Grounds, or any other location under the control of the
    Congress in the District of Columbia.
      "(b) As used in this section -
        "(1) the term 'essential support activity or function' means a
      support activity or function so designated by the Committee on
      House Oversight [now Committee on House Administration] of the
      House of Representatives or the Committee on Rules and
      Administration of the Senate, acting jointly or separately, as
      appropriate;
        "(2) the term 'personal property tax' means a tax of a State, a
      subdivision of a State, or any other authority of a State, that
      is levied on, levied with respect to, or measured by, the value
      of personal property;
        "(3) the term 'sales, use, or similar excise tax' means a tax
      of a State, a subdivision of a State, or any other authority of a
      State, that is levied on, levied with respect to, or measured by,
      sales, receipts from sales, or purchases, or by storage,
      possession, or use of personal property; and
        "(4) the term 'State' means a State of the United States, the
      District of Columbia, or a territory or possession of the United
      States.
      "(c) This section shall apply to any sale, receipt, purchase,
    storage, possession, use, or valuation taking place after December
    31, 1986."

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 106                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 106. Same; income tax

-STATUTE-
      (a) No person shall be relieved from liability for any income tax
    levied by any State, or by any duly constituted taxing authority
    therein, having jurisdiction to levy such a tax, by reason of his
    residing within a Federal area or receiving income from
    transactions occurring or services performed in such area; and such
    State or taxing authority shall have full jurisdiction and power to
    levy and collect such tax in any Federal area within such State to
    the same extent and with the same effect as though such area was
    not a Federal area.
      (b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall be applicable only
    with respect to income or receipts received after December 31,
    1940.

-SOURCE-
    (July 30, 1947, ch. 389, 61 Stat. 644.)

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 107                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 107. Same; exception of United States, its instrumentalities,
      and authorized purchases (!1) therefrom

-STATUTE-

-STATUTE-
      (a) The provisions of sections 105 and 106 of this title shall
    not be deemed to authorize the levy or collection of any tax on or
    from the United States or any instrumentality thereof, or the levy
    or collection of any tax with respect to sale, purchase, storage,
    or use of tangible personal property sold by the United States or
    any instrumentality thereof to any authorized purchaser.
      (b) A person shall be deemed to be an authorized purchaser under
    this section only with respect to purchases which he is permitted
    to make from commissaries, ship's stores, or voluntary
    unincorporated organizations of personnel of any branch of the
    Armed Forces of the United States, under regulations promulgated by
    the departmental Secretary having jurisdiction over such branch.

-SOURCE-
    (July 30, 1947, ch. 389, 61 Stat. 645; Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263,
    Sec. 4, 68 Stat. 1227.)

-MISC1-
                                AMENDMENTS
      1954 - Subsec. (b). Act Sept. 3, 1954, substituted "personnel of
    any branch of the Armed Forces of the United States" for "Army or
    Navy personnel".

-FOOTNOTE-
    (!1) So in original. Probably should be "purchasers".

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 108                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 108. Same; jurisdiction of United States over Federal areas
      unaffected

-STATUTE-
      The provisions of sections 105-110 of this title shall not for
    the purposes of any other provision of law be deemed to deprive the
    United States of exclusive jurisdiction over any Federal area over
    which it would otherwise have exclusive jurisdiction or to limit
    the jurisdiction of the United States over any Federal area.

-SOURCE-
    (July 30, 1947, ch. 389, 61 Stat. 645.)

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 109                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 109. Same; exception of Indians

-STATUTE-
      Nothing in sections 105 and 106 of this title shall be deemed to
    authorize the levy or collection of any tax on or from any Indian
    not otherwise taxed.

-SOURCE-
    (July 30, 1947, ch. 389, 61 Stat. 645.)

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 110                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 110. Same; definitions

-STATUTE-
      As used in sections 105-109 of this title -
      (a) The term "person" shall have the meaning assigned to it in
    section 3797 of title 26.
      (b) The term "sales or use tax" means any tax levied on, with
    respect to, or measured by, sales, receipts from sales, purchases,
    storage, or use of tangible personal property, except a tax with
    respect to which the provisions of section 104 of this title are
    applicable.
      (c) The term "income tax" means any tax levied on, with respect
    to, or measured by, net income, gross income, or gross receipts.
      (d) The term "State" includes any Territory or possession of the
    United States.
      (e) The term "Federal area" means any lands or premises held or
    acquired by or for the use of the United States or any department,
    establishment, or agency, of the United States; and any Federal
    area, or any part thereof, which is located within the exterior
    boundaries of any State, shall be deemed to be a Federal area
    located within such State.

-SOURCE-
    (July 30, 1947, ch. 389, 61 Stat. 645.)

-REFTEXT-
                            REFERENCES IN TEXT
      Section 3797 of title 26, referred to in subsec. (a), is a
    reference to section 3797 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,
    which was repealed by section 7851 of the Internal Revenue Code of
    1954, Title 26, and is covered by section 7701(a)(1) of Title 26.
    The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was redesignated the Internal
    Revenue Code of 1986 by Pub. L. 99-514, Sec. 2, Oct. 22, 1986, 100
    Stat. 2095. For table of comparisons of the 1939 Code to the 1986
    Code, see Table I preceding section 1 of Title 26, Internal Revenue
    Code. See also section 7852(b) of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code,
    for provision that references in any other law to a provision of
    the 1939 Code, unless expressly incompatible with the intent
    thereof, shall be deemed a reference to the corresponding provision
    of the 1986 Code.

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 111                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 111. Same; taxation affecting Federal employees; income tax

-STATUTE-
      (a) General Rule. - The United States consents to the taxation of
    pay or compensation for personal service as an officer or employee
    of the United States, a territory or possession or political
    subdivision thereof, the government of the District of Columbia, or
    an agency or instrumentality of one or more of the foregoing, by a
    duly constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction, if the
    taxation does not discriminate against the officer or employee
    because of the source of the pay or compensation.
      (b) Treatment of Certain Federal Employees Employed at Federal
    Hydroelectric Facilities Located on the Columbia River. - Pay or
    compensation paid by the United States for personal services as an
    employee of the United States at a hydroelectric facility -
        (1) which is owned by the United States;
        (2) which is located on the Columbia River; and
        (3) portions of which are within the States of Oregon and
      Washington,

    shall be subject to taxation by the State or any political
    subdivision thereof of which such employee is a resident.
      (c) Treatment of Certain Federal Employees Employed at Federal
    Hydroelectric Facilities Located on the Missouri River. - Pay or
    compensation paid by the United States for personal services as an
    employee of the United States at a hydroelectric facility -
        (1) which is owned by the United States;
        (2) which is located on the Missouri River; and
        (3) portions of which are within the States of South Dakota and
      Nebraska,

    shall be subject to taxation by the State or any political
    subdivision thereof of which such employee is a resident.

-SOURCE-
    (Added Pub. L. 89-554, Sec. 2(c), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 608;
    amended Pub. L. 105-261, div. A, title X, Sec. 1075(b)(1), Oct. 17,
    1998, 112 Stat. 2138.)

-MISC1-

                       HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES
    --------------------------------------------------------------------
     Derivation             U.S. Code             Revised Statutes and
                                                    Statutes at Large
    --------------------------------------------------------------------
                    5 U.S.C. 84a                Apr. 12, 1939, ch. 59,
                                                 Sec. 4, 53 Stat. 575.
    --------------------------------------------------------------------

      The words "received after December 31, 1938," are omitted as
    obsolete. The words "pay or" are added before "compensation" for
    clarity as the word "pay" is used throughout title 5, United States
    Code, to refer to the remuneration, salary, wages, or compensation
    for the personal services of a Federal employee. The word
    "territory" is not capitalized as there are no longer any
    "Territories." The words "to tax such compensation" are omitted as
    unnecessary.

                                AMENDMENTS
      1998 - Pub. L. 105-261 designated existing provisions as subsec.
    (a), inserted heading, and added subsecs. (b) and (c).

                     EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1998 AMENDMENT
      Pub. L. 105-261, div. A, title X, Sec. 1075(b)(2), Oct. 17, 1998,
    112 Stat. 2139, provided that: "The amendment made by this
    subsection [amending this section] shall apply to pay and
    compensation paid after the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct.
    17, 1998]."

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 112                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 112. Compacts between States for cooperation in prevention of
      crime; consent of Congress

-STATUTE-
      (a) The consent of Congress is hereby given to any two or more
    States to enter into agreements or compacts for cooperative effort
    and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime and in the
    enforcement of their respective criminal laws and policies, and to
    establish such agencies, joint or otherwise, as they may deem
    desirable for making effective such agreements and compacts.
      (b) For the purpose of this section, the term "States" means the
    several States and Alaska, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
    the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the District of Columbia.

-SOURCE-
    (Added May 24, 1949, ch. 139, Sec. 129(b), 63 Stat. 107, Sec. 112,
    formerly Sec. 111; amended Aug. 3, 1956, ch. 941, 70 Stat. 1020;
    Pub. L. 87-406, Feb. 16, 1962, 76 Stat. 9; renumbered Sec. 112,
    Pub. L. 89-554, Sec. 2(c), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 608.)

-MISC1-
                       HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTE
      This section [section 129(b) of Act May 24, 1949] incorporates in
    title 4, U.S.C. (enacted into positive law by act of July 30, 1947
    (ch. 389, Sec. 1, 61 Stat. 641), the provisions of former section
    420 of title 18, U.S.C. (act of June 6, 1934, ch. 406, 48 Stat.
    909), which, in the course of the revision of such title 18, was
    omitted therefrom and recommended for transfer to such title 4.
    (See table 7 - Transferred sections, p. A219, H. Rept. No. 304,
    April 24, 1947, to accompany H.R. 3190, 80th Cong.).

                                AMENDMENTS
      1962 - Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 87-406 inserted "Guam" after "the
    Virgin Islands,".
      1956 - Act Aug. 3, 1956, designated existing provisions as
    subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

                ADMISSION OF ALASKA AND HAWAII TO STATEHOOD
      Alaska was admitted into the Union on Jan. 3, 1959, on issuance
    of Proc. No. 3269, Jan. 3, 1959, 24 F.R. 81, 73 Stat. c16, and
    Hawaii was admitted into the Union on Aug. 21, 1959, on issuance of
    Proc. No. 3309, Aug. 21, 1959, 24 F.R. 6868, 73 Stat. c74. For
    Alaska Statehood Law, see Pub. L. 85-508, July 7, 1958, 72 Stat.
    339, set out as a note preceding former section 21 of Title 48,
    Territories and Insular Possessions. For Hawaii Statehood Law, see
    Pub. L. 86-3, Mar. 18, 1959, 73 Stat. 4, set out as a note
    preceding former section 491 of Title 48.

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 113                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 113. Residence of Members of Congress for State income tax
      laws

-STATUTE-
      (a) No State, or political subdivision thereof, in which a Member
    of Congress maintains a place of abode for purposes of attending
    sessions of Congress may, for purposes of any income tax (as
    defined in section 110(c) of this title) levied by such State or
    political subdivision thereof -
        (1) treat such Member as a resident or domiciliary of such
      State or political subdivision thereof; or
        (2) treat any compensation paid by the United States to such
      Member as income for services performed within, or from sources
      within, such State or political subdivision thereof,

    unless such Member represents such State or a district in such
    State.
      (b) For purposes of subsection (a) -
        (1) the term "Member of Congress" includes the delegates from
      the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, and the
      Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico; and
        (2) the term "State" includes the District of Columbia.

-SOURCE-
    (Added Pub. L. 95-67, Sec. 1(a), July 19, 1977, 91 Stat. 271.)

-MISC1-
                              EFFECTIVE DATE
      Section 1(c) of Pub. L. 95-67 provided that: "The amendments made
    by subsections (a) and (b) [enacting this section and amending
    analysis preceding section 101 of this title] shall be effective
    with respect to all taxable years, whether beginning before, on, or
    after the date of the enactment of this Act [July 19, 1977]."

    RESIDENCE OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR STATE PERSONAL PROPERTY TAX ON
                              MOTOR VEHICLES
      Pub. L. 99-190, Sec. 101(c) [H.R. 3067, Sec. 131], Dec. 19, 1985,
    99 Stat. 1224; Pub. L. 100-202, Sec. 106, Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat.
    1329-433, provided that:
      "(a) No State, or political subdivision thereof, in which a
    Member of Congress maintains a place of abode for purposes of
    attending sessions of Congress may impose a personal property tax
    with respect to any motor vehicle owned by such Member (or by the
    spouse of such Member) unless such Member represents such State or
    a district in such State.
      "(b) For purposes of this section -
        "(1) the term 'Member of Congress' includes the delegates from
      the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, and the
      Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico;
        "(2) the term 'State' includes the District of Columbia; and
        "(3) the term 'personal property tax' means any tax imposed on
      an annual basis and levied on, with respect to, or measured by,
      the market value or assessed value of an item of personal
      property.
      "(c) This section shall apply to all taxable periods beginning on
    or after January 1, 1985."

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 114                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 114. Limitation on State income taxation of certain pension
      income

-STATUTE-
      (a) No State may impose an income tax on any retirement income of
    an individual who is not a resident or domiciliary of such State
    (as determined under the laws of such State).
      (b) For purposes of this section -
        (1) The term "retirement income" means any income from -
          (A) a qualified trust under section 401(a) of the Internal
        Revenue Code of 1986 that is exempt under section 501(a) from
        taxation;
          (B) a simplified employee pension as defined in section
        408(k) of such Code;
          (C) an annuity plan described in section 403(a) of such Code;
          (D) an annuity contract described in section 403(b) of such
        Code;
          (E) an individual retirement plan described in section
        7701(a)(37) of such Code;
          (F) an eligible deferred compensation plan (as defined in
        section 457 of such Code);
          (G) a governmental plan (as defined in section 414(d) of such
        Code);
          (H) a trust described in section 501(c)(18) of such Code; or
          (I) any plan, program, or arrangement described in section
        3121(v)(2)(C) of such Code (or any plan, program, or
        arrangement that is in writing, that provides for retirement
        payments in recognition of prior service to be made to a
        retired partner, and that is in effect immediately before
        retirement begins), if such income -
            (i) is part of a series of substantially equal periodic
          payments (not less frequently than annually which may include
          income described in subparagraphs (A) through (H)) made for -

              (I) the life or life expectancy of the recipient (or the
            joint lives or joint life expectancies of the recipient and
            the designated beneficiary of the recipient), or
              (II) a period of not less than 10 years, or

            (ii) is a payment received after termination of employment
          and under a plan, program, or arrangement (to which such
          employment relates) maintained solely for the purpose of
          providing retirement benefits for employees in excess of the
          limitations imposed by 1 or more of sections 401(a)(17),
          401(k), 401(m), 402(g), 403(b), 408(k), or 415 of such Code
          or any other limitation on contributions or benefits in such
          Code on plans to which any of such sections apply.

        The fact that payments may be adjusted from time to time
        pursuant to such plan, program, or arrangement to limit total
        disbursements under a predetermined formula, or to provide cost
        of living or similar adjustments, will not cause the periodic
        payments provided under such plan, program, or arrangement to
        fail the "substantially equal periodic payments" test.

      Such term includes any retired or retainer pay of a member or
      former member of a uniform service computed under chapter 71 of
      title 10, United States Code.
        (2) The term "income tax" has the meaning given such term by
      section 110(c).
        (3) The term "State" includes any political subdivision of a
      State, the District of Columbia, and the possessions of the
      United States.
        (4) For purposes of this section, the term "retired partner" is
      an individual who is described as a partner in section 7701(a)(2)
      of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and who is retired under
      such individual's partnership agreement.

      (e) (!1) Nothing in this section shall be construed as having any
    effect on the application of section 514 of the Employee Retirement
    Income Security Act of 1974.

-SOURCE-
    (Added Pub. L. 104-95, Sec. 1(a), Jan. 10, 1996, 109 Stat. 979;
    amended Pub. L. 109-264, Sec. 1(a), Aug. 3, 2006, 120 Stat. 667.)

-REFTEXT-
                            REFERENCES IN TEXT
      The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (b)(1),
    (4), is classified generally to Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.
      Section 514 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
    1974, referred to in subsec. (e), is classified to section 1144 of
    Title 29, Labor.

-MISC1-
                                AMENDMENTS
      2006 - Subsec. (b)(1)(I). Pub. L. 109-264, Sec. 1(a)(1)-(3),
    inserted "(or any plan, program, or arrangement that is in writing,
    that provides for retirement payments in recognition of prior
    service to be made to a retired partner, and that is in effect
    immediately before retirement begins)" after "section 3121(v)(2)(C)
    of such Code" in introductory provisions, "which may include income
    described in subparagraphs (A) through (H)" after "(not less
    frequently than annually" in cl. (i), and concluding provisions at
    end.
      Subsec. (b)(4). Pub. L. 109-264, Sec. 1(a)(4), which directed the
    addition of par. (4) at end of subsec. (b)(1)(I), was executed by
    adding par. (4) at end of subsec. (b) to reflect the probable
    intent of Congress.

                     EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2006 AMENDMENT
      Pub. L. 109-264, Sec. 1(b), Aug. 3, 2006, 120 Stat. 667, provided
    that: "The amendments made by this section [amending this section]
    apply to amounts received after December 31, 1995."

                              EFFECTIVE DATE
      Section 1(c) of Pub. L. 104-95 provided that: "The amendments
    made by this section [enacting this section] shall apply to amounts
    received after December 31, 1995."

-FOOTNOTE-
    (!1) So in original. No subsecs. (c) and (d) have been enacted.

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 115                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 115. Limitation on State authority to tax compensation paid to
      individuals performing services at Fort Campbell, Kentucky

-STATUTE-
      Pay and compensation paid to an individual for personal services
    at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, shall be subject to taxation by the
    State or any political subdivision thereof of which such employee
    is a resident.

-SOURCE-
    (Added Pub. L. 105-261, div. A, title X, Sec. 1075(a)(1), Oct. 17,
    1998, 112 Stat. 2138.)

-MISC1-
                              EFFECTIVE DATE
      Pub. L. 105-261, div. A, title X, Sec. 1075(a)(3), Oct. 17, 1998,
    112 Stat. 2138, provided that: "The amendments made by this
    subsection [enacting this section] shall apply to pay and
    compensation paid after the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct.
    17, 1998]."

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 116                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 116. Rules for determining State and local government
      treatment of charges related to mobile telecommunications
      services

-STATUTE-
      (a) Application of This Section Through Section 126. - This
    section through (!1) 126 of this title apply to any tax, charge, or
    fee levied by a taxing jurisdiction as a fixed charge for each
    customer or measured by gross amounts charged to customers for
    mobile telecommunications services, regardless of whether such tax,
    charge, or fee is imposed on the vendor or customer of the service
    and regardless of the terminology used to describe the tax, charge,
    or fee.

      (b) General Exceptions. - This section through (!1) 126 of this
    title do not apply to -
        (1) any tax, charge, or fee levied upon or measured by the net
      income, capital stock, net worth, or property value of the
      provider of mobile telecommunications service;
        (2) any tax, charge, or fee that is applied to an equitably
      apportioned amount that is not determined on a transactional
      basis;
        (3) any tax, charge, or fee that represents compensation for a
      mobile telecommunications service provider's use of public rights
      of way or other public property, provided that such tax, charge,
      or fee is not levied by the taxing jurisdiction as a fixed charge
      for each customer or measured by gross amounts charged to
      customers for mobile telecommunication services;
        (4) any generally applicable business and occupation tax that
      is imposed by a State, is applied to gross receipts or gross
      proceeds, is the legal liability of the home service provider,
      and that statutorily allows the home service provider to elect to
      use the sourcing method required in this section through (!1) 126
      of this title;
        (5) any fee related to obligations under section 254 of the
      Communications Act of 1934; or
        (6) any tax, charge, or fee imposed by the Federal
      Communications Commission.

      (c) Specific Exceptions. - This section through (!1) 126 of this
    title -
        (1) do not apply to the determination of the taxing situs of
      prepaid telephone calling services;
        (2) do not affect the taxability of either the initial sale of
      mobile telecommunications services or subsequent resale of such
      services, whether as sales of such services alone or as a part of
      a bundled product, if the Internet Tax Freedom Act would preclude
      a taxing jurisdiction from subjecting the charges of the sale of
      such services to a tax, charge, or fee, but this section provides
      no evidence of the intent of Congress with respect to the
      applicability of the Internet Tax Freedom Act to such charges;
      and
        (3) do not apply to the determination of the taxing situs of
      air-ground radiotelephone service as defined in section 22.99 of
      title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations as in effect on June
      1, 1999.

-SOURCE-
    (Added Pub. L. 106-252, Sec. 2(a), July 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 626.)

-REFTEXT-
                            REFERENCES IN TEXT
      Section 254 of the Communications Act of 1934, referred to in
    subsec. (b)(5), is classified to section 254 of Title 47,
    Telegraphs, Telephones, and Radiotelegraphs.
      The Internet Tax Freedom Act, referred to in subsec. (c)(2), is
    title XI of Pub. L. 105-277, div. C, Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681-
    719, which is set out as a note under section 151 of Title 47,
    Telegraphs, Telephones, and Radiotelegraphs.

-MISC1-
                 EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENT
      Pub. L. 106-252, Sec. 3, July 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 633, provided
    that:
      "(a) Effective Date. - Except as provided in subsection (b), this
    Act [enacting this section and sections 117 to 126 of this title
    and provisions set out as a note under section 1 of this title] and
    the amendment made by this Act shall take effect on the date of the
    enactment of this Act [July 28, 2000].
      "(b) Application of Act. - The amendment made by this Act
    [enacting this section and sections 117 to 126 of this title] shall
    apply only to customer bills issued after the first day of the
    first month beginning more than 2 years after the date of the
    enactment of this Act [July 28, 2000]."

-FOOTNOTE-
    (!1) So in original. Probably should be followed by "section".

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 117                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 117. Sourcing rules

-STATUTE-
      (a) Treatment of Charges for Mobile Telecommunications Services. -
     Notwithstanding the law of any State or political subdivision of
    any State, mobile telecommunications services provided in a taxing
    jurisdiction to a customer, the charges for which are billed by or
    for the customer's home service provider, shall be deemed to be
    provided by the customer's home service provider.
      (b) Jurisdiction. - All charges for mobile telecommunications
    services that are deemed to be provided by the customer's home
    service provider under sections 116 through 126 of this title are
    authorized to be subjected to tax, charge, or fee by the taxing
    jurisdictions whose territorial limits encompass the customer's
    place of primary use, regardless of where the mobile
    telecommunication services originate, terminate, or pass through,
    and no other taxing jurisdiction may impose taxes, charges, or fees
    on charges for such mobile telecommunications services.

-SOURCE-
    (Added Pub. L. 106-252, Sec. 2(a), July 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 627.)

-MISC1-
                 EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENT
      Section effective July 28, 2000, and applicable only to customer
    bills issued after the first day of the first month beginning more
    than 2 years after July 28, 2000, see section 3 of Pub. L. 106-252,
    set out as a note under section 116 of this title.

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 118                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 118. Limitations

-STATUTE-
      Sections 116 through 126 of this title do not -
        (1) provide authority to a taxing jurisdiction to impose a tax,
      charge, or fee that the laws of such jurisdiction do not
      authorize such jurisdiction to impose; or
        (2) modify, impair, supersede, or authorize the modification,
      impairment, or supersession of the law of any taxing jurisdiction
      pertaining to taxation except as expressly provided in sections
      116 through 126 of this title.

-SOURCE-
    (Added Pub. L. 106-252, Sec. 2(a), July 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 627.)

-MISC1-
                 EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENT
      Section effective July 28, 2000, and applicable only to customer
    bills issued after the first day of the first month beginning more
    than 2 years after July 28, 2000, see section 3 of Pub. L. 106-252,
    set out as a note under section 116 of this title.

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 119                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 119. Electronic databases for nationwide standard numeric
      jurisdictional codes

-STATUTE-
      (a) Electronic Database. -
        (1) Provision of database. - A State may provide an electronic
      database to a home service provider or, if a State does not
      provide such an electronic database to home service providers,
      then the designated database provider may provide an electronic
      database to a home service provider.
        (2) Format. - (A) Such electronic database, whether provided by
      the State or the designated database provider, shall be provided
      in a format approved by the American National Standards
      Institute's Accredited Standards Committee X12, that, allowing
      for de minimis deviations, designates for each street address in
      the State, including to the extent practicable, any multiple
      postal street addresses applicable to one street location, the
      appropriate taxing jurisdictions, and the appropriate code for
      each taxing jurisdiction, for each level of taxing jurisdiction,
      identified by one nationwide standard numeric code.
        (B) Such electronic database shall also provide the appropriate
      code for each street address with respect to political
      subdivisions which are not taxing jurisdictions when reasonably
      needed to determine the proper taxing jurisdiction.
        (C) The nationwide standard numeric codes shall contain the
      same number of numeric digits with each digit or combination of
      digits referring to the same level of taxing jurisdiction
      throughout the United States using a format similar to FIPS 55-3
      or other appropriate standard approved by the Federation of Tax
      Administrators and the Multistate Tax Commission, or their
      successors. Each address shall be provided in standard postal
      format.

      (b) Notice; Updates. - A State or designated database provider
    that provides or maintains an electronic database described in
    subsection (a) shall provide notice of the availability of the then
    current electronic database, and any subsequent revisions thereof,
    by publication in the manner normally employed for the publication
    of informational tax, charge, or fee notices to taxpayers in such
    State.
      (c) User Held Harmless. - A home service provider using the data
    contained in an electronic database described in subsection (a)
    shall be held harmless from any tax, charge, or fee liability that
    otherwise would be due solely as a result of any error or omission
    in such database provided by a State or designated database
    provider. The home service provider shall reflect changes made to
    such database during a calendar quarter not later than 30 days
    after the end of such calendar quarter for each State that issues
    notice of the availability of an electronic database reflecting
    such changes under subsection (b).

-SOURCE-
    (Added Pub. L. 106-252, Sec. 2(a), July 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 627.)

-MISC1-
                 EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENT
      Section effective July 28, 2000, and applicable only to customer
    bills issued after the first day of the first month beginning more
    than 2 years after July 28, 2000, see section 3 of Pub. L. 106-252,
    set out as a note under section 116 of this title.

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 120                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 120. Procedure if no electronic database provided

-STATUTE-
      (a) Safe Harbor. - If neither a State nor designated database
    provider provides an electronic database under section 119, a home
    service provider shall be held harmless from any tax, charge, or
    fee liability in such State that otherwise would be due solely as a
    result of an assignment of a street address to an incorrect taxing
    jurisdiction if, subject to section 121, the home service provider
    employs an enhanced zip code to assign each street address to a
    specific taxing jurisdiction for each level of taxing jurisdiction
    and exercises due diligence at each level of taxing jurisdiction to
    ensure that each such street address is assigned to the correct
    taxing jurisdiction. If an enhanced zip code overlaps boundaries of
    taxing jurisdictions of the same level, the home service provider
    must designate one specific jurisdiction within such enhanced zip
    code for use in taxing the activity for such enhanced zip code for
    each level of taxing jurisdiction. Any enhanced zip code assignment
    changed in accordance with section 121 is deemed to be in
    compliance with this section. For purposes of this section, there
    is a rebuttable presumption that a home service provider has
    exercised due diligence if such home service provider demonstrates
    that it has -
        (1) expended reasonable resources to implement and maintain an
      appropriately detailed electronic database of street address
      assignments to taxing jurisdictions;
        (2) implemented and maintained reasonable internal controls to
      promptly correct misassignments of street addresses to taxing
      jurisdictions; and
        (3) used all reasonably obtainable and usable data pertaining
      to municipal annexations, incorporations, reorganizations and any
      other changes in jurisdictional boundaries that materially affect
      the accuracy of such database.

      (b) Termination of Safe Harbor. - Subsection (a) applies to a
    home service provider that is in compliance with the requirements
    of subsection (a), with respect to a State for which an electronic
    database is not provided under section 119 until the later of -
        (1) 18 months after the nationwide standard numeric code
      described in section 119(a) has been approved by the Federation
      of Tax Administrators and the Multistate Tax Commission; or
        (2) 6 months after such State or a designated database provider
      in such State provides such database as prescribed in section
      119(a).

-SOURCE-
    (Added Pub. L. 106-252, Sec. 2(a), July 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 628.)

-MISC1-
                 EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENT
      Section effective July 28, 2000, and applicable only to customer
    bills issued after the first day of the first month beginning more
    than 2 years after July 28, 2000, see section 3 of Pub. L. 106-252,
    set out as a note under section 116 of this title.

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 121                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 121. Correction of erroneous data for place of primary use

-STATUTE-
      (a) (!1) In General. - A taxing jurisdiction, or a State on
    behalf of any taxing jurisdiction or taxing jurisdictions within
    such State, may -

        (1) determine that the address used for purposes of determining
      the taxing jurisdictions to which taxes, charges, or fees for
      mobile telecommunications services are remitted does not meet the
      definition of place of primary use in section 124(8) and give
      binding notice to the home service provider to change the place
      of primary use on a prospective basis from the date of notice of
      determination if -
          (A) if the taxing jurisdiction making such determination is
        not a State, such taxing jurisdiction obtains the consent of
        all affected taxing jurisdictions within the State before
        giving such notice of determination; and
          (B) before the taxing jurisdiction gives such notice of
        determination, the customer is given an opportunity to
        demonstrate in accordance with applicable State or local tax,
        charge, or fee administrative procedures that the address is
        the customer's place of primary use;

        (2) determine that the assignment of a taxing jurisdiction by a
      home service provider under section 120 does not reflect the
      correct taxing jurisdiction and give binding notice to the home
      service provider to change the assignment on a prospective basis
      from the date of notice of determination if -
          (A) if the taxing jurisdiction making such determination is
        not a State, such taxing jurisdiction obtains the consent of
        all affected taxing jurisdictions within the State before
        giving such notice of determination; and
          (B) the home service provider is given an opportunity to
        demonstrate in accordance with applicable State or local tax,
        charge, or fee administrative procedures that the assignment
        reflects the correct taxing jurisdiction.

-SOURCE-
    (Added Pub. L. 106-252, Sec. 2(a), July 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 629.)

-MISC1-
                 EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENT
      Section effective July 28, 2000, and applicable only to customer
    bills issued after the first day of the first month beginning more
    than 2 years after July 28, 2000, see section 3 of Pub. L. 106-252,
    set out as a note under section 116 of this title.

-FOOTNOTE-
    (!1) So in original. No subsec. (b) was enacted.

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 122                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 122. Determination of place of primary use

-STATUTE-
      (a) Place of Primary Use. - A home service provider shall be
    responsible for obtaining and maintaining the customer's place of
    primary use (as defined in section 124). Subject to section 121,
    and if the home service provider's reliance on information provided
    by its customer is in good faith, a taxing jurisdiction shall -
        (1) allow a home service provider to rely on the applicable
      residential or business street address supplied by the home
      service provider's customer; and
        (2) not hold a home service provider liable for any additional
      taxes, charges, or fees based on a different determination of the
      place of primary use for taxes, charges, or fees that are
      customarily passed on to the customer as a separate itemized
      charge.

      (b) Address Under Existing Agreements. - Except as provided in
    section 121, a taxing jurisdiction shall allow a home service
    provider to treat the address used by the home service provider for
    tax purposes for any customer under a service contract or agreement
    in effect 2 years after the date of the enactment of the Mobile
    Telecommunications Sourcing Act as that customer's place of primary
    use for the remaining term of such service contract or agreement,
    excluding any extension or renewal of such service contract or
    agreement, for purposes of determining the taxing jurisdictions to
    which taxes, charges, or fees on charges for mobile
    telecommunications services are remitted.

-SOURCE-
    (Added Pub. L. 106-252, Sec. 2(a), July 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 630.)

-REFTEXT-
                            REFERENCES IN TEXT
      The date of the enactment of the Mobile Telecommunications
    Sourcing Act, referred to in subsec. (b), is the date of enactment
    of Pub. L. 106-252, which was approved July 28, 2000.

-MISC1-
                 EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENT
      Section effective July 28, 2000, and applicable only to customer
    bills issued after the first day of the first month beginning more
    than 2 years after July 28, 2000, see section 3 of Pub. L. 106-252,
    set out as a note under section 116 of this title.

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 123                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 123. Scope; special rules

-STATUTE-
      (a) Act Does Not Supersede Customer's Liability to Taxing
    Jurisdiction. - Nothing in sections 116 through 126 modifies,
    impairs, supersedes, or authorizes the modification, impairment, or
    supersession of, any law allowing a taxing jurisdiction to collect
    a tax, charge, or fee from a customer that has failed to provide
    its place of primary use.
      (b) Additional Taxable Charges. - If a taxing jurisdiction does
    not otherwise subject charges for mobile telecommunications
    services to taxation and if these charges are aggregated with and
    not separately stated from charges that are subject to taxation,
    then the charges for nontaxable mobile telecommunications services
    may be subject to taxation unless the home service provider can
    reasonably identify charges not subject to such tax, charge, or fee
    from its books and records that are kept in the regular course of
    business.
      (c) Nontaxable Charges. - If a taxing jurisdiction does not
    subject charges for mobile telecommunications services to taxation,
    a customer may not rely upon the nontaxability of charges for
    mobile telecommunications services unless the customer's home
    service provider separately states the charges for nontaxable
    mobile telecommunications services from taxable charges or the home
    service provider elects, after receiving a written request from the
    customer in the form required by the provider, to provide
    verifiable data based upon the home service provider's books and
    records that are kept in the regular course of business that
    reasonably identifies the nontaxable charges.

-SOURCE-
    (Added Pub. L. 106-252, Sec. 2(a), July 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 630.)

-REFTEXT-
                            REFERENCES IN TEXT
      Act, referred to in subsec. (a), probably means the Mobile
    Telecommunications Sourcing Act, Pub. L. 106-252, July 28, 2000,
    114 Stat. 626, which enacted sections 116 to 126 of this title and
    provisions set out as notes under sections 1 and 116 of this title.
    For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short
    Title of 2000 Amendment note set out under section 1 of this title
    and Tables.

-MISC1-
                 EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENT
      Section effective July 28, 2000, and applicable only to customer
    bills issued after the first day of the first month beginning more
    than 2 years after July 28, 2000, see section 3 of Pub. L. 106-252,
    set out as a note under section 116 of this title.

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 124                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 124. Definitions

-STATUTE-
      In sections 116 through 126 of this title:
        (1) Charges for mobile telecommunications services. - The term
      "charges for mobile telecommunications services" means any charge
      for, or associated with, the provision of commercial mobile radio
      service, as defined in section 20.3 of title 47 of the Code of
      Federal Regulations as in effect on June 1, 1999, or any charge
      for, or associated with, a service provided as an adjunct to a
      commercial mobile radio service, that is billed to the customer
      by or for the customer's home service provider regardless of
      whether individual transmissions originate or terminate within
      the licensed service area of the home service provider.
        (2) Customer. -
          (A) In general. - The term "customer" means -
            (i) the person or entity that contracts with the home
          service provider for mobile telecommunications services; or
            (ii) if the end user of mobile telecommunications services
          is not the contracting party, the end user of the mobile
          telecommunications service, but this clause applies only for
          the purpose of determining the place of primary use.

          (B) The term "customer" does not include -
            (i) a reseller of mobile telecommunications service; or
            (ii) a serving carrier under an arrangement to serve the
          customer outside the home service provider's licensed service
          area.

        (3) Designated database provider. - The term "designated
      database provider" means a corporation, association, or other
      entity representing all the political subdivisions of a State
      that is -
          (A) responsible for providing an electronic database
        prescribed in section 119(a) if the State has not provided such
        electronic database; and
          (B) approved by municipal and county associations or leagues
        of the State whose responsibility it would otherwise be to
        provide such database prescribed by sections 116 through 126 of
        this title.

        (4) Enhanced zip code. - The term "enhanced zip code" means a
      United States postal zip code of 9 or more digits.
        (5) Home service provider. - The term "home service provider"
      means the facilities-based carrier or reseller with which the
      customer contracts for the provision of mobile telecommunications
      services.
        (6) Licensed service area. - The term "licensed service area"
      means the geographic area in which the home service provider is
      authorized by law or contract to provide commercial mobile radio
      service to the customer.
        (7) Mobile telecommunications service. - The term "mobile
      telecommunications service" means commercial mobile radio
      service, as defined in section 20.3 of title 47 of the Code of
      Federal Regulations as in effect on June 1, 1999.
        (8) Place of primary use. - The term "place of primary use"
      means the street address representative of where the customer's
      use of the mobile telecommunications service primarily occurs,
      which must be -
          (A) the residential street address or the primary business
        street address of the customer; and
          (B) within the licensed service area of the home service
        provider.

        (9) Prepaid telephone calling services. - The term "prepaid
      telephone calling service" means the right to purchase
      exclusively telecommunications services that must be paid for in
      advance, that enables the origination of calls using an access
      number, authorization code, or both, whether manually or
      electronically dialed, if the remaining amount of units of
      service that have been prepaid is known by the provider of the
      prepaid service on a continuous basis.
        (10) Reseller. - The term "reseller" -
          (A) means a provider who purchases telecommunications
        services from another telecommunications service provider and
        then resells, uses as a component part of, or integrates the
        purchased services into a mobile telecommunications service;
        and
          (B) does not include a serving carrier with which a home
        service provider arranges for the services to its customers
        outside the home service provider's licensed service area.

        (11) Serving carrier. - The term "serving carrier" means a
      facilities-based carrier providing mobile telecommunications
      service to a customer outside a home service provider's or
      reseller's licensed service area.
        (12) Taxing jurisdiction. - The term "taxing jurisdiction"
      means any of the several States, the District of Columbia, or any
      territory or possession of the United States, any municipality,
      city, county, township, parish, transportation district, or
      assessment jurisdiction, or any other political subdivision
      within the territorial limits of the United States with the
      authority to impose a tax, charge, or fee.

-SOURCE-
    (Added Pub. L. 106-252, Sec. 2(a), July 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 631.)

-MISC1-
                 EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENT
      Section effective July 28, 2000, and applicable only to customer
    bills issued after the first day of the first month beginning more
    than 2 years after July 28, 2000, see section 3 of Pub. L. 106-252,
    set out as a note under section 116 of this title.

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 125                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 125. Nonseverability

-STATUTE-
      If a court of competent jurisdiction enters a final judgment on
    the merits that -
        (1) is based on Federal law;
        (2) is no longer subject to appeal; and
        (3) substantially limits or impairs the essential elements of
      sections 116 through 126 of this title,

    then sections 116 through 126 of this title are invalid and have no
    legal effect as of the date of entry of such judgment.

-SOURCE-
    (Added Pub. L. 106-252, Sec. 2(a), July 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 632.)

-MISC1-
                 EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENT
      Section effective July 28, 2000, and applicable only to customer
    bills issued after the first day of the first month beginning more
    than 2 years after July 28, 2000, see section 3 of Pub. L. 106-252,
    set out as a note under section 116 of this title.

-End-

-CITE-
    4 USC Sec. 126                                              01/07/2011

-EXPCITE-
    TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
    CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

-HEAD-
    Sec. 126. No inference

-STATUTE-
      (a) Internet Tax Freedom Act. - Nothing in sections 116 through
    this section of this title shall be construed as bearing on
    Congressional intent in enacting the Internet Tax Freedom Act or to
    modify or supersede the operation of such Act.
      (b) Telecommunications Act of 1996. - Nothing in sections 116
    through this section of this title shall limit or otherwise affect
    the implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 or the
    amendments made by such Act.

-SOURCE-
    (Added Pub. L. 106-252, Sec. 2(a), July 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 632.)

-REFTEXT-
                            REFERENCES IN TEXT
      The Internet Tax Freedom Act, referred to in subsec. (a), is
    title XI of Pub. L. 105-277, div. C, Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681-
    719, which is set out as a note under section 151 of Title 47,
    Telegraphs, Telephones, and Radiotelegraphs.
      The Telecommunications Act of 1996, referred to in subsec. (b),
    is Pub. L. 104-104, Feb. 8, 1996, 110 Stat. 56. For complete
    classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title of 1996
    Amendment note set out under section 609 of Title 47, Telegraphs,
    Telephones, and Radiotelegraphs, and Tables.

-MISC1-
                 EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENT
      Section effective July 28, 2000, and applicable only to customer
    bills issued after the first day of the first month beginning more
    than 2 years after July 28, 2000, see section 3 of Pub. L. 106-252,
    set out as a note under section 116 of this title.

-End-

49 USC SUBCHAPTER I – TRANSPORTATION – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC SUBCHAPTER I – GENERAL‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER I – GENERAL

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER I – GENERAL‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30101‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER I – GENERAL

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30101. Purpose and policy

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  The purpose of this chapter is to reduce traffic accidents and
‚ ‚ ‚  deaths and injuries resulting from traffic accidents. Therefore it
‚ ‚ ‚  is necessary –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) to prescribe motor vehicle safety standards for motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicles and motor vehicle equipment in interstate commerce; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) to carry out needed safety research and development.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 941.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30101‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1381.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 1, 80 Stat. 718.
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  The words “Congress hereby declares that”, “to persons”, and
‚ ‚ ‚  “Congress determines that” are omitted as surplus. The words “motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle” before “equipment” are added for consistency. The words
‚ ‚ ‚  “and to expand the national driver register” are omitted because
‚ ‚ ‚  section 401 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
‚ ‚ ‚  1966 (Public Law 89-563, 80 Stat. 730), the only section in this
‚ ‚ ‚  law related to the national driver register, was superseded by the
‚ ‚ ‚  National Driver Register Act of 1982 (Public Law 97-364, 96 Stat.
‚ ‚ ‚  1740).

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  SHORT TITLE OF 2007 AMENDMENT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 110-140, title I, Sec. 101, Dec. 19, 2007, 121 Stat.
‚ ‚ ‚  1498, provided that: “This subtitle [subtitle A (Secs. 101-113) of
‚ ‚ ‚  title I of Pub. L. 110-140, enacting section 32304A of this title,
‚ ‚ ‚  amending sections 32308, 32901 to 32904, 32905, 32906, 32908, and
‚ ‚ ‚  32912 of this title, and enacting provisions set out as notes under
‚ ‚ ‚  sections 32902, 32904, and 32908 of this title] may be cited as the
‚ ‚ ‚  ‘Ten-in-Ten Fuel Economy Act’.”

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  SHORT TITLE OF 2005 AMENDMENT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 109-59, title IV, Sec. 4001, Aug. 10, 2005, 119 Stat.
‚ ‚ ‚  1714, provided that: “This title [see Tables for classification]
‚ ‚ ‚  may be cited as the ‘Motor Carrier Safety Reauthorization Act of
‚ ‚ ‚  2005’.”

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  SHORT TITLE OF 2000 AMENDMENT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 106-414, Sec. 1, Nov. 1, 2000, 114 Stat. 1800, provided
‚ ‚ ‚  that: “This Act [enacting section 30170 of this title, amending
‚ ‚ ‚  sections 30115, 30117, 30118, 30120, 30165, and 30166 of this
‚ ‚ ‚  title, and enacting provisions set out as notes under sections
‚ ‚ ‚  30111, 30115, 30118, 30123, and 30127 of this title] may be cited
‚ ‚ ‚  as the ‘Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and
‚ ‚ ‚  Documentation (TREAD) Act’.”

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  SHORT TITLE OF 1998 AMENDMENT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 105-178, title VII, Sec. 7101, June 9, 1998, 112 Stat.
‚ ‚ ‚  465, provided that: “This subtitle [subtitle A (Secs. 7101-7107) of
‚ ‚ ‚  title VII of Pub. L. 105-178, enacting section 30105 of this title,
‚ ‚ ‚  amending sections 30104, 30114, 30120, 30123, 30127, 32102, 32304,
‚ ‚ ‚  and 32705 of this title, and enacting provisions set out as notes
‚ ‚ ‚  under this section and sections 30114 and 30127 of this title] may
‚ ‚ ‚  be cited as the ‘National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
‚ ‚ ‚  Reauthorization Act of 1998’.”

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  SHORT TITLE OF 1996 AMENDMENT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 104-152, Sec. 1, July 2, 1996, 110 Stat. 1384, provided
‚ ‚ ‚  that: “This Act [amending sections 30501 to 30505 and 33109 of this
‚ ‚ ‚  title and enacting provisions set out as a note under section 30502
‚ ‚ ‚  of this title] may be cited as the ‘Anti-Car Theft Improvements Act
‚ ‚ ‚  of 1996’.”

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  SIDE-IMPACT CRASH PROTECTION RULEMAKING‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 109-59, title X, Sec. 10302, Aug. 10, 2005, 119 Stat.
‚ ‚ ‚  1940, provided that:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(a) Rulemaking. – The Secretary [of Transportation] shall
‚ ‚ ‚  complete a rulemaking proceeding under chapter 301 of title 49,
‚ ‚ ‚  United States Code, to establish a standard designed to enhance
‚ ‚ ‚  passenger motor vehicle occupant protection, in all seating
‚ ‚ ‚  positions, in side impact crashes. The Secretary shall issue a
‚ ‚ ‚  final rule by July 1, 2008.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(b) Deadlines. – If the Secretary determines that the deadline
‚ ‚ ‚  for a final rule under this section cannot be met, the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  shall –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) notify the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Energy and Commerce and explain why that deadline cannot be met;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) establish a new deadline.”

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  VEHICLE BACKOVER AVOIDANCE TECHNOLOGY STUDY; NONTRAFFIC INCIDENT
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  DATA COLLECTION
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 109-59, title X, Secs. 10304, 10305, Aug. 10, 2005, 119
‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 1940, 1941, provided that:

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 10304. VEHICLE BACKOVER AVOIDANCE TECHNOLOGY STUDY.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(a) In General. – The Administrator of the National Highway
‚ ‚ ‚  Traffic Safety Administration shall conduct a study of effective
‚ ‚ ‚  methods for reducing the incidence of injury and death outside of
‚ ‚ ‚  parked passenger motor vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating
‚ ‚ ‚  of not more than 10,000 pounds attributable to movement of such
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicles. The Administrator shall complete the study within 1 year
‚ ‚ ‚  after the date of enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 2005] and report
‚ ‚ ‚  its findings to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Energy
‚ ‚ ‚  and Commerce not later than 15 months after the date of enactment
‚ ‚ ‚  of this Act.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(b) Specific Issues To Be Covered. – The study required by
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection (a) shall –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) include an analysis of backover prevention technology;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) identify, evaluate, and compare the available technologies
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  for detecting people or objects behind a motor vehicle with a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  gross vehicle weight rating of not more than 10,000 pounds for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  their accuracy, effectiveness, cost, and feasibility for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  installation; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) provide an estimate of cost savings that would result from
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  widespread use of backover prevention devices and technologies in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating of not more
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  than 10,000 pounds, including savings attributable to the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  prevention of –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(A) injuries and fatalities; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(B) damage to bumpers and other motor vehicle parts and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  damage to other objects.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 10305. NONTRAFFIC INCIDENT DATA COLLECTION.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(a) In General. – In conjunction with the study required in
‚ ‚ ‚  section 10304, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
‚ ‚ ‚  shall establish a method to collect and maintain data on the number
‚ ‚ ‚  and types of injuries and deaths involving motor vehicles with a
‚ ‚ ‚  gross vehicle weight rating of not more than 10,000 pounds in non-
‚ ‚ ‚  traffic incidents.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(b) Data Collection and Publication. – The Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation shall publish the data collected under subsection
‚ ‚ ‚  (a) no less frequently than biennially.”

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  STUDY ON INTERIOR DEVICE TO RELEASE TRUNK LID‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 105-178, title VII, Sec. 7106(e), June 9, 1998, 112 Stat.
‚ ‚ ‚  469, required the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to
‚ ‚ ‚  conduct a study of the benefits to motor vehicle drivers of a
‚ ‚ ‚  regulation to require the installation in a motor vehicle of an
‚ ‚ ‚  interior device to release the trunk lid and to submit a report on
‚ ‚ ‚  the results of the study to the Committee on Commerce of the House
‚ ‚ ‚  of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation of the Senate not later than 18 months after June 9,
‚ ‚ ‚  1998.

‚ ‚ ‚  NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION AUTHORIZATION ACT OF
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1991
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 102-240, title II, part B, Dec. 18, 1991, 105 Stat. 2081,
‚ ‚ ‚  as amended by Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 7(b), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat.
‚ ‚ ‚  1379, provided that:

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 2500. SHORT TITLE.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “This part may be cited as the ‘National Highway Traffic Safety
‚ ‚ ‚  Administration Authorization Act of 1991’.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “[SEC. 2501. Repealed. Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 7(b), July 5, 1994,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  108 Stat. 1379.]

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 2502. GENERAL PROVISIONS.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(a) Definitions. – As used in this part –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) the term ‘bus’ means a motor vehicle with motive power,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  except a trailer, designed for carrying more than 10 persons;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) the term ‘multipurpose passenger vehicle’ means a motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle with motive power (except a trailer), designed to carry
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  10 persons or fewer, which is constructed either on a truck
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  chassis or with special features for occasional off-road
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  operation;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) the term ‘passenger car’ means a motor vehicle with motive
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  power (except a multipurpose passenger vehicle, motorcycle, or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  trailer), designed for carrying 10 persons or fewer;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(4) the term ‘truck’ means a motor vehicle with motive power,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  except a trailer, designed primarily for the transportation of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  property or special purpose equipment; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(5) the term ‘Secretary’ means the Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(b) Procedure. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) In general. – Except as provided in paragraph (2), any
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  action taken under section 2503 shall be taken in accordance with
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the applicable provisions of the National Traffic and Motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 ([formerly] 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.).
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) Specific procedure. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(A) Initiation. – To initiate an action under section 2503,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary shall, not later than May 31, 1992, publish in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the Federal Register an advance notice of proposed rulemaking
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  or a notice of proposed rulemaking, except that if the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary is unable to publish such a notice by such date, the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary shall by such date publish in the Federal Register a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  notice that the Secretary will begin such action by a certain
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  date which may not be later than January 31, 1993 and include
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  in such notice the reasons for the delay. A notice of delayed
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  action shall not be considered agency action subject to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  judicial review. If the Secretary publishes an advance notice
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of proposed rulemaking, the Secretary is not required to follow
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  such notice with a notice of proposed rulemaking if the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary determines on the basis of such advanced notice and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the comments received thereon that the contemplated action
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  should not be taken under the provisions of the National
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 ([formerly] 15
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  U.S.C. 1381 et seq.), including the provisions of section 103
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of such Act ([formerly] 15 U.S.C. 1392), and if the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  publishes the reasons for such determination consistent with
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(B) Completion. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(i) Period. – Action under paragraphs (1) through (4) of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  section 2503 which was begun under subparagraph (A) shall be
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  completed within 26 months of the date of publication of an
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  advance notice of proposed rulemaking or 18 months of the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  date of publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking. The
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary may extend for any reason the period for completion
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of a rulemaking initiated by the issuance of a notice of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  proposed rulemaking for not more than 6 months if the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary publishes the reasons for such extension. The
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  extension of such period shall not be considered agency
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  action subject to judicial review.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(ii) Action. – A rulemaking under paragraphs (1) through
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (4) of section 2503 shall be considered completed when the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary promulgates a final rule or when the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  decides not to promulgate a rule (which decision may include
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  deferral of the action or reinitiation of the action). The
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary may not decide against promulgation of a final rule
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  because of lack of time to complete rulemaking. Any such
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  rulemaking actions shall be published in the Federal
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Register, together with the reasons for such decisions,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  consistent with chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code, and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  [formerly 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.].
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(iii) Special rule. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(I) Period. – Action under paragraph (5) of section 2503
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  which was begun under subparagraph (A) shall be completed
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  within 24 months of the date of publication of an advance
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  notice of proposed rulemaking or a notice of proposed
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  rulemaking. If the Secretary determines that there is a need
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  for delay and if the public comment period is closed, the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary may extend the date for completion for not more
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  than 6 months and shall publish in the Federal Register a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  notice stating the reasons for the extension and setting a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  date certain for completion of the action. The extension of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the completion date shall not be considered agency action
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  subject to judicial review.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(II) Action. – A rulemaking under paragraph (5) of section
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  2503 shall be considered completed when the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  promulgates a final rule with standards on improved head
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  injury protection.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(C) Standard. – The Secretary may, as part of any action
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  taken under section 2503, amend any motor vehicle safety
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  standard or establish a new standard under the National Traffic
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 ([formerly] 15 U.S.C. 1381
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  et seq.).

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 2503. MATTERS BEFORE THE SECRETARY.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “The Secretary shall address the following matters in accordance
‚ ‚ ‚  with section 2502:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) Protection against unreasonable risk of rollovers of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, and trucks with
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  a gross vehicle weight rating of 8,500 pounds or less and an
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  unloaded vehicle weight of 5,500 pounds or less.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) Extension of passenger car side impact protection to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  multipurpose passenger vehicles and trucks with a gross vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  weight rating of 8,500 pounds or less and an unloaded vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  weight of 5,500 pounds or less.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) Safety of child booster seats used in passenger cars and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  other appropriate motor vehicles.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(4) Improved design for safety belts.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(5) Improved head impact protection from interior components
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of passenger cars (i.e. roof rails, pillars, and front headers).

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “[SECS. 2504, 2505. Repealed. Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 7(b), July 5,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1994, 108 Stat. 1379.]

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 2506. REAR SEATBELTS.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “The Secretary shall expend such portion of the funds authorized
‚ ‚ ‚  to be appropriated under the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost
‚ ‚ ‚  Savings Act ([formerly] 15 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.), for fiscal year
‚ ‚ ‚  1993, as the Secretary deems necessary for the purpose of
‚ ‚ ‚  disseminating information to consumers regarding the manner in
‚ ‚ ‚  which passenger cars may be retrofitted with lap and shoulder rear
‚ ‚ ‚  seatbelts.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 2507. BRAKE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR PASSENGER CARS.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “Not later than December 31, 1993, the Secretary, in accordance
‚ ‚ ‚  with the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
‚ ‚ ‚  [formerly 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.], shall publish an advance notice
‚ ‚ ‚  of proposed rulemaking to consider the need for any additional
‚ ‚ ‚  brake performance standards for passenger cars, including antilock
‚ ‚ ‚  brake standards. The Secretary shall complete such rulemaking (in
‚ ‚ ‚  accordance with section 2502(b)(2)(B)(ii)) not later than 36 months
‚ ‚ ‚  from the date of initiation of such advance notice of proposed
‚ ‚ ‚  rulemaking. In order to facilitate and encourage innovation and
‚ ‚ ‚  early application of economical and effective antilock brake
‚ ‚ ‚  systems for all such vehicles, the Secretary shall, as part of the
‚ ‚ ‚  rulemaking, consider any such brake system adopted by a
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “[SEC. 2508. Repealed. Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 7(b), July 5, 1994,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  108 Stat. 1379.]

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 2509. HEAD INJURY IMPACT STUDY.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “The Secretary, in the case of any head injury protection matters
‚ ‚ ‚  not subject to section 2503(5) for which the Secretary is on the
‚ ‚ ‚  date of enactment of this Act [Dec. 18, 1991] examining the need
‚ ‚ ‚  for rulemaking and is conducting research, shall provide a report
‚ ‚ ‚  to Congress by the end of fiscal year 1993 identifying those
‚ ‚ ‚  matters and their status. The report shall include a statement of
‚ ‚ ‚  any actions planned toward initiating such rulemaking no later than
‚ ‚ ‚  fiscal year 1994 or 1995 through use of either an advance notice of
‚ ‚ ‚  proposed rulemaking or a notice of proposed rulemaking and
‚ ‚ ‚  completing such rulemaking as soon as possible thereafter.”

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  FUEL SYSTEM INTEGRITY STANDARD‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 93-492, title I, Sec. 108, Oct. 27, 1974, 88 Stat. 1482,
‚ ‚ ‚  provided that:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(a) Ratification of Standard. – Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
‚ ‚ ‚  Standard Number 301 (49 CFR 571.301-75; Docket No. 73-20, Notice 2)
‚ ‚ ‚  as published on March 21, 1974 (39 F.R. 10588-10590) shall take
‚ ‚ ‚  effect on the dates prescribed in such standard (as so published).
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(b) Amendment or Repeal of Standard. – The Secretary may amend
‚ ‚ ‚  the standard described in subsection (a) in order to correct
‚ ‚ ‚  technical errors in the standard, and may amend or repeal such
‚ ‚ ‚  standard if he determines such amendment or repeal will not
‚ ‚ ‚  diminish the level of motor vehicle safety.”
-EXEC-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  EX. ORD. NO. 11357. ADMINISTRATION OF TRAFFIC AND MOTOR VEHICLE
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  SAFETY THROUGH NATIONAL HIGHWAY SAFETY BUREAU AND ITS DIRECTOR
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Ex. Ord. No. 11357, June 6, 1967, 32 F.R. 8225, provided:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the
‚ ‚ ‚  United States by Section 201 of the Highway Safety Act of 1966, as
‚ ‚ ‚  amended (80 Stat. 735, 943) [set out as a note under section 401 of
‚ ‚ ‚  Title 23, Highways], and by Section 3(f)(3) of the Department of
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation Act (80 Stat. 932) [former 49 U.S.C. 1652(f)(3)], it
‚ ‚ ‚  is hereby ordered that the provisions of the National Traffic and
‚ ‚ ‚  Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended (80 Stat. 718, 943)
‚ ‚ ‚  [formerly 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.], shall be carried out through the
‚ ‚ ‚  National Highway Safety Bureau and the Director thereof.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Lyndon B. Johnson.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30102‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER I – GENERAL

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30102. Definitions

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) General Definitions. – In this chapter –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) “dealer” means a person selling and distributing new motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicles or motor vehicle equipment primarily to purchasers that
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  in good faith purchase the vehicles or equipment other than for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  resale.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) “defect” includes any defect in performance, construction,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  a component, or material of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  equipment.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) “distributor” means a person primarily selling and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  distributing motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  resale.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (4) “interstate commerce” means commerce between a place in a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  State and a place in another State or between places in the same
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  State through another State.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (5) “manufacturer” means a person –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) manufacturing or assembling motor vehicles or motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle equipment; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) importing motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  resale.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (6) “motor vehicle” means a vehicle driven or drawn by
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  streets, roads, and highways, but does not include a vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  operated only on a rail line.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (7) “motor vehicle equipment” means –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) any system, part, or component of a motor vehicle as
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  originally manufactured;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) any similar part or component manufactured or sold for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  replacement or improvement of a system, part, or component, or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  as an accessory or addition to a motor vehicle; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (C) any device or an article or apparel (except medicine or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  eyeglasses prescribed by a licensed practitioner) that is not a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  system, part, or component of a motor vehicle and is
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  manufactured, sold, delivered, offered, or intended to be used
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  only to safeguard motor vehicles and highway users against risk
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of accident, injury, or death.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (8) “motor vehicle safety” means the performance of a motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in a way that protects the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  public against unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of the design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  and against unreasonable risk of death or injury in an accident,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  and includes nonoperational safety of a motor vehicle.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (9) “motor vehicle safety standard” means a minimum standard
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  for motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment performance.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (10) “State” means a State of the United States, the District
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  American Samoa, and the Virgin Islands.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (11) “United States district court” means a district court of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the United States, a United States court for Guam, the Virgin
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Islands, and American Samoa, and the district court for the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Northern Mariana Islands.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Limited Definitions. – (1) In sections 30117(b), 30118-30121,
‚ ‚ ‚  and 30166(f) of this title –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) “adequate repair” does not include repair resulting in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  substantially impaired operation of a motor vehicle or motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle equipment;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) “first purchaser” means the first purchaser of a motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle or motor vehicle equipment other than for resale;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (C) “original equipment” means motor vehicle equipment
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (including a tire) installed in or on a motor vehicle at the time
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of delivery to the first purchaser;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (D) “replacement equipment” means motor vehicle equipment
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (including a tire) that is not original equipment;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (E) a brand name owner of a tire marketed under a brand name
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  not owned by the manufacturer of the tire is deemed to be the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer of the tire;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (F) a defect in original equipment, or noncompliance of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  original equipment with a motor vehicle safety standard
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed under this chapter, is deemed to be a defect or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  noncompliance of the motor vehicle in or on which the equipment
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  was installed at the time of delivery to the first purchaser;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (G) a manufacturer of a motor vehicle in or on which original
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  equipment was installed when delivered to the first purchaser is
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  deemed to be the manufacturer of the equipment; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (H) a retreader of a tire is deemed to be the manufacturer of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the tire.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) The Secretary of Transportation may prescribe regulations
‚ ‚ ‚  changing paragraph (1)(C), (D), (F), or (G) of this subsection.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 941.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30102(a)(1)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1391(7).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 102(1)-(3),‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (5)-(9), (11), (12), 80‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 718, 719.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1391(10).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 102(10), 80‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 718; restated Oct.‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  27, 1974, Pub. L. 93-492,‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 110(a), 88 Stat. 1484.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  49‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Oct. 15, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  App.:1655(a)(6)(A).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-670, Sec. 6(a)(6)(A), 80
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 938.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30102(a)(2)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1391(11).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30102(a)(3)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1391(6).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30102(a)(4)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1391(9).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30102(a)(5)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1391(5).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30102(a)(6)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1391(3).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30102(a)(7)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1391(4).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 102(4), 80‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 718; restated May 22,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1970, Pub. L. 91-265, Sec.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  2, 84 Stat. 262.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30102(a)(8)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1391(1).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30102(a)(9)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1391(2).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30102(a)(10)‚ ‚ ‚  15:1391(8).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30102(a)(11)‚ ‚ ‚  15:1391(12).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30102(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1419.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  159; added Oct. 27, 1974,‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 93-492, Sec.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102(a), 88 Stat. 1476.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a), the definitions apply to the entire chapter
‚ ‚ ‚  because of references in 15:1421-1431 applying 15:1391-1420 to
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1421-1431. Before clause (1), the words “As used” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus. In clause (1), the text of 15:1391(10) and 49
‚ ‚ ‚  App.:1655(a)(6)(A) is omitted as surplus because the complete name
‚ ‚ ‚  of the Secretary of Transportation is used the first time the term
‚ ‚ ‚  appears in a section. The words “selling and distributing” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “who is engaged in the sale and distribution of” to
‚ ‚ ‚  eliminate unnecessary words. The word “purposes” is omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus. In clause (3), the words “selling and distributing” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “engaged in the sale and distribution of” to
‚ ‚ ‚  eliminate unnecessary words. In clause (5)(A), the words
‚ ‚ ‚  “manufacturing or assembling” are substituted for “engaged in the
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturing or assembling of” to eliminate unnecessary words. In
‚ ‚ ‚  clause (7), the words “physician or other duly” and “drivers,
‚ ‚ ‚  passengers, and other” are omitted as surplus. In clause (8), the
‚ ‚ ‚  words “is also protected” and “to persons” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  unnecessary. In clause (9), the words “which is practicable, which
‚ ‚ ‚  meets the need for motor vehicle safety and which provides
‚ ‚ ‚  objective criteria” are omitted as unnecessary because of
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392(a) which is restated in section 30111 of the revised title.
‚ ‚ ‚  In clauses (10) and (11), the words “the Northern Mariana Islands”
‚ ‚ ‚  are added because of section 502(a)(2) of the Covenant to Establish
‚ ‚ ‚  a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union
‚ ‚ ‚  with the United States of America, as enacted by the Act of March
‚ ‚ ‚  24, 1976 (Public Law 94-241, 90 Stat. 268), and as proclaimed to be
‚ ‚ ‚  in effect by the President on January 9, 1978 (Proc. No. 4534, Oct.
‚ ‚ ‚  24, 1977, 42 F.R. 56593). The words “the Canal Zone” are omitted
‚ ‚ ‚  because of the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977. In clause (10), the
‚ ‚ ‚  word “means” is substituted for “includes” as being more
‚ ‚ ‚  appropriate. The words “a State of the United States” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “each of the several States” for consistency. The
‚ ‚ ‚  words “the Commonwealth of” are omitted as surplus. In clause (11),
‚ ‚ ‚  the word “Federal” is omitted as surplus. The words “of the
‚ ‚ ‚  Commonwealth of Puerto Rico” are omitted as unnecessary because the
‚ ‚ ‚  district court of Puerto Rico is a district court of the United
‚ ‚ ‚  States under 28:119.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(1), before clause (A), the words “The term” and
‚ ‚ ‚  “the term” are omitted as surplus. In clause (B), the words “of a
‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment” are added for clarity. In
‚ ‚ ‚  clause (E), the words “to be” are added for consistency. The words
‚ ‚ ‚  “marketed under such brand name” are omitted as surplus. In clause
‚ ‚ ‚  (F), the words “a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under
‚ ‚ ‚  this chapter” are added for clarity and consistency. The word
‚ ‚ ‚  “noncompliance” is substituted for “failure to comply” for
‚ ‚ ‚  consistency in the chapter. In clause (G), the words “(rather than
‚ ‚ ‚  the manufacturer of such equipment)” are omitted as surplus. The
‚ ‚ ‚  words “deemed to be” are substituted for “considered” for
‚ ‚ ‚  consistency. In clause (H), the words “which have been” are omitted
‚ ‚ ‚  as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Subsection (b)(2) is substituted for “Except as otherwise
‚ ‚ ‚  provided in regulations of the Secretary” for clarity and because
‚ ‚ ‚  of the restatement.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC BICYCLES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 107-319, Sec. 2, Dec. 4, 2002, 116 Stat. 2776, provided
‚ ‚ ‚  that: “For purposes of motor vehicle safety standards issued and
‚ ‚ ‚  enforced pursuant to chapter 301 of title 49, United States Code, a
‚ ‚ ‚  low-speed electric bicycle (as defined in section 38(b) of the
‚ ‚ ‚  Consumer Product Safety Act [15 U.S.C. 2085(b)]) shall not be
‚ ‚ ‚  considered a motor vehicle as defined by section 30102(6) of title
‚ ‚ ‚  49, United States Code.”

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30103‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER I – GENERAL

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30103. Relationship to other laws

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Uniformity of Regulations. – The Secretary of Transportation
‚ ‚ ‚  may not prescribe a safety regulation related to a motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  subject to subchapter I of chapter 135 of this title that differs
‚ ‚ ‚  from a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter.
‚ ‚ ‚  However, the Secretary may prescribe, for a motor vehicle operated
‚ ‚ ‚  by a carrier subject to subchapter I of chapter 135, a safety
‚ ‚ ‚  regulation that imposes a higher standard of performance after
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacture than that required by an applicable standard in effect
‚ ‚ ‚  at the time of manufacture.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Preemption. – (1) When a motor vehicle safety standard is in
‚ ‚ ‚  effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a
‚ ‚ ‚  State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to
‚ ‚ ‚  the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed under this chapter. However, the United States
‚ ‚ ‚  Government, a State, or a political subdivision of a State may
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribe a standard for a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment
‚ ‚ ‚  obtained for its own use that imposes a higher performance
‚ ‚ ‚  requirement than that required by the otherwise applicable standard
‚ ‚ ‚  under this chapter.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) A State may enforce a standard that is identical to a
‚ ‚ ‚  standard prescribed under this chapter.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Antitrust Laws. – This chapter does not –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) exempt from the antitrust laws conduct that is unlawful
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  under those laws; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) prohibit under the antitrust laws conduct that is lawful
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  under those laws.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Warranty Obligations and Additional Legal Rights and
‚ ‚ ‚  Remedies. – Sections 30117(b), 30118-30121, 30166(f), and 30167(a)
‚ ‚ ‚  and (b) of this title do not establish or affect a warranty
‚ ‚ ‚  obligation under a law of the United States or a State. A remedy
‚ ‚ ‚  under those sections and sections 30161 and 30162 of this title is
‚ ‚ ‚  in addition to other rights and remedies under other laws of the
‚ ‚ ‚  United States or a State.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (e) Common Law Liability. – Compliance with a motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a
‚ ‚ ‚  person from liability at common law.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 943; Pub. L.
‚ ‚ ‚  104-88, title III, Sec. 308(j), Dec. 29, 1995, 109 Stat. 947.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30103(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392(g).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Secs. 103(g),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  105(a)(6), 116, 80 Stat.‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  720, 721, 727.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30103(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392(d).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 103(d), 80‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 719; Oct. 15, 1982,‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 97-331, Sec. 3, 96‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 1619.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30103(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1405.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30103(d)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1394(a)(6).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1410a(e).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Secs.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  124(e), 160; added Oct. 27,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1974, Pub. L. 93-492, Secs.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102(a), 106, 88 Stat. 1477,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1481.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1420.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30103(e)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(k).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 108(k), 80‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 723; Oct. 31, 1988,‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 100-562, Sec. 2(b),
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102 Stat. 2818.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a), the words “or the Transportation of Explosives
‚ ‚ ‚  Act, as amended (18 U.S.C. 831-835)” are omitted as obsolete
‚ ‚ ‚  because 18:831-835 have been repealed. The word “prescribe” is
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “adopt” for consistency. The words “or continue in
‚ ‚ ‚  effect” and “In prescribing safety regulations” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus. The word “prescribed” is substituted for “issued” for
‚ ‚ ‚  consistency. The words “to comply” and “Federal” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus. The words “in effect” are added for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(1), the word “Federal” is omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚  The word “prescribe” is substituted for “either to establish, or to
‚ ‚ ‚  continue in effect” for consistency and to eliminate unnecessary
‚ ‚ ‚  words. The words “standard prescribed under this chapter” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “Federal standard” for clarity. The words “However,
‚ ‚ ‚  the United States . . . may prescribe” are substituted for “Nothing
‚ ‚ ‚  in this section shall be construed to prevent the Federal . . .
‚ ‚ ‚  from establishing” for consistency. The words “of a State” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “thereof” for clarity. The word “standard” is
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “safety requirement” for consistency. The words
‚ ‚ ‚  “performance requirement” are substituted for “standard of
‚ ‚ ‚  performance” to avoid using “standard” in 2 different ways.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Subsection (b)(2) is substituted for 15:1392(d) (2d sentence) for
‚ ‚ ‚  consistency and to eliminate unnecessary words.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c), the words “be deemed to” and “of the United
‚ ‚ ‚  States” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (d), the words “United States” are substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “Federal” in 15:1420 for consistency. The words “Consumer” in
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1420, “not in lieu of” in 15:1410a(e) and 1420, and “not in
‚ ‚ ‚  substitution for” in 15:1394(a)(6) are omitted as surplus. The word
‚ ‚ ‚  “other” is added for clarity.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  AMENDMENTS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1995 – Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 104-88 substituted “subchapter I of
‚ ‚ ‚  chapter 135” for “subchapter II of chapter 105” in two places.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1995 AMENDMENT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Amendment by Pub. L. 104-88 effective Jan. 1, 1996, see section 2
‚ ‚ ‚  of Pub. L. 104-88, set out as an Effective Date note under section
‚ ‚ ‚  701 of this title.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30104‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER I – GENERAL

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30104. Authorization of appropriations

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  $98,313,500 for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
‚ ‚ ‚  to carry out this part in each fiscal year beginning in fiscal year
‚ ‚ ‚  1999 and ending in fiscal year 2001.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 944; Pub. L.
‚ ‚ ‚  105-178, title VII, Sec. 7102(a), June 9, 1998, 112 Stat. 465; Pub.
‚ ‚ ‚  L. 106-39, Sec. 1(a), July 28, 1999, 113 Stat. 206.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30104‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392 (note).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Dec. 18, 1991, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102-240, Sec. 2501(a), 105‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 2081.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In this section, before clause (1), the words “to the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  of Transportation for the National Highway Traffic Safety
‚ ‚ ‚  Administration” are substituted for “For the National Highway
‚ ‚ ‚  Traffic Safety Administration” for clarity and consistency in the
‚ ‚ ‚  revised title and with other titles of the United States Code. The
‚ ‚ ‚  reference to fiscal year 1992 is omitted as obsolete.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  AMENDMENTS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1999 – Pub. L. 106-39 substituted “$98,313,500” for
‚ ‚ ‚  “$81,200,000”.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1998 – Pub. L. 105-178 reenacted section catchline without change
‚ ‚ ‚  and amended text generally. Prior to amendment, text read as
‚ ‚ ‚  follows: “The following amounts may be appropriated to the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary of Transportation for the National Highway Traffic Safety
‚ ‚ ‚  Administration to carry out this chapter:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) $71,333,436 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1993.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) $74,044,106 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1994.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) $76,857,782 for the fiscal year ending September 30,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1995.”

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30105‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER I – GENERAL

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30105. Restriction on lobbying activities

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) In General. – No funds appropriated to the Secretary for the
‚ ‚ ‚  National Highway Traffic Safety Administration shall be available
‚ ‚ ‚  for any activity specifically designed to urge a State or local
‚ ‚ ‚  legislator to favor or oppose the adoption of any specific
‚ ‚ ‚  legislative proposal pending before any State or local legislative
‚ ‚ ‚  body.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Appearance as Witness Not Barred. – Subsection (a) does not
‚ ‚ ‚  prohibit officers or employees of the United States from testifying
‚ ‚ ‚  before any State or local legislative body in response to the
‚ ‚ ‚  invitation of any member of that legislative body or a State
‚ ‚ ‚  executive office.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Added and amended Pub. L. 105-178, title VII, Sec. 7104(a), (c),
‚ ‚ ‚  June 9, 1998, 112 Stat. 466; Pub. L. 105-206, title IX, Sec.
‚ ‚ ‚  9012(a), July 22, 1998, 112 Stat. 864.)
-MISC1-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  AMENDMENTS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1998 – Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 105-178, Sec. 7104(c), as added by
‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 105-206, inserted “for the National Highway Traffic Safety
‚ ‚ ‚  Administration” after “Secretary”.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1998 AMENDMENT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Title IX of Pub. L. 105-206 effective simultaneously with
‚ ‚ ‚  enactment of Pub. L. 105-178 and to be treated as included in Pub.
‚ ‚ ‚  L. 105-178 at time of enactment, and provisions of Pub. L. 105-178,
‚ ‚ ‚  as in effect on day before July 22, 1998, that are amended by title
‚ ‚ ‚  IX of Pub. L. 105-206 to be treated as not enacted, see section
‚ ‚ ‚  9016 of Pub. L. 105-206, set out as a note under section 101 of
‚ ‚ ‚  Title 23, Highways.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30106‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER I – GENERAL

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30106. Rented or leased motor vehicle safety and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  responsibility

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) In General. – An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or
‚ ‚ ‚  leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall
‚ ‚ ‚  not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision
‚ ‚ ‚  thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an
‚ ‚ ‚  affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that
‚ ‚ ‚  results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner).

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Financial Responsibility Laws. – Nothing in this section
‚ ‚ ‚  supersedes the law of any State or political subdivision thereof –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) imposing financial responsibility or insurance standards on
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege of registering and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  operating a motor vehicle; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) imposing liability on business entities engaged in the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  insurance requirements under State law.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Applicability and Effective Date. – Notwithstanding any other
‚ ‚ ‚  provision of law, this section shall apply with respect to any
‚ ‚ ‚  action commenced on or after the date of enactment of this section
‚ ‚ ‚  without regard to whether the harm that is the subject of the
‚ ‚ ‚  action, or the conduct that caused the harm, occurred before such
‚ ‚ ‚  date of enactment.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Definitions. – In this section, the following definitions
‚ ‚ ‚  apply:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) Affiliate. – The term “affiliate” means a person other than
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the owner that directly or indirectly controls, is controlled by,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  or is under common control with the owner. In the preceding
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence, the term “control” means the power to direct the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  management and policies of a person whether through ownership of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  voting securities or otherwise.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) Owner. – The term “owner” means a person who is –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) a record or beneficial owner, holder of title, lessor, or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  lessee of a motor vehicle;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) entitled to the use and possession of a motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  subject to a security interest in another person; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (C) a lessor, lessee, or a bailee of a motor vehicle, in the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles, having
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the use or possession thereof, under a lease, bailment, or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  otherwise.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) Person. – The term “person” means any individual,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  corporation, company, limited liability company, trust,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  association, firm, partnership, society, joint stock company, or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  any other entity.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Added Pub. L. 109-59, title X, Sec. 10208(a), Aug. 10, 2005, 119
‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 1935.)

-REFTEXT-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  REFERENCES IN TEXT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  The date of enactment of this section, referred to in subsec.
‚ ‚ ‚  (c), is the date of enactment of Pub. L. 109-59, which was approved
‚ ‚ ‚  Aug. 10, 2005.

-End-
-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30111‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30111. Standards

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) General Requirements. – The Secretary of Transportation shall
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribe motor vehicle safety standards. Each standard shall be
‚ ‚ ‚  practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and be stated
‚ ‚ ‚  in objective terms.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Considerations and Consultation. – When prescribing a motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle safety standard under this chapter, the Secretary shall –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) consider relevant available motor vehicle safety
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  information;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) consult with the agency established under the Act of August
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  20, 1958 (Public Law 85-684, 72 Stat. 635), and other appropriate
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  State or interstate authorities (including legislative
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  committees);
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) consider whether a proposed standard is reasonable,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  practicable, and appropriate for the particular type of motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle or motor vehicle equipment for which it is prescribed;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (4) consider the extent to which the standard will carry out
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  section 30101 of this title.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Cooperation. – The Secretary may advise, assist, and
‚ ‚ ‚  cooperate with departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the
‚ ‚ ‚  United States Government, States, and other public and private
‚ ‚ ‚  agencies in developing motor vehicle safety standards.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Effective Dates of Standards. – The Secretary shall specify
‚ ‚ ‚  the effective date of a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed
‚ ‚ ‚  under this chapter in the order prescribing the standard. A
‚ ‚ ‚  standard may not become effective before the 180th day after the
‚ ‚ ‚  standard is prescribed or later than one year after it is
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed. However, the Secretary may prescribe a different
‚ ‚ ‚  effective date after finding, for good cause shown, that a
‚ ‚ ‚  different effective date is in the public interest and publishing
‚ ‚ ‚  the reasons for the finding.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (e) 5-Year Plan for Testing Standards. – The Secretary shall
‚ ‚ ‚  establish and periodically review and update on a continuing basis
‚ ‚ ‚  a 5-year plan for testing motor vehicle safety standards prescribed
‚ ‚ ‚  under this chapter that the Secretary considers capable of being
‚ ‚ ‚  tested. In developing the plan and establishing testing priorities,
‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary shall consider factors the Secretary considers
‚ ‚ ‚  appropriate, consistent with section 30101 of this title and the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary’s other duties and powers under this chapter. The
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary may change at any time those priorities to address
‚ ‚ ‚  matters the Secretary considers of greater priority. The initial
‚ ‚ ‚  plan may be the 5-year plan for compliance testing in effect on
‚ ‚ ‚  December 18, 1991.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 944.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30111(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392(a), (b),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (e) (1st sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Secs. 102(13),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  103(a)-(c), (e), (f), 107‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to standards), 80‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 719, 721.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30111(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1391(13).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392(f).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30111(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1396 (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  standards).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30111(d)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392(c), (e)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (last sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30111(e)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392(j).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  103(j); added Dec. 18, 1991,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 102-240, Sec. 2505,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  105 Stat. 2084.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a), the words “shall prescribe” are substituted
‚ ‚ ‚  for “shall establish by order” in 15:1392(a) and “may by order” in
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392(e) (1st sentence) for consistency. The words “amend or
‚ ‚ ‚  revoke” in 15:1392(e) (1st sentence) and 1397(b)(1) (last sentence)
‚ ‚ ‚  are omitted because they are included in “prescribe”. The words
‚ ‚ ‚  “appropriate Federal” in 15:1392(a) and “Federal” in 15:1392(e)
‚ ‚ ‚  (1st sentence) are omitted as surplus. The words “established under
‚ ‚ ‚  this section” are omitted because of the restatement. The text of
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392(b) is omitted as surplus because 5:chs. 5, subch. II, and 7
‚ ‚ ‚  apply unless otherwise stated.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(1), the words “including the results of
‚ ‚ ‚  research, development, testing and evaluation activities conducted
‚ ‚ ‚  pursuant to this chapter” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(2), the words “agency established under the Act
‚ ‚ ‚  of August 20, 1958 (Public Law 85-684, 72 Stat. 635)” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for 15:1391(13) and “the Vehicle Equipment Safety
‚ ‚ ‚  Commission” in 15:1392(f) because of the restatement. The citation
‚ ‚ ‚  in parenthesis is included only for information purposes.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(4), the words “contribute to” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c), the words “departments, agencies, and
‚ ‚ ‚  instrumentalities of the United States Government, States, and
‚ ‚ ‚  other public and private agencies” are substituted for “other
‚ ‚ ‚  Federal departments and agencies, and State and other interested
‚ ‚ ‚  public and private agencies” for consistency. The words “planning
‚ ‚ ‚  and” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (d), the words “The Secretary” are added for
‚ ‚ ‚  clarity. The words “effective date” are substituted for “the date .
‚ ‚ ‚  . . is to take effect” to eliminate unnecessary words. The words
‚ ‚ ‚  “under this chapter” are added for clarity. The words “However, the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary may prescribe a different effective date” are substituted
‚ ‚ ‚  for “unless the Secretary” for clarity. The word “different” is
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “earlier or later” to eliminate unnecessary words.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (e), the words “duties and powers” are substituted
‚ ‚ ‚  for “responsibilities”, and the word “change” is substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “adjust”, and for clarity and consistency in the revised title.

-REFTEXT-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  REFERENCES IN TEXT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Act of August 20, 1958, referred to in subsec. (b)(2), is set out
‚ ‚ ‚  as a note under former section 313 of Title 23, Highways.
-MISC2-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  PEDESTRIAN SAFETY ENHANCEMENT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 111-373, Jan. 4, 2011, 124 Stat. 4086, provided that:

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “This Act may be cited as the ‘Pedestrian Safety Enhancement Act
‚ ‚ ‚  of 2010’.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “As used in this Act –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) the term ‘Secretary’ means the Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) the term ‘alert sound’ (herein referred to as the ‘sound’)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  means a vehicle-emitted sound to enable pedestrians to discern
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle presence, direction, location, and operation;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) the term ‘cross-over speed’ means the speed at which tire
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  noise, wind resistance, or other factors eliminate the need for a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  separate alert sound as determined by the Secretary;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(4) the term ‘motor vehicle’ has the meaning given such term
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  in section 30102(a)(6) of title 49, United States Code, except
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  that such term shall not include a trailer (as such term is
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  defined in section 571.3 of title 49, Code of Federal
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Regulations);
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(5) the term ‘conventional motor vehicle’ means a motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle powered by a gasoline, diesel, or alternative fueled
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  internal combustion engine as its sole means of propulsion;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(6) the term ‘manufacturer’ has the meaning given such term in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  section 30102(a)(5) of title 49, United States Code;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(7) the term ‘dealer’ has the meaning given such term in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  section 30102(a)(1) of title 49, United States Code;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(8) the term ‘defect’ has the meaning given such term in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  section 30102(a)(2) of title 49, United States Code;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(9) the term ‘hybrid vehicle’ means a motor vehicle which has
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  more than one means of propulsion; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(10) the term ‘electric vehicle’ means a motor vehicle with an
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  electric motor as its sole means of propulsion.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 3. MINIMUM SOUND REQUIREMENT FOR MOTOR VEHICLES.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(a) Rulemaking Required. – Not later than 18 months after the
‚ ‚ ‚  date of enactment of this Act [Jan. 4, 2011] the Secretary shall
‚ ‚ ‚  initiate rulemaking, under section 30111 of title 49, United States
‚ ‚ ‚  Code, to promulgate a motor vehicle safety standard –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) establishing performance requirements for an alert sound
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  that allows blind and other pedestrians to reasonably detect a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  nearby electric or hybrid vehicle operating below the cross-over
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  speed, if any; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) requiring new electric or hybrid vehicles to provide an
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  alert sound conforming to the requirements of the motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  safety standard established under this subsection.
‚ ‚ ‚  “The motor vehicle safety standard established under this
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection shall not require either driver or pedestrian activation
‚ ‚ ‚  of the alert sound and shall allow the pedestrian to reasonably
‚ ‚ ‚  detect a nearby electric or hybrid vehicle in critical operating
‚ ‚ ‚  scenarios including, but not limited to, constant speed,
‚ ‚ ‚  accelerating, or decelerating. The Secretary shall allow
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturers to provide each vehicle with one or more sounds that
‚ ‚ ‚  comply with the motor vehicle safety standard at the time of
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacture. Further, the Secretary shall require manufacturers to
‚ ‚ ‚  provide, within reasonable manufacturing tolerances, the same sound
‚ ‚ ‚  or set of sounds for all vehicles of the same make and model and
‚ ‚ ‚  shall prohibit manufacturers from providing any mechanism for
‚ ‚ ‚  anyone other than the manufacturer or the dealer to disable, alter,
‚ ‚ ‚  replace, or modify the sound or set of sounds, except that the
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer or dealer may alter, replace, or modify the sound or
‚ ‚ ‚  set of sounds in order to remedy a defect or non-compliance with
‚ ‚ ‚  the motor vehicle safety standard. The Secretary shall promulgate
‚ ‚ ‚  the required motor vehicle safety standard pursuant to this
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection not later than 36 months after the date of enactment of
‚ ‚ ‚  this Act.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(b) Consideration. – When conducting the required rulemaking,
‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary shall –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) determine the minimum level of sound emitted from a motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle that is necessary to provide blind and other pedestrians
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  with the information needed to reasonably detect a nearby
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  electric or hybrid vehicle operating at or below the cross-over
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  speed, if any;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) determine the performance requirements for an alert sound
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  that is recognizable to a pedestrian as a motor vehicle in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  operation; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) consider the overall community noise impact.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(c) Phase-in Required. – The motor vehicle safety standard
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall
‚ ‚ ‚  establish a phase-in period for compliance, as determined by the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary, and shall require full compliance with the required
‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle safety standard for motor vehicles manufactured on or
‚ ‚ ‚  after September 1st of the calendar year that begins 3 years after
‚ ‚ ‚  the date on which the final rule is issued.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(d) Required Consultation. – When conducting the required study
‚ ‚ ‚  and rulemaking, the Secretary shall –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) consult with the Environmental Protection Agency to assure
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  that the motor vehicle safety standard is consistent with
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  existing noise requirements overseen by the Agency;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) consult consumer groups representing individuals who are
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  blind;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) consult with automobile manufacturers and professional
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  organizations representing them;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(4) consult technical standardization organizations
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  responsible for measurement methods such as the Society of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Automotive Engineers, the International Organization for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Standardization, and the United Nations Economic Commission for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Europe, World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(e) Required Study and Report to Congress. – Not later than 48
‚ ‚ ‚  months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall
‚ ‚ ‚  complete a study and report to Congress as to whether there exists
‚ ‚ ‚  a safety need to apply the motor vehicle safety standard required
‚ ‚ ‚  by subsection (a) to conventional motor vehicles. In the event that
‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary determines there exists a safety need, the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  shall initiate rulemaking under section 30111 of title 49, United
‚ ‚ ‚  States Code, to extend the standard to conventional motor vehicles.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 4. FUNDING.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, $2,000,000 of any
‚ ‚ ‚  amounts made available to the Secretary of Transportation under
‚ ‚ ‚  under section 406 of title 23, United States Code, shall be made
‚ ‚ ‚  available to the Administrator of the National Highway
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation Safety Administration for carrying out section 3 of
‚ ‚ ‚  this Act.”

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  CHILD SAFETY STANDARDS FOR MOTOR VEHICLES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 110-189, Feb. 28, 2008, 122 Stat. 639, provided that:

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “This Act may be cited as the ‘Cameron Gulbransen Kids
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation Safety Act of 2007’ or the ‘K.T. Safety Act of
‚ ‚ ‚  2007’.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 2. RULEMAKING REGARDING CHILD SAFETY.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(a) Power Window Safety. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) Consideration of rule. – Not later than 18 months after
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the date of the enactment of this Act [Feb. 28, 2008], the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary of Transportation (referred to in this Act as the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  ‘Secretary’) shall initiate a rulemaking to consider prescribing
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  or amending Federal motor vehicle safety standards to require
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  power windows and panels on motor vehicles to automatically
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  reverse direction when such power windows and panels detect an
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  obstruction to prevent children and others from being trapped,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  injured, or killed.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) Deadline for decision. – If the Secretary determines such
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  safety standards are reasonable, practicable, and appropriate,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary shall prescribe, under section 30111 of title 49,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  United States Code, the safety standards described in paragraph
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) not later than 30 months after the date of enactment of this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Act. If the Secretary determines that no additional safety
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  standards are reasonable, practicable, and appropriate, the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary shall –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(A) not later than 30 months after the date of enactment of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  this Act, transmit a report to the Committee on Energy and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate describing
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the reasons such standards were not prescribed; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(B) publish and otherwise make available to the public
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  through the Internet and other means (such as the ‘Buying a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Safer Car’ brochure) information regarding which vehicles are
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  or are not equipped with power windows and panels that
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  automatically reverse direction when an obstruction is
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  detected.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(b) Rearward Visibility. – Not later than 12 months after the
‚ ‚ ‚  date of the enactment of this Act [Feb. 28, 2008], the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  shall initiate a rulemaking to revise Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
‚ ‚ ‚  Standard 111 (FMVSS 111) to expand the required field of view to
‚ ‚ ‚  enable the driver of a motor vehicle to detect areas behind the
‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle to reduce death and injury resulting from backing
‚ ‚ ‚  incidents, particularly incidents involving small children and
‚ ‚ ‚  disabled persons. The Secretary may prescribe different
‚ ‚ ‚  requirements for different types of motor vehicles to expand the
‚ ‚ ‚  required field of view to enable the driver of a motor vehicle to
‚ ‚ ‚  detect areas behind the motor vehicle to reduce death and injury
‚ ‚ ‚  resulting from backing incidents, particularly incidents involving
‚ ‚ ‚  small children and disabled persons. Such standard may be met by
‚ ‚ ‚  the provision of additional mirrors, sensors, cameras, or other
‚ ‚ ‚  technology to expand the driver’s field of view. The Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  shall prescribe final standards pursuant to this subsection not
‚ ‚ ‚  later than 36 months after the date of enactment of this Act.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(c) Phase-In Period. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) Phase-in period required. – The safety standards
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) shall establish a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  phase-in period for compliance, as determined by the Secretary,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  and require full compliance with the safety standards not later
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  than 48 months after the date on which the final rule is issued.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) Phase-in priorities. – In establishing the phase-in period
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of the rearward visibility safety standards required under
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  subsection (b), the Secretary shall consider whether to require
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the phase-in according to different types of motor vehicles based
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  on data demonstrating the frequency by which various types of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicles have been involved in backing incidents resulting
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  in injury or death. If the Secretary determines that any type of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle should be given priority, the Secretary shall issue
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  regulations that specify –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(A) which type or types of motor vehicles shall be phased-in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  first; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(B) the percentages by which such motor vehicles shall be
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  phased-in.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(d) Preventing Motor Vehicles From Rolling Away. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) Requirement. – Each motor vehicle with an automatic
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  transmission that includes a ‘park’ position manufactured for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sale after September 1, 2010, shall be equipped with a system
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  that requires the service brake to be depressed before the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  transmission can be shifted out of ‘park’. This system shall
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  function in any starting system key position in which the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  transmission can be shifted out of ‘park’.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) Treatment as motor vehicle safety standard. – A violation
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of paragraph (1) shall be treated as a violation of a motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle safety standard prescribed under section 30111 of title
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  49, United States Code, and shall be subject to enforcement by
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary under chapter 301 of such title.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) Publication of noncompliant vehicles. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(A) Information submission. – Not later than 60 days after
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the date of the enactment of this Act [Feb. 28, 2008], for the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  current model year and annually thereafter through 2010, each
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle manufacturer shall transmit to the Secretary the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  make and model of motor vehicles with automatic transmissions
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  that include a ‘park’ position that do not comply with the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  requirements of paragraph (1).
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(B) Publication. – Not later than 30 days after receiving
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the information submitted under subparagraph (A), the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  shall publish and otherwise make available to the public
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  through the Internet and other means the make and model of the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  applicable motor vehicles that do not comply with the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  requirements of paragraph (1). Any motor vehicle not included
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  in the publication under this subparagraph shall be presumed to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  comply with such requirements.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(e) Definition of Motor Vehicle. – As used in this Act and for
‚ ‚ ‚  purposes of the motor vehicle safety standards described in
‚ ‚ ‚  subsections (a) and (b), the term ‘motor vehicle’ has the meaning
‚ ‚ ‚  given such term in section 30102(a)(6) of title 49, United States
‚ ‚ ‚  Code, except that such term shall not include –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) a motorcycle or trailer (as such terms are defined in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  section 571.3 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations); or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) any motor vehicle that is rated at more than 10,000 pounds
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  gross vehicular weight.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(f) Database on Injuries and Deaths in Nontraffic, Noncrash
‚ ‚ ‚  Events. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) In general. – Not later than 12 months after the date of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the enactment of this Act [Feb. 28, 2008], the Secretary shall
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  establish and maintain a database of injuries and deaths in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  nontraffic, noncrash events involving motor vehicles.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) Contents. – The database established pursuant to paragraph
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) shall include information regarding –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(A) the number, types, and causes of injuries and deaths
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  resulting from the events described in paragraph (1);
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(B) the make, model, and model year of motor vehicles
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  involved in such events, when practicable; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(C) other variables that the Secretary determines will
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  enhance the value of the database.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) Availability. – The Secretary shall make the information
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  contained in the database established pursuant to paragraph (1)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  available to the public through the Internet and other means.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 3. CHILD SAFETY INFORMATION PROGRAM.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(a) In General. – Not later than 9 months after the date of the
‚ ‚ ‚  enactment of this Act [Feb. 28, 2008], the Secretary shall provide
‚ ‚ ‚  information about hazards to children in nontraffic, noncrash
‚ ‚ ‚  incident situations by –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) supplementing an existing consumer information program
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  relating to child safety; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) creating a new consumer information program relating to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  child safety.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(b) Program Requirements. – In carrying out the program under
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection (a), the Secretary shall –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) utilize information collected pursuant to section 2(f)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  regarding nontraffic, noncrash injuries, and other relevant data
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary considers appropriate, to establish priorities for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the program;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) address ways in which parents and caregivers can reduce
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  risks to small children arising from back over incidents,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  hyperthermia in closed motor vehicles, accidental actuation of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  power windows, and any other risks the Secretary determines
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  should be addressed; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) make information related to the program available to the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  public through the Internet and other means.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 4. DEADLINES.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “If the Secretary determines that the deadlines applicable under
‚ ‚ ‚  this Act cannot be met, the Secretary shall –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) establish new deadlines; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) notify the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation of the Senate of the new deadlines and describing
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the reasons the deadlines specified under this Act could not be
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  met.”

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  IMPROVING CRITERIA USED IN A RECALL‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 106-414, Sec. 15, Nov. 1, 2000, 114 Stat. 1808, provided
‚ ‚ ‚  that:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(a) Review of Standards and Criteria Used in Opening a Defect or
‚ ‚ ‚  Noncompliance Investigation. – The Secretary shall, not later than
‚ ‚ ‚  30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 1, 2000],
‚ ‚ ‚  undertake a comprehensive review of all standards, criteria,
‚ ‚ ‚  procedures, and methods, including data management and analysis
‚ ‚ ‚  used by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in
‚ ‚ ‚  determining whether to open a defect or noncompliance investigation
‚ ‚ ‚  pursuant to subchapter II or IV of chapter 301 of title 49, United
‚ ‚ ‚  States Code, and shall undertake such steps as may be necessary to
‚ ‚ ‚  update and improve such standards, criteria, procedures, or
‚ ‚ ‚  methods, including data management and analysis.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(b) Report to Congress. – Not later than 1 year after the date
‚ ‚ ‚  of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 1, 2000], the Secretary shall
‚ ‚ ‚  transmit to the Committee on Commerce [now Committee on Energy and
‚ ‚ ‚  Commerce] of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
‚ ‚ ‚  Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report
‚ ‚ ‚  describing the Secretary’s findings and actions under subsection
‚ ‚ ‚  (a).”

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30112‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30112. Prohibitions on manufacturing, selling, and importing
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  noncomplying motor vehicles and equipment

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) General. – (1) Except as provided in this section, sections
‚ ‚ ‚  30113 and 30114 of this title, and subchapter III of this chapter,
‚ ‚ ‚  a person may not manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale,
‚ ‚ ‚  introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or
‚ ‚ ‚  import into the United States, any motor vehicle or motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  equipment manufactured on or after the date an applicable motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter takes effect
‚ ‚ ‚  unless the vehicle or equipment complies with the standard and is
‚ ‚ ‚  covered by a certification issued under section 30115 of this
‚ ‚ ‚  title.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) Except as provided in this section, sections 30113 and 30114
‚ ‚ ‚  of this title, and subchapter III of this chapter, a school or
‚ ‚ ‚  school system may not purchase or lease a new 15-passenger van if
‚ ‚ ‚  it will be used significantly by, or on behalf of, the school or
‚ ‚ ‚  school system to transport preprimary, primary, or secondary school
‚ ‚ ‚  students to or from school or an event related to school, unless
‚ ‚ ‚  the 15-passenger van complies with the motor vehicle standards
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed for school buses and multifunction school activity buses
‚ ‚ ‚  under this title. This paragraph does not apply to the purchase or
‚ ‚ ‚  lease of a 15-passenger van under a contract executed before the
‚ ‚ ‚  date of enactment of this paragraph.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Nonapplication. – This section does not apply to –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) the sale, offer for sale, or introduction or delivery for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  introduction in interstate commerce of a motor vehicle or motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle equipment after the first purchase of the vehicle or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  equipment in good faith other than for resale;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) a person –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) establishing that the person had no reason to know,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  despite exercising reasonable care, that a motor vehicle or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle equipment does not comply with applicable motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle safety standards prescribed under this chapter; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) holding, without knowing about the noncompliance and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  before the vehicle or equipment is first purchased in good
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  faith other than for resale, a certificate issued by a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer or importer stating the vehicle or equipment
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  complies with applicable standards prescribed under this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  chapter;

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment intended only
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  for export, labeled for export on the vehicle or equipment and on
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the outside of any container of the vehicle or equipment, and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  exported;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (4) a motor vehicle the Secretary of Transportation decides
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  under section 30141 of this title is capable of complying with
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  applicable standards prescribed under this chapter;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (5) a motor vehicle imported for personal use by an individual
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  who receives an exemption under section 30142 of this title;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (6) a motor vehicle under section 30143 of this title imported
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  by an individual employed outside the United States;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (7) a motor vehicle under section 30144 of this title imported
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  on a temporary basis;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (8) a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment under
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  section 30145 of this title requiring further manufacturing; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (9) a motor vehicle that is at least 25 years old.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 945; Pub. L.
‚ ‚ ‚  109-59, title X, Sec. 10309(b), Aug. 10, 2005, 119 Stat. 1942.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30112(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(A).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 108(a)(1)(A),‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  80 Stat. 722; Oct. 27, 1974,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 93-492, Sec.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  103(a)(1), 88 Stat. 1477;‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Oct. 31, 1988, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  100-562, Sec. 2(c), (d), 102
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 2824.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(c)(1).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  108(c)(1), (i); added Oct.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  31, 1988, Pub. L. 100-562,‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 2(b), 102 Stat. 2818,‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  2823.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30112(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(2)(D),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1)-(3)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b)(1) (1st‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 108(a)(2)(D),‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence), (2).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b)(1) (1st sentence), (2),
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  80 Stat. 722; Oct. 27, 1974,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 93-492, Sec.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  103(a)(1), 88 Stat. 1477,‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1478.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(b)(3).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 108(b)(3), 80‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 723; Oct. 27, 1974,‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 93-492, Sec.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  103(a)(1)(B), 88 Stat. 1478;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Oct. 31, 1988, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  100-562, Sec. 2(a), 102‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 2818.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30112(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (no source).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (4)-(8)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30112(b)(9)‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(i).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a), the words “Except as provided in this section
‚ ‚ ‚  . . . and subchapter III of this chapter” are substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(c)(1) to eliminate unnecessary words and because of the
‚ ‚ ‚  restatement. The reference to section 30113 is added for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b), before clause (1), the text of
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(2)(D) is omitted as obsolete because under section 30124
‚ ‚ ‚  of the revised title a standard prescribed under this chapter may
‚ ‚ ‚  not allow compliance by use of a safety belt interlock or a
‚ ‚ ‚  continuous buzzer. In clause (2)(A), the words “despite exercising
‚ ‚ ‚  reasonable care” are substituted for “in the exercise of due care”
‚ ‚ ‚  for clarity and consistency in the revised title. The words “motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle safety standards prescribed under this chapter” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “Federal motor vehicle safety standards” for
‚ ‚ ‚  clarity and consistency in this chapter. In clause (2)(B), the
‚ ‚ ‚  words “without knowing about the noncompliance” are substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “unless such person knows that such vehicle or equipment does not
‚ ‚ ‚  so conform” to eliminate unnecessary words and for consistency in
‚ ‚ ‚  the revised title. Clauses (4)-(8) are added to provide cross-
‚ ‚ ‚  references to sections restating exceptions to the general rule
‚ ‚ ‚  restated in subsection (a) of this section.

-REFTEXT-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  REFERENCES IN TEXT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  The date of enactment of this paragraph, referred to in subsec.
‚ ‚ ‚  (a)(2), is the date of enactment of Pub. L. 109-59, which was
‚ ‚ ‚  approved Aug. 10, 2005.
-MISC2-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  AMENDMENTS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  2005 – Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 109-59, which directed amendment of
‚ ‚ ‚  section 30112(a), without specifying the title to be amended, by
‚ ‚ ‚  designating existing provisions as par. (1) and adding par. (2),
‚ ‚ ‚  was executed to this section, to reflect the probable intent of
‚ ‚ ‚  Congress.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30113‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30113. General exemptions

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Definition. – In this section, “low-emission motor vehicle”
‚ ‚ ‚  means a motor vehicle meeting the standards for new motor vehicles
‚ ‚ ‚  applicable to the vehicle under section 202 of the Clean Air Act
‚ ‚ ‚  (42 U.S.C. 7521) when the vehicle is manufactured and emitting an
‚ ‚ ‚  air pollutant in an amount significantly below one of those
‚ ‚ ‚  standards.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Authority To Exempt and Procedures. – (1) The Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation may exempt, on a temporary basis, motor vehicles
‚ ‚ ‚  from a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter
‚ ‚ ‚  or passenger motor vehicles from a bumper standard prescribed under
‚ ‚ ‚  chapter 325 of this title, on terms the Secretary considers
‚ ‚ ‚  appropriate. An exemption may be renewed. A renewal may be granted
‚ ‚ ‚  only on reapplication and must conform to the requirements of this
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) The Secretary may begin a proceeding under this subsection
‚ ‚ ‚  when a manufacturer applies for an exemption or a renewal of an
‚ ‚ ‚  exemption. The Secretary shall publish notice of the application
‚ ‚ ‚  and provide an opportunity to comment. An application for an
‚ ‚ ‚  exemption or for a renewal of an exemption shall be filed at a time
‚ ‚ ‚  and in the way, and contain information, this section and the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary require.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) The Secretary may act under this subsection on finding that –
‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) an exemption is consistent with the public interest and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  this chapter or chapter 325 of this title (as applicable); and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B)(i) compliance with the standard would cause substantial
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  economic hardship to a manufacturer that has tried to comply with
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the standard in good faith;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (ii) the exemption would make easier the development or field
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  evaluation of a new motor vehicle safety feature providing a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  safety level at least equal to the safety level of the standard;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (iii) the exemption would make the development or field
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  evaluation of a low-emission motor vehicle easier and would not
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  unreasonably lower the safety level of that vehicle; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (iv) compliance with the standard would prevent the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer from selling a motor vehicle with an overall safety
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  level at least equal to the overall safety level of nonexempt
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicles.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Contents of Applications. – A manufacturer applying for an
‚ ‚ ‚  exemption under subsection (b) of this section shall include the
‚ ‚ ‚  following information in the application:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) if the application is made under subsection (b)(3)(B)(i) of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  this section, a complete financial statement describing the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  economic hardship and a complete description of the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer’s good faith effort to comply with each motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter, or a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  bumper standard prescribed under chapter 325 of this title, from
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  which the manufacturer is requesting an exemption.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) if the application is made under subsection (b)(3)(B)(ii)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of this section, a record of the research, development, and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  testing establishing the innovative nature of the safety feature
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  and a detailed analysis establishing that the safety level of the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  feature at least equals the safety level of the standard.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) if the application is made under subsection (b)(3)(B)(iii)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of this section, a record of the research, development, and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  testing establishing that the motor vehicle is a low-emission
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle and that the safety level of the vehicle is not
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  lowered unreasonably by exemption from the standard.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (4) if the application is made under subsection (b)(3)(B)(iv)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of this section, a detailed analysis showing how the vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  provides an overall safety level at least equal to the overall
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  safety level of nonexempt vehicles.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Eligibility. – A manufacturer is eligible for an exemption
‚ ‚ ‚  under subsection (b)(3)(B)(i) of this section (including an
‚ ‚ ‚  exemption under subsection (b)(3)(B)(i) relating to a bumper
‚ ‚ ‚  standard referred to in subsection (b)(1)) only if the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  determines that the manufacturer’s total motor vehicle production
‚ ‚ ‚  in the most recent year of production is not more than 10,000. A
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer is eligible for an exemption under subsection
‚ ‚ ‚  (b)(3)(B)(ii), (iii), or (iv) of this section only if the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  determines the exemption is for not more than 2,500 vehicles to be
‚ ‚ ‚  sold in the United States in any 12-month period.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (e) Maximum Period. – An exemption or renewal under subsection
‚ ‚ ‚  (b)(3)(B)(i) of this section may be granted for not more than 3
‚ ‚ ‚  years. An exemption or renewal under subsection (b)(3)(B)(ii),
‚ ‚ ‚  (iii), or (iv) of this section may be granted for not more than 2
‚ ‚ ‚  years.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (f) Disclosure. – The Secretary may make public, by the 10th day
‚ ‚ ‚  after an application is filed, information contained in the
‚ ‚ ‚  application or relevant to the application unless the information
‚ ‚ ‚  concerns or is related to a trade secret or other confidential
‚ ‚ ‚  information not relevant to the application.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (g) Notice of Decision. – The Secretary shall publish in the
‚ ‚ ‚  Federal Register a notice of each decision granting an exemption
‚ ‚ ‚  under this section and the reasons for granting it.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (h) Permanent Label Requirement. – The Secretary shall require a
‚ ‚ ‚  permanent label to be fixed to a motor vehicle granted an exemption
‚ ‚ ‚  under this section. The label shall either name or describe each
‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter or
‚ ‚ ‚  bumper standard prescribed under chapter 325 of this title from
‚ ‚ ‚  which the vehicle is exempt. The Secretary may require that written
‚ ‚ ‚  notice of an exemption be delivered by appropriate means to the
‚ ‚ ‚  dealer and the first purchaser of the vehicle other than for
‚ ‚ ‚  resale.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 945; Pub. L.
‚ ‚ ‚  105-277, div. A, Sec. 101(g) [title III, Sec. 351(a)], Oct. 21,
‚ ‚ ‚  1998, 112 Stat. 2681-439, 2681-475.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30113(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1410(g).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  123; added Apr. 10, 1968,‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 90-283, 82 Stat. 72;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  restated Oct. 25, 1972, Pub.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  L. 92-548, Sec. 3, 86 Stat.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1159.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30113(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1410(a) (1st‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence), (c)(1)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (23d-last words),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) (23d-last‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  words).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30113(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1410(e).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30113(d)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1410(d).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30113(e)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1410(c)(1)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1st-22d words),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) (1st-22d words).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30113(f)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1410(f).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30113(g)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1410(a) (last‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30113(h)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1410(b).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a), the words “the term” and “type of” are omitted
‚ ‚ ‚  as surplus. The words “when the vehicle is manufactured” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “at the time of manufacture” for consistency.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(1), the words “Except as provided in subsection
‚ ‚ ‚  (d) of this section” are omitted as surplus. The words “to such
‚ ‚ ‚  extent” are omitted as being included in “on terms the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  considers appropriate”.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(2), the words “The Secretary may begin a
‚ ‚ ‚  proceeding under this subsection . . . for an exemption or a
‚ ‚ ‚  renewal of an exemption” are added because of the restatement. The
‚ ‚ ‚  words “of the application” are added for clarity. The words “An
‚ ‚ ‚  application for an exemption or for a renewal of an exemption shall
‚ ‚ ‚  be filed” are added because of the restatement.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(3)(A), the words “such temporary” and “the
‚ ‚ ‚  objectives of” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(3)(B)(i), the words “to a manufacturer that”
‚ ‚ ‚  are substituted for “such manufacturer . . . and that the
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer” to eliminate unnecessary words. The words “from which
‚ ‚ ‚  it requests to be exempted” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(3)(B)(ii), the words “from which an exemption
‚ ‚ ‚  is sought” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(3)(B)(iii), the words “lower the safety level”
‚ ‚ ‚  are substituted for “degrade the safety” for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(3)(B)(iv), the word “requiring” is omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c), before clause (1), the words “the following
‚ ‚ ‚  information” are added for clarity. In clause (1), the word
‚ ‚ ‚  “describing” is substituted for “the basis of showing” to eliminate
‚ ‚ ‚  unnecessary words. The words “each motor vehicle safety standard
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed under this chapter from which the manufacturer is
‚ ‚ ‚  requesting an exemption” are substituted for “the standards” for
‚ ‚ ‚  clarity. In clauses (2) and (3), the words “a record” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “documentation” for consistency in the revised
‚ ‚ ‚  title. In clause (2), the words “establishing that the safety level
‚ ‚ ‚  of the feature at least equals the safety level of the standard”
‚ ‚ ‚  are substituted for “establishing that the level of safety of the
‚ ‚ ‚  new safety feature is equivalent to or exceeds the level of safety
‚ ‚ ‚  established in the standard from which the exemption is sought”
‚ ‚ ‚  because of the restatement. In clause (3), the word “level” is
‚ ‚ ‚  added, and the words “lowered . . . by exemption from the standard”
‚ ‚ ‚  are substituted for “degraded”, for consistency in this section. In
‚ ‚ ‚  clause (4), the words “at least equal to” are substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “equivalent to or exceeding” for consistency.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (f), the text of 15:1410(f) (1st sentence) is
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as executed. The words “under this section all” and “other
‚ ‚ ‚  information” are omitted as surplus. The words “to the application”
‚ ‚ ‚  are substituted for “thereto” for clarity. The words “business” and
‚ ‚ ‚  “for exemption” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (g), the words “The Secretary” are added for
‚ ‚ ‚  clarity. The word “temporary” is omitted as surplus. The words
‚ ‚ ‚  “under this section” are added for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (h), the words “a . . . label to be fixed to a
‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle granted an exemption under this section” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “labeling of each exempted motor vehicle . . . and
‚ ‚ ‚  be affixed to such exempted vehicles” for clarity. The words “of
‚ ‚ ‚  such exempted motor vehicle in such manner as he deems” are omitted
‚ ‚ ‚  as surplus. The words “motor vehicle safety standard prescribed
‚ ‚ ‚  under this chapter” are substituted for “the standards” for clarity
‚ ‚ ‚  and consistency in this chapter.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  AMENDMENTS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1998 – Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 105-277, Sec. 101(g) [title III,
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 351(a)(1)(A)], inserted “or passenger motor vehicles from a
‚ ‚ ‚  bumper standard prescribed under chapter 325 of this title,” after
‚ ‚ ‚  “a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter”.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Subsec. (b)(3)(A). Pub. L. 105-277, Sec. 101(g) [title III, Sec.
‚ ‚ ‚  351(a)(1)(B)], inserted “or chapter 325 of this title (as
‚ ‚ ‚  applicable)” after “this chapter”.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Subsec. (c)(1). Pub. L. 105-277, Sec. 101(g) [title III, Sec.
‚ ‚ ‚  351(a)(2)], inserted “, or a bumper standard prescribed under
‚ ‚ ‚  chapter 325 of this title,” after “motor vehicle safety standard
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed under this chapter”.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 105-277, Sec. 101(g) [title III, Sec.
‚ ‚ ‚  351(a)(3)], inserted “(including an exemption under subsection
‚ ‚ ‚  (b)(3)(B)(i) relating to a bumper standard referred to in
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection (b)(1))” after “subsection (b)(3)(B)(i) of this
‚ ‚ ‚  section”.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 105-277, Sec. 101(g) [title III, Sec.
‚ ‚ ‚  351(a)(4)], inserted “or bumper standard prescribed under chapter
‚ ‚ ‚  325 of this title” after “each motor vehicle safety standard
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed under this chapter”.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30114‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30114. Special exemptions

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  The Secretary of Transportation may exempt a motor vehicle or
‚ ‚ ‚  item of motor vehicle equipment from section 30112(a) of this title
‚ ‚ ‚  on terms the Secretary decides are necessary for research,
‚ ‚ ‚  investigations, demonstrations, training, competitive racing
‚ ‚ ‚  events, show, or display.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 947; Pub. L.
‚ ‚ ‚  105-178, title VII, Sec. 7107(a), June 9, 1998, 112 Stat. 469.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30114‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(j).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  108(j); added Oct. 31, 1988,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 100-562, Sec. 2(b),
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102 Stat. 2824.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  The word “conditions” is omitted as being included in “terms”,
‚ ‚ ‚  and the word “studies” is omitted as being included in “research”.
‚ ‚ ‚  The word “solely” is omitted as unnecessary.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  AMENDMENTS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1998 – Pub. L. 105-178 substituted “competitive racing events,
‚ ‚ ‚  show, or display” for “or competitive racing events”.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  TRANSITION RULE‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 105-178, title VII, Sec. 7107(b), June 9, 1998, 112 Stat.
‚ ‚ ‚  469, provided that: “A person who is the owner of a motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  located in the United States on the date of enactment of this Act
‚ ‚ ‚  [June 9, 1998] may seek an exemption under section 30114 of title
‚ ‚ ‚  49, United States Code, as amended by subsection (a) of this
‚ ‚ ‚  section, for a period of 6 months after the date regulations of the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary of Transportation promulgated in response to such
‚ ‚ ‚  amendment take effect.”

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30115‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30115. Certification of compliance

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) In General. – A manufacturer or distributor of a motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle or motor vehicle equipment shall certify to the distributor
‚ ‚ ‚  or dealer at delivery that the vehicle or equipment complies with
‚ ‚ ‚  applicable motor vehicle safety standards prescribed under this
‚ ‚ ‚  chapter. A person may not issue the certificate if, in exercising
‚ ‚ ‚  reasonable care, the person has reason to know the certificate is
‚ ‚ ‚  false or misleading in a material respect. Certification of a
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle must be shown by a label or tag permanently fixed to the
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle. Certification of equipment may be shown by a label or tag
‚ ‚ ‚  on the equipment or on the outside of the container in which the
‚ ‚ ‚  equipment is delivered.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Certification Label. – In the case of the certification label
‚ ‚ ‚  affixed by an intermediate or final stage manufacturer of a motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle built in more than 1 stage, each intermediate or final
‚ ‚ ‚  stage manufacturer shall certify with respect to each applicable
‚ ‚ ‚  Federal motor vehicle safety standard –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) that it has complied with the specifications set forth in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the compliance documentation provided by the incomplete motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle manufacturer in accordance with regulations prescribed by
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) that it has elected to assume responsibility for compliance
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  with that standard.

‚ ‚ ‚  If the intermediate or final stage manufacturer elects to assume
‚ ‚ ‚  responsibility for compliance with the standard covered by the
‚ ‚ ‚  documentation provided by an incomplete motor vehicle manufacturer,
‚ ‚ ‚  the intermediate or final stage manufacturer shall notify the
‚ ‚ ‚  incomplete motor vehicle manufacturer in writing within a
‚ ‚ ‚  reasonable time of affixing the certification label. A violation of
‚ ‚ ‚  this subsection shall not be subject to a civil penalty under
‚ ‚ ‚  section 30165.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 947; Pub. L.
‚ ‚ ‚  106-414, Sec. 9, Nov. 1, 2000, 114 Stat. 1805.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30115‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(C),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (E) (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 108(a)(1)(C),‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1403).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (E) (related to Sec. 114),‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  80 Stat. 722; Oct. 27, 1974,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 93-492, Sec.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  103(a)(1)(A), (2)(B), 88‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 1477, 1478.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1403.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 114, 80 Stat.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  726.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  The words “fail to issue a certificate required by section 1403
‚ ‚ ‚  of this title” in 15:1397(a)(1)(C) and the text of 15:1397(a)(1)(E)
‚ ‚ ‚  (related to 15:1403) are omitted as surplus. The word “certify” is
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “furnish . . . the certification” in 15:1403 to
‚ ‚ ‚  eliminate unnecessary words. The words “the time of” and “of such
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle or equipment by such manufacturer or distributor” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as surplus. The words “prescribed under this chapter” are
‚ ‚ ‚  added for clarity. The word “reasonable” is substituted for “due”
‚ ‚ ‚  in 15:1397(a)(1)(C) for consistency in the revised title. The words
‚ ‚ ‚  “to the effect that a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  equipment conforms to all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety
‚ ‚ ‚  standards” are omitted because of the restatement. The words “shown
‚ ‚ ‚  by” are substituted for “in the form of” in 15:1403 for clarity.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  AMENDMENTS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  2000 – Pub. L. 106-414 designated existing provisions as subsec.
‚ ‚ ‚  (a), inserted heading, and added subsec. (b).

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  FOLLOW-UP REPORT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 106-414, Sec. 16, Nov. 1, 2000, 114 Stat. 1808, provided
‚ ‚ ‚  that: “One year after the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov.
‚ ‚ ‚  1, 2000], the Secretary of Transportation shall report to the
‚ ‚ ‚  Congress on the implementation of the amendments made by this Act
‚ ‚ ‚  [see Short Title of 2000 Amendment note set out under section 30101
‚ ‚ ‚  of this title] and any recommendations for additional amendments
‚ ‚ ‚  for consumer safety.”

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30116‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30116. Defects and noncompliance found before sale to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  purchaser

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Actions Required of Manufacturers and Distributors. – If,
‚ ‚ ‚  after a manufacturer or distributor sells a motor vehicle or motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle equipment to a distributor or dealer and before the
‚ ‚ ‚  distributor or dealer sells the vehicle or equipment, it is decided
‚ ‚ ‚  that the vehicle or equipment contains a defect related to motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle safety or does not comply with applicable motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  safety standards prescribed under this chapter –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) the manufacturer or distributor immediately shall
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  repurchase the vehicle or equipment at the price paid by the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  distributor or dealer, plus transportation charges and reasonable
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  reimbursement of at least one percent a month of the price paid
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  prorated from the date of notice of noncompliance or defect to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the date of repurchase; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) if a vehicle, the manufacturer or distributor immediately
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  shall give to the distributor or dealer at the manufacturer’s or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  distributor’s own expense, the part or equipment needed to make
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the vehicle comply with the standards or correct the defect.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Distributor or Dealer Installation. – The distributor or
‚ ‚ ‚  dealer shall install the part or equipment referred to in
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection (a)(2) of this section. If the distributor or dealer
‚ ‚ ‚  installs the part or equipment with reasonable diligence after it
‚ ‚ ‚  is received, the manufacturer shall reimburse the distributor or
‚ ‚ ‚  dealer for the reasonable value of the installation and a
‚ ‚ ‚  reasonable reimbursement of at least one percent a month of the
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer’s or distributor’s selling price prorated from the
‚ ‚ ‚  date of notice of noncompliance or defect to the date the motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle complies with applicable motor vehicle safety standards
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed under this chapter or the defect is corrected.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Establishing Amount Due and Civil Actions. – The parties
‚ ‚ ‚  shall establish the value of installation and the amount of
‚ ‚ ‚  reimbursement under this section. If the parties do not agree, or
‚ ‚ ‚  if a manufacturer or distributor refuses to comply with subsection
‚ ‚ ‚  (a) or (b) of this section, the distributor or dealer purchasing
‚ ‚ ‚  the motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment may bring a civil
‚ ‚ ‚  action. The action may be brought in a United States district court
‚ ‚ ‚  for the judicial district in which the manufacturer or distributor
‚ ‚ ‚  resides, is found, or has an agent, to recover damages, court
‚ ‚ ‚  costs, and a reasonable attorney’s fee. An action under this
‚ ‚ ‚  section must be brought not later than 3 years after the claim
‚ ‚ ‚  accrues.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 947.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30116(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1400(a) (less‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) (last 97‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 111, 80 Stat.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  words)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  724.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30116(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1400(a)(2) (last‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  97 words).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30116(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1400(b), (c).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a)(1), the words “as the case may be”, “from such
‚ ‚ ‚  distributor or dealer”, “all . . . involved”, and “by the
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer or distributor” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a)(2), the words “manufacturer’s or distributor’s”
‚ ‚ ‚  are substituted for “his” for clarity. The words “or parts” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted because of 1:1. The words “the vehicle comply with the
‚ ‚ ‚  standards or correct the defect” are substituted for “conforming”
‚ ‚ ‚  for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b), the words “the part or equipment referred to
‚ ‚ ‚  in subsection (a)(2) of this section” are added because of the
‚ ‚ ‚  restatement. The words “If the distributor or dealer installs the
‚ ‚ ‚  part or equipment with reasonable diligence after it is received,
‚ ‚ ‚  the manufacturer shall reimburse the distributor or dealer” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “and for the installation involved the manufacturer
‚ ‚ ‚  shall reimburse such distributor or dealer . . . Provided, however,
‚ ‚ ‚  That the distributor or dealer proceeds with reasonable diligence
‚ ‚ ‚  with the installation after the required part, parts or equipment
‚ ‚ ‚  are received” to eliminate unnecessary words. The words “on or in
‚ ‚ ‚  such vehicle” are omitted as surplus. The words “notice of
‚ ‚ ‚  noncompliance or defect” are substituted for “notice of such
‚ ‚ ‚  nonconformance”, and the words “complies with applicable motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle safety standards prescribed under this chapter or the
‚ ‚ ‚  defect is corrected” are substituted for “is brought into
‚ ‚ ‚  conformance with applicable Federal standards”, to eliminate
‚ ‚ ‚  unnecessary words and for consistency in the revised title.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c), the words “the amount of reimbursement” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “such reasonable reimbursements” for clarity and
‚ ‚ ‚  because of the restatement. The words “by mutual agreement” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as surplus. The words “If the parties do not agree” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “or failing such agreement”, and the words “by the
‚ ‚ ‚  court pursuant to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section”
‚ ‚ ‚  are omitted, because of the restatement. The words “the
‚ ‚ ‚  requirements of”, “then”, “as the case may be”, and “without
‚ ‚ ‚  respect to the amount in controversy” are omitted as surplus. The
‚ ‚ ‚  words “civil action” are substituted for “suit” because of rule 2
‚ ‚ ‚  of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 App. U.S.C.). The words
‚ ‚ ‚  “against such manufacturer or distributor” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚  The word “judicial” is added for consistency. The words “to recover
‚ ‚ ‚  damages, court costs, and a reasonable attorney’s fee” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “and shall recover the damage by him sustained, as
‚ ‚ ‚  well as all court costs plus reasonable attorneys’ fees”, and the
‚ ‚ ‚  words “must be brought” are substituted for “shall be forever
‚ ‚ ‚  barred unless commenced”, to eliminate unnecessary words. The word
‚ ‚ ‚  “claim” is substituted for “cause of action” for consistency.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30117‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30117. Providing information to, and maintaining records on,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  purchasers

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Providing Information and Notice. – The Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation may require that each manufacturer of a motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle or motor vehicle equipment provide technical information
‚ ‚ ‚  related to performance and safety required to carry out this
‚ ‚ ‚  chapter. The Secretary may require the manufacturer to give the
‚ ‚ ‚  following notice of that information when the Secretary decides it
‚ ‚ ‚  is necessary:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) to each prospective purchaser of a vehicle or equipment
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  before the first sale other than for resale at each location at
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  which the vehicle or equipment is offered for sale by a person
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  having a legal relationship with the manufacturer, in a way the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary decides is appropriate.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) to the first purchaser of a vehicle or equipment other than
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  for resale when the vehicle or equipment is bought, in printed
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  matter placed in the vehicle or attached to or accompanying the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  equipment.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Maintaining Purchaser Records and Procedures. – (1) A
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer of a motor vehicle or tire (except a retreaded tire)
‚ ‚ ‚  shall cause to be maintained a record of the name and address of
‚ ‚ ‚  the first purchaser of each vehicle or tire it produces and, to the
‚ ‚ ‚  extent prescribed by regulations of the Secretary, shall cause to
‚ ‚ ‚  be maintained a record of the name and address of the first
‚ ‚ ‚  purchaser of replacement equipment (except a tire) that the
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer produces. The Secretary may prescribe by regulation
‚ ‚ ‚  the records to be maintained and reasonable procedures for
‚ ‚ ‚  maintaining the records under this subsection, including procedures
‚ ‚ ‚  to be followed by distributors and dealers to assist the
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer in obtaining the information required by this
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection. A procedure shall be reasonable for the type of vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  or tire involved, and shall provide reasonable assurance that a
‚ ‚ ‚  customer list of a distributor or dealer, or similar information,
‚ ‚ ‚  will be made available to a person (except the distributor or
‚ ‚ ‚  dealer) only when necessary to carry out this subsection and
‚ ‚ ‚  sections 30118-30121, 30166(f), and 30167(a) and (b) of this title.
‚ ‚ ‚  Availability of assistance from a distributor or dealer does not
‚ ‚ ‚  affect an obligation of a manufacturer under this subsection.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2)(A) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection,
‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary may require a distributor or dealer to maintain a
‚ ‚ ‚  record under paragraph (1) of this subsection only if the business
‚ ‚ ‚  of the distributor or dealer is owned or controlled by a
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer of tires.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) The Secretary shall require each distributor and dealer whose
‚ ‚ ‚  business is not owned or controlled by a manufacturer of tires to
‚ ‚ ‚  give a registration form (containing the tire identification
‚ ‚ ‚  number) to the first purchaser of a tire. The Secretary shall
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribe the form, which shall be standardized for all tires and
‚ ‚ ‚  designed to allow the purchaser to complete and return it directly
‚ ‚ ‚  to the manufacturer of the tire. The manufacturer shall give
‚ ‚ ‚  sufficient copies of forms to distributors and dealers.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3)(A) The Secretary shall evaluate from time to time how
‚ ‚ ‚  successful the procedures under paragraph (2) of this subsection
‚ ‚ ‚  have been in helping to maintain records about first purchasers of
‚ ‚ ‚  tires. After each evaluation, the Secretary shall decide –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (i) the extent to which distributors and dealers have complied
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  with the procedures;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (ii) the extent to which distributors and dealers have
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  encouraged first purchasers of tires to register the tires; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (iii) whether to prescribe for manufacturers, distributors, or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  dealers other requirements that the Secretary decides will
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  increase significantly the percentage of first purchasers of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  tires about whom records are maintained.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) The Secretary may prescribe a requirement under subparagraph
‚ ‚ ‚  (A) of this paragraph only if the Secretary decides it is necessary
‚ ‚ ‚  to reduce the risk to motor vehicle safety, after considering –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (i) the cost of the requirement to manufacturers and the burden
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of the requirement on distributors and dealers, compared to the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  increase in the percentage of first purchasers of tires about
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  whom records would be maintained as a result of the requirement;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (ii) the extent to which distributors and dealers have complied
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  with the procedures in paragraph (2) of this subsection; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (iii) the extent to which distributors and dealers have
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  encouraged first purchasers of tires to register the tires.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (C) A manufacturer of tires shall reimburse distributors and
‚ ‚ ‚  dealers of that manufacturer’s tires for all reasonable costs
‚ ‚ ‚  incurred by the distributors and dealers in complying with a
‚ ‚ ‚  requirement prescribed by the Secretary under subparagraph (A) of
‚ ‚ ‚  this paragraph.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (D) After making a decision under subparagraph (A) of this
‚ ‚ ‚  paragraph, the Secretary shall submit to each House of Congress a
‚ ‚ ‚  report containing a detailed statement of the decision and an
‚ ‚ ‚  explanation of the reasons for the decision.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Rollover Tests. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) Development. – Not later than 2 years from the date of the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) develop a dynamic test on rollovers by motor vehicles for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the purposes of a consumer information program; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) carry out a program of conducting such tests.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) Test results. – As the Secretary develops a test under
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  paragraph (1)(A), the Secretary shall conduct a rulemaking to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  determine how best to disseminate test results to the public.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) Motor vehicles covered. – This subsection applies to motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicles, including passenger cars, multipurpose passenger
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicles, and trucks, with a gross vehicle weight rating of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  10,000 pounds or less. A motor vehicle designed to provide
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  temporary residential accommodations is not covered.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 948; Pub. L.
‚ ‚ ‚  106-414, Sec. 12, Nov. 1, 2000, 114 Stat. 1806.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30117(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(B),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (E) (as‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 108(a)(1)(B)‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1397(a)(1)(B), (E)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to Sec. 112(d)),‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  relates to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (D) (related to Sec.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(d)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  158(b)), (E) (related to‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 112(d)), 80 Stat. 722;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Oct. 27, 1974, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  93-492, Sec. 103(a)(1)(A),‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2), (3), 88 Stat. 1477,‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1478.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(d).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 112(d), 80‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 725; May 22, 1970,‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 91-265, Sec. 3, 84‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 262.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30117(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1418(b)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1418(b)(1).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  158(b)(1); added Oct. 27,‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1974, Pub. L. 93-492, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102(a), 88 Stat. 1476; Nov.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  6, 1978, Pub. L. 95-599,‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 317, 92 Stat. 2752;‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Oct. 15, 1982, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  97-331, Sec. 4(a)(1), 96‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 1619.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1418(b)(2), (3).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  158(b)(2), (3); added Oct.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15, 1982, Pub. L. 97-331,‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 4(a)(2), 96 Stat. 1620.
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In this section, the text of 15:1397(a)(1)(B) (related to
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(d)), (D) (related to 15:1418(b)), and (E) (related to
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(d)) is omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a), before clause (1), the words “such performance
‚ ‚ ‚  data and other”, “as may be”, “the purposes of”, “performance and
‚ ‚ ‚  technical”, and “to carry out the purposes of this chapter” the 2d
‚ ‚ ‚  time they appear are omitted as surplus. In clause (1), the words
‚ ‚ ‚  “such manufacturer’s” and “which may include, but is not limited
‚ ‚ ‚  to, printed matter (A) available for retention by such prospective
‚ ‚ ‚  purchaser and (B) sent by mail to such prospective purchaser upon
‚ ‚ ‚  his request” are omitted as surplus. The words “legal relationship”
‚ ‚ ‚  are substituted for “contractual, proprietary, or other legal
‚ ‚ ‚  relationship” to eliminate unnecessary words.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(1), the word “cause to be maintained” is
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “cause the establishment and maintenance of” to
‚ ‚ ‚  eliminate unnecessary words. The words “prescribe by regulation”
‚ ‚ ‚  are substituted for “by rule, specify” for consistency and because
‚ ‚ ‚  “rule” and “regulation” are synonymous. The words “under this
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection” are added for clarity. The word “involved” is
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “for which they are prescribed” to eliminate
‚ ‚ ‚  unnecessary words. The words “the purpose of” and “except that . .
‚ ‚ ‚  . or not” are omitted as surplus. The words “from a distributor or
‚ ‚ ‚  dealer” are added for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(3)(A), before clause (i), the words “At the end
‚ ‚ ‚  of the two-year period following the effective date of this
‚ ‚ ‚  paragraph” are omitted as expired. In clause (iii), the words “(or
‚ ‚ ‚  any combination of such groups)” are omitted as unnecessary.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(3)(B), before clause (i), the words “may
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribe a requirement” are substituted for “may order by rule the
‚ ‚ ‚  imposition of requirements” for consistency and to eliminate
‚ ‚ ‚  unnecessary words.

-REFTEXT-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  REFERENCES IN TEXT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  The date of the enactment of this subsection, referred to in
‚ ‚ ‚  subsec. (c)(1), is the date of enactment of Pub. L. 106-414, which
‚ ‚ ‚  was approved Nov. 1, 2000.
-MISC2-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  AMENDMENTS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  2000 – Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 106-414 added subsec. (c).

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15-PASSENGER VAN SAFETY‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 109-59, title X, Sec. 10309(a), Aug. 10, 2005, 119 Stat.
‚ ‚ ‚  1942, provided that:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) In general. – The Secretary of Transportation shall require
‚ ‚ ‚  the testing of 15-passenger vans as part of the rollover resistance
‚ ‚ ‚  program of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s new
‚ ‚ ‚  car assessment program.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) 15-passenger van defined. – In this subsection, the term ’15-
‚ ‚ ‚  passenger van’ means a vehicle that seats 10 to 14 passengers, not
‚ ‚ ‚  including the driver.”

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30118‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30118. Notification of defects and noncompliance

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Notification by Secretary. – The Secretary of Transportation
‚ ‚ ‚  shall notify the manufacturer of a motor vehicle or replacement
‚ ‚ ‚  equipment immediately after making an initial decision (through
‚ ‚ ‚  testing, inspection, investigation, or research carried out under
‚ ‚ ‚  this chapter, examining communications under section 30166(f) of
‚ ‚ ‚  this title, or otherwise) that the vehicle or equipment contains a
‚ ‚ ‚  defect related to motor vehicle safety or does not comply with an
‚ ‚ ‚  applicable motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this
‚ ‚ ‚  chapter. The notification shall include the information on which
‚ ‚ ‚  the decision is based. The Secretary shall publish a notice of each
‚ ‚ ‚  decision under this subsection in the Federal Register. Subject to
‚ ‚ ‚  section 30167(a) of this title, the notification and information
‚ ‚ ‚  are available to any interested person.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Defect and Noncompliance Proceedings and Orders. – (1) The
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary may make a final decision that a motor vehicle or
‚ ‚ ‚  replacement equipment contains a defect related to motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  safety or does not comply with an applicable motor vehicle safety
‚ ‚ ‚  standard prescribed under this chapter only after giving the
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer an opportunity to present information, views, and
‚ ‚ ‚  arguments showing that there is no defect or noncompliance or that
‚ ‚ ‚  the defect does not affect motor vehicle safety. Any interested
‚ ‚ ‚  person also shall be given an opportunity to present information,
‚ ‚ ‚  views, and arguments.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) If the Secretary decides under paragraph (1) of this
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection that the vehicle or equipment contains the defect or
‚ ‚ ‚  does not comply, the Secretary shall order the manufacturer to –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) give notification under section 30119 of this title to the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  owners, purchasers, and dealers of the vehicle or equipment of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the defect or noncompliance; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) remedy the defect or noncompliance under section 30120 of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  this title.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Notification by Manufacturer. – A manufacturer of a motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle or replacement equipment shall notify the Secretary by
‚ ‚ ‚  certified mail, and the owners, purchasers, and dealers of the
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle or equipment as provided in section 30119(d) of this
‚ ‚ ‚  section, if the manufacturer –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) learns the vehicle or equipment contains a defect and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  decides in good faith that the defect is related to motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  safety; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) decides in good faith that the vehicle or equipment does
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  not comply with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed under this chapter.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Exemptions. – On application of a manufacturer, the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  shall exempt the manufacturer from this section if the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  decides a defect or noncompliance is inconsequential to motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle safety. The Secretary may take action under this subsection
‚ ‚ ‚  only after notice in the Federal Register and an opportunity for
‚ ‚ ‚  any interested person to present information, views, and arguments.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (e) Hearings About Meeting Notification Requirements. – On the
‚ ‚ ‚  motion of the Secretary or on petition of any interested person,
‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary may conduct a hearing to decide whether the
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer has reasonably met the notification requirements under
‚ ‚ ‚  this section. Any interested person may make written and oral
‚ ‚ ‚  presentations of information, views, and arguments on whether the
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer has reasonably met the notification requirements. If
‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary decides that the manufacturer has not reasonably met
‚ ‚ ‚  the notification requirements, the Secretary shall order the
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer to take specified action to meet those requirements
‚ ‚ ‚  and may take any other action authorized under this chapter.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 950; Pub. L.
‚ ‚ ‚  106-346, Sec. 101(a) [title III, Sec. 364], Oct. 23, 2000, 114
‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 1356, 1356A-37; Pub. L. 106-414, Sec. 2, Nov. 1, 2000, 114
‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 1800.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30118(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 108(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1412(a) (1st-3d ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to Secs. 151, 152,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentences)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  153(c) (1st sentence cl.‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (6)), 156, 157), 80 Stat.‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  722; restated Oct. 27, 1974,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 93-492, Sec.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  103(a)(1)(A), (3), 88 Stat.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1477, 1478.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1412(a) (1st-3d ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentences).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Secs.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  151, 152, 156 (related to‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  notice), 157 (related to‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  notice); added Oct. 27,‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1974, Pub. L. 93-492, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102(a), 88 Stat. 1470, 1475.
‚ ‚ ‚  30118(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1412(a) (last‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence), (b)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1412(a) (last‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence), (b).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30118(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1411, 1413(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1st sentence cl.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (6))).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1411.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1413(c) (1st‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence cl. (6)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  153(c) (1st sentence cl.‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (6)); added Oct. 27, 1974,‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 93-492, Sec. 102(a),
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  88 Stat. 1472; Oct. 15,‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1982, Pub. L. 97-331, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  4(b)(2), 96 Stat. 1620.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30118(d)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1417).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1417 (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  notice).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30118(e)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1416).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1416 (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  notice).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In this section, the text of 15:1397(a)(1)(D) (related to
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1411, 1412, 1413(c) (1st sentence cl. (6)), and 1417) is omitted
‚ ‚ ‚  as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a), the words “making an initial decision” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “determines” to distinguish the decision from the
‚ ‚ ‚  decision made under subsection (b) of this section. The words “of
‚ ‚ ‚  such determination”, “to the manufacturer”, and “of the Secretary”
‚ ‚ ‚  are omitted as surplus. The words “under this subsection” are added
‚ ‚ ‚  for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(1), the words “may make a final decision” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “determines”, and the words “prescribed under this
‚ ‚ ‚  chapter” are added, for clarity and consistency in this chapter.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(2), before clause (A), the words “If the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary decides under paragraph (1) of this subsection that the
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle or equipment contains a defect or does not comply” are
‚ ‚ ‚  added for clarity and because of the restatement. The words “after
‚ ‚ ‚  such presentations by the manufacturer and interested persons” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as surplus. In clause (A), the words “of the defect or
‚ ‚ ‚  noncompliance” are added for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c), before clause (1), the words “A manufacturer
‚ ‚ ‚  of a motor vehicle or replacement equipment” are substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “manufactured by him” in 15:1411 for clarity. The words “shall
‚ ‚ ‚  notify” are substituted for “he shall furnish notification to” to
‚ ‚ ‚  eliminate unnecessary words. The words “to the Secretary, if
‚ ‚ ‚  section 1411 of this title applies” in 15:1413(c) (1st sentence cl.
‚ ‚ ‚  (6)) are omitted because of the restatement. The words “of the
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle or equipment” are added for clarity. The words “and he
‚ ‚ ‚  shall remedy the defect or failure to comply in accordance with
‚ ‚ ‚  section 1414 of this title” in 15:1411 are omitted as unnecessary
‚ ‚ ‚  because of the source provisions restated in section 30120 of the
‚ ‚ ‚  revised title.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (d), the words “any requirement under”, “to give
‚ ‚ ‚  notice with respect to”, and “as it relates” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus. The words “The Secretary may take action under this
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection only” are added because of the restatement.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (e), the words “(including a manufacturer)” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as surplus. The word “information” is substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “data” for consistency in the revised title.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  AMENDMENTS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  2000 – Pub. L. 106-346, Sec. 101(a) [title III, Sec. 364], which
‚ ‚ ‚  directed amendment of this section in subsecs. (a), (b)(1), and
‚ ‚ ‚  (c), by inserting “, original equipment,” before “or replacement
‚ ‚ ‚  equipment” wherever appearing, and in subsec. (c), by redesignating
‚ ‚ ‚  pars. (1) and (2) as subpars. (A) and (B), respectively, and
‚ ‚ ‚  realigning margins, by substituting “(1) In general. – A
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer” for “A manufacturer”, and by adding a new par (2)
‚ ‚ ‚  relating to duty of manufacturers, was repealed by Pub. L. 106-414,
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 2. See Construction of 2000 Amendment note below.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  CONSTRUCTION OF 2000 AMENDMENT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 106-414, Sec. 2, Nov. 1, 2000, 114 Stat. 1800, provided
‚ ‚ ‚  that: “The amendments made to section 30118 of title 49, United
‚ ‚ ‚  States Code, by section 364 of the Department of Transportation and
‚ ‚ ‚  Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2001 [Pub. L. 106-346, Sec.
‚ ‚ ‚  101(a) [title III, Sec. 364], Oct. 23, 2000, 114 Stat. 1356, 1356A-
‚ ‚ ‚  37] are repealed and such section shall be effective as if such
‚ ‚ ‚  amending section had not been enacted.”

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30119‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30119. Notification procedures

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Contents of Notification. – Notification by a manufacturer
‚ ‚ ‚  required under section 30118 of this title of a defect or
‚ ‚ ‚  noncompliance shall contain –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) a clear description of the defect or noncompliance;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) an evaluation of the risk to motor vehicle safety
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  reasonably related to the defect or noncompliance;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) the measures to be taken to obtain a remedy of the defect
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  or noncompliance;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (4) a statement that the manufacturer giving notice will remedy
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the defect or noncompliance without charge under section 30120 of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  this title;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (5) the earliest date on which the defect or noncompliance will
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  be remedied without charge, and for tires, the period during
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  which the defect or noncompliance will be remedied without charge
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  under section 30120 of this title;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (6) the procedure the recipient of a notice is to follow to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  inform the Secretary of Transportation when a manufacturer,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  distributor, or dealer does not remedy the defect or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  noncompliance without charge under section 30120 of this title;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (7) other information the Secretary prescribes by regulation.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Earliest Remedy Date. – The date specified by a manufacturer
‚ ‚ ‚  in a notification under subsection (a)(5) of this section or
‚ ‚ ‚  section 30121(c)(2) of this title is the earliest date that parts
‚ ‚ ‚  and facilities reasonably can be expected to be available to remedy
‚ ‚ ‚  the defect or noncompliance. The Secretary may disapprove the date.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Time for Notification. – Notification required under section
‚ ‚ ‚  30118 of this title shall be given within a reasonable time –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) prescribed by the Secretary, after the manufacturer
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  receives notice of a final decision under section 30118(b) of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  this title; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) after the manufacturer first decides that a safety-related
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  defect or noncompliance exists under section 30118(c) of this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  title.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Means of Providing Notification. – (1) Notification required
‚ ‚ ‚  under section 30118 of this title about a motor vehicle shall be
‚ ‚ ‚  sent by first class mail –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) to each person registered under State law as the owner and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  whose name and address are reasonably ascertainable by the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer through State records or other available sources; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) if a registered owner is not notified under clause (A) of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  this paragraph, to the most recent purchaser known to the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) Notification required under section 30118 of this title about
‚ ‚ ‚  replacement equipment (except a tire) shall be sent by first class
‚ ‚ ‚  mail to the most recent purchaser known to the manufacturer. In
‚ ‚ ‚  addition, if the Secretary decides that public notice is required
‚ ‚ ‚  for motor vehicle safety, public notice shall be given in the way
‚ ‚ ‚  required by the Secretary after consulting with the manufacturer.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) Notification required under section 30118 of this title about
‚ ‚ ‚  a tire shall be sent by first class mail (or, if the manufacturer
‚ ‚ ‚  prefers, by certified mail) to the most recent purchaser known to
‚ ‚ ‚  the manufacturer. In addition, if the Secretary decides that public
‚ ‚ ‚  notice is required for motor vehicle safety, public notice shall be
‚ ‚ ‚  given in the way required by the Secretary after consulting with
‚ ‚ ‚  the manufacturer. In deciding whether public notice is required,
‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary shall consider –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) the magnitude of the risk to motor vehicle safety caused by
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the defect or noncompliance; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) the cost of public notice compared to the additional number
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of owners the notice may reach.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (4) A dealer to whom a motor vehicle or replacement equipment was
‚ ‚ ‚  delivered shall be notified by certified mail or quicker means if
‚ ‚ ‚  available.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (e) Second Notification. – If the Secretary decides that a
‚ ‚ ‚  notification sent by a manufacturer under this section has not
‚ ‚ ‚  resulted in an adequate number of motor vehicles or items of
‚ ‚ ‚  replacement equipment being returned for remedy, the Secretary may
‚ ‚ ‚  order the manufacturer to send a 2d notification in the way the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary prescribes by regulation.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (f) Notification by Lessor to Lessee. – (1) In this subsection,
‚ ‚ ‚  “leased motor vehicle” means a motor vehicle that is leased to a
‚ ‚ ‚  person for at least 4 months by a lessor that has leased at least 5
‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicles in the 12 months before the date of the
‚ ‚ ‚  notification.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) A lessor that receives a notification required by section
‚ ‚ ‚  30118 of this title about a leased motor vehicle shall provide a
‚ ‚ ‚  copy of the notification to the lessee in the way the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribes by regulation.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 951.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30119(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 108(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1413(a)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to Secs. 153(a)-(c)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1st sentence cls. (1)-(5),
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  last sentence), 154(b)(2)‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2d, last sentences)), 80‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 722; restated Oct. 27,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1974, Pub. L. 93-492, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  103(a)(1)(A), (3), 88 Stat.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1477, 1478.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1413(a).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Secs.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  153(a), (b), 154(b)(2) (2d,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  last sentences); added Oct.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  27, 1974, Pub. L. 93-492,‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 102(a), 88 Stat. 1471,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1473.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30119(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1414(b)(2) (2d,‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  last sentences)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1414(b)(2) (2d,‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  last sentences).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30119(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1413(b)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1413(b).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30119(d)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1413(c) (1st‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence cls.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1)-(5), last‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1413(c) (1st‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence cls.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1)-(5), last‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  153(c) (1st sentence cls.‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1)-(5), last sentence);‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  added Oct. 27, 1974, Pub. L.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  93-492, Sec. 102(a), 88‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 1471, 1472; Oct. 15,‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1982, Pub. L. 97-331, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  4(b), 96 Stat. 1620.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30119(e)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1413(d).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  153(d), (e); added Dec. 18,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1991, Pub. L. 102-240, Sec.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  2504(a), 105 Stat. 2083.‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30119(f)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1413(e).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In this section, the text of 15:1397(a)(1)(D) (related to
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1413(a)-(c) (1st sentence cls. (1)-(5), last sentence),
‚ ‚ ‚  1414(b)(2) (2d, last sentences), and 1416) is omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a), before clause (1), the words “a motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  or item of replacement equipment” are omitted as surplus. The words
‚ ‚ ‚  “by a manufacturer” are added for clarity. In clause (3), the words
‚ ‚ ‚  “a statement of” are omitted as surplus. In clause (4), the word
‚ ‚ ‚  “remedy” is substituted for “cause . . . to be remedied” to
‚ ‚ ‚  eliminate unnecessary words. In clause (5), the words “(specified
‚ ‚ ‚  in accordance with the second and third sentences of section
‚ ‚ ‚  1414(b)(2) of this title)” are omitted as surplus. In clause (6),
‚ ‚ ‚  the words “a description of” are omitted as surplus. The words
‚ ‚ ‚  “under section 30120 of this title” are added for consistency with
‚ ‚ ‚  the source provisions restated in this subsection. In clause (7),
‚ ‚ ‚  the words “in addition to such . . . as” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b), the words “in a notification under subsection
‚ ‚ ‚  (a)(5) of this section or section 30121(c) of this title” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “In either case” because of the restatement. The
‚ ‚ ‚  words “may disapprove” are substituted for “shall be subject to
‚ ‚ ‚  disapproval by” to eliminate unnecessary words.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c)(1), the words “Secretary’s” and “that there is
‚ ‚ ‚  a defect or failure to comply” are omitted as surplus. The word
‚ ‚ ‚  “final” is added for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c)(2), the words “decides that a safety-related
‚ ‚ ‚  defect or noncompliance exists” are substituted for “makes a
‚ ‚ ‚  determination with respect to a defect or failure to comply” for
‚ ‚ ‚  clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (d), the text of 15:1413(c) (1st sentence words
‚ ‚ ‚  before cl. (1)) is incorporated into each paragraph as appropriate.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (d)(1)(A), the words “who is” and “of such vehicle”
‚ ‚ ‚  are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (d)(1)(B), the words “if a registered owner is not
‚ ‚ ‚  notified” are substituted for “unless the registered owner (if any)
‚ ‚ ‚  of such vehicle was notified” for clarity. The words “most recent
‚ ‚ ‚  purchaser” are substituted for “first purchaser (or if a more
‚ ‚ ‚  recent purchaser is” for clarity and to eliminate unnecessary
‚ ‚ ‚  words. The words “of each such vehicle containing such defect or
‚ ‚ ‚  failure to comply” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (d)(3), the words “(or, if the manufacturer
‚ ‚ ‚  prefers, by certified mail)” are substituted for 15:1413(c) (last
‚ ‚ ‚  sentence) to eliminate unnecessary words.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (d)(4), the words “or dealers” are omitted because
‚ ‚ ‚  of 1:1. The words “of such manufacturer” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (e), the word “replacement” is added for clarity
‚ ‚ ‚  and consistency with the source provisions being restated in
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection (d) of this section.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30120‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30120. Remedies for defects and noncompliance

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Ways To Remedy. – (1) Subject to subsections (f) and (g) of
‚ ‚ ‚  this section, when notification of a defect or noncompliance is
‚ ‚ ‚  required under section 30118(b) or (c) of this title, the
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer of the defective or noncomplying motor vehicle or
‚ ‚ ‚  replacement equipment shall remedy the defect or noncompliance
‚ ‚ ‚  without charge when the vehicle or equipment is presented for
‚ ‚ ‚  remedy. Subject to subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer shall remedy the defect or noncompliance in any of the
‚ ‚ ‚  following ways the manufacturer chooses:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) if a vehicle –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (i) by repairing the vehicle;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (ii) by replacing the vehicle with an identical or reasonably
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  equivalent vehicle; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (iii) by refunding the purchase price, less a reasonable
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  allowance for depreciation.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) if replacement equipment, by repairing the equipment or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  replacing the equipment with identical or reasonably equivalent
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  equipment.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) The Secretary of Transportation may prescribe regulations to
‚ ‚ ‚  allow the manufacturer to impose conditions on the replacement of a
‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle or refund of its price.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Tire Remedies. – (1) A manufacturer of a tire, including an
‚ ‚ ‚  original equipment tire, shall remedy a defective or noncomplying
‚ ‚ ‚  tire if the owner or purchaser presents the tire for remedy not
‚ ‚ ‚  later than 60 days after the later of –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) the day the owner or purchaser receives notification under
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  section 30119 of this title; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) if the manufacturer decides to replace the tire, the day
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the owner or purchaser receives notification that a replacement
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  is available.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) If the manufacturer decides to replace the tire and the
‚ ‚ ‚  replacement is not available during the 60-day period, the owner or
‚ ‚ ‚  purchaser must present the tire for remedy during a subsequent 60-
‚ ‚ ‚  day period that begins only after the owner or purchaser receives
‚ ‚ ‚  notification that a replacement will be available during the
‚ ‚ ‚  subsequent period. If tires are available during the subsequent
‚ ‚ ‚  period, only a tire presented for remedy during that period must be
‚ ‚ ‚  remedied.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Adequacy of Repairs. – (1) If a manufacturer decides to
‚ ‚ ‚  repair a defective or noncomplying motor vehicle or replacement
‚ ‚ ‚  equipment and the repair is not done adequately within a reasonable
‚ ‚ ‚  time, the manufacturer shall –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) replace the vehicle or equipment without charge with an
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  identical or reasonably equivalent vehicle or equipment; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) for a vehicle, refund the purchase price, less a reasonable
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  allowance for depreciation.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) Failure to repair a motor vehicle or replacement equipment
‚ ‚ ‚  adequately not later than 60 days after its presentation is prima
‚ ‚ ‚  facie evidence of failure to repair within a reasonable time.
‚ ‚ ‚  However, the Secretary may extend, by order, the 60-day period if
‚ ‚ ‚  good cause for an extension is shown and the reason is published in
‚ ‚ ‚  the Federal Register before the period ends. Presentation of a
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle or equipment for repair before the date specified by a
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer in a notice under section 30119(a)(5) or 30121(c)(2)
‚ ‚ ‚  of this title is not a presentation under this subsection.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) If the Secretary determines that a manufacturer’s remedy
‚ ‚ ‚  program is not likely to be capable of completion within a
‚ ‚ ‚  reasonable time, the Secretary may require the manufacturer to
‚ ‚ ‚  accelerate the remedy program if the Secretary finds –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) that there is a risk of serious injury or death if the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  remedy program is not accelerated; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) that acceleration of the remedy program can be reasonably
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  achieved by expanding the sources of replacement parts, expanding
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the number of authorized repair facilities, or both.

‚ ‚ ‚  The Secretary may prescribe regulations to carry out this
‚ ‚ ‚  paragraph.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Filing Manufacturer’s Remedy Program. – A manufacturer shall
‚ ‚ ‚  file with the Secretary a copy of the manufacturer’s program under
‚ ‚ ‚  this section for remedying a defect or noncompliance. The Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  shall make the program available to the public and publish a notice
‚ ‚ ‚  of availability in the Federal Register. A manufacturer’s remedy
‚ ‚ ‚  program shall include a plan for reimbursing an owner or purchaser
‚ ‚ ‚  who incurred the cost of the remedy within a reasonable time in
‚ ‚ ‚  advance of the manufacturer’s notification under subsection (b) or
‚ ‚ ‚  (c) of section 30118. The Secretary may prescribe regulations
‚ ‚ ‚  establishing what constitutes a reasonable time for purposes of the
‚ ‚ ‚  preceding sentence and other reasonable conditions for the
‚ ‚ ‚  reimbursement plan. In the case of a remedy program involving the
‚ ‚ ‚  replacement of tires, the manufacturer shall include a plan
‚ ‚ ‚  addressing how to prevent, to the extent reasonably within the
‚ ‚ ‚  control of the manufacturer, replaced tires from being resold for
‚ ‚ ‚  installation on a motor vehicle, and how to limit, to the extent
‚ ‚ ‚  reasonably within the control of the manufacturer, the disposal of
‚ ‚ ‚  replaced tires in landfills, particularly through shredding,
‚ ‚ ‚  crumbling, recycling, recovery, and other alternative beneficial
‚ ‚ ‚  non-vehicular uses. The manufacturer shall include information
‚ ‚ ‚  about the implementation of such plan with each quarterly report to
‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary regarding the progress of any notification or remedy
‚ ‚ ‚  campaigns.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (e) Hearings About Meeting Remedy Requirements. – On the motion
‚ ‚ ‚  of the Secretary or on application by any interested person, the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary may conduct a hearing to decide whether the manufacturer
‚ ‚ ‚  has reasonably met the remedy requirements under this section. Any
‚ ‚ ‚  interested person may make written and oral presentations of
‚ ‚ ‚  information, views, and arguments on whether the manufacturer has
‚ ‚ ‚  reasonably met the remedy requirements. If the Secretary decides a
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer has not reasonably met the remedy requirements, the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary shall order the manufacturer to take specified action to
‚ ‚ ‚  meet those requirements and may take any other action authorized
‚ ‚ ‚  under this chapter.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (f) Fair Reimbursement to Dealers. – A manufacturer shall pay
‚ ‚ ‚  fair reimbursement to a dealer providing a remedy without charge
‚ ‚ ‚  under this section.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (g) Nonapplication. – (1) The requirement that a remedy be
‚ ‚ ‚  provided without charge does not apply if the motor vehicle or
‚ ‚ ‚  replacement equipment was bought by the first purchaser more than
‚ ‚ ‚  10 calendar years, or the tire, including an original equipment
‚ ‚ ‚  tire, was bought by the first purchaser more than 5 calendar years,
‚ ‚ ‚  before notice is given under section 30118(c) of this title or an
‚ ‚ ‚  order is issued under section 30118(b) of this title, whichever is
‚ ‚ ‚  earlier.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) This section does not apply during any period in which
‚ ‚ ‚  enforcement of an order under section 30118(b) of this title is
‚ ‚ ‚  restrained or the order is set aside in a civil action to which
‚ ‚ ‚  section 30121(d) of this title applies.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (h) Exemptions. – On application of a manufacturer, the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  shall exempt the manufacturer from this section if the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  decides a defect or noncompliance is inconsequential to motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle safety. The Secretary may take action under this subsection
‚ ‚ ‚  only after notice in the Federal Register and an opportunity for
‚ ‚ ‚  any interested person to present information, views, and arguments.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (i) Limitation on Sale or Lease. – (1) If notification is
‚ ‚ ‚  required by an order under section 30118(b) of this title or is
‚ ‚ ‚  required under section 30118(c) of this title and the manufacturer
‚ ‚ ‚  has provided to a dealer (including retailers of motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  equipment) notification about a new motor vehicle or new item of
‚ ‚ ‚  replacement equipment in the dealer’s possession at the time of
‚ ‚ ‚  notification that contains a defect related to motor vehicle safety
‚ ‚ ‚  or does not comply with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed under this chapter, the dealer may sell or lease the
‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle or item of replacement equipment only if –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) the defect or noncompliance is remedied as required by this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  section before delivery under the sale or lease; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) when the notification is required by an order under section
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  30118(b) of this title, enforcement of the order is restrained or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the order is set aside in a civil action to which section
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  30121(d) of this title applies.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) This subsection does not prohibit a dealer from offering for
‚ ‚ ‚  sale or lease the vehicle or equipment.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (j) Prohibition on Sales of Replaced Equipment. – No person may
‚ ‚ ‚  sell or lease any motor vehicle equipment (including a tire), for
‚ ‚ ‚  installation on a motor vehicle, that is the subject of a decision
‚ ‚ ‚  under section 30118(b) or a notice required under section 30118(c)
‚ ‚ ‚  in a condition that it may be reasonably used for its original
‚ ‚ ‚  purpose unless –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) the defect or noncompliance is remedied as required by this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  section before delivery under the sale or lease; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) notification of the defect or noncompliance is required
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  under section 30118(b) but enforcement of the order is set aside
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  in a civil action to which section 30121(d) applies.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 952; Pub. L.
‚ ‚ ‚  105-178, title VII, Sec. 7106(a), June 9, 1998, 112 Stat. 467; Pub.
‚ ‚ ‚  L. 106-414, Secs. 4, 6-8, Nov. 1, 2000, 114 Stat. 1803-1805.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30120(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 108(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1414(a)(1) (1st‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to Secs. 154(a),‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence), (2)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b)(1), (2) (1st sentence),
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c), 156, 157), 80 Stat.‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  722; restated Oct. 27, 1974,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 93-492, Sec.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  103(a)(1)(A), (3), 88 Stat.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1477, 1478.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1414(a)(1) (1st‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence), (2).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Secs.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  154(a), (b)(1), (2) (1st‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence), (c), 156 (related
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  to remedy), 157 (related to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  remedy); added Oct. 27,‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1974, Pub. L. 93-492, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102(a), 88 Stat. 1472, 1474,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1475.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30120(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1414(a)(5)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1414(a)(5).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30120(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1414(b)(1), (2)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1st sentence)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1414(b)(1), (2)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1st sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30120(d)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1414(c)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1414(c).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30120(e)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1416).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1416 (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  remedy).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30120(f)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1414(a)(3)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1414(a)(3).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30120(g)(1)‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1414(a)(4)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1414(a)(4).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30120(g)(2)‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1414(a)(1) (last‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1414(a)(1) (last‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30120(h)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1417).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1417 (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  remedy).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30120(i)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1414(d).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  154(d); added Dec. 18, 1991,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 102-240, Sec.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  2504(b), 105 Stat. 2083.‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In this section, the text of 15:1397(a)(1)(D) (related to
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1414(a), (b)(1), (2) (1st sentence), and (c), and 1416) is
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a)(1), before clause (A), the words “Subject to
‚ ‚ ‚  subsections (f) and (g) of this section” are added for clarity. The
‚ ‚ ‚  words “with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard . .
‚ ‚ ‚  . which relates to motor vehicle safety” and “pursuant to such
‚ ‚ ‚  notification” are omitted as surplus. The words “shall remedy” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “shall cause such defect or failure to comply in
‚ ‚ ‚  such motor vehicle or such item of replacement equipment to be
‚ ‚ ‚  remedied” to eliminate unnecessary words. The words “the defect or
‚ ‚ ‚  noncompliance” are added for clarity. In clauses (A) and (B), the
‚ ‚ ‚  words “without charge” are omitted as unnecessary because of the
‚ ‚ ‚  words “without charge” in this subsection before this clause (A).
‚ ‚ ‚  In clause (A), the words “presented for remedy pursuant to such
‚ ‚ ‚  notification” and “of such motor vehicle in full” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Subsection (a)(2) is substituted for 15:1414(a)(2)(A) (last
‚ ‚ ‚  sentence) for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(1), before clause (A), the words “shall remedy
‚ ‚ ‚  a defective or noncomplying tire if” are substituted for “shall not
‚ ‚ ‚  be obligated to remedy such tire if such tire is not” to eliminate
‚ ‚ ‚  unnecessary words and for consistency. The words “pursuant to
‚ ‚ ‚  notification” are omitted as surplus. In clause (B), the words
‚ ‚ ‚  “decides to replace the tire” are substituted for “elects
‚ ‚ ‚  replacement” for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Subsection (b)(2) is substituted for 15:1414(a)(5)(B) to
‚ ‚ ‚  eliminate unnecessary words.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c)(1), the words before clause (A) are substituted
‚ ‚ ‚  for “Whenever a manufacturer has elected under subsection (a) of
‚ ‚ ‚  this section to cause the repair of a defect in a motor vehicle or
‚ ‚ ‚  item of replacement equipment or of a failure of such vehicle or
‚ ‚ ‚  item of replacement equipment to comply with a motor vehicle safety
‚ ‚ ‚  standard, and he has failed to cause such defect or failure to
‚ ‚ ‚  comply to be adequately repaired within a reasonable time, then (A)
‚ ‚ ‚  he shall” to eliminate unnecessary words. In clause (A), the word
‚ ‚ ‚  “replace” is substituted for “cause . . . to be replaced” for
‚ ‚ ‚  consistency. In clause (B), the word “refund” is substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “shall cause . . . to be refunded” for consistency. The words “in
‚ ‚ ‚  full” and “and if the manufacturer so elects)” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c)(2), the word “presentation” is substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “tender” for clarity. The words “for repair” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus. The last sentence is substituted for 15:1414(b)(2) (1st
‚ ‚ ‚  sentence) because of the restatement.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (e), the words “(including a manufacturer)” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as surplus. The word “information” is substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “data” for consistency in the revised title.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (f), the word “fair” is substituted for “fair and
‚ ‚ ‚  equitable” to eliminate unnecessary words. The words “for such
‚ ‚ ‚  remedy” are omitted as surplus. The words “providing a” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “who effects” for consistency.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (g)(2), the words “In the case of notification
‚ ‚ ‚  required by an order” are omitted as unnecessary. The word “civil”
‚ ‚ ‚  is added because of rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
‚ ‚ ‚  (28 App. U.S.C.).
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (h), the words “any requirement under”, “or to
‚ ‚ ‚  remedy”, and “as it relates” are omitted as surplus. The words “The
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary may take action under this subsection only” are added
‚ ‚ ‚  because of the restatement.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  AMENDMENTS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  2000 – Subsec. (c)(3). Pub. L. 106-414, Sec. 6(a), added par.
‚ ‚ ‚  (3).
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 106-414, Sec. 7, inserted at end “In the
‚ ‚ ‚  case of a remedy program involving the replacement of tires, the
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer shall include a plan addressing how to prevent, to the
‚ ‚ ‚  extent reasonably within the control of the manufacturer, replaced
‚ ‚ ‚  tires from being resold for installation on a motor vehicle, and
‚ ‚ ‚  how to limit, to the extent reasonably within the control of the
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer, the disposal of replaced tires in landfills,
‚ ‚ ‚  particularly through shredding, crumbling, recycling, recovery, and
‚ ‚ ‚  other alternative beneficial non-vehicular uses. The manufacturer
‚ ‚ ‚  shall include information about the implementation of such plan
‚ ‚ ‚  with each quarterly report to the Secretary regarding the progress
‚ ‚ ‚  of any notification or remedy campaigns.”
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 106-414, Sec. 6(b), inserted at end “A manufacturer’s
‚ ‚ ‚  remedy program shall include a plan for reimbursing an owner or
‚ ‚ ‚  purchaser who incurred the cost of the remedy within a reasonable
‚ ‚ ‚  time in advance of the manufacturer’s notification under subsection
‚ ‚ ‚  (b) or (c) of section 30118. The Secretary may prescribe
‚ ‚ ‚  regulations establishing what constitutes a reasonable time for
‚ ‚ ‚  purposes of the preceding sentence and other reasonable conditions
‚ ‚ ‚  for the reimbursement plan.”
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Subsec. (g)(1). Pub. L. 106-414, Sec. 4, substituted “10 calendar
‚ ‚ ‚  years” for “8 calendar years” and “5 calendar years” for “3
‚ ‚ ‚  calendar years”.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Subsec. (j). Pub. L. 106-414, Sec. 8, added subsec. (j).
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1998 – Subsec. (i)(1). Pub. L. 105-178 inserted “(including
‚ ‚ ‚  retailers of motor vehicle equipment)” after “provided to a dealer”
‚ ‚ ‚  in introductory provisions.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30121‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30121. Provisional notification and civil actions to enforce

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Provisional Notification. – (1) The Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation may order a manufacturer to issue a provisional
‚ ‚ ‚  notification if a civil action about an order issued under section
‚ ‚ ‚  30118(b) of this title has been brought under section 30163 of this
‚ ‚ ‚  title. The provisional notification shall contain –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) a statement that the Secretary has decided that a defect
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  related to motor vehicle safety or noncompliance with a motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter exists and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  that the manufacturer is contesting the decision in a civil
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  action in a United States district court;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) a clear description of the Secretary’s stated basis for the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  decision;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (C) the Secretary’s evaluation of the risk to motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  safety reasonably related to the defect or noncompliance;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (D) measures the Secretary considers necessary to avoid an
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety resulting from the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  defect or noncompliance;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (E) a statement that the manufacturer will remedy the defect or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  noncompliance without charge under section 30120 of this title,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  but that the requirement to remedy without charge is conditioned
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  on the outcome of the civil action; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (F) other information the Secretary prescribes by regulation or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  includes in the order requiring the notice.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) A notification under this subsection does not relieve a
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer of liability for not giving notification required by
‚ ‚ ‚  an order under section 30118(b) of this title.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Civil Actions for Not Notifying. – (1) A manufacturer that
‚ ‚ ‚  does not notify owners and purchasers under section 30119(c) and
‚ ‚ ‚  (d) of this title is liable to the United States Government for a
‚ ‚ ‚  civil penalty, unless the manufacturer prevails in a civil action
‚ ‚ ‚  referred to in subsection (a) of this section or the court in that
‚ ‚ ‚  action enjoins enforcement of the order. Enforcement may be
‚ ‚ ‚  enjoined only if the court decides that the failure to notify is
‚ ‚ ‚  reasonable and that the manufacturer has demonstrated the
‚ ‚ ‚  likelihood of prevailing on the merits. If enforcement is enjoined,
‚ ‚ ‚  the manufacturer is not liable during the time the order is stayed.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) A manufacturer that does not notify owners and purchasers as
‚ ‚ ‚  required under subsection (a) of this section is liable for a civil
‚ ‚ ‚  penalty regardless of whether the manufacturer prevails in an
‚ ‚ ‚  action on the validity of the order issued under section 30118(b)
‚ ‚ ‚  of this title.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Orders to Manufacturers. – If the Secretary prevails in a
‚ ‚ ‚  civil action referred to in subsection (a) of this section, the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary shall order the manufacturer –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) to notify each owner, purchaser, and dealer described in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  section 30119(d) of this title of the outcome of the action and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  other information the Secretary requires, and notification under
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  this clause may be combined with notification required under
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  section 30118(b) of this title;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) to specify the earliest date under section 30119(b) of this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  title on which the defect or noncompliance will be remedied
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  without charge under section 30120 of this title; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) if notification was required under subsection (a) of this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  section, to reimburse an owner or purchaser for reasonable and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  necessary expenses (in an amount that is not more than the amount
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  specified in the order of the Secretary under subsection (a))
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  incurred for repairing the defect or noncompliance during the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  period beginning on the date that notification was required to be
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  issued and ending on the date the owner or purchaser receives the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  notification under this subsection.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Venue. – Notwithstanding section 30163(c) of this title, a
‚ ‚ ‚  civil action about an order issued under section 30118(b) of this
‚ ‚ ‚  title must be brought in the United States district court for a
‚ ‚ ‚  judicial district in the State in which the manufacturer is
‚ ‚ ‚  incorporated or the District of Columbia. On motion of a party, the
‚ ‚ ‚  court may transfer the action to another district court if good
‚ ‚ ‚  cause is shown. All actions related to the same order under section
‚ ‚ ‚  30118(b) shall be consolidated in an action in one judicial
‚ ‚ ‚  district under an order of the court in which the first action was
‚ ‚ ‚  brought. If the first action is transferred to another court, that
‚ ‚ ‚  court shall issue the consolidation order.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 954.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30121(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 108(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1415(b)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to Sec. 155), 80‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 722; restated Oct. 27,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1974, Pub. L. 93-492, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  103(a)(1)(A), (3), 88 Stat.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1477, 1478.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1415(b).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  155(b)-(d); added Oct. 27,‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1974, Pub. L. 93-492, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102(a), 88 Stat. 1474.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30121(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1415(c)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1415(c).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30121(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1415(d)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1415(d).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30121(d)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1415(a)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1415(a).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  155(a); added Oct. 27, 1974,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 93-492, Sec. 102(a),
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  88 Stat. 1474; Nov. 8, 1984,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 98-620, Sec.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  402(17), 98 Stat. 3358.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In this section, the text of 15:1397(a)(1)(D) (related to
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1415) is omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a)(1), before clause (A), the words “and to which
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection (a) of this section applies” are omitted because of the
‚ ‚ ‚  restatement. In clause (A), the words “prescribed under this
‚ ‚ ‚  chapter” are substituted for “Federal”, and the words “civil
‚ ‚ ‚  action” are substituted for “proceeding”, for consistency. In
‚ ‚ ‚  clause (B), the words “that there is such a defect or failure” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as surplus. In clause (D), the word “considers” is
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “which in the judgment of . . . are” to eliminate
‚ ‚ ‚  unnecessary words. In clause (E), the word “remedy” is substituted
‚ ‚ ‚  for “cause . . . to be remedied” to eliminate unnecessary words.
‚ ‚ ‚  The words “civil action” are substituted for “court proceeding” for
‚ ‚ ‚  consistency.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(1), the words “with respect to such failure to
‚ ‚ ‚  notify” are omitted as surplus. The word “enjoins” is substituted
‚ ‚ ‚  for “restrains” for consistency. The words “of such an order” and
‚ ‚ ‚  “for which the effectiveness of” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(2), the words “by an order”, “or not”, and “(to
‚ ‚ ‚  which subsection (a) of the section applies)” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c), before clause (1), the words “a civil action
‚ ‚ ‚  referred to in subsection (a) of this section” are substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “(i) a manufacturer fails within the period specified in section
‚ ‚ ‚  1413(b) of this title to comply with an order under section 1412(b)
‚ ‚ ‚  of this title to afford notification to owners and purchasers, (ii)
‚ ‚ ‚  a civil action to which subsection (a) of this section applies is
‚ ‚ ‚  commenced with respect to such order, and (iii) . . . in such
‚ ‚ ‚  action” to eliminate unnecessary words. In clause (1), the word
‚ ‚ ‚  “action” is substituted for “proceeding” for consistency. The words
‚ ‚ ‚  “containing” and “by an order” are omitted as surplus. In clause
‚ ‚ ‚  (2), the words “under section 30119(b) of this title” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “(in accordance with the second and third sentences
‚ ‚ ‚  of section 1414(b) of this title)” for clarity. The words “under
‚ ‚ ‚  section 30120 of this title” are added for clarity. In clause (3),
‚ ‚ ‚  the words “which are . . . by such owner or purchaser”, “the
‚ ‚ ‚  purpose of”, and “to which the order relates” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (d), the words “Notwithstanding section 30163(c) of
‚ ‚ ‚  this title” are added for clarity. The words “An action under
‚ ‚ ‚  section 1399(a) of this title to restrain a violation of an order .
‚ ‚ ‚  . . or under section 1398 of this title to collect a civil penalty
‚ ‚ ‚  with respect to a violation of such an order” and “to which the
‚ ‚ ‚  order applies” are omitted as surplus. The words “may transfer the
‚ ‚ ‚  action” are substituted for “orders a change of venue” for
‚ ‚ ‚  consistency with 28:1404. The words “(including enforcement
‚ ‚ ‚  actions)” are omitted as surplus. The words “that court shall issue
‚ ‚ ‚  the consolidation order” are substituted for “by order of such
‚ ‚ ‚  other court” for clarity.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30122‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30122. Making safety devices and elements inoperative

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Definition. – In this section, “motor vehicle repair
‚ ‚ ‚  business” means a person holding itself out to the public to repair
‚ ‚ ‚  for compensation a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Prohibition. – A manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle repair business may not knowingly make inoperative any part
‚ ‚ ‚  of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  or motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter unless the
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business reasonably
‚ ‚ ‚  believes the vehicle or equipment will not be used (except for
‚ ‚ ‚  testing or a similar purpose during maintenance or repair) when the
‚ ‚ ‚  device or element is inoperative.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Regulations. – The Secretary of Transportation may prescribe
‚ ‚ ‚  regulations –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) to exempt a person from this section if the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  decides the exemption is consistent with motor vehicle safety and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  section 30101 of this title; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) to define “make inoperative”.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Nonapplication. – This section does not apply to a safety
‚ ‚ ‚  belt interlock or buzzer designed to indicate a safety belt is not
‚ ‚ ‚  in use as described in section 30124 of this title.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 956.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30122(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(2)(A)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (last sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  108(a)(2)(A)- (C); added ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Oct. 27, 1974, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  93-492, Sec. 103(a) (1)(A),
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  88 Stat. 1477.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30122(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(2)(A)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1st sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30122(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(2)(B).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30122(d)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(2)(C).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsections (a) and (c), the words “the term” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a), the words “in the business of” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b), the words “an applicable motor vehicle safety
‚ ‚ ‚  standard prescribed under this chapter” are substituted for “an
‚ ‚ ‚  applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard” for consistency.
‚ ‚ ‚  The words “of design” the 2d time they appear and “rendered” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c)(1), the words “section 30101 of this title” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “the purposes of this chapter” as being more
‚ ‚ ‚  precise.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (d), the words “with respect . . . the rendering
‚ ‚ ‚  inoperative of” are omitted as surplus.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30123‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30123. Tires

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Regrooved Tire Limitations. – (1) In this subsection,
‚ ‚ ‚  “regrooved tire” means a tire with a new tread produced by cutting
‚ ‚ ‚  into the tread of a worn tire.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) The Secretary may authorize the sale, offer for sale,
‚ ‚ ‚  introduction for sale, or delivery for introduction in interstate
‚ ‚ ‚  commerce, of a regrooved tire or a motor vehicle equipped with
‚ ‚ ‚  regrooved tires if the Secretary decides the tires are designed and
‚ ‚ ‚  made in a way consistent with section 30101 of this title. A person
‚ ‚ ‚  may not sell, offer for sale, introduce for sale, or deliver for
‚ ‚ ‚  introduction in interstate commerce, a regrooved tire or a vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  equipped with regrooved tires unless authorized by the Secretary.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Uniform Quality Grading System, Nomenclature, and Marketing
‚ ‚ ‚  Practices. – The Secretary shall prescribe through standards a
‚ ‚ ‚  uniform quality grading system for motor vehicle tires to help
‚ ‚ ‚  consumers make an informed choice when purchasing tires. The
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary also shall cooperate with industry and the Federal Trade
‚ ‚ ‚  Commission to the greatest extent practicable to eliminate
‚ ‚ ‚  deceptive and confusing tire nomenclature and marketing practices.
‚ ‚ ‚  A tire standard or regulation prescribed under this chapter
‚ ‚ ‚  supersedes an order or administrative interpretation of the
‚ ‚ ‚  Commission.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Maximum Load Standards. – The Secretary shall require a motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle to be equipped with tires that meet maximum load standards
‚ ‚ ‚  when the vehicle is loaded with a reasonable amount of luggage and
‚ ‚ ‚  the total number of passengers the vehicle is designed to carry.
‚ ‚ ‚  The vehicle shall be equipped with those tires by the manufacturer
‚ ‚ ‚  or by the first purchaser when the vehicle is first bought in good
‚ ‚ ‚  faith other than for resale.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 956; Pub. L.
‚ ‚ ‚  105-178, title VII, Sec. 7106(b), June 9, 1998, 112 Stat. 467.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30123(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1421 (1st‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Secs. 201-203,‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  204(c), 205, 80 Stat. 728,‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  729.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30123(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1421 (2d ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30123(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1421 (last‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30123(d)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1424(a).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 204(a), 80‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 729; restated Oct. 27,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1974, Pub. L. 93-492, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  110(c), 88 Stat. 1484.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1424(c).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30123(e)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1423.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1425.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30123(f)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1422.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsections (a) and (d)(2), the words “section 30101 of this
‚ ‚ ‚  title” are substituted for “the purposes of this chapter” as being
‚ ‚ ‚  more precise.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a), the words “to a motor vehicle safety standard
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed under this chapter” are substituted for “In all
‚ ‚ ‚  standards for . . . established under subchapter I of this chapter
‚ ‚ ‚  . . . thereto” for consistency and because of the restatement.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(1)(A) and (B), the word “suitable” is omitted
‚ ‚ ‚  as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(1)(C), the words “for a tire containing” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “unless the tire contains . . . in which case it
‚ ‚ ‚  shall also contain” to eliminate unnecessary words. The word
‚ ‚ ‚  “allowing” is substituted for “which would permit” for consistency.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(3), the word “actual” is omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(5)(A), the word “statement” is substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “recital” for clarity. The words “complies with” are substituted
‚ ‚ ‚  for “conforms to”, the words “prescribed under this chapter” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “Federal”, and the word “or” is substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “except that in lieu of such recital”, for consistency.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(5)(B), the word “appropriate” is omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (d)(2), the words “by order” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus. The words “a regrooved tire or a motor vehicle equipped
‚ ‚ ‚  with regrooved tires” are substituted for “any tire or motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle equipped with any tire which has been regrooved” for
‚ ‚ ‚  consistency. The words “A person may not . . . unless authorized by
‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary” are substituted for “No person shall” for clarity
‚ ‚ ‚  and consistency in the revised title. The word “introduce” is
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “introduction” after “or” to correct a mistake.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (e), the words “The Secretary shall prescribe
‚ ‚ ‚  through standards” are substituted for “within two years after
‚ ‚ ‚  September 9, 1966, the Secretary shall, through standards
‚ ‚ ‚  established under subchapter I of this chapter, prescribe by order,
‚ ‚ ‚  and publish in the Federal Register” in 15:1423 to eliminate
‚ ‚ ‚  unnecessary and executed words. The text of 15:1423 (2d sentence)
‚ ‚ ‚  is omitted as executed. The last sentence is substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1425 to eliminate unnecessary words.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (f), the words “In standards established under
‚ ‚ ‚  subchapter I of this chapter” and “fully” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚  The words “The vehicle shall be equipped” are added for clarity.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  AMENDMENTS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1998 – Pub. L. 105-178 redesignated subsecs. (d) to (f) as (a) to
‚ ‚ ‚  (c), respectively, and struck out former subsecs. (a) to (c), which
‚ ‚ ‚  related to labeling requirements, contents of label, and additional
‚ ‚ ‚  information that may be required, respectively.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  IMPROVED TIRE INFORMATION‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 106-414, Sec. 11, Nov. 1, 2000, 114 Stat. 1806, provided
‚ ‚ ‚  that:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(a) Tire Labeling. – Within 30 days after the date of the
‚ ‚ ‚  enactment of this Act [Nov. 1, 2000], the Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation shall initiate a rulemaking proceeding to improve
‚ ‚ ‚  the labeling of tires required by section 30123 of title 49, United
‚ ‚ ‚  States Code[,] to assist consumers in identifying tires that may be
‚ ‚ ‚  the subject of a decision under section 30118(b) [of title 49] or a
‚ ‚ ‚  notice required under section 30118(c). The Secretary shall
‚ ‚ ‚  complete the rulemaking not later than June 1, 2002.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(b) Inflation Levels and Load Limits. – In the rulemaking
‚ ‚ ‚  initiated under subsection (a), the Secretary may take whatever
‚ ‚ ‚  additional action is appropriate to ensure that the public is aware
‚ ‚ ‚  of the importance of observing motor vehicle tire load limits and
‚ ‚ ‚  maintaining proper tire inflation levels for the safe operation of
‚ ‚ ‚  a motor vehicle. Such additional action may include a requirement
‚ ‚ ‚  that the manufacturer of motor vehicles provide the purchasers of
‚ ‚ ‚  the motor vehicles information on appropriate tire inflation levels
‚ ‚ ‚  and load limits if the Secretary determines that requiring such
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturers to provide such information is the most appropriate
‚ ‚ ‚  way such information can be provided.”

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  TIRE PRESSURE WARNING‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 106-414, Sec. 13, Nov. 1, 2000, 114 Stat. 1806, provided
‚ ‚ ‚  that: “Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of
‚ ‚ ‚  this Act [Nov. 1, 2000], the Secretary of Transportation shall
‚ ‚ ‚  complete a rulemaking for a regulation to require a warning system
‚ ‚ ‚  in new motor vehicles to indicate to the operator when a tire is
‚ ‚ ‚  significantly under inflated. Such requirement shall become
‚ ‚ ‚  effective not later than 2 years after the date of the completion
‚ ‚ ‚  of such rulemaking.”

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30124‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30124. Buzzers indicating nonuse of safety belts

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  A motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter may
‚ ‚ ‚  not require or allow a manufacturer to comply with the standard by
‚ ‚ ‚  using a safety belt interlock designed to prevent starting or
‚ ‚ ‚  operating a motor vehicle if an occupant is not using a safety belt
‚ ‚ ‚  or a buzzer designed to indicate a safety belt is not in use,
‚ ‚ ‚  except a buzzer that operates only during the 8-second period after
‚ ‚ ‚  the ignition is turned to the “start” or “on” position.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 957.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30124‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1410b.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  125; added Oct. 27, 1974,‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 93-492, Sec. 109, 88
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 1482.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  The text of 15:1410b(a) and (c)-(e) is omitted as obsolete. The
‚ ‚ ‚  text of 15:1410b(b)(2) and (3) and (f)(2) and (3) is omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  unnecessary because of the restatement. The words “After the
‚ ‚ ‚  effective date of the amendment prescribed under subsection (a) of
‚ ‚ ‚  this section” are omitted as executed. The words “prescribed under
‚ ‚ ‚  this chapter” are substituted for “Federal” for consistency in this
‚ ‚ ‚  chapter.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30125‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30125. Schoolbuses and schoolbus equipment

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Definitions. – In this section –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) “schoolbus” means a passenger motor vehicle designed to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  carry a driver and more than 10 passengers, that the Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation decides is likely to be used significantly to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  transport preprimary, primary, and secondary school students to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  or from school or an event related to school.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) “schoolbus equipment” means equipment designed primarily
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  for a schoolbus or manufactured or sold to replace or improve a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  system, part, or component of a schoolbus or as an accessory or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  addition to a schoolbus.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Standards. – The Secretary shall prescribe motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  safety standards for schoolbuses and schoolbus equipment
‚ ‚ ‚  manufactured in, or imported into, the United States. Standards
‚ ‚ ‚  shall include minimum performance requirements for –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) emergency exits;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) interior protection for occupants;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) floor strength;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (4) seating systems;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (5) crashworthiness of body and frame (including protection
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  against rollover hazards);
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (6) vehicle operating systems;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (7) windows and windshields; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (8) fuel systems.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Test Driving by Manufacturers. – The Secretary may require by
‚ ‚ ‚  regulation a schoolbus to be test-driven by a manufacturer before
‚ ‚ ‚  introduction in commerce.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 957.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30125(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1391(14), (15).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102(14), (15); added Oct.‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  27, 1974, Pub. L. 93-492,‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1484.‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30125(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392(i)(1).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  103(i)(1), (2); added Oct.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  27, 1974, Pub. L. 93-492,‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 202, 88 Stat. 1484;‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  July 8, 1976, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  94-346, Sec. 2, 90 Stat. 815.
‚ ‚ ‚  30125(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392(i)(2).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(F).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  108(a)(1)(F); added Oct. 27,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1974, Pub. L. 93-492, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  203, 88 Stat. 1485.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a)(1), the words “the purpose of” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a)(2), the words “any similar part or component”
‚ ‚ ‚  are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b), before clause (1), the text of
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392(i)(1)(A) (1st sentence) and (B) (words before 2d comma) is
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as executed. The word “prescribe” is substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “promulgate”, and the word “Federal” is omitted, for consistency.
‚ ‚ ‚  The words “Such proposed standards” and “those aspects of
‚ ‚ ‚  performance set out in clauses (i) through (viii) of subparagraph
‚ ‚ ‚  (A) of this paragraph” are omitted because of the restatement. The
‚ ‚ ‚  word “requirements” is substituted for “standards” to avoid using
‚ ‚ ‚  “standards” in 2 different ways. The text of 15:1392(i)(1)(B) (last
‚ ‚ ‚  6 words) is omitted as executed.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c), the text of 15:1397(a)(1)(F) is omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  unnecessary because of the restatement.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30126‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30126. Used motor vehicles

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  To ensure a continuing and effective national safety program, it
‚ ‚ ‚  is the policy of the United States Government to encourage and
‚ ‚ ‚  strengthen State inspection of used motor vehicles. Therefore, the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe uniform motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  safety standards applicable to all used motor vehicles. The
‚ ‚ ‚  standards shall be stated in terms of motor vehicle safety
‚ ‚ ‚  performance.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 958.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30126‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(b)(1)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2d-last sentences).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 108(b)(1)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2d-last sentences), 80‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 722.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  The words “In order” are omitted as surplus. The words “United
‚ ‚ ‚  States Government” are substituted for “Congress” for clarity and
‚ ‚ ‚  consistency in the revised title. The words “Therefore, the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe uniform motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  safety standards applicable to all used motor vehicles” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for 15:1397(b)(1) (4th sentence) to eliminate
‚ ‚ ‚  unnecessary and executed words. The text of 15:1397(b)(1) (last
‚ ‚ ‚  sentence) is omitted as unnecessary because of 5:ch. 5, subch. II.
‚ ‚ ‚  The text of 15:1397(b)(1) (3d sentence) is omitted as executed.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30127‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30127. Automatic occupant crash protection and seat belt use

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Definitions. – In this section –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) “bus” means a motor vehicle with motive power (except a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  trailer) designed to carry more than 10 individuals.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) “multipurpose passenger vehicle” means a motor vehicle with
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  motive power (except a trailer), designed to carry not more than
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  10 individuals, that is constructed either on a truck chassis or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  with special features for occasional off-road operation.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) “passenger car” means a motor vehicle with motive power
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (except a multipurpose passenger vehicle, motorcycle, or trailer)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  designed to carry not more than 10 individuals.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (4) “truck” means a motor vehicle with motive power (except a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  trailer) designed primarily to transport property or special
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  purpose equipment.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Inflatable Restraint Requirements. – (1) Not later than
‚ ‚ ‚  September 1, 1993, the Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe
‚ ‚ ‚  under this chapter an amendment to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
‚ ‚ ‚  Standard 208 issued under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  Safety Act of 1966. The amendment shall require that the automatic
‚ ‚ ‚  occupant crash protection system for both of the front outboard
‚ ‚ ‚  seating positions for each of the following vehicles be an
‚ ‚ ‚  inflatable restraint (with lap and shoulder belts) complying with
‚ ‚ ‚  the occupant protection requirements under section 4.1.2.1 of
‚ ‚ ‚  Standard 208:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) 95 percent of each manufacturer’s annual production of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  passenger cars manufactured after August 31, 1996, and before
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  September 1, 1997.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) 80 percent of each manufacturer’s annual production of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  buses, multipurpose passenger vehicles, and trucks (except walk-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  in van-type trucks and vehicles designed to be sold only to the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  United States Postal Service) with a gross vehicle weight rating
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of not more than 8,500 pounds and an unloaded vehicle weight of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  not more than 5,500 pounds manufactured after August 31, 1997,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  and before September 1, 1998.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (C) 100 percent of each manufacturer’s annual production of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  passenger cars manufactured after August 31, 1997.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (D) 100 percent of each manufacturer’s annual production of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicles described in clause (B) of this paragraph manufactured
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  after August 31, 1998.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) Manufacturers may not use credits and incentives available
‚ ‚ ‚  before September 1, 1998, under the provisions of Standard 208 (as
‚ ‚ ‚  amended by this section) to comply with the requirements of
‚ ‚ ‚  paragraph (1)(D) of this subsection after August 31, 1998.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Owner Manual Requirements. – In amending Standard 208, the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary of Transportation shall require, to be effective as soon
‚ ‚ ‚  as possible after the amendment is prescribed, that owner manuals
‚ ‚ ‚  for passenger cars, buses, multipurpose passenger vehicles, and
‚ ‚ ‚  trucks equipped with an inflatable restraint include a statement in
‚ ‚ ‚  an easily understandable format stating that –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) either or both of the front outboard seating positions of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the vehicle are equipped with an inflatable restraint referred to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  as an “airbag” and a lap and shoulder belt;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) the “airbag” is a supplemental restraint and is not a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  substitute for lap and shoulder belts;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) lap and shoulder belts also must be used correctly by an
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  occupant in a front outboard seating position to provide
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  restraint or protection from frontal crashes as well as other
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  types of crashes or accidents; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (4) occupants should always wear their lap and shoulder belts,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  if available, or other safety belts, whether or not there is an
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  inflatable restraint.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Seat Belt Use Laws. – Congress finds that it is in the public
‚ ‚ ‚  interest for each State to adopt and enforce mandatory seat belt
‚ ‚ ‚  use laws and for the United States Government to adopt and enforce
‚ ‚ ‚  mandatory seat belt use regulations.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (e) Temporary Exemptions. – (1) On application of a manufacturer,
‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary of Transportation may exempt, on a temporary basis,
‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicles of that manufacturer from any requirement under
‚ ‚ ‚  subsections (b) and (c) of this section on terms the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  considers appropriate. An exemption may be renewed.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) The Secretary of Transportation may grant an exemption under
‚ ‚ ‚  paragraph (1) of this subsection if the Secretary finds that there
‚ ‚ ‚  has been a disruption in the supply of any component of an
‚ ‚ ‚  inflatable restraint or in the use and installation of that
‚ ‚ ‚  component by the manufacturer because of an unavoidable event not
‚ ‚ ‚  under the control of the manufacturer that will prevent the
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer from meeting its anticipated production volume of
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicles with those restraints.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) Only an affected manufacturer may apply for an exemption. The
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe in the amendment to
‚ ‚ ‚  Standard 208 required under this section the information an
‚ ‚ ‚  affected manufacturer must include in its application under this
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection. The manufacturer shall specify in the application the
‚ ‚ ‚  models, lines, and types of vehicles affected. The Secretary may
‚ ‚ ‚  consolidate similar applications from different manufacturers.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (4) An exemption or renewal of an exemption is conditioned on the
‚ ‚ ‚  commitment of the manufacturer to recall the exempted vehicles for
‚ ‚ ‚  installation of the omitted inflatable restraints within a
‚ ‚ ‚  reasonable time that the manufacturer proposes and the Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation approves after the components become available in
‚ ‚ ‚  sufficient quantities to satisfy both anticipated production and
‚ ‚ ‚  recall volume requirements.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (5) The Secretary of Transportation shall publish in the Federal
‚ ‚ ‚  Register a notice of each application under this subsection and
‚ ‚ ‚  each decision to grant or deny a temporary exemption and the
‚ ‚ ‚  reasons for the decision.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (6) The Secretary of Transportation shall require a label for
‚ ‚ ‚  each exempted vehicle that can be removed only after recall and
‚ ‚ ‚  installation of the required inflatable restraint. The Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  shall require that written notice of the exemption be provided to
‚ ‚ ‚  the dealer and the first purchaser of each exempted vehicle other
‚ ‚ ‚  than for resale, with the notice being provided in a way, and
‚ ‚ ‚  containing the information, the Secretary considers appropriate.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (f) Application. – (1) This section revises, but does not
‚ ‚ ‚  replace, Standard 208 as in effect on December 18, 1991, including
‚ ‚ ‚  the amendment of March 26, 1991 (56 Fed. Reg. 12472), to Standard
‚ ‚ ‚  208, extending the requirements for automatic crash protection,
‚ ‚ ‚  with incentives for more innovative automatic crash protection, to
‚ ‚ ‚  trucks, buses, and multipurpose passenger vehicles. This section
‚ ‚ ‚  may not be construed as –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) affecting another provision of law carried out by the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary of Transportation applicable to passenger cars, buses,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  multipurpose passenger vehicles, or trucks; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) establishing a precedent related to developing or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  prescribing a Government motor vehicle safety standard.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) This section and amendments to Standard 208 made under this
‚ ‚ ‚  section may not be construed as indicating an intention by Congress
‚ ‚ ‚  to affect any liability of a motor vehicle manufacturer under
‚ ‚ ‚  applicable law related to vehicles with or without inflatable
‚ ‚ ‚  restraints.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (g) Report. – (1) On October 1, 1992, and annually after that
‚ ‚ ‚  date through October 1, 2000, the Secretary of Transportation shall
‚ ‚ ‚  submit reports on the effectiveness of occupant restraint systems
‚ ‚ ‚  expressed as a percentage reduction in fatalities or injuries of
‚ ‚ ‚  restrained occupants compared to unrestrained occupants for –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) a combination of inflated restraints and lap and shoulder
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  belts;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) inflated restraints only; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (C) lap and shoulder belts only.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) In consultation with the Secretaries of Labor and Defense,
‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary of Transportation also shall provide information and
‚ ‚ ‚  analysis on lap and shoulder belt use, nationally and in each State
‚ ‚ ‚  by –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) military personnel;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) Government, State, and local law enforcement officers;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (C) other Government and State employees; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (D) the public.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (h) Airbags for Government Cars. – In cooperation with the
‚ ‚ ‚  Administrator of General Services and the heads of appropriate
‚ ‚ ‚  departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Government, the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary of Transportation shall establish a program, consistent
‚ ‚ ‚  with applicable procurement laws of the Government and available
‚ ‚ ‚  appropriations, requiring that all passenger cars acquired –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) after September 30, 1994, for use by the Government be
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  equipped, to the maximum extent practicable, with driver-side
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  inflatable restraints; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) after September 30, 1996, for use by the Government be
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  equipped, to the maximum extent practicable, with inflatable
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  restraints for both front outboard seating positions.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 958; Pub. L.
‚ ‚ ‚  105-178, title VII, Sec. 7106(c), June 9, 1998, 112 Stat. 467.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30127(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392 (note).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Dec. 18, 1991, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102-240, Sec. 2502(a), 105‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 2081.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30127(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392 (note).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Dec. 18, 1991, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102-240, Sec. 2508(a)(1)‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1st sentence), (b), 105‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 2084, 2085.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30127(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392 (note).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Dec. 18, 1991, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102-240, Sec. 2508(a)(2),‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  105 Stat. 2085.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30127(d)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392 (note).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Dec. 18, 1991, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102-240, Sec. 2508(a)(3),‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  105 Stat. 2085.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30127(e)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392 (note).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Dec. 18, 1991, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102-240, Sec. 2508(c), 105‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 2086.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30127(f)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392 (note).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Dec. 18, 1991, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102-240, Sec. 2508(a)(1)‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (last sentence), (d), 105‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 2085, 2086.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30127(g)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392 (note).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Dec. 18, 1991, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102-240, Sec. 2508(e), 105‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 2086.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30127(h)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1392 (note).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Dec. 18, 1991, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102-240, Sec. 2508(f), 105‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 2087.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a), the definitions are derived from section
‚ ‚ ‚  2502(a) of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of
‚ ‚ ‚  1991 (Public Law 102-240, 105 Stat. 2081) and are restated because
‚ ‚ ‚  those definitions apply to the source provisions being restated in
‚ ‚ ‚  this section.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(1), before clause (A), the words
‚ ‚ ‚  “Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule” and “(to the
‚ ‚ ‚  extent such Act is not in conflict with the provisions of this
‚ ‚ ‚  section)” are omitted as unnecessary because of the restatement.
‚ ‚ ‚  The words “The amendment shall require” are substituted for “The
‚ ‚ ‚  amendment promulgated under subsection (a) shall establish the
‚ ‚ ‚  following schedule” for clarity. The words “manufactured on or
‚ ‚ ‚  after the dates specified in the applicable schedule established by
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection (b)”, “The amendment shall take effect”, and “Subject to
‚ ‚ ‚  the provisions of subsection (c)” are omitted as unnecessary
‚ ‚ ‚  because of the restatement. The words “for both of the front
‚ ‚ ‚  outboard seating positions for each” are substituted for “for the
‚ ‚ ‚  front outboard designated seating positions of each” for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚  In clause (B), the word “new” is omitted as unnecessary because of
‚ ‚ ‚  the restatement. The word “only” is substituted for “exclusively”
‚ ‚ ‚  for consistency in the revised title.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(2), the words “after August 31, 1998” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “on and after such date” for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c), before clause (1), the words “In amending
‚ ‚ ‚  Standard 208, the Secretary of Transportation shall require” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “The amendment to such Standard 208 shall also
‚ ‚ ‚  require” for clarity and to eliminate unnecessary words.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (e)(3), the words “Only an affected manufacturer
‚ ‚ ‚  may apply for an exemption” are added for clarity. The words
‚ ‚ ‚  “consolidate similar applications from different manufacturers” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “consolidate applications of a similar nature of 1
‚ ‚ ‚  or more manufacturers” for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (f)(1), before clause (A), the words “by the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary or any other person, including any court” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus. In clause (A), the word “affecting” is substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “altering or affecting” to eliminate an unnecessary word.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (f)(2), the words “by any person or court” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as unnecessary. The word “affect” is substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “affect, change, or modify” to eliminate unnecessary words.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (g)(1), before clause (A), the words “and every 6
‚ ‚ ‚  months after that date through” are substituted for “biannually . .
‚ ‚ ‚  . and continuing to” for clarity. The word “actual” is omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  unnecessary. The word “expressed” is substituted for “defined” for
‚ ‚ ‚  clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (g)(2)(C), the words “other Government and State
‚ ‚ ‚  employees” are substituted for “Federal and State employees other
‚ ‚ ‚  than law enforcement officers” for clarity and because of the
‚ ‚ ‚  restatement.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (h)(2), the words “for both front outboard seating
‚ ‚ ‚  positions” are substituted for “for both the driver and front seat
‚ ‚ ‚  outboard seating positions” for clarity and consistency in this
‚ ‚ ‚  section.

-REFTEXT-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  REFERENCES IN TEXT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,
‚ ‚ ‚  referred to in subsec. (b)(1), is Pub. L. 89-563, Sept. 9, 1966, 80
‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 718, as amended, which was classified generally to chapter 38
‚ ‚ ‚  (Sec. 1381 et seq.) of Title 15, Commerce and Trade, and was
‚ ‚ ‚  substantially repealed by Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 7(b), July 5, 1994,
‚ ‚ ‚  108 Stat. 1379, and reenacted by the first section thereof as this
‚ ‚ ‚  chapter.
-MISC2-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  AMENDMENTS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1998 – Subsec. (g)(1). Pub. L. 105-178 substituted “annually” for
‚ ‚ ‚  “every 6 months” in introductory provisions.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF CHILD RESTRAINTS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 107-318, Dec. 4, 2002, 116 Stat. 2772, provided that:

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “This Act may be cited as ‘Anton’s Law’.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “Congress finds the following:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) It is the policy of the Department of Transportation that
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  all child occupants of motor vehicles, regardless of seating
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  position, be appropriately restrained in order to reduce the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  incidence of injuries and fatalities resulting from motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  crashes on the streets, roads, and highways.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) Research has shown that very few children between the ages
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of 4 to 8 years old are in the appropriate restraint for their
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  age when riding in passenger motor vehicles.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) Children who have outgrown their child safety seats should
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  ride in a belt-positioning booster seat until an adult seat belt
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  fits properly.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(4) Children who were properly restrained when riding in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  passenger motor vehicles suffered less severe injuries from
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  accidents than children not properly restrained.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 3. IMPROVEMENT OF SAFETY OF CHILD RESTRAINTS IN PASSENGER
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  MOTOR VEHICLES.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(a) In General. – The Secretary of Transportation (hereafter
‚ ‚ ‚  referred to as the ‘Secretary’) shall initiate a rulemaking
‚ ‚ ‚  proceeding to establish performance requirements for child
‚ ‚ ‚  restraints, including booster seats, for the restraint of children
‚ ‚ ‚  weighing more than 50 pounds.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(b) Elements for Consideration. – In the rulemaking proceeding
‚ ‚ ‚  required by subsection (a), the Secretary shall –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) consider whether to include injury performance criteria
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  for child restraints, including booster seats and other products
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  for use in passenger motor vehicles for the restraint of children
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  weighing more than 50 pounds, under the requirements established
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  in the rulemaking proceeding;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) consider whether to establish performance requirements for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  seat belt fit when used with booster seats and other belt
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  guidance devices;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) consider whether to address situations where children
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  weighing more than 50 pounds only have access to seating
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  positions with lap belts, such as allowing tethered child
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  restraints for such children; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(4) review the definition of the term ‘booster seat’ in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Federal motor vehicle safety standard No. 213 under section
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  571.213 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, to determine if
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  it is sufficiently comprehensive.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(c) Completion. – The Secretary shall complete the rulemaking
‚ ‚ ‚  proceeding required by subsection (a) not later than 30 months
‚ ‚ ‚  after the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 4, 2002].

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 4. DEVELOPMENT OF ANTHROPOMORPHIC TEST DEVICE SIMULATING A
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  10-YEAR OLD CHILD.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(a) Development and Evaluation. – Not later than 24 months after
‚ ‚ ‚  the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 4, 2002], the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  shall develop and evaluate an anthropomorphic test device that
‚ ‚ ‚  simulates a 10-year old child for use in testing child restraints
‚ ‚ ‚  used in passenger motor vehicles.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(b) Adoption by Rulemaking. – Within 1 year following the
‚ ‚ ‚  development and evaluation carried out under subsection (a), the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary shall initiate a rulemaking proceeding for the adoption
‚ ‚ ‚  of an anthropomorphic test device as developed under subsection
‚ ‚ ‚  (a).

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 5. REQUIREMENTS FOR INSTALLATION OF LAP AND SHOULDER BELTS.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(a) In General. – Not later than 24 months after the date of the
‚ ‚ ‚  enactment of this Act [Dec. 4, 2002], the Secretary shall complete
‚ ‚ ‚  a rulemaking proceeding to amend Federal motor vehicle safety
‚ ‚ ‚  standard No. 208 under section 571.208 of title 49, Code of Federal
‚ ‚ ‚  Regulations, relating to occupant crash protection, in order to –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) require a lap and shoulder belt assembly for each rear
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  designated seating position in a passenger motor vehicle with a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less, except that
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  if the Secretary determines that installation of a lap and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  shoulder belt assembly is not practicable for a particular
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  designated seating position in a particular type of passenger
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle, the Secretary may exclude the designated seating
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  position from the requirement; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) apply that requirement to passenger motor vehicles in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  phases in accordance with subsection (b).
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(b) Implementation Schedule. – The requirement prescribed under
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection (a)(1) shall be implemented in phases on a production
‚ ‚ ‚  year basis beginning with the production year that begins not later
‚ ‚ ‚  than 12 months after the end of the year in which the regulations
‚ ‚ ‚  are prescribed under subsection (a). The final rule shall apply to
‚ ‚ ‚  all passenger motor vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating of
‚ ‚ ‚  10,000 pounds or less that are manufactured in the third production
‚ ‚ ‚  year of the implementation phase-in under the schedule.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 6. EVALUATION OF INTEGRATED CHILD SAFETY SYSTEMS.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(a) Evaluation. – Not later than 180 days after the date of
‚ ‚ ‚  enactment of this Act [Dec. 4, 2002], the Secretary shall initiate
‚ ‚ ‚  an evaluation of integrated or built-in child restraints and
‚ ‚ ‚  booster seats. The evaluation should include –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) the safety of the child restraint and correctness of fit
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  for the child;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) the availability of testing data on the system and vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  in which the child restraint will be used;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) the compatibility of the child restraint with different
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  makes and models;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(4) the cost-effectiveness of mass production of the child
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  restraint for consumers;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(5) the ease of use and relative availability of the child
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  restraint to children riding in motor vehicles; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(6) the benefits of built-in seats for improving compliance
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  with State child occupant restraint laws.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(b) Report. – Not later than 12 months after the date of
‚ ‚ ‚  enactment of this Act [Dec. 4, 2002], the Secretary shall transmit
‚ ‚ ‚  to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
‚ ‚ ‚  Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation of the Senate a report of this evaluation.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “As used in this Act, the following definitions apply:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) Child restraint. – The term ‘child restraint’ means any
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  product designed to provide restraint to a child (including
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  booster seats and other products used with a lap and shoulder
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  belt assembly) that meets applicable Federal motor vehicle safety
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  standards prescribed by the National Highway Traffic Safety
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Administration.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) Production year. – The term ‘production year’ means the 12-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  month period between September 1 of a year and August 31 of the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  following year.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) Passenger motor vehicle. – The term ‘passenger motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle’ has the meaning given that term in section 405(f)(5) of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  title 23, United States Code.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 8. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(a) In General. – There are authorized to be appropriated
‚ ‚ ‚  $5,000,000 to the Secretary of Transportation for –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) the evaluation required by section 6 of this Act; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) research of the nature and causes of injury to children
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  involved in motor vehicle crashes.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(b) Limitation. – Funds appropriated under subsection (a) shall
‚ ‚ ‚  not be available for the general administrative expenses of the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary.”
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 106-414, Sec. 14, Nov. 1, 2000, 114 Stat. 1806, provided
‚ ‚ ‚  that:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(a) In General. – Not later than 12 months after the date of the
‚ ‚ ‚  enactment of this Act [Nov. 1, 2000], the Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation shall initiate a rulemaking for the purpose of
‚ ‚ ‚  improving the safety of child restraints, including minimizing head
‚ ‚ ‚  injuries from side impact collisions.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(b) Elements for Consideration. – In the rulemaking required by
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection (a), the Secretary shall consider –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) whether to require more comprehensive tests for child
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  restraints than the current Federal motor vehicle safety
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  standards requires, including the use of dynamic tests that –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(A) replicate an array of crash conditions, such as side-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  impact crashes and rear-impact crashes; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(B) reflect the designs of passenger motor vehicles as of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 1, 2000];
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) whether to require the use of anthropomorphic test devices
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  that –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(A) represent a greater range of sizes of children including
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the need to require the use of an anthropomorphic test device
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  that is representative of a ten-year-old child; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(B) are Hybrid III anthropomorphic test devices;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) whether to require improved protection from head injuries
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  in side-impact and rear-impact crashes;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(4) how to provide consumer information on the physical
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  compatibility of child restraints and vehicle seats on a model-by-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  model basis;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(5) whether to prescribe clearer and simpler labels and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  instructions required to be placed on child restraints;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(6) whether to amend Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  213 (49 CFR 571.213) to cover restraints for children weighing up
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  to 80 pounds;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(7) whether to establish booster seat performance and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  structural integrity requirements to be dynamically tested in 3-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  point lap and shoulder belts;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(8) whether to apply scaled injury criteria performance
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  levels, including neck injury, developed for Federal Motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208 to child restraints and booster
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  seats covered by in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  213; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(9) whether to include child restraint in each vehicle crash
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  tested under the New Car Assessment Program.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(c) Report to Congress. – If the Secretary does not incorporate
‚ ‚ ‚  any element described in subsection (b) in the final rule, the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary shall explain, in a report to the Senate Committee on
‚ ‚ ‚  Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of
‚ ‚ ‚  Representatives Committee on Commerce [now Committee on Energy and
‚ ‚ ‚  Commerce] submitted within 30 days after issuing the final rule,
‚ ‚ ‚  specifically why the Secretary did not incorporate any such element
‚ ‚ ‚  in the final rule.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(d) Completion. – Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary shall complete the rulemaking required by subsection
‚ ‚ ‚  (a) not later than 24 months after the date of the enactment of
‚ ‚ ‚  this Act [Nov. 1, 2000].
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(e) Child Restraint Defined. – In this section, the term ‘child
‚ ‚ ‚  restraint’ has the meaning given the term ‘Child restraint system’
‚ ‚ ‚  in section 571.213 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (as in
‚ ‚ ‚  effect on the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 1, 2000]).
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(f) Funding. – For each fiscal year, of the funds made available
‚ ‚ ‚  to the Secretary for activities relating to safety, not less than
‚ ‚ ‚  $750,000 shall be made available to carry out crash testing of
‚ ‚ ‚  child restraints.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(g) Child Restraint Safety Ratings Program. – No later than 12
‚ ‚ ‚  months after the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 1, 2000],
‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary of Transportation shall issue a notice of proposed
‚ ‚ ‚  rulemaking to establish a child restraint safety rating consumer
‚ ‚ ‚  information program to provide practicable, readily understandable,
‚ ‚ ‚  and timely information to consumers for use in making informed
‚ ‚ ‚  decisions in the purchase of child restraints. No later than 24
‚ ‚ ‚  months after the date of the enactment of this Act the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  shall issue a final rule establishing a child restraint safety
‚ ‚ ‚  rating program and providing other consumer information which the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary determines would be useful [to] consumers who purchase
‚ ‚ ‚  child restraint systems.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(h) Booster Seat Study. – In addition to consideration of
‚ ‚ ‚  booster seat performance and structural integrity contained in
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection (b)(7), not later than 12 months after the date of the
‚ ‚ ‚  enactment of this Act [Nov. 1, 2000], the Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation shall initiate and complete a study, taking into
‚ ‚ ‚  account the views of the public, on the use and effectiveness of
‚ ‚ ‚  automobile booster seats for children, compiling information on the
‚ ‚ ‚  advantages and disadvantages of using booster seats and determining
‚ ‚ ‚  the benefits, if any, to children from use of booster with lap and
‚ ‚ ‚  shoulder belts compared to children using lap and shoulder belts
‚ ‚ ‚  alone, and submit a report on the results of that study to the
‚ ‚ ‚  Congress.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(i) Booster Seat Education Program. – The Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation within 1 year after the date of the enactment of
‚ ‚ ‚  this Act [Nov. 1, 2000] shall develop [a] 5 year strategic plan to
‚ ‚ ‚  reduce deaths and injuries caused by failure to use the appropriate
‚ ‚ ‚  booster seat in the 4 to 8 year old age group by 25 percent.”

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  IMPROVING AIR BAG SAFETY‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 105-178, title VII, Sec. 7103, June 9, 1998, 112 Stat.
‚ ‚ ‚  465, provided that:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(a) Rulemaking To Improve Air Bags. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) Notice of proposed rulemaking. – Not later than September
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1, 1998, the Secretary of Transportation shall issue a notice of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  proposed rulemaking to improve occupant protection for occupants
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of different sizes, belted and unbelted, under Federal Motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208, while minimizing the risk to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  infants, children, and other occupants from injuries and deaths
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  caused by air bags, by means that include advanced air bags.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) Final rule. – Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary shall complete the rulemaking required by this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  subsection by issuing, not later than September 1, 1999, a final
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  rule with any provision the Secretary deems appropriate,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  consistent with paragraph (1) and the requirements of section
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  30111, title 49, United States Code. If the Secretary determines
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  that the final rule cannot be completed by that date to meet the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  purposes of paragraph (1), the Secretary may extend the date for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  issuing the final rule to not later than March 1, 2000.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) Effective date. – The final rule issued under this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  subsection shall become effective in phases as rapidly as
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  practicable, beginning not earlier than September 1, 2002, and no
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sooner than 30 months after the date of the issuance of the final
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  rule, but not later than September 1, 2003. The final rule shall
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  become fully effective for all vehicles identified in section
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  30127(b), title 49, United States Code, that are manufactured on
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  and after September 1, 2005. Should the phase-in of the final
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  rule required by this paragraph commence on September 1, 2003,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  then in that event, and only in that event, the Secretary is
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  authorized to make the final rule fully effective on September 1,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  2006, for all vehicles that are manufactured on and after that
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  date.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(4) Coordination of effective dates. – The requirements of S13
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of Standard No. 208 shall remain in effect unless and until
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  changed by the rule required by this subsection.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(5) Credit for early compliance. – To encourage early
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  compliance, the Secretary is directed to include in the notice of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  proposed rulemaking required by paragraph (1) means by which
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturers may earn credits for future compliance. Credits, on
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  a one-vehicle for one-vehicle basis, may be earned for vehicles
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  certified as being in full compliance under section 30115 of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  title 49, United States Code, with the rule required by paragraph
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) which are either –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(A) so certified in advance of the phase-in period; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(B) in excess of the percentage requirements during the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  phase-in period.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(b) Advisory Committees. – Any government advisory committee,
‚ ‚ ‚  task force, or other entity involving air bags shall include
‚ ‚ ‚  representatives of consumer and safety organizations, insurers,
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturers, and suppliers.”

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30128‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER II – STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30128. Vehicle rollover prevention and crash mitigation

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) In General. – The Secretary shall initiate rulemaking
‚ ‚ ‚  proceedings, for the purpose of establishing rules or standards
‚ ‚ ‚  that will reduce vehicle rollover crashes and mitigate deaths and
‚ ‚ ‚  injuries associated with such crashes for motor vehicles with a
‚ ‚ ‚  gross vehicle weight rating of not more than 10,000 pounds.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Rollover Prevention. – One of the rulemaking proceedings
‚ ‚ ‚  initiated under subsection (a) shall be to establish performance
‚ ‚ ‚  criteria to reduce the occurrence of rollovers consistent with
‚ ‚ ‚  stability enhancing technologies. The Secretary shall issue a
‚ ‚ ‚  proposed rule in this proceeding by rule by October 1, 2006, and a
‚ ‚ ‚  final rule by April 1, 2009.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Occupant Ejection Prevention. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) In general. – The Secretary shall also initiate a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  rulemaking proceeding to establish performance standards to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  reduce complete and partial ejections of vehicle occupants from
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  outboard seating positions. In formulating the standards the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary shall consider various ejection mitigation systems. The
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary shall issue a final rule under this paragraph no later
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  than October 1, 2009.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) Door locks and door retention. – The Secretary shall
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  complete the rulemaking proceeding initiated to upgrade Federal
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 206, relating to door locks and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  door retention, no later than 30 months after the date of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  enactment of this section.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Protection of Occupants. – One of the rulemaking proceedings
‚ ‚ ‚  initiated under subsection (a) shall be to establish performance
‚ ‚ ‚  criteria to upgrade Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 216
‚ ‚ ‚  relating to roof strength for driver and passenger sides. The
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary may consider industry and independent dynamic tests that
‚ ‚ ‚  realistically duplicate the actual forces transmitted during a
‚ ‚ ‚  rollover crash. The Secretary shall issue a proposed rule by
‚ ‚ ‚  December 31, 2005, and a final rule by July 1, 2008.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (e) Deadlines. – If the Secretary determines that the deadline
‚ ‚ ‚  for a final rule under this section cannot be met, the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  shall –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) notify the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Energy and Commerce and explain why that deadline cannot be met;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) establish a new deadline.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Added Pub. L. 109-59, title X, Sec. 10301(a), Aug. 10, 2005, 119
‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 1939.)

-REFTEXT-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  REFERENCES IN TEXT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  The date of enactment of this section, referred to in subsec.
‚ ‚ ‚  (c)(2), is the date of enactment of Pub. L. 109-59, which was
‚ ‚ ‚  approved Aug. 10, 2005.

-COD-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  CODIFICATION‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section 10301(a) of Pub. L. 109-59, which directed that this
‚ ‚ ‚  section be added at the end of subchapter II of chapter 301,
‚ ‚ ‚  without specifying the title to be amended, was executed by adding
‚ ‚ ‚  this section at the end of subchapter II of this chapter, to
‚ ‚ ‚  reflect the probable intent of Congress.

-End-
-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC SUBCHAPTER III – IMPORTING NONCOMPLYING MOTOR
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER III – IMPORTING NONCOMPLYING MOTOR VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER III – IMPORTING NONCOMPLYING MOTOR VEHICLES AND
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  EQUIPMENT

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30141‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER III – IMPORTING NONCOMPLYING MOTOR VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30141. Importing motor vehicles capable of complying with
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  standards

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) General. – Section 30112(a) of this title does not apply to a
‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle if –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) on the initiative of the Secretary of Transportation or on
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  petition of a manufacturer or importer registered under
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  subsection (c) of this section, the Secretary decides –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) the vehicle is –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (i) substantially similar to a motor vehicle originally
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  manufactured for import into and sale in the United States;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (ii) certified under section 30115 of this title;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (iii) the same model year (as defined under regulations of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary of Transportation) as the model of the motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle it is being compared to; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (iv) capable of being readily altered to comply with
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  applicable motor vehicle safety standards prescribed under
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  this chapter; or

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) if there is no substantially similar United States motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle, the safety features of the vehicle comply with or are
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  capable of being altered to comply with those standards based
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  on destructive test information or other evidence the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of Transportation decides is adequate;

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) the vehicle is imported by a registered importer; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) the registered importer pays the annual fee the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of Transportation establishes under subsection (e) of this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  section to pay for the costs of carrying out the registration
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  program for importers under subsection (c) of this section and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  any other fees the Secretary of Transportation establishes to pay
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  for the costs of –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) processing bonds provided to the Secretary of the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Treasury under subsection (d) of this section; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) making the decisions under this subchapter.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Procedures on Deciding on Motor Vehicle Capability. – (1) The
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary of Transportation shall establish by regulation
‚ ‚ ‚  procedures for making a decision under subsection (a)(1) of this
‚ ‚ ‚  section and the information a petitioner must provide to show
‚ ‚ ‚  clearly that the motor vehicle is capable of being brought into
‚ ‚ ‚  compliance with applicable motor vehicle safety standards
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed under this chapter. In establishing the procedures, the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary shall provide for a minimum period of public notice and
‚ ‚ ‚  written comment consistent with ensuring expeditious, but complete,
‚ ‚ ‚  consideration and avoiding delay by any person. In making a
‚ ‚ ‚  decision under those procedures, the Secretary shall consider test
‚ ‚ ‚  information and other information available to the Secretary,
‚ ‚ ‚  including any information provided by the manufacturer. If the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary makes a negative decision, the Secretary may not make
‚ ‚ ‚  another decision for the same model until at least 3 calendar
‚ ‚ ‚  months have elapsed after the negative decision.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) The Secretary of Transportation shall publish each year in
‚ ‚ ‚  the Federal Register a list of all decisions made under subsection
‚ ‚ ‚  (a)(1) of this section. Each published decision applies to the
‚ ‚ ‚  model of the motor vehicle for which the decision was made. A
‚ ‚ ‚  positive decision permits another importer registered under
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection (c) of this section to import a vehicle of the same
‚ ‚ ‚  model under this section if the importer complies with all the
‚ ‚ ‚  terms of the decision.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Registration. – (1) The Secretary of Transportation shall
‚ ‚ ‚  establish procedures for registering a person who complies with
‚ ‚ ‚  requirements prescribed by the Secretary by regulation under this
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection, including –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) recordkeeping requirements;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) inspection of records and facilities related to motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicles the person has imported, altered, or both; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (C) requirements that ensure that the importer (or a successor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  in interest) will be able technically and financially to carry
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  out responsibilities under sections 30117(b), 30118-30121, and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  30166(f) of this title.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) The Secretary of Transportation shall deny registration to a
‚ ‚ ‚  person whose registration is revoked under paragraph (4) of this
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) The Secretary of Transportation may deny registration to a
‚ ‚ ‚  person that is or was owned or controlled by, or under common
‚ ‚ ‚  ownership or control with, a person whose registration was revoked
‚ ‚ ‚  under paragraph (4) of this subsection.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (4) The Secretary of Transportation shall establish procedures
‚ ‚ ‚  for –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) revoking or suspending a registration issued under
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  paragraph (1) of this subsection for not complying with a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  requirement of this subchapter or any of sections 30112, 30115,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  30117-30122, 30125(c), 30127, or 30166 of this title or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  regulations prescribed under this subchapter or any of those
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sections;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) automatically suspending a registration for not paying a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  fee under subsection (a)(3) of this section in a timely manner or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  for knowingly filing a false or misleading certification under
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  section 30146 of this title; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (C) reinstating suspended registrations.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Bonds. – (1) A person importing a motor vehicle under this
‚ ‚ ‚  section shall provide a bond to the Secretary of the Treasury
‚ ‚ ‚  (acting for the Secretary of Transportation) and comply with the
‚ ‚ ‚  terms the Secretary of Transportation decides are appropriate to
‚ ‚ ‚  ensure that the vehicle –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) will comply with applicable motor vehicle safety standards
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed under this chapter within a reasonable time (specified
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  by the Secretary of Transportation) after the vehicle is
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  imported; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) will be exported (at no cost to the United States
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Government) by the Secretary of the Treasury or abandoned to the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Government.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) The amount of the bond provided under this subsection shall
‚ ‚ ‚  be at least equal to the dutiable value of the motor vehicle (as
‚ ‚ ‚  determined by the Secretary of the Treasury) but not more than 150
‚ ‚ ‚  percent of that value.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (e) Fee Review, Adjustment, and Use. – The Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation shall review and make appropriate adjustments at
‚ ‚ ‚  least every 2 years in the amounts of the fees required to be paid
‚ ‚ ‚  under subsection (a)(3) of this section. The Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation shall establish the fees for each fiscal year before
‚ ‚ ‚  the beginning of that year. All fees collected remain available
‚ ‚ ‚  until expended without fiscal year limit to the extent provided in
‚ ‚ ‚  advance by appropriation laws. The amounts are only for use by the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary of Transportation –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) in carrying out this section and sections 30146(a)-(c)(1),
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d), and (e) and 30147(b) of this title; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) in advancing to the Secretary of the Treasury amounts for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  costs incurred under this section and section 30146 of this title
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  to reimburse the Secretary of the Treasury for those costs.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 960; Pub. L.
‚ ‚ ‚  103-429, Sec. 6(23), Oct. 31, 1994, 108 Stat. 4380.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  PUB. L. 103-272‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30141(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(c)(3)(A),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (C)(i).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  108(c)(2), (3)(A)-(D); added
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Oct. 31, 1988, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  100-562, Sec. 2(b), 102‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 2818.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30141(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(c)(3)(C)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (ii)-(iv).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30141(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(c)(3)(D).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30141(d)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(c)(2).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30141(e)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(c)(3)(B).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a)(1)(A)(iv), the words “prescribed under this
‚ ‚ ‚  chapter” are substituted for “Federal” for consistency in this
‚ ‚ ‚  chapter.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a)(3), before clause (A), the words “any other
‚ ‚ ‚  fees” are substituted for “such other annual fee or fees” to
‚ ‚ ‚  eliminate unnecessary words. In clause (B), the words “this
‚ ‚ ‚  subchapter” are substituted for “this section” for clarity. See H.
‚ ‚ ‚  Rept. No. 100-431, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 19 (1987).
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(1), the words “procedures for making a decision
‚ ‚ ‚  under subsection (a)(1) of this section” are substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “procedures for considering such petitions” and “procedures for
‚ ‚ ‚  determinations made on the Secretary’s initiative” because of the
‚ ‚ ‚  restatement. The words “(whether or not confidential)” are omitted
‚ ‚ ‚  as unnecessary because of the restatement.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(2), the word “permits” is substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “shall be sufficient authority” for clarity. The word “conditions”
‚ ‚ ‚  is omitted as being included in “terms”.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c)(1), before clause (A), the words “under this
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection” are added for clarity. The word “including” is
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “include, as a minimum” to eliminate unnecessary
‚ ‚ ‚  words. In clause (B), the words “(relating to discovery,
‚ ‚ ‚  notification, and remedy of defects)” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c)(3), the words “directly or indirectly” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as unnecessary because of the restatement.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (d)(1), before clause (A), the word “conditions” is
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as being included in “terms”.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  PUB. L. 103-429‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  This amends 49:30141(c)(4)(A) and 30165(a) to correct erroneous
‚ ‚ ‚  cross-references.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  AMENDMENTS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1994 – Subsec. (c)(4)(A). Pub. L. 103-429 substituted “any of
‚ ‚ ‚  sections 30112” for “section 30112” and inserted “any of” before
‚ ‚ ‚  “those sections”.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1994 AMENDMENT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Amendment by Pub. L. 103-429 effective July 5, 1994, see section
‚ ‚ ‚  9 of Pub. L. 103-429, set out as a note under section 321 of this
‚ ‚ ‚  title.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30142‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER III – IMPORTING NONCOMPLYING MOTOR VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30142. Importing motor vehicles for personal use

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) General. – Section 30112(a) of this title does not apply to
‚ ‚ ‚  an imported motor vehicle if –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) the vehicle is imported for personal use, and not for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  resale, by an individual (except an individual described in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sections 30143 and 30144 of this title);
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) the vehicle is imported after January 31, 1990; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) the individual takes the actions required under subsection
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) of this section to receive an exemption.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Exemptions. – (1) To receive an exemption under subsection
‚ ‚ ‚  (a) of this section, an individual must –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) provide the Secretary of the Treasury (acting for the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary of Transportation) with –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (i) an appropriate bond in an amount determined under section
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  30141(d) of this title;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (ii) a copy of an agreement with an importer registered under
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  section 30141(c) of this title for bringing the motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  into compliance with applicable motor vehicle safety standards
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed under this chapter; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (iii) a certification that the vehicle meets the requirement
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of section 30141(a)(1)(A) or (B) of this title; and

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) comply with appropriate terms the Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation imposes to ensure that the vehicle –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (i) will be brought into compliance with those standards
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  within a reasonable time (specified by the Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation) after the vehicle is imported; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (ii) will be exported (at no cost to the United States
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Government) by the Secretary of the Treasury or abandoned to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the Government.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) For good cause shown, the Secretary of Transportation may
‚ ‚ ‚  allow an individual additional time, but not more than 30 days
‚ ‚ ‚  after the day on which the motor vehicle is offered for import, to
‚ ‚ ‚  comply with paragraph (1)(A)(ii) of this subsection.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 962.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30142(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(f)(1).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  108(f); added Oct. 31, 1988,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 100-562, Sec. 2(b),
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102 Stat. 2822.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30142(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(f)(2).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a)(2), the words “after January 31, 1990” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “after the effective date of the regulations
‚ ‚ ‚  initially issued to implement the amendments made to this section
‚ ‚ ‚  by the Imported Vehicle Safety Compliance Act of 1988” for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚  See 49 C.F.R. part 591.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a)(3), the words “the individual takes the actions
‚ ‚ ‚  required under subsection (b) of this section” are substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “if that individual takes the actions required by paragraph (2)”
‚ ‚ ‚  for clarity and because of the restatement.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(1), the word “compliance” is substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “conformity” for consistency in this chapter.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(1)(B), before subclause (i), the word
‚ ‚ ‚  “conditions” is omitted as being included in “terms”.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30143‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER III – IMPORTING NONCOMPLYING MOTOR VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30143. Motor vehicles imported by individuals employed outside
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the United States

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Definition. – In this section, “assigned place of employment”
‚ ‚ ‚  means –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) the principal location at which an individual is
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  permanently or indefinitely assigned to work; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) for a member of the uniformed services, the individual’s
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  permanent duty station.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) General. – Section 30112(a) of this title does not apply to a
‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle imported for personal use, and not for resale, by an
‚ ‚ ‚  individual –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) whose assigned place of employment was outside the United
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  States as of October 31, 1988, and who has not had an assigned
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  place of employment in the United States from that date through
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the date the vehicle is imported into the United States;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) who previously had not imported a motor vehicle into the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  United States under this section or section 108(g) of the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 or, before
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  October 31, 1988, under section 108(b)(3) of that Act;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) who acquired, or made a binding contract to acquire, the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle before October 31, 1988;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (4) who imported the vehicle into the United States not later
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  than October 31, 1992; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (5) who satisfies section 108(b)(3) of that Act as in effect on
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  October 30, 1988.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Certification. – Subsection (b) of this section is carried
‚ ‚ ‚  out by certification in the form the Secretary of Transportation or
‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 963.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30143(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(g) (3d,‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  last sentences).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  108(g); added Oct. 31, 1988,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 100-562, Sec. 2(b),
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102 Stat. 2823.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30143(b),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(g) (1st, 2d ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentences).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b), before clause (1), the words “(including a
‚ ‚ ‚  member of the uniformed services)” are omitted as unnecessary
‚ ‚ ‚  because of the restatement. In clause (1), the words “from that
‚ ‚ ‚  date through the date the vehicle is imported into the United
‚ ‚ ‚  States” are substituted for “that date and the date of entry of
‚ ‚ ‚  such motor vehicle” for clarity and consistency in this chapter. In
‚ ‚ ‚  clause (2), the words “under this section or section 108(g) of the
‚ ‚ ‚  National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “this subsection” to preserve the exemption for
‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicles imported under the source provisions between October
‚ ‚ ‚  30, 1988, and the effective date of this restatement. In clause
‚ ‚ ‚  (4), the word “imports” is substituted for “enters” for clarity and
‚ ‚ ‚  consistency in this chapter. In clause (5) the word “satisfies” is
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “meets the terms, conditions, and other
‚ ‚ ‚  requirements . . . under” to eliminate unnecessary words.

-REFTEXT-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  REFERENCES IN TEXT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Subsections (b)(3) and (g) of section 108 of the National Traffic
‚ ‚ ‚  and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, referred to in subsec.
‚ ‚ ‚  (b)(2), (5), are subsecs. (b)(3) and (g) of section 108 of Pub. L.
‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, which were classified to subsecs. (b)(3) and (g),
‚ ‚ ‚  respectively, of section 1397 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade, were
‚ ‚ ‚  repealed and reenacted in sections 30112(b)(1)-(3) and 30143,
‚ ‚ ‚  respectively, of this title by Pub. L. 103-272, Secs. 1(e), 7(b),
‚ ‚ ‚  July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 945, 963, 1379.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30144‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER III – IMPORTING NONCOMPLYING MOTOR VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30144. Importing motor vehicles on a temporary basis

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) General. – Section 30112(a) of this title does not apply to a
‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle imported on a temporary basis for personal use by an
‚ ‚ ‚  individual who is a member of –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1)(A) the personnel of the government of a foreign country on
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  assignment in the United States or a member of the Secretariat of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  a public international organization designated under the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  International Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. 288 et
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  seq.); and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) the class of individuals for whom the Secretary of State
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  has authorized free importation of motor vehicles; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) the armed forces of a foreign country on assignment in the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  United States.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Verification. – The Secretary of Transportation or the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary of the Treasury may require verification, that the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary of Transportation considers appropriate, that an
‚ ‚ ‚  individual is a member described under subsection (a) of this
‚ ‚ ‚  section. The Secretary of Transportation shall ensure that a motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle imported under this section will be exported (at no cost to
‚ ‚ ‚  the United States Government) or abandoned to the Government when
‚ ‚ ‚  the individual no longer –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) resides in the United States; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) is a member described under subsection (a) of this section.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Sale in the United States. – A motor vehicle imported under
‚ ‚ ‚  this section may not be sold when in the United States.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 964; Pub. L.
‚ ‚ ‚  104-287, Sec. 5(57), Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3394.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  PUB. L. 103-272‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30144(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(h) (1st‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  108(h); added Oct. 31, 1988,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 100-562, Sec. 2(b),
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102 Stat. 2823.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30144(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(h) (2d, 3d ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentences).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30144(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(h) (last‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a)(1)(B), the word “importation” is substituted
‚ ‚ ‚  for “entry” for clarity and consistency in this chapter.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b), before clause (1), the words “that an
‚ ‚ ‚  individual is a member described under subsection (a) of this
‚ ‚ ‚  section” are substituted for “such status” for clarity. The word
‚ ‚ ‚  “imported” is substituted for “entered” for clarity and consistency
‚ ‚ ‚  in this chapter. In clause (2), the words “a member described under
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection (a) of this section” are substituted for “hold such
‚ ‚ ‚  status” for clarity.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  PUB. L. 104-287‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  This amends 49:30144(a)(1)(A) to correct an erroneous cross-
‚ ‚ ‚  reference.

-REFTEXT-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  REFERENCES IN TEXT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  The International Organizations Immunities Act, referred to in
‚ ‚ ‚  subsec. (a)(1)(A), is title I of act Dec. 29, 1945, ch. 652, 59
‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 669, as amended, which is classified principally to
‚ ‚ ‚  subchapter XVIII (Sec. 288 et seq.) of chapter 7 of Title 22,
‚ ‚ ‚  Foreign Relations and Intercourse. For complete classification of
‚ ‚ ‚  this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section
‚ ‚ ‚  288 of Title 22 and Tables.
-MISC2-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  AMENDMENTS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1996 – Subsec. (a)(1)(A). Pub. L. 104-287 substituted
‚ ‚ ‚  “International Organizations” for “International Organization”.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30145‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER III – IMPORTING NONCOMPLYING MOTOR VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30145. Importing motor vehicles or equipment requiring further
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturing

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section 30112(a) of this title does not apply to a motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  or motor vehicle equipment if the vehicle or equipment –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) requires further manufacturing to perform its intended
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  function as decided under regulations prescribed by the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of Transportation; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) is accompanied at the time of importation by a written
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  statement issued by the manufacturer indicating the applicable
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter with
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  which it does not comply.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 964.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30145‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(e).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  108(e); added Oct. 31, 1988,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 100-562, Sec. 2(b),
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102 Stat. 2822.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In clause (2), the word “importation” is substituted for “entry”
‚ ‚ ‚  for clarity and consistency in this chapter. The words “of the
‚ ‚ ‚  incomplete motor vehicle or item of equipment” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  unnecessary because of the restatement. The words “prescribed under
‚ ‚ ‚  this chapter” are substituted for “Federal” for consistency in this
‚ ‚ ‚  chapter.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30146‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER III – IMPORTING NONCOMPLYING MOTOR VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30146. Release of motor vehicles and bonds

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Compliance Certification and Bond. – (1) Except as provided
‚ ‚ ‚  in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, an importer registered
‚ ‚ ‚  under section 30141(c) of this title may license or register an
‚ ‚ ‚  imported motor vehicle for use on public streets, roads, or
‚ ‚ ‚  highways, or release custody of a motor vehicle imported by the
‚ ‚ ‚  registered importer or imported by an individual under section
‚ ‚ ‚  30142 of this title and altered by the registered importer to meet
‚ ‚ ‚  applicable motor vehicle safety standards prescribed under this
‚ ‚ ‚  chapter to a person for license or registration for use on public
‚ ‚ ‚  streets, roads, or highways, only after 30 days after the
‚ ‚ ‚  registered importer certifies to the Secretary of Transportation,
‚ ‚ ‚  in the way the Secretary prescribes, that the motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  complies with each standard prescribed in the year the vehicle was
‚ ‚ ‚  manufactured and that applies in that year to that vehicle. A
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle may not be released if the Secretary gives written notice
‚ ‚ ‚  before the end of the 30-day period that the Secretary will inspect
‚ ‚ ‚  the vehicle under subsection (c) of this section.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) The Secretaries of Transportation and the Treasury shall
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribe regulations –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) ensuring the release of a motor vehicle and bond required
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  under section 30141(d) of this title at the end of the 30-day
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  period, unless the Secretary of Transportation issues a notice of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  an inspection under subsection (c) of this section; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) providing that the Secretary of Transportation shall
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  release the vehicle and bond promptly after an inspection under
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  subsection (c) of this section showing compliance with the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  standards applicable to the vehicle.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) Each registered importer shall include on each motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  released under this subsection a label prescribed by the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  of Transportation identifying the importer and stating that the
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle has been altered by the importer to comply with the
‚ ‚ ‚  standards applicable to the vehicle.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Reliance on Manufacturer’s Certification. – In making a
‚ ‚ ‚  certification under subsection (a)(1) of this section, the
‚ ‚ ‚  registered importer may rely on the manufacturer’s certification
‚ ‚ ‚  for the model to which the motor vehicle involved is substantially
‚ ‚ ‚  similar if the importer certifies that any alteration made by the
‚ ‚ ‚  importer did not affect the compliance of the safety features of
‚ ‚ ‚  the vehicle and the importer keeps records verifying the
‚ ‚ ‚  certification for the period the Secretary of Transportation
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribes.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Evidence of Compliance. – (1) The Secretary of Transportation
‚ ‚ ‚  may require that the certification under subsection (a)(1) of this
‚ ‚ ‚  section be accompanied by evidence of compliance the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  considers appropriate or may inspect the certified motor vehicle,
‚ ‚ ‚  or both. If the Secretary gives notice of an inspection, an
‚ ‚ ‚  importer may release the vehicle only after –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) an inspection showing the motor vehicle complies with
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  applicable motor vehicle safety standards prescribed under this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  chapter for which the inspection was made; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) release of the vehicle by the Secretary.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) The Secretary of Transportation shall inspect periodically a
‚ ‚ ‚  representative number of motor vehicles for which certifications
‚ ‚ ‚  have been filed under subsection (a)(1) of this section. In
‚ ‚ ‚  carrying out a motor vehicle testing program under this chapter,
‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary shall include a representative number of motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicles for which certifications have been filed under subsection
‚ ‚ ‚  (a)(1).
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Challenging the Certification. – A motor vehicle or bond may
‚ ‚ ‚  not be released under subsection (a) of this section if the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary of Transportation, not later than 30 days after receiving
‚ ‚ ‚  a certification under subsection (a)(1) of this section, gives
‚ ‚ ‚  written notice that the Secretary believes or has reason to believe
‚ ‚ ‚  that the certification is false or contains a mispresentation.(!1)
‚ ‚ ‚  The vehicle and bond may be released only after the Secretary is
‚ ‚ ‚  satisfied with the certification and any modification of the
‚ ‚ ‚  certification.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (e) Bond Release. – A release of a bond required under section
‚ ‚ ‚  30141(d) of this title is deemed an acceptance of a certification
‚ ‚ ‚  or completion of an inspection under this section but is not a
‚ ‚ ‚  decision by the Secretary of Transportation under section 30118(a)
‚ ‚ ‚  or (b) of this title of compliance with applicable motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  safety standards prescribed under this chapter.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 964.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30146(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(c)(3)(E)(i)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1st, 3d, last‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentences), (vii).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  108(c)(3)(E); added Oct. 31,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1988, Pub. L. 100-562, Sec.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  2(b), 102 Stat. 2820.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30146(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(c)(3)(E)(‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  ii).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30146(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(c)(3)(E)(i)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2d sentence),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (iii), (iv).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30146(d)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(c)(3)(E)(‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vi).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30146(e)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(c)(3)(E)(v).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a)(1), the words “Except as provided in
‚ ‚ ‚  subsections (c) and (d) of this section” are added because of the
‚ ‚ ‚  restatement.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a)(2)(B), the words “showing compliance with the
‚ ‚ ‚  standards” are substituted for “showing no such failure to comply”
‚ ‚ ‚  for clarity.

-FOOTNOTE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (!1) So in original. Probably should be “misrepresentation.”
-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30147‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER III – IMPORTING NONCOMPLYING MOTOR VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30147. Responsibility for defects and noncompliance

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Deeming Defect or Noncompliance to Certain Vehicles and
‚ ‚ ‚  Importer as Manufacturer. – (1) In carrying out sections 30117(b),
‚ ‚ ‚  30118-30121, and 30166(f) of this title –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) for a defect or noncompliance with an applicable motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter for a motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle originally manufactured for import into the United
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  States, an imported motor vehicle having a valid certification
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  under section 30146(a)(1) of this title and decided to be
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  substantially similar to that motor vehicle shall be deemed as
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  having the same defect or as not complying with the same standard
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  unless the manufacturer or importer registered under section
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  30141(c) of this title demonstrates otherwise to the Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) the registered importer shall be deemed to be the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer of any motor vehicle that the importer imports or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  brings into compliance with the standards for an individual under
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  section 30142 of this title.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) The Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register notice of
‚ ‚ ‚  any defect or noncompliance under paragraph (1)(A) of this
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Financial Responsibility Requirement. – The Secretary shall
‚ ‚ ‚  require by regulation each registered importer (including any
‚ ‚ ‚  successor in interest) to provide and maintain evidence,
‚ ‚ ‚  satisfactory to the Secretary, of sufficient financial
‚ ‚ ‚  responsibility to meet its obligations under sections 30117(b),
‚ ‚ ‚  30118-30121, and 30166(f) of this title.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 966.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30147(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(d)(1).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  108(d); added Oct. 31, 1988,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 100-562, Sec. 2(b),
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102 Stat. 2821.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30147(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(d)(2).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In this section, the words “(relating to discovery, notification,
‚ ‚ ‚  and remedy of motor vehicle defects)” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a)(1)(A), the words “for a motor vehicle” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “in, or regarding, any motor vehicle” to eliminate
‚ ‚ ‚  unnecessary words.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a)(1)(B), the word “compliance” is substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “conformity” for consistency in this chapter.

-End-
-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC SUBCHAPTER IV – ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER IV – ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER IV – ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30161‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER IV – ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30161. Judicial review of standards

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Filing and Venue. – A person adversely affected by an order
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribing a motor vehicle safety standard under this chapter may
‚ ‚ ‚  apply for review of the order by filing a petition for review in
‚ ‚ ‚  the court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which
‚ ‚ ‚  the person resides or has its principal place of business. The
‚ ‚ ‚  petition must be filed not later than 59 days after the order is
‚ ‚ ‚  issued.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Notifying Secretary. – The clerk of the court shall send
‚ ‚ ‚  immediately a copy of the petition to the Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation. The Secretary shall file with the court a record of
‚ ‚ ‚  the proceeding in which the order was prescribed.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Additional Proceedings. – (1) On request of the petitioner,
‚ ‚ ‚  the court may order the Secretary to receive additional evidence
‚ ‚ ‚  and evidence in rebuttal if the court is satisfied that the
‚ ‚ ‚  additional evidence is material and there were reasonable grounds
‚ ‚ ‚  for not presenting the evidence in the proceeding before the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) The Secretary may modify findings of fact or make new
‚ ‚ ‚  findings because of the additional evidence presented. The
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary shall file a modified or new finding, a recommendation to
‚ ‚ ‚  modify or set aside the order, and the additional evidence with the
‚ ‚ ‚  court.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Certified Copies of Records of Proceedings. – The Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  shall give any interested person a certified copy of the transcript
‚ ‚ ‚  of the record in a proceeding under this section on request and
‚ ‚ ‚  payment of costs. A certified copy of the record of the proceeding
‚ ‚ ‚  is admissible in a proceeding arising out of a matter under this
‚ ‚ ‚  chapter, regardless of whether the proceeding under this section
‚ ‚ ‚  has begun or becomes final.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (e) Finality of Judgment and Supreme Court Review. – A judgment
‚ ‚ ‚  of a court under this section is final and may be reviewed only by
‚ ‚ ‚  the Supreme Court under section 1254 of title 28.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 966.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30161(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1394(a)(1) (1st‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence), (3).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 105(a)(1)-(5),
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b), 80 Stat. 720, 721.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30161(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1394(a)(1) (2d,‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  last sentences).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30161(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1394(a)(2).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30161(d)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1394(b).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30161(e)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1394(a)(4), (5).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a), the words “In a case of actual controversy as
‚ ‚ ‚  to the validity of” and “who will be . . . when it is effective”
‚ ‚ ‚  are omitted as surplus. The words “an order prescribing a motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle safety standard under this chapter” are substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “any order under section 1392 of this title” for consistency. The
‚ ‚ ‚  words “apply for review” are added for clarity. The words “The
‚ ‚ ‚  petition must be filed” are substituted for “at any time” for
‚ ‚ ‚  clarity. The text of 15:1394(a)(3) is omitted as surplus because
‚ ‚ ‚  5:ch. 7 applies unless otherwise stated.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b), the words “or other officer designated by him
‚ ‚ ‚  for that purpose” are omitted as surplus because of 49:322(b). The
‚ ‚ ‚  words “in which the order was prescribed” are substituted for “on
‚ ‚ ‚  which the Secretary based his order” for consistency. The words “as
‚ ‚ ‚  provided in section 2112 of title 28” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c)(1), the words “in such manner and upon such
‚ ‚ ‚  terms and conditions as to the court may seem proper” are omitted
‚ ‚ ‚  as surplus. The words “is satisfied” are substituted for “shows to
‚ ‚ ‚  the satisfaction of” to eliminate unnecessary words. The words “and
‚ ‚ ‚  to be adduced upon the hearing” are omitted as unnecessary.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c)(2), the words “with the court” are substituted
‚ ‚ ‚  for “the return of” for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (d), the words “thereof” and “criminal, exclusion
‚ ‚ ‚  of imports, or other” are omitted as surplus. The words “under this
‚ ‚ ‚  section” are substituted for “with respect to the order” for
‚ ‚ ‚  clarity. The word “previously” is omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (e), the words “under this section is final and may
‚ ‚ ‚  be reviewed only” are substituted for “affirming or setting aside,
‚ ‚ ‚  in whole or in part, any such order of the Secretary shall be
‚ ‚ ‚  final, subject to review” to eliminate unnecessary words. The text
‚ ‚ ‚  of 15:1394(a)(5) is omitted because of rule 43 of the Federal Rules
‚ ‚ ‚  of Appellate Procedure (28 App. U.S.C.).

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30162‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER IV – ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30162. Petitions by interested persons for standards and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  enforcement

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Filing. – Any interested person may file a petition with the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary of Transportation requesting the Secretary to begin a
‚ ‚ ‚  proceeding –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) to prescribe a motor vehicle safety standard under this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  chapter; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) to decide whether to issue an order under section 30118(b)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of this title.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Statement of Facts. – The petition must state facts that the
‚ ‚ ‚  person claims establish that a motor vehicle safety standard or
‚ ‚ ‚  order referred to in subsection (a) of this section is necessary
‚ ‚ ‚  and briefly describe the order the Secretary should issue.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Proceedings. – The Secretary may hold a public hearing or
‚ ‚ ‚  conduct an investigation or proceeding to decide whether to grant
‚ ‚ ‚  the petition.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Actions of Secretary. – The Secretary shall grant or deny a
‚ ‚ ‚  petition not later than 120 days after the petition is filed. If a
‚ ‚ ‚  petition is granted, the Secretary shall begin the proceeding
‚ ‚ ‚  promptly. If a petition is denied, the Secretary shall publish the
‚ ‚ ‚  reasons for the denial in the Federal Register.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 967.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30162(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1410a(a).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  124(a)-(d); added Oct. 27,‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1974, Pub. L. 93-492, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  106, 88 Stat. 1481.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30162(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1410a(b).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30162(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1410a(c).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30162(d)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1410a(d).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Subsection (a)(1) is substituted for “the issuance of an order
‚ ‚ ‚  pursuant to section 1392 of this title” for clarity and because of
‚ ‚ ‚  the restatement.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b), the words “a motor vehicle safety standard”
‚ ‚ ‚  are added because of the restatement. The words “referred to in
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection (a) of this section” are added for clarity. The words
‚ ‚ ‚  “of the substance” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c), the words “as he deems appropriate in order”
‚ ‚ ‚  and “or not” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (d), the words “described in subsection (b) of this
‚ ‚ ‚  section”, “either”, and “requested in the petition” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30163‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER IV – ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30163. Actions by the Attorney General

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Civil Actions To Enforce. – The Attorney General may bring a
‚ ‚ ‚  civil action in a United States district court to enjoin –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) a violation of this chapter or a regulation prescribed or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  order issued under this chapter; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) the sale, offer for sale, or introduction or delivery for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  introduction, in interstate commerce, or the importation into the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  United States, of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  which it is decided, before the first purchase in good faith
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  other than for resale, that the vehicle or equipment –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) contains a defect related to motor vehicle safety about
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  which notice was given under section 30118(c) of this title or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  an order was issued under section 30118(b) of this title; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) does not comply with an applicable motor vehicle safety
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  standard prescribed under this chapter.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Prior Notice. – When practicable, the Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation shall notify a person against whom a civil action
‚ ‚ ‚  under subsection (a) of this section is planned, give the person an
‚ ‚ ‚  opportunity to present that person’s views, and, except for a
‚ ‚ ‚  knowing and willful violation of this chapter, give the person a
‚ ‚ ‚  reasonable opportunity to remedy the defect or comply with the
‚ ‚ ‚  applicable motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this
‚ ‚ ‚  chapter. Failure to give notice and an opportunity to remedy the
‚ ‚ ‚  defect or comply with the applicable motor vehicle safety standard
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed under this chapter does not prevent a court from
‚ ‚ ‚  granting appropriate relief.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Venue. – Except as provided in section 30121(d) of this
‚ ‚ ‚  title, a civil action under this section or section 30165(a) of
‚ ‚ ‚  this title may be brought in the judicial district in which the
‚ ‚ ‚  violation occurred or the defendant is found, resides, or does
‚ ‚ ‚  business. Process in the action may be served in any other judicial
‚ ‚ ‚  district in which the defendant resides or is found.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Jury Trial Demand. – In a trial for criminal contempt for
‚ ‚ ‚  violating an injunction or restraining order issued under
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection (a) of this section, the violation of which is also a
‚ ‚ ‚  violation of this chapter, the defendant may demand a jury trial.
‚ ‚ ‚  The defendant shall be tried as provided in rule 42(b) of the
‚ ‚ ‚  Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (18 App. U.S.C.).
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (e) Subpenas for Witnesses. – In a civil action brought under
‚ ‚ ‚  this section, a subpena for a witness may be served in any judicial
‚ ‚ ‚  district.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 967.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30163(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1399(a) (1st‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 110(a), (c), 80
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 723, 724; Oct. 27,‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1974, Pub. L. 93-492, Secs.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102(b)(2), 103(c), 88 Stat.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1477, 1478.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1424(b) (related ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  to injunctions).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 204(b) (related
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  to injunctions), 80 Stat.‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  729.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30163(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1399(a) (2d,‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  last sentences).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30163(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1399(c).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30163(d)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1399(b).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 110(b), (d)‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to Sec. 110), 80‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 723, 724.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30163(e)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1399(d) (related ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  to 15:1399).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a), before clause (1), the text of 15:1424(b)
‚ ‚ ‚  (related to injunctions) is omitted because of the restatement. The
‚ ‚ ‚  words “The Attorney General may bring a civil action” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “upon petition by . . . the Attorney General” for
‚ ‚ ‚  consistency. The words “the appropriate United States attorney or .
‚ ‚ ‚  . . on behalf of the United States” are omitted as surplus. The
‚ ‚ ‚  words “for cause shown and subject to the provisions of rule 65(a)
‚ ‚ ‚  and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus. In clause (1), the words “a regulation prescribed or order
‚ ‚ ‚  issued under this chapter” are substituted for “(or rules,
‚ ‚ ‚  regulations or orders thereunder)” for clarity and consistency and
‚ ‚ ‚  because “rule” and “regulation” are synonymous. In clause (2),
‚ ‚ ‚  before subclause (A), the words “that the vehicle or equipment” are
‚ ‚ ‚  added for clarity. The words “of such vehicle” and “purposes” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as surplus. In subclause (B), the words “does not comply
‚ ‚ ‚  with” are substituted for “is determined . . . not to conform to”
‚ ‚ ‚  for clarity and consistency.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsections (b), (c), and (e), the word “civil” is added
‚ ‚ ‚  because of rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 App.
‚ ‚ ‚  U.S.C.).
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b), the words “comply with the applicable motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “achieve compliance”, and the words “a court” are
‚ ‚ ‚  added, for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c), the words “any act or transaction constituting
‚ ‚ ‚  the” are omitted as surplus. The word “resides” is substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “is an inhabitant” for consistency in the revised title. The words
‚ ‚ ‚  “the action” are substituted for “such cases” for consistency.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (d), the words “the defendant may demand a jury
‚ ‚ ‚  trial” are substituted for “trial shall be by the court, or, upon
‚ ‚ ‚  demand of the accused, by a jury” to eliminate unnecessary words
‚ ‚ ‚  and for consistency in the revised title.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (e), the words “who are required to attend a United
‚ ‚ ‚  States district court” are omitted as surplus. The words “be served
‚ ‚ ‚  in” are substituted for “run into” for clarity.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30164‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER IV – ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30164. Service of process

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Designating Agents. – A manufacturer offering a motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚  or motor vehicle equipment for import shall designate an agent on
‚ ‚ ‚  whom service of notices and process in administrative and judicial
‚ ‚ ‚  proceedings may be made. The designation shall be in writing and
‚ ‚ ‚  filed with the Secretary of Transportation. The designation may be
‚ ‚ ‚  changed in the same way as originally made.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Service. – An agent may be served at the agent’s office or
‚ ‚ ‚  usual place of residence. Service on the agent is deemed to be
‚ ‚ ‚  service on the manufacturer. If a manufacturer does not designate
‚ ‚ ‚  an agent, service may be made by posting the notice or process in
‚ ‚ ‚  the office of the Secretary.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 968.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30164(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1399(e) (1st‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 110(e), 80‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 724.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30164(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1399(e) (last‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a), the words “A manufacturer offering . . .
‚ ‚ ‚  shall” are substituted for “It shall be the duty of every
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer offering . . . to” to eliminate unnecessary words. The
‚ ‚ ‚  words “into the United States”, “all . . . orders, decisions and
‚ ‚ ‚  requirements”, and “for and on behalf of said manufacturer” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as surplus. The words “The designation may be changed in
‚ ‚ ‚  the same way as originally made” are substituted for “which
‚ ‚ ‚  designation may from time to time be changed by like writing,
‚ ‚ ‚  similarly filed” for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b), the words “An agent may be served” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “Service of all administrative and judicial
‚ ‚ ‚  processes, notices, orders, decisions and requirements may be made
‚ ‚ ‚  upon said manufacturer by service upon such designated agent” to
‚ ‚ ‚  eliminate unnecessary words. The words “Service on the agent is
‚ ‚ ‚  deemed to be service on the manufacturer” are substituted for “with
‚ ‚ ‚  like effects as if made personally upon said manufacturer”, and the
‚ ‚ ‚  words “If a manufacturer does not designate an agent” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “and in default of such designation of such agent”,
‚ ‚ ‚  for clarity. The words “of process, notice, order, requirement or
‚ ‚ ‚  decision in any proceeding before the Secretary or in any judicial
‚ ‚ ‚  proceeding for enforcement of this subchapter or any standards
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed pursuant to this subchapter” and “order, requirement or
‚ ‚ ‚  decision” are omitted as surplus.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30165‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER IV – ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30165. Civil penalty

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Civil Penalties. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) In general. – A person that violates any of section 30112,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  30115, 30117 through 30122, 30123(d),(!1) 30125(c), 30127, or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  30141 through 30147, or a regulation prescribed thereunder, is
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  more than $5,000 for each violation. A separate violation occurs
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  for each motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment and for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  each failure or refusal to allow or perform an act required by
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  any of those sections. The maximum penalty under this subsection
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  for a related series of violations is $15,000,000.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) School buses. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) In general. – Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the maximum
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  amount of a civil penalty under this paragraph shall be $10,000
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  in the case of –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (i) the manufacture, sale, offer for sale, introduction or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  delivery for introduction into interstate commerce, or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  importation of a school bus or school bus equipment (as those
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  terms are defined in section 30125(a) of this title) in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  violation of section 30112(a)(1) of this title; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (ii) a violation of section 30112(a)(2) of this title.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) Related series of violations. – A separate violation
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  occurs for each motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  equipment and for each failure or refusal to allow or perform
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  an act required by that section. The maximum penalty under this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  paragraph for a related series of violations is $15,000,000.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) Section 30166. – A person who violates section 30166 or a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  regulation prescribed under that section is liable to the United
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  States Government for a civil penalty for failing or refusing to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  allow or perform an act required under that section or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  regulation. The maximum penalty under this paragraph is $5,000
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  per violation per day. The maximum penalty under this paragraph
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  for a related series of daily violations is $15,000,000.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Compromise and Setoff. – (1) The Secretary of Transportation
‚ ‚ ‚  may compromise the amount of a civil penalty imposed under this
‚ ‚ ‚  section.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) The Government may deduct the amount of a civil penalty
‚ ‚ ‚  imposed or compromised under this section from amounts it owes the
‚ ‚ ‚  person liable for the penalty.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Considerations. – In determining the amount of a civil
‚ ‚ ‚  penalty or compromise, the appropriateness of the penalty or
‚ ‚ ‚  compromise to the size of the business of the person charged and
‚ ‚ ‚  the gravity of the violation shall be considered.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Subpenas for Witnesses. – In a civil action brought under
‚ ‚ ‚  this section, a subpena for a witness may be served in any judicial
‚ ‚ ‚  district.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 968; Pub. L.
‚ ‚ ‚  103-429, Sec. 6(23), Oct. 31, 1994, 108 Stat. 4380; Pub. L. 106-
‚ ‚ ‚  414, Sec. 5(a), Nov. 1, 2000, 114 Stat. 1803; Pub. L. 109-59,
‚ ‚ ‚  title X, Sec. 10309(c), Aug. 10, 2005, 119 Stat. 1942.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  PUB. L. 103-272‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30165(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1398(a).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 109(a), 80‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 723; Oct. 27, 1974,‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 93-492, Sec. 103(b),
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  88 Stat. 1478.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1424(b) (related ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  to civil penalty).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Secs. 109(b), 110(d)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to Sec. 109),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  204(b) (related to civil‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  penalty), 80 Stat. 723, 724,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  729.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30165(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1398(b) (1st,‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  last sentences).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30165(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1398(b) (2d ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30165(d)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1399(d) (related ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  to 15:1398).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a), the text of 15:1424(b) (related to civil
‚ ‚ ‚  penalty) is omitted because of the restatement. The words “is
‚ ‚ ‚  liable to the United States Government for” are substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “shall be subject to” for consistency. The words “A separate
‚ ‚ ‚  violation occurs for” are substituted for “Such violation of a
‚ ‚ ‚  provision of section 1397 of this title, or regulations issued
‚ ‚ ‚  thereunder, shall constitute a separate violation with respect to”
‚ ‚ ‚  to eliminate unnecessary words.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(2), the words “amount of a civil penalty
‚ ‚ ‚  imposed or compromised” are substituted for “amount of such
‚ ‚ ‚  penalty, when finally determined, or the amount agreed upon in
‚ ‚ ‚  compromise” to eliminate unnecessary words.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (d), the words “who are required to attend a United
‚ ‚ ‚  States district court” are omitted as surplus. The words “be served
‚ ‚ ‚  in” are substituted for “run into” for clarity.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  PUB. L. 103-429‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  This amends 49:30141(c)(4)(A) and 30165(a) to correct erroneous
‚ ‚ ‚  cross-references.

-REFTEXT-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  REFERENCES IN TEXT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section 30123(d) of this title, referred to in subsec. (a)(1),
‚ ‚ ‚  was redesignated section 30123(a) of this title by Pub. L. 105-178,
‚ ‚ ‚  title VII, Sec. 7106(b), June 9, 1998, 112 Stat. 467.
-MISC2-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  AMENDMENTS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  2005 – Subsec. (a)(2), (3). Pub. L. 109-59, which directed
‚ ‚ ‚  amendment of section 30165(a), without specifying the title to be
‚ ‚ ‚  amended, by adding par. (2) and redesignating former par. (2) as
‚ ‚ ‚  (3), was executed to this section, to reflect the probable intent
‚ ‚ ‚  of Congress.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  2000 – Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 106-414 amended heading and text
‚ ‚ ‚  generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: “A person that
‚ ‚ ‚  violates any of sections 30112, 30115, 30117-30122, 30123(d),
‚ ‚ ‚  30125(c), 30127, 30141-30147, or 30166 of this title or a
‚ ‚ ‚  regulation prescribed under any of those sections is liable to the
‚ ‚ ‚  United States Government for a civil penalty of not more than
‚ ‚ ‚  $1,000 for each violation. A separate violation occurs for each
‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment and for each
‚ ‚ ‚  failure or refusal to allow or perform an act required by any of
‚ ‚ ‚  those sections. The maximum penalty under this subsection for a
‚ ‚ ‚  related series of violations is $800,000.”
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1994 – Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 103-429 substituted “any of sections
‚ ‚ ‚  30112” for “section 30112” and inserted “any of” before “those
‚ ‚ ‚  sections” in two places.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1994 AMENDMENT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Amendment by Pub. L. 103-429 effective July 5, 1994, see section
‚ ‚ ‚  9 of Pub. L. 103-429, set out as a note under section 321 of this
‚ ‚ ‚  title.

-FOOTNOTE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (!1) See References in Text note below.
-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30166‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER IV – ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30166. Inspections, investigations, and records

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Definition. – In this section, “motor vehicle accident” means
‚ ‚ ‚  an occurrence associated with the maintenance or operation of a
‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment resulting in personal
‚ ‚ ‚  injury, death, or property damage.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Authority To Inspect and Investigate. – (1) The Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation may conduct an inspection or investigation –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) that may be necessary to enforce this chapter or a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  regulation prescribed or order issued under this chapter; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) related to a motor vehicle accident and designed to carry
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  out this chapter.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) The Secretary of Transportation shall cooperate with State
‚ ‚ ‚  and local officials to the greatest extent possible in an
‚ ‚ ‚  inspection or investigation under paragraph (1)(B) of this
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Matters That Can Be Inspected and Impoundment. – In carrying
‚ ‚ ‚  out this chapter, an officer or employee designated by the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary of Transportation –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) at reasonable times, may inspect and copy any record
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  related to this chapter;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) on request, may inspect records of a manufacturer,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  distributor, or dealer to decide whether the manufacturer,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  distributor, or dealer has complied or is complying with this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  chapter or a regulation prescribed or order issued under this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  chapter; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) at reasonable times, in a reasonable way, and on display of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  proper credentials and written notice to an owner, operator, or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  agent in charge, may –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) enter and inspect with reasonable promptness premises in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  which a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment is
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  manufactured, held for introduction in interstate commerce, or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  held for sale after introduction in interstate commerce;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) enter and inspect with reasonable promptness premises at
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  which a vehicle or equipment involved in a motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  accident is located;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (C) inspect with reasonable promptness that vehicle or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  equipment; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (D) impound for not more than 72 hours a vehicle or equipment
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  involved in a motor vehicle accident.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Reasonable Compensation. – When a motor vehicle (except a
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle subject to subchapter I of chapter 135 of this title) or
‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle equipment is inspected or temporarily impounded under
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection (c)(3) of this section, the Secretary of Transportation
‚ ‚ ‚  shall pay reasonable compensation to the owner of the vehicle if
‚ ‚ ‚  the inspection or impoundment results in denial of use, or
‚ ‚ ‚  reduction in value, of the vehicle.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (e) Records and Making Reports. – The Secretary of Transportation
‚ ‚ ‚  reasonably may require a manufacturer of a motor vehicle or motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle equipment to keep records, and a manufacturer, distributor,
‚ ‚ ‚  or dealer to make reports, to enable the Secretary to decide
‚ ‚ ‚  whether the manufacturer, distributor, or dealer has complied or is
‚ ‚ ‚  complying with this chapter or a regulation prescribed or order
‚ ‚ ‚  issued under this chapter. This subsection does not impose a
‚ ‚ ‚  recordkeeping requirement on a distributor or dealer in addition to
‚ ‚ ‚  those imposed under subsection (f) of this section and section
‚ ‚ ‚  30117(b) of this title or a regulation prescribed or order issued
‚ ‚ ‚  under subsection (f) or section 30117(b).
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (f) Providing Copies of Communications About Defects and
‚ ‚ ‚  Noncompliance. – A manufacturer shall give the Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation a true or representative copy of each communication
‚ ‚ ‚  to the manufacturer’s dealers or to owners or purchasers of a motor
‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle or replacement equipment produced by the manufacturer about
‚ ‚ ‚  a defect or noncompliance with a motor vehicle safety standard
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed under this chapter in a vehicle or equipment that is
‚ ‚ ‚  sold or serviced.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (g) Administrative Authority on Reports, Answers, and Hearings. –
‚ ‚ ‚  (1) In carrying out this chapter, the Secretary of Transportation
‚ ‚ ‚  may –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) require, by general or special order, any person to file
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  reports or answers to specific questions, including reports or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  answers under oath; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) conduct hearings, administer oaths, take testimony, and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  require (by subpena or otherwise) the appearance and testimony of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  witnesses and the production of records the Secretary considers
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  advisable.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) A witness summoned under this subsection is entitled to the
‚ ‚ ‚  same fee and mileage the witness would have been paid in a court of
‚ ‚ ‚  the United States.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (h) Civil Actions To Enforce and Venue. – A civil action to
‚ ‚ ‚  enforce a subpena or order under subsection (g) of this section may
‚ ‚ ‚  be brought in the United States district court for any judicial
‚ ‚ ‚  district in which the proceeding is conducted. The court may punish
‚ ‚ ‚  a failure to obey an order of the court to comply with a subpena or
‚ ‚ ‚  order as a contempt of court.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (i) Governmental Cooperation. – The Secretary of Transportation
‚ ‚ ‚  may request a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United
‚ ‚ ‚  States Government to provide records the Secretary considers
‚ ‚ ‚  necessary to carry out this chapter. The head of the department,
‚ ‚ ‚  agency, or instrumentality shall provide the record on request, may
‚ ‚ ‚  detail personnel on a reimbursable basis, and otherwise shall
‚ ‚ ‚  cooperate with the Secretary. This subsection does not affect a law
‚ ‚ ‚  limiting the authority of a department, agency, or instrumentality
‚ ‚ ‚  to provide information to another department, agency, or
‚ ‚ ‚  instrumentality.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (j) Cooperation of Secretary. – The Secretary of Transportation
‚ ‚ ‚  may advise, assist, and cooperate with departments, agencies, and
‚ ‚ ‚  instrumentalities of the Government, States, and other public and
‚ ‚ ‚  private agencies in developing a method for inspecting and testing
‚ ‚ ‚  to determine compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (k) Providing Information. – The Secretary of Transportation
‚ ‚ ‚  shall provide the Attorney General and, when appropriate, the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary of the Treasury, information obtained that indicates a
‚ ‚ ‚  violation of this chapter or a regulation prescribed or order
‚ ‚ ‚  issued under this chapter.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (l) Reporting of Defects in Motor Vehicles and Products in
‚ ‚ ‚  Foreign Countries. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) Reporting of defects, manufacturer determination. – Not
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  later than 5 working days after determining to conduct a safety
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  recall or other safety campaign in a foreign country on a motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle or motor vehicle equipment that is identical or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  substantially similar to a motor vehicle or motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  equipment offered for sale in the United States, the manufacturer
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  shall report the determination to the Secretary.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) Reporting of defects, foreign government determination. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Not later than 5 working days after receiving notification that
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the government of a foreign country has determined that a safety
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  recall or other safety campaign must be conducted in the foreign
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  country on a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment that is
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  identical or substantially similar to a motor vehicle or motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle equipment offered for sale in the United States, the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer of the motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  shall report the determination to the Secretary.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) Reporting requirements. – The Secretary shall prescribe the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  contents of the notification required by this subsection.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (m) Early Warning Reporting Requirements. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) Rulemaking required. – Not later than 120 days after the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  date of the enactment of the Transportation Recall Enhancement,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act, the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  shall initiate a rulemaking proceeding to establish early warning
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  reporting requirements for manufacturers of motor vehicles and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle equipment to enhance the Secretary’s ability to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  carry out the provisions of this chapter.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) Deadline. – The Secretary shall issue a final rule under
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  paragraph (1) not later than June 30, 2002.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) Reporting elements. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) Warranty and claims data. – As part of the final rule
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  promulgated under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall require
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  report, periodically or upon request by the Secretary,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  information which is received by the manufacturer derived from
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  foreign and domestic sources to the extent that such
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  information may assist in the identification of defects related
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  to motor vehicle safety in motor vehicles and motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  equipment in the United States and which concerns –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (i) data on claims submitted to the manufacturer for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  serious injuries (including death) and aggregate statistical
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  data on property damage from alleged defects in a motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle or in motor vehicle equipment; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (ii) customer satisfaction campaigns, consumer advisories,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  recalls, or other activity involving the repair or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  replacement of motor vehicles or items of motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  equipment.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) Other data. – As part of the final rule promulgated under
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  paragraph (1), the Secretary may, to the extent that such
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  information may assist in the identification of defects related
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  to motor vehicle safety in motor vehicles and motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  equipment in the United States, require manufacturers of motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicles or motor vehicle equipment to report, periodically or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  upon request of the Secretary, such information as the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary may request.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (C) Reporting of possible defects. – The manufacturer of a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment shall report to the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary, in such manner as the Secretary establishes by
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  regulation, all incidents of which the manufacturer receives
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  actual notice which involve fatalities or serious injuries
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  which are alleged or proven to have been caused by a possible
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  defect in such manufacturer’s motor vehicle or motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  equipment in the United States, or in a foreign country when
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the possible defect is in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  equipment that is identical or substantially similar to a motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle or motor vehicle equipment offered for sale in the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  United States.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (4) Handling and utilization of reporting elements. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) Secretary’s specifications. – In requiring the reporting
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of any information requested by the Secretary under this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  subsection, the Secretary shall specify in the final rule
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  promulgated under paragraph (1) –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (i) how such information will be reviewed and utilized to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  assist in the identification of defects related to motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle safety;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (ii) the systems and processes the Secretary will employ or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  establish to review and utilize such information; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (iii) the manner and form of reporting such information,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  including in electronic form.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) Information in possession of manufacturer. – The
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  regulations promulgated by the Secretary under paragraph (1)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  may not require a manufacturer of a motor vehicle or motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle equipment to maintain or submit records respecting
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  information not in the possession of the manufacturer.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (C) Disclosure. – None of the information collected pursuant
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  to the final rule promulgated under paragraph (1) shall be
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  disclosed pursuant to section 30167(b) unless the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  determines the disclosure of such information will assist in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  carrying out sections 30117(b) and 30118 through 30121.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (D) Burdensome requirements. – In promulgating the final rule
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall not impose
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  requirements unduly burdensome to a manufacturer of a motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle or motor vehicle equipment, taking into account the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer’s cost of complying with such requirements and the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary’s ability to use the information sought in a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  meaningful manner to assist in the identification of defects
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  related to motor vehicle safety.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (5) Periodic review. – As part of the final rule promulgated
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  pursuant to paragraph (1), the Secretary shall specify procedures
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  for the periodic review and update of such rule.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (n) Sale or Lease of Defective or Noncompliant Tire. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) In general. – The Secretary shall, within 90 days of the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  date of the enactment of the Transportation Recall Enhancement,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act, issue a final rule
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  requiring any person who knowingly and willfully sells or leases
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  for use on a motor vehicle a defective tire or a tire which is
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  not compliant with an applicable tire safety standard with actual
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  knowledge that the manufacturer of such tire has notified its
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  dealers of such defect or noncompliance as required under section
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  30118(c) or as required by an order under section 30118(b) to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  report such sale or lease to the Secretary.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) Defect or noncompliance remedied or order not in effect. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Regulations under paragraph (1) shall not require the reporting
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  described in paragraph (1) where before delivery under a sale or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  lease of a tire –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) the defect or noncompliance of the tire is remedied as
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  required by section 30120; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) notification of the defect or noncompliance is required
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  under section 30118(b) but enforcement of the order is
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  restrained or the order is set aside in a civil action to which
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  section 30121(d) applies.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 969; Pub. L.
‚ ‚ ‚  103-429, Sec. 6(24), Oct. 31, 1994, 108 Stat. 4380; Pub. L. 104-88,
‚ ‚ ‚  title III, Sec. 308(j), Dec. 29, 1995, 109 Stat. 947; Pub. L. 104-
‚ ‚ ‚  287, Sec. 6(f)(3), Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3399; Pub. L. 106-414,
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 3(a)-(c), Nov. 1, 2000, 114 Stat. 1800-1802.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  PUB. L. 103-272‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30166(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(B),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (E) (as‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 108(a)(1)(B)‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1397(a)(1)(B), (E)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to Sec.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  relates to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  112(a)-(c)), (D) (related to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(a)(3)(B)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 158(a)(1)), (E)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to Sec.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  112(a)-(c)), 80 Stat. 722;‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Oct. 27, 1974, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  93-492, Sec. 103(a)(1)(A),‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2), (3), 88 Stat. 1477,‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1478.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(a)(3)(B).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 112(a)-(c), 80
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 725; restated Oct. 27,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1974, Pub. L. 93-492, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  104(a), 88 Stat. 1478.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30166(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(B),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (E) (as‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1397(a)(1)(B), (E)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  relates to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(a)(1) (1st,‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  last sentences)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(a)(1) (1st,‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  last sentences).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30166(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(B),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (E) (as‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1397(a)(1)(B), (E)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  relates to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(a)(2), (b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1st sentence ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  61st-last words),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c)(2)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(a)(2), (b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1st sentence ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  61st-last words),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c)(2).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30166(d)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(B),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (E) (as‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1397(a)(1)(B), (E)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  relates to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(a)(3)(A)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(a)(3)(A).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30166(e)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(B),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (E) (as‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1397(a)(1)(B), (E)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  relates to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(b) (1st‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence 1st-60th‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  words, last‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(b) (1st‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence 1st-60th‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  words, last‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30166(f)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1418(a)(1)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1418(a)(1).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  158(a)(1); added Oct. 27,‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1974, Pub. L. 93-492, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102(a), 88 Stat. 1475.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30166(g)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(B),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (E) (as‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1397(a)(1)(B), (E)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  relates to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(c)(1), (3),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (5)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(c)(1), (3),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (5).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30166(h)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(B),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (E) (as‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1397(a)(1)(B), (E)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  relates to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(c)(4)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(c)(4).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30166(i)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(B),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (E) (as‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1397(a)(1)(B), (E)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  relates to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(c)(6)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(c)(6).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30166(j)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1396 (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  inspecting and ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 107 (related to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  testing).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  inspecting and testing), 80
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 721.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30166(k)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(B),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (E) (as‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1397(a)(1)(B), (E)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  relates to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(a)(1) (2d ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(a)(1) (2d ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In this section, the words “regulation prescribed or order issued
‚ ‚ ‚  under this chapter” are substituted for “rules, regulations, or
‚ ‚ ‚  orders issued thereunder” and “regulations and orders promulgated
‚ ‚ ‚  thereunder” for consistency and because “rule” and “regulation” are
‚ ‚ ‚  synonymous. The text of 15:1397(a)(1)(B) and (E) (as 1397(a)(1)(B),
‚ ‚ ‚  (E) relates to 15:1401) is omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a), the words “As used” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚  The word “use” is omitted as being included in “operation”.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(1)(A), the words “this chapter” are substituted
‚ ‚ ‚  for “this subchapter” because of the restatement.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(1)(B), the words “the facts, circumstances,
‚ ‚ ‚  conditions, and causes of” are omitted as surplus. The words
‚ ‚ ‚  “designed to carry out” are substituted for “which is for the
‚ ‚ ‚  purposes of carrying out” to eliminate unnecessary words.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b)(2), the words “making”, “appropriate”, and
‚ ‚ ‚  “consistent with the purposes of this subsection” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c), before clause (1), the words “In carrying out
‚ ‚ ‚  this chapter” are substituted for “For purposes of carrying out
‚ ‚ ‚  paragraph (1)” in 15:1401(a)(2) and “In order to carry out the
‚ ‚ ‚  provisions of this subchapter” in 15:1401(c)(2) for clarity and
‚ ‚ ‚  consistency in this chapter. The words “an officer or employee
‚ ‚ ‚  designated by the Secretary of Transportation” are substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “officers or employees duly designated by the Secretary” in
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(a)(2), “an officer or employee duly designated by the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary” in 15:1401(b), and “his duly authorized agent” in
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(c)(2) for consistency. In clause (1), the words “may
‚ ‚ ‚  inspect and copy” are substituted for “shall . . . have access to,
‚ ‚ ‚  and for the purposes of examination the right to copy” in
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(c)(2) to eliminate unnecessary words. The words “of any
‚ ‚ ‚  person having materials or information . . . any function of the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary under” are omitted as surplus. In clause (2), the word
‚ ‚ ‚  “may” is substituted for “permit such officer or employee to” in
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(b) because of the restatement. The words “appropriate” and
‚ ‚ ‚  “relevant” are omitted as surplus. In clause (3)(A)-(C), the words
‚ ‚ ‚  “inspect with reasonable promptness” are substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(a)(2) (last sentence) to eliminate unnecessary words and
‚ ‚ ‚  for consistency. In clause (3)(A), the word “premises” is
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “factory, warehouse, or establishment” for
‚ ‚ ‚  consistency. In clause (3)(D), the words “not more than” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “a period not to exceed” for consistency.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (d), the words “for the purpose of inspection” and
‚ ‚ ‚  “the authority of” are omitted as surplus. The words “is inspected
‚ ‚ ‚  or temporarily impounded under subsection (c)(3) of this section”
‚ ‚ ‚  are substituted for “Whenever, under the authority of paragraph
‚ ‚ ‚  (2)(B), the Secretary inspects or temporarily impounds for the
‚ ‚ ‚  purpose of inspection” for clarity and to correct the cross-
‚ ‚ ‚  reference in the source provision. The words “to its owner” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (e), the words “establish and” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus. The words “This subsection does not impose” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as
‚ ‚ ‚  imposing” for consistency and to eliminate unnecessary words.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (f), the words “notices, bulletins, and other” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as surplus. The words “with a motor vehicle safety standard
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribed under this chapter” are added for clarity. The text of
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D) (related to 15:1418(a)(1)) is omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (g)(1), before clause (A), the words “or on the
‚ ‚ ‚  authorization of the Secretary, any officer or employee of the
‚ ‚ ‚  Department of Transportation” are omitted as surplus because of
‚ ‚ ‚  49:322(b). In clause (A), the words “in writing”, “in such form as
‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary may prescribe”, “relating to any function of the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary under this subchapter”, and “shall be filed with the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary within such reasonable period as the Secretary may
‚ ‚ ‚  prescribe” are omitted as surplus. In clause (B), the words “sit
‚ ‚ ‚  and act at such times and places” are omitted as being included in
‚ ‚ ‚  “conduct hearings”. The word “records” is substituted for “such
‚ ‚ ‚  books, papers, correspondence, memorandums, contracts, agreements,
‚ ‚ ‚  or other records” for consistency in the revised title and with
‚ ‚ ‚  other titles of the United States Code.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (h), the words “A civil action to enforce a subpena
‚ ‚ ‚  or order . . . may be brought in the United States district court
‚ ‚ ‚  for the judicial district in which the proceeding is conducted” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “any of the district courts of the United States
‚ ‚ ‚  within the jurisdiction of which an inquiry is carried on may, in
‚ ‚ ‚  the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpena or order of the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary or such officer or employee . . . issue an order
‚ ‚ ‚  requiring compliance therewith” for clarity and to eliminate
‚ ‚ ‚  unnecessary words. The words “an order of the court to comply with
‚ ‚ ‚  a subpena or order” are substituted for “such order of the court”
‚ ‚ ‚  for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (i), the words “United States” are substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “Federal” for consistency. The words “to provide” are substituted
‚ ‚ ‚  for “from” because of the restatement. The words “his functions
‚ ‚ ‚  under” are omitted as surplus. The words “head of the” are added
‚ ‚ ‚  for consistency. The words “to the Department of Transportation . .
‚ ‚ ‚  . made by the Secretary” are omitted as surplus. The words “detail
‚ ‚ ‚  personnel on a reimbursable basis” are substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(c)(6)(B) to eliminate unnecessary words and because of the
‚ ‚ ‚  restatement. The word “otherwise” is added for clarity. The words
‚ ‚ ‚  “be deemed to” and “provision of” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (j), the words “departments, agencies, and
‚ ‚ ‚  instrumentalities of the Government, States, and other public and
‚ ‚ ‚  private agencies” are substituted for “other Federal departments
‚ ‚ ‚  and agencies, and State and other interested public and private
‚ ‚ ‚  agencies” for consistency.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (k), the words “for appropriate action” are omitted
‚ ‚ ‚  as surplus.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  PUB. L. 103-429‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  This amends 49:30166(h) to clarify the restatement of
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(c)(4) by section 1 of the Act of July 5, 1994 (Public Law
‚ ‚ ‚  103-272, 108 Stat. 970).

-REFTEXT-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  REFERENCES IN TEXT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  The date of the enactment of the Transportation Recall
‚ ‚ ‚  Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act,
‚ ‚ ‚  referred to in subsecs. (m)(1) and (n)(1), is the date of enactment
‚ ‚ ‚  of Pub. L. 106-414, which was approved Nov. 1, 2000.
-MISC2-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  AMENDMENTS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  2000 – Subsecs. (l) to (n). Pub. L. 106-414 added subsecs. (l) to
‚ ‚ ‚  (n).
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1996 – Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 104-287 made technical amendment to
‚ ‚ ‚  directory language of Pub. L. 104-88, Sec. 308(j). See 1995
‚ ‚ ‚  Amendment note below.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1995 – Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 104-88, Sec. 308(j), as amended by
‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 104-287, substituted “subchapter I of chapter 135” for
‚ ‚ ‚  “subchapter II of chapter 105”.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1994 – Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 103-429 substituted “any judicial
‚ ‚ ‚  district” for “the judicial district”.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1996 AMENDMENT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section 6(f)(3) of Pub. L. 104-287 provided that the amendment
‚ ‚ ‚  made by that section is effective Dec. 29, 1995.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1995 AMENDMENT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Amendment by Pub. L. 104-88 effective Jan. 1, 1996, see section 2
‚ ‚ ‚  of Pub. L. 104-88, set out as an Effective Date note under section
‚ ‚ ‚  701 of this title.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1994 AMENDMENT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Amendment by Pub. L. 103-429 effective July 5, 1994, see section
‚ ‚ ‚  9 of Pub. L. 103-429, set out as a note under section 321 of this
‚ ‚ ‚  title.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30167‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER IV – ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30167. Disclosure of information by the Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Confidentiality of Information. – Information obtained under
‚ ‚ ‚  this chapter related to a confidential matter referred to in
‚ ‚ ‚  section 1905 of title 18 may be disclosed only in the following
‚ ‚ ‚  ways:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) to other officers and employees carrying out this chapter.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) when relevant to a proceeding under this chapter.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) to the public if the confidentiality of the information is
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  preserved.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (4) to the public when the Secretary of Transportation decides
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  that disclosure is necessary to carry out section 30101 of this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  title.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Defect and Noncompliance Information. – Subject to subsection
‚ ‚ ‚  (a) of this section, the Secretary shall disclose information
‚ ‚ ‚  obtained under this chapter related to a defect or noncompliance
‚ ‚ ‚  that the Secretary decides will assist in carrying out sections
‚ ‚ ‚  30117(b) and 30118-30121 of this title or that is required to be
‚ ‚ ‚  disclosed under section 30118(a) of this title. A requirement to
‚ ‚ ‚  disclose information under this subsection is in addition to the
‚ ‚ ‚  requirements of section 552 of title 5.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Information About Manufacturer’s Increased Costs. – A
‚ ‚ ‚  manufacturer opposing an action of the Secretary under this chapter
‚ ‚ ‚  because of increased cost shall submit to the Secretary information
‚ ‚ ‚  about the increased cost, including the manufacturer’s cost and the
‚ ‚ ‚  cost to retail purchasers, that allows the public and the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  to evaluate the manufacturer’s statement. The Secretary shall
‚ ‚ ‚  evaluate the information promptly and, subject to subsection (a) of
‚ ‚ ‚  this section, shall make the information and evaluation available
‚ ‚ ‚  to the public. The Secretary shall publish a notice in the Federal
‚ ‚ ‚  Register that the information is available.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Withholding Information From Congress. – This section does
‚ ‚ ‚  not authorize information to be withheld from a committee of
‚ ‚ ‚  Congress authorized to have the information.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 970.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30167(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(B)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 108(a)(1)(B)‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(e) (1st‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to Sec. 112(e)),‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence)), (D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (D) (related to Sec.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  158(a)(2)), (E) (related to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1418(a)(2)(B)),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 112(e)), 80 Stat. 722;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (E) (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Oct. 27, 1974, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(e) (1st‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  93-492, Sec. 103(a)(1)(A),‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2), (3), 88 Stat. 1477,‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1478.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(e) (1st‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 112(e), 80‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 725; Oct. 27, 1974,‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 93-492, Sec. 104(b),
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  88 Stat. 1480.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1402(b)(2) (1st‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  113; added Oct. 27, 1974,‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 93-492, Sec. 105, 88
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 1480.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1418(a)(2)(B).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, 80 Stat. 718, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  158(a)(2); added Oct. 27,‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1974, Pub. L. 93-492, Sec.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  102(a), 88 Stat. 1476.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30167(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(D)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (related to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1418(a)(2)(A),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (C)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1418(a)(2)(A),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (C).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30167(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1402(a), (b)(1),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c)-(e).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30167(d)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397(a)(1)(B),‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (E) (as‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1397(a)(1)(B), (E)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  relates to‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(e) (last‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence)).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(e) (last‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1402(b)(2) (last‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  sentence).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In this section, the text of 15:1397(a)(1)(B) (related to
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(e)), (D) (related to 15:1418(a)(2)), and (E) (related to
‚ ‚ ‚  15:1401(e)) is omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a), before clause (1), the words “Except as
‚ ‚ ‚  otherwise provided in section 1418(a)(2) and section 1402(b) of
‚ ‚ ‚  this title” in 15:1401(e) (1st sentence) are omitted, and the words
‚ ‚ ‚  “Information obtained under this chapter related to a confidential
‚ ‚ ‚  matter” are substituted for “all information reported to or
‚ ‚ ‚  otherwise obtained by the Secretary or his representative pursuant
‚ ‚ ‚  to this subchapter which information contains or relates to a trade
‚ ‚ ‚  secret or other matter” in 15:1401(e) (1st sentence) and “described
‚ ‚ ‚  in subparagraph (A)” in 15:1418(a)(2)(B), because of the
‚ ‚ ‚  restatement. The words “shall be considered confidential for the
‚ ‚ ‚  purpose of that section” are omitted as surplus. The words “may be
‚ ‚ ‚  disclosed only in the following ways” are substituted for “except
‚ ‚ ‚  that such information may be disclosed” in 15:1401(e) (1st
‚ ‚ ‚  sentence) and 15:1402(b)(2) (1st sentence) and “and shall not be
‚ ‚ ‚  disclosed; unless” in 15:1418(a)(2)(B) to eliminate unnecessary
‚ ‚ ‚  words. Clause (3) is substituted for 15:1402(b)(2) (1st sentence
‚ ‚ ‚  words before 2d comma) to eliminate unnecessary words.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b), the words “Subject to” are substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “Except as provided in” for consistency. The words “to the public
‚ ‚ ‚  so much of any” and “which is” are omitted as surplus. The words
‚ ‚ ‚  “which relates to motor vehicle safety” and “with an applicable
‚ ‚ ‚  Federal motor vehicle safety standard” are omitted because of the
‚ ‚ ‚  restatement. The words “the purposes of” and “and not in lieu of”
‚ ‚ ‚  are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c), the words “For purposes of this section, the
‚ ‚ ‚  term ‘cost information’ means” and “such cost information” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted because of the restatement. The words “alleged”, “both”,
‚ ‚ ‚  and “resulting from action by the Secretary, in such form” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as surplus. The words “Such term includes” are omitted
‚ ‚ ‚  because of the restatement. The words “to evaluate” are substituted
‚ ‚ ‚  for “to make an informed judgment” to eliminate unnecessary words
‚ ‚ ‚  and for consistency in the subsection. The words “(in such detail
‚ ‚ ‚  as the Secretary may by regulation or order prescribe)” are omitted
‚ ‚ ‚  as surplus because of 49:322(a). The word “thereafter” is omitted
‚ ‚ ‚  as surplus. The word “evaluate” is substituted for “prepare an
‚ ‚ ‚  evaluation of” to eliminate unnecessary words. The words “The
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary” are added for clarity. The text of 15:1402(d) is omitted
‚ ‚ ‚  as surplus because of 49:322(a). The text of 15:1402(e) is omitted
‚ ‚ ‚  as surplus because of the restatement.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (d), the words “by the Secretary or any officer or
‚ ‚ ‚  employee under his control” and “duly” are omitted as surplus. The
‚ ‚ ‚  words “to have the information” are added for clarity.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30168‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER IV – ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30168. Research, testing, development, and training

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) General Authority. – (1) The Secretary of Transportation
‚ ‚ ‚  shall conduct research, testing, development, and training
‚ ‚ ‚  necessary to carry out this chapter. The research, development,
‚ ‚ ‚  testing, and training shall include –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) collecting information to determine the relationship
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  between motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment performance
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  characteristics and –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (i) accidents involving motor vehicles; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (ii) the occurrence of death or personal injury resulting
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  from those accidents;

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) obtaining experimental and other motor vehicles and motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle equipment for research or testing; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (C) selling or otherwise disposing of test motor vehicles and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle equipment and crediting the proceeds to current
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  appropriations available to carry out this chapter.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) The Secretary may carry out this subsection through grants to
‚ ‚ ‚  States, interstate authorities, and nonprofit institutions.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Use of Public Agencies. – In carrying out this chapter, the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary shall use the services, research, and testing facilities
‚ ‚ ‚  of public agencies to the maximum extent practicable to avoid
‚ ‚ ‚  duplication.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (c) Facilities. – The Secretary may plan, design, and build a new
‚ ‚ ‚  facility or modify an existing facility to conduct research,
‚ ‚ ‚  development, and testing in traffic safety, highway safety, and
‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle safety. An expenditure of more than $100,000 for
‚ ‚ ‚  planning, design, or construction may be made only if the planning,
‚ ‚ ‚  design, or construction is approved by substantially similar
‚ ‚ ‚  resolutions by the Committees on Commerce and Transportation and
‚ ‚ ‚  Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committees
‚ ‚ ‚  on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and Environment and Public
‚ ‚ ‚  Works of the Senate. To obtain that approval, the Secretary shall
‚ ‚ ‚  submit to Congress a prospectus on the proposed facility. The
‚ ‚ ‚  prospectus shall include –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) a brief description of the facility being planned,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  designed, or built;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) the location of the facility;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) an estimate of the maximum cost of the facility;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (4) a statement identifying private and public agencies that
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  will use the facility and the contribution each agency will make
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  to the cost of the facility; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (5) a justification of the need for the facility.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (d) Increasing Costs of Approved Facilities. – The estimated
‚ ‚ ‚  maximum cost of a facility approved under subsection (c) of this
‚ ‚ ‚  section may be increased by an amount equal to the percentage
‚ ‚ ‚  increase in construction costs from the date the prospectus is
‚ ‚ ‚  submitted to Congress. However, the increase in the cost of the
‚ ‚ ‚  facility may not be more than 10 percent of the estimated maximum
‚ ‚ ‚  cost included in the prospectus. The Secretary shall decide what
‚ ‚ ‚  increase in construction costs has occurred.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (e) Availability of Information, Patents, and Developments. –
‚ ‚ ‚  When the United States Government makes more than a minimal
‚ ‚ ‚  contribution to a research or development activity under this
‚ ‚ ‚  chapter, the Secretary shall include in the arrangement for the
‚ ‚ ‚  activity a provision to ensure that all information, patents, and
‚ ‚ ‚  developments related to the activity are available to the public.
‚ ‚ ‚  However, the owner of a background patent may not be deprived of a
‚ ‚ ‚  right under the patent.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 971; Pub. L.
‚ ‚ ‚  104-287, Sec. 5(58), Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3394.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30168(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1395(a), (b).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Secs. 106, 118, 80‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 721, 728.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30168(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1406.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30168(c)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1431(a).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 301, 80 Stat.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  729; restated May 22, 1970,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 91-265, Sec. 7, 84‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 263.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30168(d)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1431(b).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30168(e)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1395(c).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a)(1), before clause (A), the words “the purposes
‚ ‚ ‚  of” and “but not limited to” are omitted as surplus. In clause (A),
‚ ‚ ‚  before subclause (i), the words “from any source” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus. In clause (B), the words “(by negotiation or otherwise)”
‚ ‚ ‚  and “purposes” are omitted as surplus. In clause (C), the word
‚ ‚ ‚  “crediting” is substituted for “reimbursing” because it is more
‚ ‚ ‚  appropriate. The words “of such sale or disposal” and “the purposes
‚ ‚ ‚  of” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a)(2), the words “conduct research, testing,
‚ ‚ ‚  development, and training as authorized to be . . . for the conduct
‚ ‚ ‚  of such research, testing, development, and training” are omitted
‚ ‚ ‚  as surplus. The word “authorities” is substituted for “agencies”
‚ ‚ ‚  for consistency.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (b), the words “in order” are omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (c), before clause (1), the word “suitable” is
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as surplus. The word “testing” is substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “compliance and other testing” to eliminate unnecessary words. The
‚ ‚ ‚  words “An expenditure of more than $100,000 . . . may be made only”
‚ ‚ ‚  are substituted for “except that no appropriation shall be made . .
‚ ‚ ‚  . involving an expenditure in excess of $100,000” as being more
‚ ‚ ‚  precise and to eliminate unnecessary words. The words
‚ ‚ ‚  “substantially similar resolutions” are substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “resolutions adopted in substantially the same form” to eliminate
‚ ‚ ‚  unnecessary words. The words “Energy and Commerce” are substituted
‚ ‚ ‚  for “Interstate and Foreign Commerce”, and the words “Public Works
‚ ‚ ‚  and Transportation” are substituted for “Public Works”, to conform
‚ ‚ ‚  to the amendments made to House Rule X changing the names of those
‚ ‚ ‚  committees. The words “Commerce, Science, and Transportation” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “Commerce”, and the words “Environment and Public
‚ ‚ ‚  Works” are substituted for “Public Works”, to conform to the
‚ ‚ ‚  amendments made to Senate Rule XXV changing the names of those
‚ ‚ ‚  committees. The words “To obtain that” are substituted for “For the
‚ ‚ ‚  purpose of securing consideration of such” to eliminate unnecessary
‚ ‚ ‚  words. The words “The prospectus shall include” are substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “including” for clarity. The words “(but not limited to)” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as surplus. In clause (5), the words “statement of” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as surplus.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (d), the words “if any” are omitted as surplus. The
‚ ‚ ‚  words “in the cost of the facility” are substituted for “authorized
‚ ‚ ‚  by this subsection”, and the words “The Secretary shall decide what
‚ ‚ ‚  increase in construction costs has occurred” are substituted for
‚ ‚ ‚  “as determined by the Secretary”, for clarity.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (e), the words “United States Government” are
‚ ‚ ‚  substituted for “Federal” for consistency. The words “arrangement
‚ ‚ ‚  for the activity” are substituted for “contract, grant, or other
‚ ‚ ‚  arrangement for such research or development activity”, and the
‚ ‚ ‚  words “patents, and developments” are substituted for “uses,
‚ ‚ ‚  processes, patents, and other developments”, to eliminate
‚ ‚ ‚  unnecessary words. The words “encouraging motor vehicle safety”,
‚ ‚ ‚  “effective”, “fully and freely”, and “general” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus. The word “However” is added for clarity. The words “may
‚ ‚ ‚  not be” are substituted for “Nothing herein shall be construed to”
‚ ‚ ‚  for consistency. The words “which he may have” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  surplus.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  AMENDMENTS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1996 – Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 104-287 substituted “Committees on
‚ ‚ ‚  Commerce and Transportation and Infrastructure” for “Committees on
‚ ‚ ‚  Energy and Commerce and Public Works and Transportation”.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30169‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER IV – ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30169. Annual reports

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) General Report. – The Secretary of Transportation shall
‚ ‚ ‚  submit to the President to submit to Congress on July 1 of each
‚ ‚ ‚  year a report on the administration of this chapter for the prior
‚ ‚ ‚  calendar year. The report shall include –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) a thorough statistical compilation of accidents and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  injuries;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) motor vehicle safety standards in effect or prescribed
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  under this chapter;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) the degree of observance of the standards;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (4) a summary of current research grants and contracts and a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  description of the problems to be considered under those grants
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  and contracts;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (5) an analysis and evaluation of research activities completed
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  and technological progress achieved;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (6) enforcement actions;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (7) the extent to which technical information was given the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  scientific community and consumer-oriented information was made
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  available to the public; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (8) recommendations for legislation needed to promote
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  cooperation among the States in improving traffic safety and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  strengthening the national traffic safety program.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Report on Importing Motor Vehicles. – Not later than 18
‚ ‚ ‚  months after regulations are first prescribed under section
‚ ‚ ‚  2(e)(1)(B) of the Imported Vehicle Safety Compliance Act of 1988,
‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report of the actions
‚ ‚ ‚  taken to carry out subchapter III of this chapter and the
‚ ‚ ‚  effectiveness of those actions, including any testing by the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary under section 30146(c)(2) of this title. After the first
‚ ‚ ‚  report, the Secretary shall submit a report to Congress under this
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection not later than July 31 of each year.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 972.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30169(a)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1408.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  89-563, Sec. 120, 80 Stat.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  728; May 22, 1970, Pub. L.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  91-265, Sec. 5, 84 Stat.‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  263; Oct. 27, 1974, Pub. L.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  93-492, Sec. 110(b), 88‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 1484.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30169(b)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  15:1397 (note).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Oct. 31, 1988, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  100-562, Sec. 2(e)(4), 102‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Stat. 2825.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In subsection (a), before clause (1), the words “prepare and”,
‚ ‚ ‚  “comprehensive”, and “but not be restricted to” are omitted as
‚ ‚ ‚  unnecessary. In clause (1), the words “occurring in such year” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as surplus. In clause (2), the words “in such year” are
‚ ‚ ‚  omitted as surplus. The words “under this chapter” are substituted
‚ ‚ ‚  for “Federal” for consistency in this chapter. In clause (3), the
‚ ‚ ‚  words “applicable Federal motor vehicle” are omitted as surplus. In
‚ ‚ ‚  clause (4), the word “all” is omitted as surplus. In clause (5),
‚ ‚ ‚  the words “including relevant policy recommendations” and “during
‚ ‚ ‚  such year” are omitted as surplus. In clause (6), the words “a
‚ ‚ ‚  statement of . . . including judicial decisions, settlements, or
‚ ‚ ‚  pending litigation during such year” are omitted as surplus. In
‚ ‚ ‚  clause (7), the word “motoring” is omitted as surplus. In clause
‚ ‚ ‚  (8), the words “The report required by subsection (a) of this
‚ ‚ ‚  section shall contain such” are omitted because of the restatement.
‚ ‚ ‚  The words “additional . . . as the Secretary deems” and “several”
‚ ‚ ‚  are omitted as surplus.

-REFTEXT-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  REFERENCES IN TEXT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section 2(e)(1)(B) of the Imported Vehicle Safety Compliance Act
‚ ‚ ‚  of 1988, referred to in subsec. (b), is section 2(e)(1)(B) of Pub.
‚ ‚ ‚  L. 100-562, which was set out as a note under section 1397 of Title
‚ ‚ ‚  15, Commerce and Trade, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 103-272, Sec.
‚ ‚ ‚  7(b), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1379.
-MISC2-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  TERMINATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  For termination, effective May 15, 2000, of provisions of law
‚ ‚ ‚  requiring submittal to Congress of any annual, semiannual, or other
‚ ‚ ‚  regular periodic report listed in House Document No. 103-7 (in
‚ ‚ ‚  which the 1st item on page 135 and the 2nd item on page 134
‚ ‚ ‚  identify reporting provisions which, as subsequently amended, are
‚ ‚ ‚  contained, respectively, in subsecs. (a) and (b) of this section),
‚ ‚ ‚  see section 3003 of Pub. L. 104-66, set out as a note under section
‚ ‚ ‚  1113 of Title 31, Money and Finance.

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30170‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 301 – MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBCHAPTER IV – ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30170. Criminal Penalties

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (a) Criminal Liability for Falsifying or Withholding Information.
‚ ‚ ‚  –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) General rule. – A person who violates section 1001 of title
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  18 with respect to the reporting requirements of section 30166,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  with the specific intention of misleading the Secretary with
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  respect to motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment safety
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  related defects that have caused death or serious bodily injury
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  to an individual (as defined in section 1365(g)(3) (!1) of title
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  18), shall be subject to criminal penalties of a fine under title
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  18, or imprisoned for not more than 15 years, or both.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) Safe harbor to encourage reporting and for whistle blowers.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) Correction. – A person described in paragraph (1) shall
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  not be subject to criminal penalties under this subsection if:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) at the time of the violation, such person does not know
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  that the violation would result in an accident causing death or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  serious bodily injury; and (2) the person corrects any improper
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  reports or failure to report within a reasonable time.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) Reasonable time and sufficiency of correction. – The
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary shall establish by regulation what constitutes a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  reasonable time for the purposes of subparagraph (A) and what
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  manner of correction is sufficient for purposes of subparagraph
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A). The Secretary shall issue a final rule under this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  subparagraph within 90 days of the date of the enactment of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  this section.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (C) Effective date. – Subsection (a) shall not take effect
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  before the final rule under subparagraph (B) takes effect.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (b) Coordination with Department of Justice. – The Attorney
‚ ‚ ‚  General may bring an action, or initiate grand jury proceedings,
‚ ‚ ‚  for a violation of subsection (a) only at the request of the
‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary of Transportation.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Added Pub. L. 106-414, Sec. 5(b)(1), Nov. 1, 2000, 114 Stat.
‚ ‚ ‚  1803.)

-REFTEXT-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  REFERENCES IN TEXT‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section 1365(g)(3) of title 18, referred to in subsec. (a)(1),
‚ ‚ ‚  was redesignated section 1365(h)(3) of title 18 by Pub. L. 107-307,
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 2(1), Dec. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 2445.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  The date of the enactment of this section, referred to in subsec.
‚ ‚ ‚  (a)(2)(B), is the date of enactment of Pub. L. 106-414, which was
‚ ‚ ‚  approved Nov. 1, 2000.

-FOOTNOTE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (!1) See References in Text note below.
-End-
-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC CHAPTER 303 – NATIONAL DRIVER REGISTER‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 303 – NATIONAL DRIVER REGISTER

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 303 – NATIONAL DRIVER REGISTER‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 

-MISC1-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30301.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Definitions.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30302.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  National Driver Register.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30303.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  State participation.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30304.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Reports by chief driver licensing officials.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30305.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Access to Register information.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30306.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  National Driver Register Advisory Committee.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30307.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Criminal penalties.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  30308.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Authorization of appropriations.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 

-End-

 

-CITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  49 USC Sec. 30301‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1/07/2011 (111-383)

-EXPCITE-
‚ ‚ ‚  TITLE 49 – TRANSPORTATION
‚ ‚ ‚  SUBTITLE VI – MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
‚ ‚ ‚  PART A – GENERAL
‚ ‚ ‚  CHAPTER 303 – NATIONAL DRIVER REGISTER

-HEAD-
‚ ‚ ‚  Sec. 30301. Definitions

-STATUTE-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In this chapter –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (1) “alcohol” has the same meaning given that term in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2) “chief driver licensing official” means the official in a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  State who is authorized to –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (A) maintain a record about a motor vehicle operator’s
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  license issued by the State; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (B) issue, deny, revoke, suspend, or cancel a motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  operator’s license issued by the State.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (3) “controlled substance” has the same meaning given that term
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  in section 102 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 802).
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (4) “motor vehicle” means a vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  or semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used on
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  public streets, roads, or highways, but does not include a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle operated only on a rail line.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (5) “motor vehicle operator’s license” means a license issued
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  by a State authorizing an individual to operate a motor vehicle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  on public streets, roads, or highways.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (6) “participating State” means a State that has notified the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary under section 30303 of this title of its participation
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  in the National Driver Register.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (7) “State” means a State of the United States, the District of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the Northern Mariana Islands, the Trust Territory of the Pacific
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Islands, and any other territory or possession of the United
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  States.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (8) “State of record” means a State that has given the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Secretary a report under section 30304 of this title about an
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  individual who is the subject of a request for information made
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  under section 30305 of this title.

-SOURCE-
‚ ‚ ‚  (Pub. L. 103-272, Sec. 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 973.)

-MISC1-

 

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Revised ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (U.S. Code)‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Source (Statutes at Large)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Section‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–
‚ ‚ ‚  30301‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  23:401 (note).‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Oct. 25, 1982, Pub. L.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  97-364, Sec. 202, 96 Stat.‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1740.‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚  ——————————————————————–

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In clauses (4) and (5), the words “public streets, roads, or
‚ ‚ ‚  highways” are substituted for “highway” and ” ‘highway’ means any
‚ ‚ ‚  road or street” for consistency in the revised title.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  In clause (4), the words “rail line” are substituted for “rail or
‚ ‚ ‚  rails” for consistency in the revised title.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  The definitions of “Secretary”, “Register”, and “Register system”
‚ ‚ ‚  are omitted as surplus because the complete name of the Secretary
‚ ‚ ‚  of Transportation and the National Driver Register are used the
‚ ‚ ‚  first time the terms appear in a section.
-TRANS-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  TERMINATION OF TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ 
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  For termination of Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, see
‚ ‚ ‚  note set out preceding section 1681 of Title 48, Territories and
‚ ‚ ‚  Insular Possessions.
-MISC2-
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  PROTECTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CRIME VICTIMS FROM CERTAIN
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  DISCLOSURES OF INFORMATION
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 109-162, title VIII, Sec. 827, Jan. 5, 2006, 119 Stat.
‚ ‚ ‚  3066, provided that: “In developing regulations or guidance with
‚ ‚ ‚  regard to identification documents, including driver’s licenses,
‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the
‚ ‚ ‚  Administrator of Social Security, shall consider and address the
‚ ‚ ‚  needs of victims, including victims of battery, extreme cruelty,
‚ ‚ ‚  domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, stalking or
‚ ‚ ‚  trafficking, who are entitled to enroll in State address
‚ ‚ ‚  confidentiality programs, whose addresses are entitled to be
‚ ‚ ‚  suppressed under State or Federal law or suppressed by a court
‚ ‚ ‚  order, or who are protected from disclosure of information pursuant
‚ ‚ ‚  to section 384 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
‚ ‚ ‚  Responsibility Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1367).”

‚ ‚ ‚  IMPROVED SECURITY FOR DRIVERS’ LICENSES AND PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  CARDS
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 110-177, title V, Sec. 508, Jan. 7, 2008, 121 Stat. 2543,
‚ ‚ ‚  provided that:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(a) Minimum Document Requirements. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) Minimum requirements. – For purposes of section 202(b)(6)
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of the REAL ID Act of 2005 [div. B of Pub. L. 109-13] (49 U.S.C.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  30301 note), a State may, in the case of an individual described
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2), include in a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  driver’s license or other identification card issued to that
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  individual by the State, the address specified in that
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  subparagraph in lieu of the individual’s address of principle
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  residence.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) Individuals and information. – The individuals and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  addresses referred to in paragraph (1) are the following:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(A) In the case of a Justice of the United States, the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  address of the United States Supreme Court.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(B) In the case of a judge of a Federal court, the address
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of the courthouse.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(b) Verification of Information. – For purposes of section
‚ ‚ ‚  202(c)(1)(D) of the REAL ID Act of 2005 (49 U.S.C. 30301 note), in
‚ ‚ ‚  the case of an individual described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of
‚ ‚ ‚  subsection (a)(2), a State need only require documentation of the
‚ ‚ ‚  address appearing on the individual’s driver’s license or other
‚ ‚ ‚  identification card issued by that State to the individual.”
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Pub. L. 109-13, div. B, title II, May 11, 2005, 119 Stat. 311,
‚ ‚ ‚  provided that:

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 201. DEFINITIONS.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “In this title, the following definitions apply:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) Driver’s license. – The term ‘driver’s license’ means a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  motor vehicle operator’s license, as defined in section 30301 of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  title 49, United States Code.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) Identification card. – The term ‘identification card’
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  means a personal identification card, as defined in section
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  1028(d) of title 18, United States Code, issued by a State.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) Official purpose. – The term ‘official purpose’ includes
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  but is not limited to accessing Federal facilities, boarding
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  federally regulated commercial aircraft, entering nuclear power
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  plants, and any other purposes that the Secretary shall
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  determine.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(4) Secretary. – The term ‘Secretary’ means the Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Homeland Security.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(5) State. – The term ‘State’ means a State of the United
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and any other territory
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  or possession of the United States.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 202. MINIMUM DOCUMENT REQUIREMENTS AND ISSUANCE STANDARDS
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  FOR FEDERAL RECOGNITION.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(a) Minimum Standards for Federal Use. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) In general. – Beginning 3 years after the date of the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  enactment of this division [May 11, 2005], a Federal agency may
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  not accept, for any official purpose, a driver’s license or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  identification card issued by a State to any person unless the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  State is meeting the requirements of this section.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) State certifications. – The Secretary shall determine
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  whether a State is meeting the requirements of this section based
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  on certifications made by the State to the Secretary. Such
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  certifications shall be made at such times and in such manner as
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Transportation, may prescribe by regulation.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(b) Minimum Document Requirements. – To meet the requirements of
‚ ‚ ‚  this section, a State shall include, at a minimum, the following
‚ ‚ ‚  information and features on each driver’s license and
‚ ‚ ‚  identification card issued to a person by the State:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) The person’s full legal name.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) The person’s date of birth.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) The person’s gender.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(4) The person’s driver’s license or identification card
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  number.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(5) A digital photograph of the person.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(6) The person’s address of principle residence.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(7) The person’s signature.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(8) Physical security features designed to prevent tampering,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  counterfeiting, or duplication of the document for fraudulent
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  purposes.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(9) A common machine-readable technology, with defined minimum
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  data elements.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(c) Minimum Issuance Standards. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) In general. – To meet the requirements of this section, a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  State shall require, at a minimum, presentation and verification
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of the following information before issuing a driver’s license or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  identification card to a person:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(A) A photo identity document, except that a non-photo
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  identity document is acceptable if it includes both the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  person’s full legal name and date of birth.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(B) Documentation showing the person’s date of birth.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(C) Proof of the person’s social security account number or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  verification that the person is not eligible for a social
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  security account number.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(D) Documentation showing the person’s name and address of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  principal residence.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) Special requirements. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(A) In general. – To meet the requirements of this section,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  a State shall comply with the minimum standards of this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  paragraph.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(B) Evidence of lawful status. – A State shall require,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  before issuing a driver’s license or identification card to a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  person, valid documentary evidence that the person –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(i) is a citizen or national of the United States;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(ii) is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  temporary residence in the United States;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(iii) has conditional permanent resident status in the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  United States;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(iv) has an approved application for asylum in the United
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  States or has entered into the United States in refugee
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  status;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(v) has a valid, unexpired nonimmigrant visa or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  nonimmigrant visa status for entry into the United States;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(vi) has a pending application for asylum in the United
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  States;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(vii) has a pending or approved application for temporary
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  protected status in the United States;
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(viii) has approved deferred action status; or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(ix) has a pending application for adjustment of status to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the United States or conditional permanent resident status in
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the United States.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(C) Temporary drivers’ licenses and identification cards. –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(i) In general. – If a person presents evidence under any
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of clauses (v) through (ix) of subparagraph (B), the State
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  may only issue a temporary driver’s license or temporary
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  identification card to the person.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(ii) Expiration date. – A temporary driver’s license or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  temporary identification card issued pursuant to this
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  subparagraph shall be valid only during the period of time of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the applicant’s authorized stay in the United States or, if
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  there is no definite end to the period of authorized stay, a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  period of one year.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(iii) Display of expiration date. – A temporary driver’s
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  license or temporary identification card issued pursuant to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  this subparagraph shall clearly indicate that it is temporary
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  and shall state the date on which it expires.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(iv) Renewal. – A temporary driver’s license or temporary
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  identification card issued pursuant to this subparagraph may
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  be renewed only upon presentation of valid documentary
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  evidence that the status by which the applicant qualified for
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the temporary driver’s license or temporary identification
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  card has been extended by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) Verification of documents. – To meet the requirements of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  this section, a State shall implement the following procedures:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(A) Before issuing a driver’s license or identification card
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  to a person, the State shall verify, with the issuing agency,
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  the issuance, validity, and completeness of each document
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  required to be presented by the person under paragraph (1) or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  (2).
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(B) The State shall not accept any foreign document, other
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  than an official passport, to satisfy a requirement of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  paragraph (1) or (2).
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(C) Not later than September 11, 2005, the State shall enter
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  into a memorandum of understanding with the Secretary of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  Homeland Security to routinely utilize the automated system
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  known as Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements, as
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  provided for by section 404 of the Illegal Immigration Reform
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 [Pub. L. 104-208, div.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  C, 8 U.S.C. 1324a note] (110 Stat. 3009-664), to verify the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  legal presence status of a person, other than a United States
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  citizen, applying for a driver’s license or identification
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  card.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(d) Other Requirements. – To meet the requirements of this
‚ ‚ ‚  section, a State shall adopt the following practices in the
‚ ‚ ‚  issuance of drivers’ licenses and identification cards:
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(1) Employ technology to capture digital images of identity
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  source documents so that the images can be retained in electronic
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  storage in a transferable format.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(2) Retain paper copies of source documents for a minimum of 7
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  years or images of source documents presented for a minimum of 10
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  years.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(3) Subject each person applying for a driver’s license or
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  identification card to mandatory facial image capture.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(4) Establish an effective procedure to confirm or verify a
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  renewing applicant’s information.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(5) Confirm with the Social Security Administration a social
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  security account number presented by a person using the full
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  social security account number. In the event that a social
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  security account number is already registered to or associated
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  with another person to which any State has issued a driver’s
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  license or identification card, the State shall resolve the
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  discrepancy and take appropriate action.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(6) Refuse to issue a driver’s license or identification card
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  to a person holding a driver’s license issued by another State
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  without confirmation that the person is terminating or has
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  terminated the driver’s license.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(7) Ensure the physical security of locations where drivers’
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  licenses and identification cards are produced and the security
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  of document materials and papers from which drivers’ licenses and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  identification cards are produced.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(8) Subject all persons authorized to manufacture or produce
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  drivers’ licenses and identification cards to appropriate
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  security clearance requirements.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(9) Establish fraudulent document recognition training
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  programs for appropriate employees engaged in the issuance of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  drivers’ licenses and identification cards.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(10) Limit the period of validity of all driver’s licenses and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  identification cards that are not temporary to a period that does
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  not exceed 8 years.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(11) In any case in which the State issues a driver’s license
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  or identification card that does not satisfy the requirements of
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  this section, ensure that such license or identification card –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(A) clearly states on its face that it may not be accepted
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  by any Federal agency for federal identification or any other
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  official purpose; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(B) uses a unique design or color indicator to alert Federal
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  agency and other law enforcement personnel that it may not be
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  accepted for any such purpose.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(12) Provide electronic access to all other States to
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  information contained in the motor vehicle database of the State.
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(13) Maintain a State motor vehicle database that contains, at
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  a minimum –
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(A) all data fields printed on drivers’ licenses and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  identification cards issued by the State; and
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “(B) motor vehicle drivers’ histories, including motor
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  vehicle violations, suspensions, and points on licenses.

‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  “SEC. 203. TRAFFICKING IN AUTHENTICATION FEATURES FOR USE IN
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚  FALSE IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS.